Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series

General Editors:
Dalsukh Malvania
Ambalal P. Shah

No. 11

AKALAṄKA'S CRITICISM OF DHARMAKĪRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

A STUDY

By

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L. D. INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY
AHMEDABAD-9
1967

A thesis approved for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Sanskrit
by the
Gujarat University
1965

Printed by Svami Tribhuvandas, Ramananda Printing Press, Kankaria Road, Ahmedabad and Published by Dalsukh Malvania Director, L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad-9

First Edition : 750 Copies March 1967

Copies can be had of

L. D. Institute of Indology — Ahmedabad-9.
Gurjar Grantha Ratna Karyalaya — Gandhi Road, Ahmedabad-1.
Motilal Banarasidas — Varanasi, Patna, Delhi.
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FOREWORD

We have great pleasure in publishing this Study of Akalaṅka's Criticism of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy, a work of valuable research done by Dr. Nagin Shah under the esteemed guidance of Dr. Pt. Sukhlalji Sanghavi. The author has done full justice to the subject and has given unmistakable evidence of a wide study — not only of Buddhist and Jaina works but also of Brahmanical works. He has selected some main problems of metaphysics and epistemology and has compared and contrasted the theories of Dharmakīrti with those of Akalaṅka in the main. Dharmakīrti is a Buddhist logician of great repute and Akalaṅka is a brilliant Jaina logician. Such a study no doubt helps us in understanding clearly the standpoints of different schools of thought and in addition makes us aware of the contribution made by one school to the development of theories upheld by another school. Dr. Shah rightly deserves our congratulations for the present study.

I am sure this publication will prove useful to all those interested in the study of Indian Philosophy.

L. D. Institute of Indology
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11-3-67

Dalsukh Malvania
Director

INTRODUCTION

This is an humble attempt at a study of Akalaṅka's criticism of Dharmakīrti's philosophy. This present study is a thesis which was approved for Ph. D. degree in Sanskrit by Gujarat University in 1965. Modern scholars have studied both—the Buddhist and the Jaina systems in their various aspects. But no one, so far as I know, has attempted a study of a particular philosopher of one system in relation to a particular philosopher of another system even when there is a clear evidence of the fact that one has vehemently criticised the other. Such a study, I think, makes us aware of the interplay of the influence of one system on the other and helps us in understanding clearly the standpoints of both the systems. And hence this study.

In preparing this work I have drawn upon the original Sanskrit works of both the logicians. I have also studied the Sanskrit commentaries on these works so that the ideas of the original works might become clearer. In tracing the development of the two traditions I have utilised Pāli and Prākṛt works also. For the understanding of the logic of these two traditions I have consulted the works of modern scholars, as for example, Dr. Mookerji's 'The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux' and 'The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism', Th. Stcherbatsky's 'Buddhist Logic', Dr. Tatia's 'Studies in Jaina Philosophy', etc. (cf. Bibliography). In order to bring out the contrast of these two standpoints with others and to show the logical (not chronological) development of ideas I have referred to the views of other systems as well on the problems concerned. And for this I have mostly made use of the original Sanskrit works of the respective systems.

I have selected some main problems of metaphysics and epistemology and keeping these problems in view I have studied Dharmakīrti's position and Akalaṅka's refutation of it. I have also given Akalaṅka's own position and at the end my observations on the two standpoints.

The work is devided into three parts. In the first part an attempt has been made to give a brief and general sketch of the development of the two thought-currents in respect of the problems concerned, of course, upto Dharmakīrti and Akalaṅka.

In the second part some main problems of metaphysics have been discussed with special reference to Dharmakīrti and Akalaṅka. This part contains three chapters, the first on the criterion of reality and its

application, the second on the problem of universals, and the third on idealism vs. realism.

In the first chapter, at the outset, I have tried to show how gradually man formulates clearly and precisely the right question—"What is the essence of reality?"—after having passed through a stage of mere cataloguing and divisions and sub-divisions of reals. Then I have explained fully Dharmakīrti's view on the essence of Existence. I have demonstrated how he proves that only momentary things can be causally efficient. I have also studied the doctrine called *Nirhetukavināśavāda* which is a necessary corollary of the doctrine of momentarism. Then follows Akalaṅka's refutation of Dharmakīrti's position. It brings out some weak points of the doctrine of momentarism. I have given Akalaṅka's own view on the problem under consideration. He is an advocate of the doctrine of *Pariṇāminityatā.* At the end of the chapter I have tried to show the strong and the weak points of both the theories.

The second chapter is on the problem of universals. This problem comes before the philosopher when he raises the question as to how one can explain the cognition of identity or similarity in respect of different individuals of a class. This necessitates acceptance of universals. After having stated the problem in this manner I have given various views expressed in the philosophies of India in order that we may be able to mark off the specialities of Dharmakīrti's and Akalaṅka's views on the nature of universals. Then I have explained at length Dharmakīrti's position. I have demonstrated how Dharmakīrti explains the cognition of identity in, and application of one name to many individuals even without positing a positive real universal in them. I am afraid this portion has become rather lengthy and therefore even tedious. But I deem it necessary to explain Dharmakīrti's position at length even against my sense of proportion because his is a peculiar view and requires full exposition. After this comes Akalaṅka's refutation of Dharmakīrti's position. I have supplemented this criticism with the one by Prabhācandra in order that we may have a complete picture of the Jaina criticism of Dhramakīrti's position. Then, I have explained Akalaṅka's own position regarding the nature of universals and pointed out that there does not exist any discrepancy between the views of Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka. I have also considered possible objections against Akalaṅka's position. At the end of the chapter I have tried to show, in conclusion, how the Jainas avoid the two extremes—one of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system and the other of the Buddhist system. For the Jainas, the universal is nothing but similar qualities of things. Things look similar because they have similar qualities. But they deem it improper to ask further as to why qualities look similar, The Nyāya-

Vaiśeṣikas go further and posit one self-identical impartite independent entity in many things to explain the cognition of similarity in respect of them. The Buddhist logicians think that there is nothing positive in things that gives rise to the cognition of similarity in respect of them. The things look similar only because they possess exclusion-of-the-opposite (*atad-vyāvṛtti*) in common. Thus for them universal is nothing but the exclusion-of-the-opposite. The Jainas do not consider the universal to be an independent entity, nor do they regard it as merely of the nature of the exclusion-of-the-opposite; for them it is nothing but similar qualities.

In the third chapter the problem of idealism vs. realism has been dealt with. The chapter opens with a general exposition of idealism, realism and materialism, and their Indian forms. Then, the possible causes of the development of Vijñānavāda idealism have been discussed and a very short sketch of the literature of Vijñānavāda upto Dharmakīrti has been given. This is followed by a rapid survey of the arguments for Vijñānavāda as presented in the systematic treatises, viz. Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi of Vasubandhu and Ālambanaparīkṣā of Diṅnāga. On the basis of this one will have a comparative idea of Dharmakīrti's treatment of the same. After this, Dharmakīrti's own version of Vijñānavāda has been given. This is mainly based on his Pramāṇavārtika. Then follows Akalaṅka's refutation of Vijñānavāda. I have also felt it necessary to give the arguments advanced by others against Vijñānavāda in order that one may have an idea of what kind of arguments were generally adduced against it. In conclusion, I have tried to show that Dharmakīrti's idealism does not prove that there are no external objects; it only tends to show that we have no right to feel sure of their existence.

In the third part the main problems of epistemology and logic have been considered with special reference to Dharmakīrti and Akalaṅka. It contains four chapters, the first on the problems of knowledge in general, the second on perception, the third on inference and the fourth on testimony.

In the first chapter I have discussed, in brief, the definitions of valid knowledge, the nature of the sources of valid knowledge, various views on how we know the validity of knowledge and *pramāṇa-saṁplava* vs. *pramāṇa-viplava*, etc.

In the beginning of the second chapter an attempt has been made to show the intimate relationship between metaphysics and epistemology (especially the theory of perception). Then follows a detailed study of the nature and types of perpection according to Dharmakīrti. After this, I have given Akalaṅka's refutation of Dharmakīrti's position. The refutation is elaborate and illuminating. This is followed by the statement of

Akalaṅka's own position. Next, after having given a brief history of the definition of perception in general, I have attempted a study of the history of the conception of indeterminate perception. At this stage, I have shown that *Avibhakta Ālocana* recognised by Praśastapāda comes very near to *Nirvikalpa pratyakṣa* recognised by Dharmakīrti. Of course, I have not lost sight of a fine line of distinction between the two. Again, I have attempted a study of the old interpretations of the term *'avyapadeśya'* used by Gautama, the author of the Nyāyasūtra, in his definition of perception. I have tried to understand the Vaiśeṣika, the Nyāya and the Mīmāṁsā views on the nature of indeterminate perception. At the end of the chapter, I have arrived at the conclusion that Akalaṅka has taken great pains for the establishment of the validity of the determinate knowledge following in the wake of indeterminate cognition generated by the external object. Furthermore, while concluding the chapter, I have attempted to point out that we would be doing no justice to any theory—Dharmakīrti's or Akalaṅka's if we were to view it apart from its metaphysical back ground.

The third chapter on inference opens with the general explanation of what inference means. Then follows the discussion on the problem of the probandum with special reference to the Buddhist and the Jaina logicians. After this comes a study of the logical grounds of inference. Here the problem of induction or the problem of the acquisition of the knowledge of a necessary connection is considered in detail with special reference to Dharmakīrti and Akalaṅka. Next, the conditions of a valid reason *(hetu-rūpa)*, fallacies of reason *(hetvābhāsa)* and types of reason *(hetuprakāra)* have been discussed. In this connection, I have generally given the views of the Nyāya logicians also in order to understand the logical development of the ideas. Under the heading of 'object and status of inference' I have explained Dharmakīrti's peculiar view that though inference is *bhrānta* it is *pramāṇa* and stated also Akalaṅka's view on the status of inference. At last, after having studied the different views on the number of the members of a syllogism, I have arrived at the conclusion that the Naiyāyikas are the pioneers in the field of logic, that Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti have tried to improve upon the Naiyāyikas and that it is left to the Jaina logicians in general and Akalaṅka in particular mostly to side with this or that party. But at times the Jaina logicians differ from the two on certain topics and they carry the Buddhist position to its logical conclusion.

The last chapter on testimony begins with the discussion on the necessity of testimony. Then the main controversy regarding the question as to whether testimony is an independent *pramāṇa* or a form of inference is stated and keeping this controversy in view, I have discussed

the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Buddhist and the Jaina views. The Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that words are directly connected with things, of course, through convention. They maintain that as soon as we understand the meaning of words we acquire the knowledge of facts and that the process of understanding the meaning of words is not inferential. So, they believe that the knowledge through testimony is not inferential. The Vaiśeṣikas, on the other hand, maintain that the process of understanding the meaning of words is inferential. Moreover, though they, like the Naiyāyikas, accept that the words are conventionally connected with things, they, unlike the Naiyāyikas, are conscious of the implications of this conventional character of the relation. Words are symbols and not signs. Hence, they contend that words *qua* words enable us to infer only the intention of the speaker and not the fact. But they state that words *qua* utterances of a reliable person enable us to infer facts. This view closely tallies with the view of Dharmakīrti, except the fact that Dharmakīrti goes even a step further and maintains that words are not in any way connected with things. Akalaṅka refutes Dharmakīrti's position that words could not directly lead to the knowledge of things. I have also studied the Jaina refutation of the veiw that testimony is a form of inference. Here I have shown that all the differences pointed out by the Jaina logicians between inference and testimony are trivial and do not furnish a sufficient gound for their view that testimony is a source of knowledge independent of inference. In conclusion, I have tried to point out that the logic of Dharmakīrti on this problem is very reasonable.

In this way, by putting forward, in this work, a study of the criticism of Dharmakīrti, a Buddhist logician of great repute, by Akalaṅka, a brilliant Jaina logician, and by keeping in view the main problems of metaphysics and epistemology in the course of my study, I have attempted to make my humble contribution to the understanding of the two different viewpoints on the problems of permanent philosophical value.

Words fail to express my deep sense of gratitude towards Dr. Pt. Sukhlalji Sanghavi under whose able guidance this work was done. I offer my grateful thanks to Pt. Dalsukhbhai Malvania, Director of L. D. Institute of Indology, for the constant help and encouragement I received from him. It is a fact that whatever is good and commendable in this work belongs to these two savants. And I own the faults that are there in the work. My sincere thanks are also due to my friend and colleague, Dr. K. K. Dixit for his valuable suggestions. I must express my heart-felt thanks to the management of L. D. Institute of Indology for giving me an opportunity to do researches in the field of my own choice and for the provision it made for the publication of this work. I am thankful to all the learned scholars whose works I have consulted and acknowledged in the Bibliography.

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1—12—'66

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AKALAṄKA'S CRITICISM

OF

DHARMAKĪRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

A STUDY

CHAPTER I
TWO TRADITIONS

Jainas are correct when they state that there are only two main philosophical views—substance view (*dravyārthikanaya*) and modal view (*paryāyārthikanaya*). Each view carried to the extreme denies the reality of the other. Each view accepts the one at the expense of the other. One puts emphasis on the universal and eternal to the exclusion of the particular and changing. The Śaṅkara Vedānta represents the extreme form of the substance view and Buddhism represents the absolute modal view. The Jaina system reconciles these two opposed views by according equal status to substance and its modes. Even the Vaiśeṣika system does the same thing. But it differs from the Jaina system in that it considers modes to be quite different from substance and posits an independent category called relation inherence (*samavāya*) to join these two absolutely different reals, while the Jaina system regards substance as partly identical with its modes and as partly different from them as well. We may term the Vaiśeṣika outlook as abstractionist while the Jaina one as concrete or synoptic.

These different philosophical views are the attempts to solve the eternal problems—whether the reality is static or dynamic, whether the reality is universal or particular, etc. Mind naturally refuses to conceive reality as possessed of two opposite natures—permanent and changing. So it accepts the one and declares the other to be unreal and illusory. The Śaṅkara Vedānta considers reality to be absolutely static and dismisses all change as illusory or mere appearance. On the other hand, Buddhism conceives reality as pure change and declares all that is indicative of permanence or staticity to be illusory and unreal. The Vaiśeṣikas found out a third way. Both the permanent and the changing are real but whatever is permanent is totally different from whatever is changing. And they are merely joined by an independent category called relation inherence. Thus according to the Vaiśeṣikas one and the same thing is not both, permanent and changing. In this manner they resolve the contradiction. Jainas are bold enough to posit a dialectical reality corresponding to the dialectical nature of reason. The thing is both permanent and changing. Both the substance and mode constitute the nature of the thing. They are not absolutely different but somewhat identical. Jainas do not abstract the modes from substance and regard them as absolutely different from the latter. As regards the problem of the universal and the particular, the Śaṇkara Vedānta considers the universal alone as real and the parti-

cular as illusory. Buddhism takes up quite a diametrically opposite view. Vaiśeṣikas hold that both are real but are quite different from each other and separately inhere in the same individual. Of course, they do not constitute the nature of the individual. Jainas, on the other hand, aver that the individual thing itself is of the nature of both the universal and the particular.

Now let us see what results the modal view and non-absolutistic view of Buddhism and Jainism respectively yielded till the time of Dharmakīrti and Akalaṅka in the field of metaphysics and epistemology.

FROM THE PIṬAKAS TO DHARMAKĪRTI

Problem of Permanence and Change : The characteristic and oft-repeated doctrine of the *piṭakas* is the doctrine of no-substance (*anattā*)[1]. Buddha adopted the method of critical analysis (*vibhajyavāda*) from the very start. He started with a very minute analysis of personality (*puggala*) into elements (*dharmas*) of which it is composed. The external world (*rūpa*) was also analysed in its component elements (*dharmas*). Rejection of substance implies mere change and nothing that changes. In other words, there are mere modes and no substance that undergoes modifications. It is interesting to note that this *anātma-dharma* theory is mentioned in the Kaṭhopaniṣad. Prof. Stcherbatsky writes " The possibility is not precluded that the foundation of the *anātma-dharma* theory was laid before Buddha... He, indeed, is reported to have emphatically disowned the authorship of a new teaching, but claimed to be the follower of a doctrine established long ago by former Buddhas. This is usually interpreted as a kind of propaganda device, but it is not quite improbable that a real historical fact underlies these assertions... In the Kaṭhopaniṣad, which belongs to this class (i. e. the oldest set of Upaniṣads), a doctrine is mentioned that is evidently strongly opposed to the monistic view of an immortal soul (*ātman*) and favours instead a theory of separate elements."[2] Again, it could be surmised that the Buddhist doctrine of momentarism is influenced by the Sāṅkhya doctrine of momentary modification (*pratikṣaṇa-pariṇāma*). The Sāṅkhya holds that there is a permanent substance called *Prakṛti* that undergoes modifications every moment. As soon as the permanent substance is removed, there remains merely a series of momentary modes,

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1. samudayo samudayo ti kho me, bhikkhave, pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakkuṁ udapādi.../ SaṁyuttaNikāya, II, p. 11
   atha vā panassa evaṁ diṭṭhi hoti—'yo me ayaṁ attā vado vedeyyo tatra tatra kalyāṇapāpakānaṁ kammānaṁ vipākaṁ paṭisaṁvedeti so kho pana me ayaṁ attā nicco dhuvo sassato avipariṇāmadhammo sassatisamaṁ tatheva ṭhassatī' iti / Majjhima-Nikāya, I, p. 13. See also Mahānidāna Sutta, DīghaNikāya, II pp. 44–57
2. The Central Conception of Buddhism, pp. 57–58

or moments. It is only this that Buddha did. And we have the Buddhist doctrine of momentarism. Th. Stcherbatsky remarks: 'A *pluralistic* view of the whole is added to make the originality of the new system, in contrast to the *unitarian* tendency of the old one.'[3] Buddha uses mainly the word *anicca*. But *anicca* would here have a special meaning viz. modes or moments or change without substance, because in Buddhism *aniccatā* is always coupled with *Anattā*. It is to be noted that Buddha uses the word *kṣaṇa* also in *Akkhaṇasutta*. And it is said that *kṣaṇa* here means the unique moment.[4]

Now there arises a question as to how one mode or moment will be related to the other if there were no underlying substance to relate them. For this Buddha propounded a special theory of causality called *pratītyasamutpāda* (Dependent Origination). The series or stream of evanescent elements is not a haphazard process. Even element, although appearing for a moment, was a dependently originating element. This theory of causality requires no substance. Dr. Murti observes, 'Buddha replaced the soul by the theory of mind-continuum, by a series of psychical states rigorously conditioned as to their nature by the causal law governing them... Rebirth does not mean that soul bodily, as an identical essence transports itself from one place to another. It only means that a new series of states is generated conditioned by the previous states.'[5]

Some wrongly equate the doctrine of momentarism with that of Annihilationism (*Ucchedavāda* = *Aśāśvatavāda*) and conclude that Buddha being a severe critic of annihilationism could not have meant anything like momentarism.[6] But it is to be noted that momentarism is not annihilationism. In momentarism, the moment is not destroyed issueless. The moment invariably generates the next one. There is a reign of causality in the world. In the theory of annihilationism the thing is destroyed issueless. Buddha seems to hold that the thing does not live for ever (*śāśvatavāda-niṣedha*) nor does it die issueless (*ucchedavāda-niṣedha*) but though it lives for a moment it begets an issue (*kṣaṇikavāda–santānavāda*) This is the middle path. This implies the doctrine of continuum (*santānavāda*) which is fully developed later on by the Sautrāntikas.

Some might even opine that Buddha did not consider all things as really momentary but he asked the people to cultivate such an attitude towards them so that they might not allure them and cause misery to them. In other words, they entertain the fond belief that for Buddha it

3. Ibid, p. 19
4. Abhidharmadīpa, p. 40, n.i.
5. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, pp. 32–33
6. Bauddha Darśana aur Anya Bhāratīya Darśana, p. 702

is not a metaphysical axiom but merely a subjective attitude necessary for man in search of happiness. This seems not to be the case. For him the doctrines of no-substance and momentariness are metaphysical convictions. Buddha harps on them every now and then. They are the fundamental axioms of his metaphysics. Of course, he has not constructed superstructure of metaphysics on them. He only takes them up as metaphysical facts but elaborates and emphasises the way of spiritual life backed by these metaphysical facts. It is a fact that every way of life implies its own metaphysics.[7]

There are some statements of Buddha that seem to go against the momentarism. He predicates origination, persistence, decay and destruction of a thing.[8] And he states that everything exists i. e. the past, the present and the future exists.[9] The first statement of his may be interpreted variously– as suggesting the spacious nature of a moment, that is, that this moment is not a mathematical point instant or as suggesting that the predication is done not of a moment but of a series of moments. The second statement of his may be interpreted in the light of his criticism of annihilationism. Each moment has its past and its future, that is, it has its cause and its effect. It does not come out of nothing nor does it die issuless. Every moment has an immediately preceding moment for its cause and the next moment for its effect. Though its cause and its effect are non-existent, they are facts, they are valid, i. e. nobody can deny them. Again, it is said that Buddha put forward the watchward 'everything exists' against the Ājīvakas' fatalism that denied the influence of the past deed upon our destinies.[10]

A school of Buddhist philosophy called Sarvāstivāda or Vaibhāṣika-darśana develops in connection with the problem of interpreting these texts. The Sarvāstivādins considered production, etc. to be objectively real (*dravyataḥ santi*) forces (*saṁskāra*). This shows their tendency to construct objective realities corresponding to our subjective notions. This tendency they shared with the Vaiśeṣikas. They, then, say that these forces work simultaneously upon an element (*dharma*). Against this is urged a difficulty to the effect that production and destruction could not be simultaneous in the case of an element that does not have more than a moment's duration. The Sarvāstivādins solve the difficulty by positing a difference between the real essence of an element (*dharmasvabhāva*) and its efficiency moment (*dharmalakṣaṇa*). And it is the latter that is termed as

7. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, pp. 29–30
8. tīṇimāni, bhikkhave, saṅkhatassa saṅkhatalakkhaṇāni / katamāni tīṇi ? uppādo paññāyati, vayo poññāyati, ṭhitassa aññathattaṁ paññāyati / AṅguttaraNikāya, I, pp. 140–141
9. SaṁyuttaNikāya, II, p. 257. MajjhimaNikāya, III, p. 260
10. Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 4

'moment' by them. The first exists always, in past, present and future. "It is not eternal because eternality means absence of change but it represents the potential appearances of the element into phenomenal existence, and its past appearances as well. This potentiality is existing for ever (*sarvadā asti*). The future potential elements are indeed divided into two different sets, those that will appear (*utpattidharmā*) and those that are suppressed and never will appear (*anutpattidharmā*)."[11]

The Vaibhāṣikas elaborately discuss the question of the relation between the essence of an element and its manifestations. Four solutions are suggested by Dharmatrāta, Ghoṣaka, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva. Their theories are termed as *bhāvānyathātvavāda, lakṣaṇānyathātvavāda, avasthānyathātvavāda* and *anyathānyathikatvavāda* respectively.[12] They are accused of being drifted into the Sāṅkhya. We may surmise that the Vaibhāṣika philosophy in its early phase has been influenced by the Sāṅkhya,[13] but in a later period it influenced the Sāṅkhya-Yoga.[14]

The Sautrāntika (critical realist) school of Buddhism emerges mainly from the criticism of the Vaibhāṣika school. The Sautrāntikas deny the objective reality of production etc. They are mere subjective notions (*prajñapti-sat*). They declare that the notions of production, etc. refer not to a moment but to a series of moments. They denied the reality of the past and the future. For them the present alone is real; nevertheless, they admit the influence of the past facts or events on the present and remote future events or facts. They explain this in terms of a gradual change in the continuum. Each moment in the continuum is generated as strictly conditioned by the previous one.[15]

The Mādhyamikas criticise the theory of momentariness. They vigorously repudiate the reality of point-instant. This repudiation is based on an appeal to common sense. However, their denial has no special

11. Ibid, pp. 35–36. See Abhidharmakośa, ii. 46
12. Tattvasaṅgraha, pp. 503–506
13. Dr. P. S. Jaini's Introduction to Abhidharmadīpa, p. 89
14. Central Conception of Buddhism, pp. 37–40
15. na hy ete jātyādayo dharmā dravyataḥ saṁvidyante yathā abhivyajyante / ...bhagavān... saṁskārapravāhasya saṁskṛtatvaṁ pratītyasamutpannatāṁ dyotayitukāma idam āha 'trīṇīmāni saṁskṛtasya saṁskṛtalakṣaṇāni,' na tu kṣaṇasya / no hi kṣaṇasyotpādādayaḥ prajñāyante/ ...tatra pravāhasyādir utpādo nivṛttir vyayaḥ / sa eva pravāho'nuvartamānaḥ sthitiḥ / tasya pūrvāparaviśeṣaḥ sthityanyathātvam / ... āha cātra — jātir ādi pravāhasya vyavacchedaḥ sthitis tu saḥ/ sthityanyathātvaṁ tasyaiva pūrvāparaviśiṣṭatā // ... tasmāt pravāha eva sthitiḥ / ... pratikṣaṇaṁ cāpi saṁskṛtasyaitāni lakṣaṇāni yujyante vināpi dravayāntarakalpanayā / ... na vai saṁskṛtasya sthitir evocyate lakṣaṇam api tu sthityanyathātvam / ... samāsatas tu atra sūtre saṁskṛtasyedaṁ lakṣaṇam iti dyotitaṁ bhagavatā "saṁskṛtaṁ nāma yad abhūtvā bhavati bhūtvā ca punar na bhavati yaś cāsya sthitisaṁjñakaḥ prabandhaḥ so'nyathā ca bhavati" iti kim atra dravyāntarair jātyādibhiḥ/ Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, ii. 46 ab.

bearing upon the theory of momentariness. They reject each and every view. Even moment is dialectical, relative and illusive for them.[16]

In the Yogācāra school of Buddhist idealism this theory of momentariness is re-established. According to it the consciousness alone is real. But this consciousness is momentary. It is, however, to be noted here that even in this school which officially repudiates the notion of soul, there enters from the back-door the soul in disguise. It is the concept of store-house consciousness (*ālaya-vijñāna*). Later Buddhists recognised the foreigner and as such it was banished by the school of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti from the Buddhist kingdom.[17]

The theory of momentariness at last attains its final form in the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra School of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti and gets its own daring logic.

Problem of the Universal: The method of critical analysis (*vibhajyavāda*) adopted by Buddha makes it crystal-clear that in Buddhism there is no room for the universal. The rejection of substance (*attā*) too implies the rejection of the universal. 'The Vaiśeṣika category of *sāmānya*...is unknown to the Pāli canon. The Buddhists being pluralists, non-substantialists and *vibhajyavādins* always tended to oppose the reality of *sāmānya*, as the latter was a stepping-stone towards a unity, a substance or even to the theory of Brahman of the Advaita school. Their formulas of *skandha, āyatana, dhātu* etc. were primarily aimed at removing false notions of unity (*ekatvagraha*).'[18] But as we have seen earlier the Vaibhāṣikas are influenced by the Vaiśeṣikas in their Dravyavāda. They objectify the subjective notions. They share the ultra-realistic tendency of the Vaiśeṣikas. So, they interpret some statements of Budhha in such a way as would imply the reality of something like the universal. These statements are to the effect that if a person behaves thus he will be born as a man and if he behaves thus he will be born as an infernal being.[19] These statements suggest only this much that there are different classes of living beings but they do not even imply the reality of anything like an independent class-essence or the universal. But the Vaibhāṣikas posit the universal under the name of Nikāyasabhāgatā on the basis of these statements.[20] They then try to justify their stand on the strength of logic. They observe

16. Buddhist Logic, I, p. 110
17. Ibid, pp. 113-114
18. Dr. P. S. Jaini's Introduction to Abhidharmadīpa, p. 95
19. sa ced itthatvam āgacchati manuṣyāṇāṁ sabhāgatām / A sūtra quoted in Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, II. 41a manuṣyāṇāṁ sabhāgatāyām upapanna iti / Divyāvadāna, 194.30. brahmalokasabhāgatāyāṁ copapanno mahābrahmā saṁvṛttaḥ / Ibid, 122.16 See also Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 98
20. sabhāgatā nāma dravyam / Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, ii. 41a

that it would be impossible for us to account for the cognition of similarity without the universal.[21]

Let us note one thing at this stage. The Vaibhāṣikas admit the possibility of the universal in living beings only. Like the *para sāmānya* and *apara sāmānya* of the Vaiśeṣikas the *sabhāgatā* of the Vaibhāṣikas is also divided into *sattva-sabhāgatā* or *Abhinnā sabhāgatā* (which is common to all living beings) and *dharma-sabhāgatā* or *Bhinnā sabhāgatā* (which is found in smaller groups of living beings like men, women, laymen, monks etc.).[22] But their conception of the universal is remarkably different from that of the Vaiśeṣikas. Though *sabhāgatā* is common to many, it is not numerically identical in each one of them.[23] It is called common to many because *sabhāgatā* in one is similar to that in the other. Thus *sabhāgatā* in the Vaibhāṣika system is nothing but similar qualities (or behaviour patterns). The difinition of *sabhāgatā* given by Saṅghabhadra corroborates this. His definition quoted in Sphuṭārthā is as follows: *śarīrendriyasaṁsthānaceṣṭāhārādisābhāgyakaraṇam anyonyābhisambandhanimittañca sabhāgatetyācārya-Saṅghabhadraḥ/* This Vaibhāṣika conception of the universal resembles very closely the Jaina conception of it. Can we surmise that Jaina logicians had before them the Vaibhāṣika conception of the universal when they were trying to formulate a theory of the universal that would best fit in with their theory of Non-absolutism?

The Sautrāntikas criticise this Vaibhāṣika understanding of *sabhāgatā* (the universal). They state that in the sūtra *sabhāgatā* is not accepted as real (*na dravyataḥ asti*). It is merely conceptual (*prajñapti-sat*). Again, if this notion of the universal were treated as real why not assume distinct *dharmas* corresponding to the notions of number, magnitude, etc.? Moreover, *sabhāgatā* as it is described by the Vaibhāṣikas is not perceived. Nor could it be said that though it is imperceptible we will have to posit it because without it we cannot account for the cognition of similarity. The Sautrāntikas ask the Vaibhāṣikas as to how that which itself is impercetible can act as the cause of the cognition of similarity. Furthermore, the Sautrāntikas observe that in paddy, barley etc. there is no *sabhāgatā* (the universal) according to the Vaibhāṣikas and yet they generate the cognition of similarity; similarly, even in the province of living beings the Sabhāgatā as a

21. ekārtharucihetur yaḥ sattvānāṁ sa sabhāgatā / Abhidharmadīpa, p. 89

22. sattvānāṁ sādṛśyaṁ nikāyasabhāga ity asyāḥ śāstre saṁjñā / sā punar abhinnā bhinnā ca / abhinnā sarvasattvānāṁ sattvasabhāgatā / pratisattvaṁ sarveṣu bhāvāt / bhinnā punas teṣām eva sattvānāṁ dhātu...aśaikṣādibhedena pratiniyatā dharmasabhāgatā / punaḥ skandhāyatanadhātutaḥ yadi sattvasabhāgatā dravyam aviśiṣṭaṁ na syāt, anyo'nyaviśeṣabhinneṣu sattveṣu 'sattva sattva' ity abhedena buddhir na syāt prajñaptiś ca / Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, ii. 41a.

23. sā sarvasattvavartinī pratisattvam anyā'nyā'py abhinnā ity ucyate sādṛśyāt / na hi sā yathā vaiśeṣikānām ekā nityā ceti / Sphuṭārthā, ii. 41

dravyāntara can be done away with. The Vaibhāṣikas have unscrupulously and blindly accepted the *sāmānya* of the Vaiśeṣikas under the name of *sabhāgatā.*[24]

The Sautrāntika-Yogācāra school of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti criticises, severely and with all the force of logic at its command, the doctrine of the universal; and this criticism is sustained, consistent and mature. The school explains the cognition of similarity on the basis of the exclusion-of-the-opposite (*atad-vyāvṛtti*). The notable feature of this period is the emergence of the wonderful theory of Negation (Apoha) meant to refute the rival theory of the *sāmānya*.

Vijñānavāda Idealism : Some scholars think that Vijñānavāda idealism is based on some Aupaniṣadic statementes.[25] But it seems more probable that this idealism is the natural result of Buddha's teaching. Subjectivistic tendency is there in Buddhism from the very start. The eternal substance and the pervasive universal were declared by Buddha himself to be unreal and mere subjective ideas. Only discrete elements (*dharmas*) were real. Thus the visible world apprehended by common people becomes quite subjective. But the Vaibhāṣikas, under the influence of the Vaiśeṣika realism, objectified even sudjective notions and increased the number of elements up to seventy five. They considered the past (*atīto'dhavā*), the future (*anāgato'dhvā*), the eternal Ākāśa, the eternal Nirvāṇa and the universal (*sabhāgatā*), etc. to be real. The Sautrāntikas, being critical realists, took them to task for their deviation from the spirit of the Master's words; they applied Occam's razor and cut down the inflated lists of categories. They declared that the past, the future, the eternal Ākāśa, the eternal Nivāṇa etc. are mere subjective ideas, mere names. They also refused to accept the *citta–viprayukta saṁskāras* like production, etc. 'They were aware of the subjectivity of phenomena to a much greater extent than the Vaibhāṣikas.'[26] They declared some of the *dharmas* accepted by Vaibhāṣikas to be *ideal* and even those that were considered by them to be real were for them inferable only. Their theory of perception is, therefore, called the theory of representative perception. And this theory directly leads to the Vijñānavāda. "The Sautrāntika by his theory of *sākārajñānavāda* (representative perception) paved the way for the emergence of the Vijñānavāda idealism. The external object was pushed into the background by maintaining that what was directly perceived was the content of knowledge and not the object. 'The object being always inferred, the content alone became real

24. Vaibhāṣikadarśana, pp. 225–227
25. "It is clear that originally Vijñānavāda is based on a number of Upaniṣadic passages...' History of Philosophy Eastern and Western, I, p. 180
26. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 82

to knowledge.' The Vijñānavādin goes a step further and maintains that the objects are mere *ideal* projections, ideas alone are real."[27]

On Perception : The conception of perception in the early Buddhism is very simple. The perception involves the participation of at least three things, viz. an object, an organ and a pure consciousness. The perceptual cognition originates depending upon its proper object and sense organ.[28] The sense organ and the object being present there arises the perceptual cognition. This implies the rejection of the agent and 'grasping' in its ordinary sense. It becomes quite clear from this that from the very beginning Buddhism has given up the anthropomorphic way of understanding the process of perceptual cognition. And all this is a necessary consequence of its theory of momentariness.

Perception means cognition of the present object. But in the philosophy of momentarism, the object does not endure till the time of the origination of its cognition. When there is object, there is no cognition of it and when there is cognition there is no object. Thus, in Buddhism perception becomes an impossibility. So, the Buddhists should give up either their doctrine of momentariness or any possibility of perception. They are conscious of this difficulty and they try to solve it.

Theravādins partially abandon the theory of momentariness- They regard the Mind (*citta*) as more variable than Matter (*rūpa*). The former flowed seventeen times faster than the latter. One matter-moment is equal to seventeen mind-moments.[29] Hence, it becomes possible for an object to endure till its cognition takes place. By assuming different standards of moment for matter and mind Theravādins solve the problem. Pubbaselia and Aparaselia repudiate Theravādin's double standard of moment. Having accepted the law of universal momentariness it is illogical and self-contradictory to propound that one thing perishes quickly and the other slowly. All moments, whether material or mental, should be equal.[30]

The Vaibhāṣikas stick to the doctrine of universal momentariness but posit a *sahabhū-hetu* to solve the problem. They are of the opinion that the object, the sense organ and the proper perceptual cognition all arise simultaneously. Temporal sequence is not necessary for causal

27. Dr. P. S. Jaini's Inroduction to Abhidharmadīpa, p. 82
28. "cakkhuṁ ca paṭicca rūpe ca upajjati cakkhuviññāṇaṁ" ti attheva suttanto ti ? āmantā / Kathāvatthu, p. 374
29. tāni pana sattarasa cittakkhaṇāni rūpadhammānaṁ āyu / Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho, iv, 8
30. idāni khaṇikakathā nāma hoti / tattha yasmā "sabbasaṅkhatadhammā aniccā, tasmā ekacittakkhaṇikā eva / samānāya hi aniccatāya eko lahuṁ bhijjati, eko cirenāti, ko ettha niyamo ?" ti yesaṁ laddhi, seyyathāpi pubbaseḷīyāparaseliyānaṁ / Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā, xxii. 8

relation. Lamp is the cause of light but both of them are simultaneous. Mere invariable concomitance is sufficient to determine causal relation; and it is there between an object and its cognition. On this Vaibhāṣika view, the thing could be said to be perceived because it is present along with its cognition.[31]

The Vaibhāṣikas posit a special relation called *sārūpya* ('co-ordination') between an object and its cognition to answer the question as to why the knowledge is determined by the object and not by the sense organ though both of them are simultaneous with the perceptual cognition.

The Sautrāntikas criticise the Vaibhāṣika concept of *sahabhū-hetu* and point out that lamp is not the cause of light; as a matter of fact they both are co-effects of something else.[32] So, according to the Sautrāntikas the perception of an object arises when the object has already been destroyed. Then how could it be called the perception of that object at all? To answer this question they use the concept of *sārūpya* already accepted by the Vaibhāṣikas. They hold that the object leaves its impression on the consciousness through the sense channels in the first moment and through this impression we perceive the object in the second moment. Though both the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas accept the concept of *sārūpya*, they make use of it differently; the former uses it only to explain why the cognition is determined by the object and not by the sense organ though both of them are simultaneous with the cognition, while the latter mainly use it to explain how the object that is already destroyed be cognised by perception. Hence, though the Vaibhāṣikas accept the concept of *sārūpya*, they are not the upholders of the doctrine of indirect or representative perception, while the Sautrāntikas are. According to the Sautrāntikas, what is directly perceived in the cognition is the representation or the copy of an object and not the object itself; the object is perceived, rather inferred, through this copy.

This theory of perception is logically and elaborately discussed in the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra school of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. The salient feature of this school is its consistent and logical exposition of the theory of perception according to which perception is devoid of all thought (*vikalpa*) whatsoever. This, of course, is not a new idea invented by the school. It goes back to the Pāli canon. Out of the five *skandhas*, the *Vijñāna skandha* corresponds to the perception of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. McGovern observes in connection with *Vijñānaskandha*: '... it is associated with much which we should call sensation. ...'[33] Th. Stcherbatsky emphatically says, 'Vijñāna and its synonyms *citta, manaḥ*

31. Sphuṭārthā, ii. 50-51
32. Ibid, ii. 51
33. A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy p. 90

represent pure sensation, the same as the *kalpanāpoḍha pratyakṣa* of Diṅnāga.... '[34] Even Bhāmatīkāra observes that *Vijñāna skandha* is nothing but *Nirvikalpa pratyakṣa*.[35] Though all Buddhist schools assume all *Vijñānas* to be devoid of all element of ideation or thought they have not developed that idea. It is this school of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti that logically developes this idea and establishes, with all the force of logic, the theory of perception according to which perception is devoid of all thought whatsoever.

On Inference : During the life-time of Buddha there were people who put emphasis on *tarka* (*takkī*) and *mīmāṁsā* (*vimaṁsī*). Buddha could not remain indifferent to them. There are instances in the Pāli canon of his having entered into discussions with many Brahmins and ascetics.[36] In his arguments with them he mainly employed apt illustrations. In other words, he took recourse to argumentation by analogy. His reasoning was not based on universal concomitance (*vyāpti*).

Though Buddha did enter into discussions with others, he often warned the Bhikkhus against the intoxicating and maddening effect of debate and discussion. He gave no importance to them. They were considered to be obstructions in the spiritual progress of man. At some places in the Pāli canon *hetu-vidyā* and *tarka* were even positively viewed with contempt.[37]

But this attitude towards the science of debate underwent tremendous change in the Age of *Abhidhamma and prakaraṇas*. Buddhism had already developed into a systematic Holy Order; it felt the necessity to increase the number of its followers. The Buddhist could do this only through convincing others of the correctness of the principles of his faith. This is possible only through discussion and debate. So, the Buddhist developed a favourable attitude towards the science of debate. They regarded it as an integral portion of Abhidhamma and even included it in the list of subjects necessary for the Bodhisattvas to know.[38] Too much emphasis on the science of debate, however, might urge a person to set aside even scriptural tenets just to win the case. This would ultimately prove detrimental to the propag-

34. Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 16
35. vijñānaskandho'ham ity ākāro rūpādiviṣaya indriyajanyo vā daṇḍāyamānaḥ / saṁjñāskandhaḥ savikalpapratyayaḥ yathā Ḍitthaḥ kuṇḍalī gauro brāhmaṇo gacchatītyevaṁjātīyakaḥ / Bhāmatī, II. 2. 14. 'savikalpapratyayaḥ' ity anena vijñānaskandho nirvikalpa iti bhedaḥ skandhayor dhvanitaḥ / Kalpataru thereon.
36. PoṭṭhapādaSutta and TevijjaSutta, DīghaNikāya, I. MahānidānaSutta, DīghaNikāya, II. VerañjaSutta, AṅguttaraNikāya, III, pp. 287–292
37. Pre–Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic From Chinese Sources, II, p. 15
38. Pt. D. Malavania's Introdution to Dharmottarapradīpa, p. ix.
On Some Aspects of the Doctrines of Maitreyanātha and Asaṅga, pp. 44–45

logical method from that of the non-Buddhist systems. So, Diṅnāga successfully endevoured to establish an independent Buddhist logic in consonance with its metaphysical theories. Moreover, he realised that it is not sufficient to examine the views of other systems in order to establish a new doctrine. He felt the necessity of the examination of the means themselves that are employd to examine the views of others. With this end in view he composed different treatises on logic from the Buddhist standpoint. Thus at the hands of Diṅnāga the science of debate is turned into the science of pure logic. Before Diṅnāga it seems there existed no such work. Hence Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa calls him the Father of Medieval Indian Logic. Following are the works of Diṅnāga on logic : (i) Pramāṇasamuccaya, (ii) Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti, (iii) Hetucakrasamarthana and (iv) Nyāyadvāra or Nyāyamukha.[43] Out of these, the first is his *magnum opus.* A generation after Diṅnāga there emerged the eminent logician Dharmakīrti. He wrote several works on logic. His chief work is the Vārtika on Pramāṇasamuccaya of Diṅnāga. It surpasses the original work in many ways. Dharmakīrti replaced Diṅnāga in all spheres of philosophy. Hence, we can maintain that Dharmakīrti gave a new shape to the Diṅnāga's tradition. His other works on logic are as follows: (i) Pramāṇaviniścaya, (ii) Nyāyabindu, (iii) Hetubindu and (iv) Vādanyāya. He has also written a commentary on Svārthānumānapariccheda of Pramāṇavārtika.[44]

On Testimony : The most outsanding trait of Buddha's personality that emerges from his picture presented in the Pāil canon is his rationality. He is radically against the claim of Authority in matters of religious faith and practice. He puts sole emphasis on individual realisation and conviction. Every one should hold these two as the sole and sufficient norm of truth and validity. His advice to the Kālāmas is note-worthy. It is as follows : 'It is in the very nature of thing that doubt should arise. Do not believe in traditions merely because they have been handed down for many generations and in many places; do not believe in anything becouse it is rumoured and spoken of by many; do not believe because the written statement of some old sage is produced; do not believe in what you have fancied, thinking that because it is extra-ordinary, it must have been implanted by a *deva* or a wonderful being. After observation and analysis, when it agrees with reason and is conducive to the good and benefit one and all, then accept and live up to it.' (Kālāmasutta, AṅguttaraNikāya).

This emphasis on the primacy of 'self-knowledge' (*Attanā jāneyyātha*) reaches its climax when he speaks to Ānanda soon before

43. His othe work are : Ālambanaparīkṣā, ĀlambanaparīkṣāVṛtti and Trikālaparīkṣā.
44. His other work are : Sambandhaparīkṣā and Santānāntarasiddhi

his death. He says, 'Be ye lamps unto yourself (*atta-dīpā*). Be ye refuge to yourself (*atta-saraṇā*)...Look for no other refuge (*anaññasaraṇā*).[45] To set a good example he even disowns his own position as the leader or guide of Bhikkhus.

This same spirit is echoed in the Bodhisattvabhūmi (a portion of Yogacaryābhūmiśāstra of Maitreya and Asaṅga) in the following words: "One must not rely upon any one's opinion; nor say, such is the opinion of a *sthavira* (an elder), or of the Buddha, or of the *saṅgha;* one must not abandon truth in itself; one must be autonomous. Obedience to a tradition, to an authority can have no value by itself. To attain knowledge, instruction is necessary, but this instruction should be corroborated and assimilated by personal experience."

Though Asaṅga and his predecessor Maitreya accept Āgama as a *pramāṇa,* they ask us not to accept it credulously and uncritically. They want us to rely ultimately on our own personal experience and reason. That is why Tucci observes that it is almost certain that Maitreya and Asaṅga do not see in it anything more than a variety of *anumāna,* just as the Vaiśeṣikas and Diṅnāga do.[46] Of course, they could not suppress the *āgama* as it is done later on by Diṅnāga and his school. This tradition or attitude continues long after Maitreya and Asaṅga in Sthiramati, Vimuktisena and Haribhadra. But it should be borne in mind that this is not the true spirit of Buddhism. Tucci says, 'Though certainly, this *(pramāṇadvaya)* was the general and more common view, the school of Maitreya, the *yogācāras,* seem to have insisted on this theory *(pramāṇatraya)* long after this master.'[47]

The school of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti recognises only two *pramāṇas pratyakṣa* and *anumāna; āgama* is declared to be only a form of *anumāna* and not an independent *pramāṇa.* This recognition of mutually exclusive and completely exhaustive division of the two *pramāṇas* is connected by Stcherbatsky with the mutually exclusive division of *vijñāna* and *saṁjñā* recognised in the Pāli canon.[48]

At the end we quote Śāntideva's words that shed a flood of light on the Buddhist attitude towards Authority. He says, '*yat kiñcin, Maitreya, subhāṣitam sarvam tad buddhabhāṣitam.*'[49]

FROM THE ĀGAMAS TO AKALAṄKA

Now let us take a rapid survey of the development of the Jaina tradition on the problems concerened from the Āgamas down to Akalaṅkadeva.

45. DīghaNikāya, II. p. 80
46. On Some Aspects of the Doctrines of Maitreyanātha and Asaṅga p. 59
47. Ibid, p. 60
48. Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 16
49. Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 12

Problem of Permanence and Change: In the *āgamas* we do not come across a general definition of reality (*sat* or *vastu*). But from the recorded dialogues between Lord Mahāvīra and Gautama there emerges a conception of reality. In connection with *Jīva* and *Pudgala* Lord Mahāvīra states that they are both permanent and changing, permanent from the point of view of substance (*davvaṭṭhayāe*) and changing from the point of view of modes (*bhāvaṭṭhayāe*).[50] Again, from some of the passages of the Bhagavatīsūtra we can deduce that Lord Mahāvīra regarded the substance to be identical with as well as different from its modes.[51] Hence one and the same thing could be said to be both eternal and non-eternal. Moreover, at one place in the Bhagavatīsūtra, while proving the impermanence of *Pudgala* from the point of view of modes, it is said that *Pudgala* undergoes varied transformations with regard to colour (*aṇegavannam...pariṇāmaṁ pariṇamati*).[52] Thus, though in the Āgamas there is a clear mention of all the elements of the doctrine of *Pariṇāma*, viz. *Dravya*—the permanent or abiding element, *Pariṇāma*—the process of transformation, *Paryāya*—the state of *Dravya*, and the relation of identity-cum-difference between *Dravya* and its *paryāyas*, they are not elaborately explained and put together to form a systematic whole.

The Tattvārthasūtra shows a more advanced philosophical development. It clearly defines each and every element of the doctrine of *pariṇāma*. *Dravya* is defined as an entity possessing *Guṇa* and *Paryāya*.[53] Here the influence of the Vaiśeṣika system is obvious as the Tattvārthasūtra, like the latter, defines *Dravya* as consisting of *Guṇa*, of course, in addition to the orthodox *Paryāya*. The explanation of *Paryāya* given in the Svopajñabhāṣya is interesting. *Paryāya* means either another state of a thing (*bhāva*) or another name (*nāma*) applied to a thing.[54] That is, *paryāyas* are either the different states of a thing or the different names applied to one and the same thing. Does Umāsvāti want to suggest by this that even the different names applied to one thing are to be called its *paryāyas* on the ground that though they refer to one thing they exactly denote the different conditions of this thing? That is, we

50. "jīvā ṇaṁ bhante kiṁ sāsayā asāsayā ?" "Goyamā jīvā siya sāsayā siya asāsayā / Goyamā davvaṭṭhayāe sāsayā bhāvaṭṭhayāe asāsayā / BhagavatīSūtra, VII. 2. 273
"paramāṇupoggale ṇaṁ bhante kiṁ sāsae asāsae ?" "Goyamā siya sāsae siya asāsae /" "se keṇaṭṭheṇa ?" "Goyamā davvaṭṭhayāe sāsae vannapajjavehiṁ jāva phāsapajjavehiṁ asāsae /" Ibid, XIV. 4. 512
51. "āyā ṇe ajjo sāmāie āyā ṇe ajjo sāmāiyassa aṭṭhe /" Ibid, I. 9. 77.
"āyā bhante nāṇe annāṇe?" "Goyamā siya nāṇe siya annāṇe; nāṇe puṇa niyamaṁ āyā /" Ibid, XII.10.468
"je āyā se vinnāyā, je vinnayā se āyā / jeṇa vijāṇai se āyā /" ĀcārāṅgaSūtra, I.5.5.
52. BhagavatīSūtra, XIV.4.510
53. guṇaparyāyavad dravyam / Tattvārthasūtra, V. 37
54. bhāvāntraṁ saṁjñāntaraṁ ca paryāyaḥ / TattvārthaBhāṣya, V. 37

may say that at least as many are the conditions of a thing as are the names applied to it. Or, in other words, it might be said that a particular name always has corresponding to itself a partitcular condition of a thing. No two different words can denote the same condition of a thing. But the converse of it may not be true. That is, it is impossible to have as many words for a thing as are the modes or *paryāyas* belonging to it. The definiton of quality given by Umāsvāti has a striking similarity with the one given by the Vaiśeṣikas. His definition is as follows: Those, which have substance as their substratum and which are not themselves the substratum of other attributes are qualities.[55] Now let us see the definition of *Pariṇāma.* Umāsvāti defines *pariṇāma* as being the nature, the 'thatness' of each substance and its qualities.[56] In fine, it is the nature of the *Dravyas* and *Guṇas* to transform. Umāsvāti has taken a further step in the development of the Jaina doctrine of *Pariṇāma* by defining reality as such under the term *sat.* For him, reality is of the nature of origination, decay and persistence.[57] Here, we find the nature of reality, which in the aphorism – *tadbhāvaḥ pariṇāmaḥ* – is stated to be *Pariṇāma*, analysed into three aspects of origination, decay and persistence. In short, we are given an analysis of *Pariṇāma* and its identification with reality (*Sat*) as such. At one place Umāsvāti states that a thing is to be called eternal in so far as it never gives up what constitutes its very being or nature. Now the nature of reality, as already stated, is to originate, to decay and to persist. Thus to be eternal is to originate, to decay and to persist.[58] This is the source of the doctrine of *pariṇāminityatā.*

Āc. Kundakunda[59] may be called a brilliant *pariṇāmavādī* philosopher. His derivation of the word *Dravya,* as one that flows and reaches

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55. dravyāśrayā nirguṇā guṇāḥ / Tattvārthasūtra, V. 41
56. tadbhāvaḥ pariṇāmaḥ / Ibid, V. 42. dharmādīnāṁ yathoktānāṁ ca guṇānāṁ svabhāvaḥ svatattvaṁ pariṇāmaḥ / Bhāṣya thereon.
57. utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktaṁ sat / Tattvārthasūtra, V. 30
58. tadbhāvāvyayaṁ nityam/ Ibid, V. 31 yat sato bhāvān na vyeti na vyeṣyati tan nityam iti/ Bhāṣya thereon.
59. The Tattvārtha-sūtra of Umāsvāti is a work which is regarded as authentic both by the Śvetāmbaras and the Digambaras, while the important works of the Digambarācārya Kundakunda viz., Pravacanasāra, Pañcāstikāya, Samayasāra and Niyamasāra, are the prime authority of the Digambaras. The dates of these two Ācāryas cannot be fixed with certainty. According to Digambara tradition and scholars like Dr. Upadhye (Pravacanasāra, Introduction, p. xxii.) and Winternitz (History of Indian Literature, Vol II, p. 476), Kundakunda lived in the first cent. A.D. and was anterior to Umāsvāti whose date is stated to be about the 3rd or the 4th cent. A D (History of Indian Literature, Winternitz, Vol. II, p. 578 and Pt. Sukhalalji's Introduction to the Tattvārtha (Gujarati), p. 11.) On the other hand, certain scholars (Muni Kalyanavijaya–Sramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra, (Hindi) p. 302.) assign a later date to Kundakunda viz., beginning of the 5th cent A.D. i.e. after Umāsvāti.

out to all its *paryāyas*, is noteworthy;[60] it beautifully explains the operation of *Pariṇāma*. The definition of *dravya* in Tattvārthasūtra makes it clear that there cannot be any *dravya* apart from *guṇa* and *paryāya*. It is also stated in the Bhāṣya on I. 5 that such a *dravya* severed from *guṇa* and *paryāya* can only be imagined through abstraction in thought;[61] but this does not clarify the point whether *guṇa* and *paryāya* can exist apart from *dravya*. Kundakunda clarifies this point and explains the mutual relationship between *dravya*, *guṇa* and *paryāya*. He observes, 'There is nothing as quality nor as modification in the absence of a substance. There is neither substance without mode nor mode without substance. The one cannot be without the other.'[62] Thus he establishes the objective identity between *dravya*, *guṇa* and *paryāya*. However, in philosophical analysis, the concepts of *dravya*, *guṇa* and *paryāya* are to be grasped as distinct and separate from one another. This raises the problem of identity and difference. Kundakunda renders a definite service to Indian philosophy by clearly enunciating the types of differences—one which is made by thought and the other which is objective. For the former he uses the term '*anyatva*' and for the latter, '*pṛthaktva*.'[63] And there obtains the relation of difference between *dravya*, *guṇa* and *paryāya* only in the sense of '*anyatva*.' Thus with the help of the distinction between '*anyatva*' and '*pṛthaktva*,' Kundakunda avoids the confusion which is likely to occur in the discussion of '*bhedābheda*.' Moreover, Kundakunda analyses the concept of *Pariṇāma* into its two components, viz. 'change' involving

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60. daviyadi gacchadi tāiṁ tāiṁ sabbhāvapajjayāiṁ jaṁ /
daviaṁ taṁ bhaṇṇante...// Pañcāstikāya, 9.

61. dravyajīva iti guṇaparyāyaviyuktaḥ prajñāsthāpito'nādipāriṇāmikabhāvayukto jīva ucyate/
Tattvārthabhāṣya, I. 5.

62. ṇatthi guṇo tti vā koī pajjāo ttīha vā viṇā davvaṁ / Pravacanasāra, II. 18
pajjayavijudaṁ davvaṁ davvavijuttā ya pajjavā ṇatthi /
doṇhaṁ aṇaṇṇabhūdaṁ bhāvaṁ samaṇā parūviṁti // Pañcāstikāyasāra, 12

63. pavibhattapayesattaṁ pudhattamidi sāsaṇaṁ Vīrassa /
aṇṇattam atabbhāvo..................// Pravacanasāra, II. 14
jaṁ davvaṁ taṇṇa guṇo jo vi guṇo so ṇa taccamatthādo /
eso hi atabbhāvo ṇeva abhāvo tti ṇiddiṭṭho // Ibid, II. 16
vavadesā saṁṭhāṇā saṁkhā visayā ya honti te bahugā /
te tesim aṇaṇṇatte aṇṇatte cāvi vijjhante // Pañcāstikāya, 52
vaṇṇarasagandhaphāsā paramāṇuparūvidā visesā hi /
davvādo ya aṇaṇṇā aṇṇattapagāsagā honti //
daṁsaṇaṇāṇāni taha jīvāṇivaddhāṇi ṇaṇṇabhūdāṇi /
vavadesado pudhattaṁ kuvvanti hi no sabhāvādo // Ibid, 57–58

utpāda and *vyaya* and 'permanence' involving *dhrauvya* by relating *utpāda* and *vyaya* to *paryāya* and *dhrauvya* to *dravya* .[64]

It is noteworthy that in the older Āgamas we do not come across the mention of '*guṇa*' meaning quality but a late passage in the Uttarādhyayanasūtra, Umāsvāti and Kundakunda have recognised *guṇa* as a distinct category in addition to *dravya* and *paryāya*. Hence, the problem of the distinction between *guṇa* and *paryāya*; the contribution of Siddhasena Divākara to the doctrine of *pariṇāma* is his logical establishment, on the basis of the Āgamas, of the non–distinction between *paryāya* and *guṇa*. For him, *guṇa* is not a distinct category apart from *paryāya* but is identical with it.[65] Again, the distinction of *paryāya* into *arthaparyāya* and *vyañjanaparyāya* is to be found for the first time in his Sanmatitarka. He uses the term *vyañjanaparyāya* to signify those *paryāyas* of a thing which are observable by us and which therefore become the basis for our calling this thing by a name; *arthaparyāyas*, on the other hand, are those *paryāyas* of a thing which are no doubt present there but are too subtle to be observed by us (and which therefore do not become the basis of our calling this thing by a name).[66]

As against the Bhāṣya explation of '*tadbhāva*' as simply '*satobhāva*' Pūjyapāda explains it as '*pratyabhijñāhetutā*' — the cause of the recognition 'this is that'. We see here a distinct progress in philosophical thought. In the Bhāṣya the principle of identity is explained, merely grammatically and objectively, as 'non-deviation from the state of being *sat* or real,' Pūjyapāda, on the other hand, explains it subjectively or rather epistemologically on the basis of the fact of recognition and thus: identity is that trait in a thing which is responsible for the recognition of this thing as identical with something that we had formerly known. This would be impossible if there were a total destruction of the thing formerly experienced or if the thing now being experienced were an altogether new phenomenon. Thus that which retains the trait in quest-

64. bhāvassa ṇatthi ṇāso ṇatthi abhāvassa ceva uppādo /
guṇapajjayesu bhāvā uppādavae pakuvvanti // Ibid, 15
uppattīva viṇāso davvassa ya ṇatthi atthi sabbhāvo /
vigamuppādadhuvattaṁ karenti tasseva pajjāyā // Ibid, 11
pādubbhavadi ya aṇṇo pajjāo pajjao vayadi aṇṇo /
davvassa taṁ pi davvaṁ ṇeva paṇaṭṭhaṁ ṇa uppaṇṇaṁ // Pravacanasāra, II. 11

65. Sanmati Prakaraṇa, III. 9–14

66. Ibid, I. 31–34

ion, negatively, does not give up this trait is *nitya* or eternal.[67] Akalaṅka in his Rājavārtika essentially follows Pūjyapāda in his explanation of '*tadbhāva*,' but makes more explicit and clear what was suggested in '*tat tu kathañcidveditavyam*' (by Pūjyapāda). Thus Akalaṅka attempts to explain the contradiction that may be alleged against the three aspects of reality viz. *utpāda, vyaya* and *dhrauvya,* by bringing into service the doctrine of relative standpoints i.e. of *Dravyārthikanaya* and *Paryāyārthikanaya*.[68] Pūjyapāda explains the three terms *utpāda, vyaya* and *dhrauvya: utpāda* or origination is the attainment of another state, due to internal and external causes—by a sentient or a non-sentient substance, without abandoning its essential nature. For example, the attainment of another state viz. that of a jar, by clay, is the former's *utpāda. Vyaya* or decay is the abandonment of a previous state; for example, the abandonment by clay of the form of *piṇda* on the origination of another form viz. that of a jar. On account of the beginningless *Pariṇāma* being the nature of reality, there is an element in it which persists because it is neither produced nor does it become extinct. This is the persistence or *dhrauvya* aspect of reality: for example, the persistence of clay in its various states, such as those of *piṇda,* jar etc.[69] Akalaṅka has nothing more to add by way of explanation of these terms. He discusses another question, namely, that of the identity or difference between *dravya* on the one hand and *utpāda, vyaya* and *dhrauvya* on the other.[70] Pūjyapāda recognises *guṇa* as a distinct category and points

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67. kas tadbhāvaḥ? pratyabhijñāhetutā / tad evedam iti smaraṇam pratyabhijñānam / tad akasmān na bhavatīti yo yas tasya hetuḥ sa tadbhāvaḥ / bhavanaṁ bhāvaḥ / tasya bhāvaḥ tadbhāvaḥ / yenātmanā prāg dṛṣṭaṁ vastu tenaivātmanā punar api bhāvāt tad evedam iti pratyabhijñāyate / yady atyantanirodho'abhinavaprādurbhāvamātram eva vā syāt tataḥ smaraṇānupapattiḥ / tadadhīno lokasaṁvyavahāro virudhyate / tatas tadbhāvenāvyayaṁ tadbhāvāvyayaṁ nityam iti niścīyate / tat tu kathañcid veditavyam / sarvathā nityatve anyathābhāvābhāvāt saṁsāratadvinivṛttikāraṇaprakriyāvirodhaḥ syāt / Sarvārthasiddhi, p. 302.

68. virodha iti cet; dharmāntarāśrayaṇāt /2/ syān matam—viyad eva na vyeti, utpadyamānam eva notpadyata iti virodhaḥ, tato na, yuktam iti; tan na; kiṁ kāraṇam? dharmāntarāśrayaṇāt / yadi yena rūpeṇa vyayodayakalpanā tenaiva rūpeṇa nityatā pratijñāyeta syād virodhaḥ; janakatvāpekṣayaiva pitāputravyapadeśavat, na tu dharmāntarasaṁśrayāt / Tattvārthavārtika, p. 497

69. cetanācetanasya vā dravyasya svāṁ jātim ajahataḥ ubhayanimittavaśād bhāvāntarāvāptir utpādanam utpādaḥ mṛtpiṇḍasya ghaṭaparyāyavat / tathā pūrvabhāvavigamanaṁ vyayaḥ / yathā ghaṭotpattau piṇḍākṛteḥ / anādi-pāriṇāmikasvabhāvena vyayodayābhāvād dhruvati sthirībhavatīti dhruvaḥ / dhruvasya bhāvaḥ karma vā dhrauvyam / yathā mṛtpiṇḍaghaṭādyavasthāsu mṛdādyanvayaḥ / Sarvārthasiddhi, p. 300

70. Tattvārthavārtika, p. 496

out its difference from *paryāya*.[71] Akalaṅka maintains both the views viz. one upholding the non-distinction between *guṇa* and *paryāya* as well as that upholding distinction between the two.[72]

One thing to be noted here is that the *Svopajñabhāṣya* of the Tattvārtha-sūtra seems to interpret the term *nitya* or *dhrauvya* in the sense that the *pāriṇāmic* nature of things is *nitya* or *dhruva* (eternal). But the commentators seem to take it in the sense that it refers to some permanent aspect of things. Nevertheless, by adding '*kathañcit*' to '*nitya*' they seem to make their explanation practically identical with that of the Bhāṣya.

Kundakunda actually applied this doctrine of *pariṇāma* to *Jīva*, *Pudgala* and *Kāla*. But Pūjyapāda, Akalaṅka and the later Jaina logicians attempt to apply it even to *Dharma*, *Adharma* and *Ākāśa*[73]. Of course, the *pariṇāmas* of these *dravyas* had to be shown not directly but through those of *Jīva* and *Pudgala*. This difficulty is due to the peculiar nature of *Dharma*, *Adharma* and *Ākāśa* which are indivisible wholes, without any movement and pervade the whole universe.

The remarkable feature of the period commencing with Pūjyapāda is the defence of the doctrine of *pariṇāma* on various grounds and the attempt to answer the objections of the rival schools of thought.

Problem of the Universal : In the Āgamas, *dravya* and *paryāya* have also the meaning of the universal (class) and the corresponding individuals respectively.[74] Again, the statement of the Sthānāṅgasūtra viz. 'there is one soul'[75] might be said to imply the universal soul. Even the Anuyogadvārasūtra seems to accept the universal under the term *avisesa*[76]. But do we find anything in the Āgamas that may give us a glimpse into its nature? There are some passages from which we can deduce the nature of the universal. Here is one such passage:

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71. ke guṇāḥ ke paryāyāḥ ? anvayino guṇā vyatirekiṇaḥ paryāyāḥ /... etad uktaṁ bhavati, dravyaṁ dravyāntarād yena viśiṣyate sa guṇaḥ / tena hi tad dravyaṁ vidhīyate / asati tasmin dravyasaṅkaraprasaṅgaḥ syāt / tad yathā jīvaḥ pudgalādibhyo jñānādibhir gunair viśiṣyate, pudgalādayaś ca rūpādibhiḥ / tataś cāviśeṣe saṅkaraḥ syāt / tataḥ sāmānyāpekṣayā anvayino jñānādayo jīvasya guṇāḥ pudgalādīnāṁ ca rūpādayaḥ / teṣāṁ vikārā viśeṣātmanā bhidyamānā paryāyāḥ / ghaṭajñānaṁ paṭajñānaṁ krodho māno gandho varṇas tīvro manda ity evamādayaḥ / Sarvārthasiddhi, pp. 309–310
72. Tattvārthavārtika, pp. 500–501
73. Sarvārthasiddhi, p. 273
74. "jīvapajjavā ṇaṁ bhante kiṁ saṅkhejjā asaṅkhejjā aṇantā ?"
"Goyamā no saṅkhejjā no asaṅkhejjā aṇantā /"
"se keṇaṭṭheṇaṁ bhante evaṁ vuccai ?"
"Goyamā asaṅkhijjā neraiyā, asaṅkhijjā asurakumārā, asaṅkhijjā nāgakumāra......"
Bhagavatīsūtra, XXV. 5. 746
75. ege āyā.../ Sthānāṅgasūtra, 1.
76. avisesie davve visesie jīvadavve ajīvadavve ya / Anuyogadvārasūtra, 123

'O Goyamā! one infernal being is similar to (or identical with) another from the standpoint of substance *(davvatthayāe)*......'[77]

In the passage infernal beings are said to be similar or identical from the point of view of substance, that is, they all are *jīvas*. Thus the similarity or identity between them is explained through similar characteristics without positing some selfsame entity running through all of them. One infernal being is similar to (or identical with) another not because both of them have one Universal Soul or one entity called *jīvatva* inhering in both of them but because both of them are *jīvas*, that is, they possess the defining characteristics of a *jīva* class. But all this is not clearly stated; it is merely implied. As a matter of fact, in the *Āgamas* we do not find a clear-cut mention of the universal or the discussion on its nature. From the classification and sub-classification of substances we gauge that something like the universal is suggested here and from the discussions on the number of the individuals of a particular class we may deduce the nature of the universal.

Umāsvāti does not give more information regarding the universal than what is given in the *Āgamas*. He, while explaining the *saṅgraha naya*, says that all things could be said to be one or identical because existence is common to them all[78].

Kundakunda is somewhat more explicit on the nature of the Universal Existence *(sattā)*. According to him it is there in all things, it is all-pervading, it pertains to innumerable individuals, it is characterized by origination, decay and persistence and it is one[79]. Moreover, it is suggested by the adjective *sapratipakṣā* that Existence *(sattā)* is the highest universal while there are other universals also like cowness, potness etc. that are lower. At one place in the Pravacanasāra he identifies this universal Existence with the *dravya*. He observes that if it were different from *dravya*, the latter would become unreal[80]. Thus Kundakunda enlightens us a little more on the nature of the universal.

We find in Pūjyapāda some further clarity on the point. Study the remarks of Pūjyapāda on *saṅgraha naya* : "The synthetic standpoint is that which comprehends several different individuals under one common head through their belonging to the same class. Take for instance existence *(sat)*, substance *(dravya)*, jar *(ghaṭa)* etc. When we speak of existence, all individuals, characterized by the feature existence and

77. "Goyamā neraie neraiyassa davvaṭṭhayāe tulle..." Bhagavatīsūtra, XXV. 5. 746
78. sarvam ekaṁ sadaviśeṣāt / Tattvārthabhāṣya, I. 35
79. sattā savvapayatthā savissarūvā aṇantapajjayā /
bhaṅguppādadhuvattā sapaḍivakkhā havadi ekkā // Pañcāstikāya, 8
80. ṇa havadi jadi saddavvaṁ asaddhuvaṁ havadi taṁ kahaṁ davvaṁ /
havadi puṇo aṇṇaṁ vā tamhā davvaṁ sayaṁ sattā // Pravacanasāra, II. 13

inferred from the sign connecting the word 'existence' with the idea of existence, are grouped together, on the basis of the feature existence, in one class without distinction. Even if the word '*dravya*' be mentioned, the soul, the non-soul etc. and their sub-divisions are grouped together under it as all these fulfil the definition of substance, viz. that which attains its modes. Similarly, even if the word 'jar' be mentioned, it includes all jars which are inferred from the sign (*pṛthubudhnodarādi*) which accompanies the idea of jar or the word 'jar'. In the same manner, other things also are the subject matters of the synthetic point of view."[81]

Here it becomes very clear that the ground on which we group the different individuals under one head is not an independent entity numerically identical in all those individuals, but the common characteristics that form the definition of the whole class. But the question as to whether or not these common characteristics themselves are numerically identical in the individuals is neither raised nor answered.

Āc. Samantabhadra observes that our cognition of identity as well as our cognition of difference characterizing things have their real respective objects. We cognise all things as identical because the universal existence is common to them all. We cognise all things as different either because they are made up of different substances or because they possess different modes etc. Thus, to account for our cognition of identity in things, Samantabhadra, posits an objectively real universal.[82] But he observes silence on the question of the actual nature of the universal. Whether the universal is an independent category over and above substance, quality and mode; whether it is merely a special type of (i. e. common) qualities and modes; if common qualities and modes themselves are viewed as the universal, what is the meaning of the word 'common'? Does it suggest numerical identity? All these questions are not before him. Of course, from the general trend of Jaina philosophy whose representative he is, we may get at his conception of the nature of the universal but he himself says nothing about it.

81. svajātyavirodhenaikadhyam upānīya paryāyānākrāntabhedānaviśeṣeṇa samastagrahaṇāt saṅgrahaḥ / sat, dravyaṁ, ghaṭa ityādi / sad ity ukte sad iti vāgvijñānānupravṛttiliṅgānumitasattādhārabhūtānām aviśeṣeṇa sarveṣāṁ saṅgrahaḥ / dravyam ity ukte'pi dravati gacchati tāṁs tān paryāyān ity upalakṣitānāṁ jīvājīvatadbhedaprabhedānāṁ saṅgrahaḥ tathā ghaṭa ity ukte'pi ghaṭabuddhyabhidhānānugamaliṅgānumitasakalārthasaṅgrahaḥ / Sarvārthasiddhi, pp. 141–142

82. [nanu caikatvapratyayāt pṛthaktvapratyayācca katham ekatvaṁ pṛthaktvaṁ ca jīvādīnām upapannaṁ tasya nirviṣayatvād ity ārekāyāṁ tasya saviṣayatvam ādarśayitumanasaḥ Svāminaḥ prāhuḥ—]
satsāmānyāt tu sarvaikyaṁ pṛthag dravyādibhedataḥ / Āptamīmāṁsā, 34
The bracketed portion indicates Aṣṭasahasrī.

Let us now come to Jinabhadra. He observes that whatever causes the cognition of identity is the universal and whatever causes the cognition of difference is the particular. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians accept both the universal and the particular as real; thus they give equal importance to the point of view of substance and the point of view of modes. So, Jinabhadra raises the question as to why they should be considered to be possessed of wrong attitude. In answer he says that they take them to be absolutely independent of one another, as if the two have no connection whatsoever with one another. Jinabhadra quotes Siddhasena Divākara in support of his view. He then clarifies what he means by all this. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians consider one universal and another included in it to be absolutely different from each other and again they regard both of them as absolutely different from the individual in which they inhere. Jinabhadra first points out that the universal is not different from the particular. This is so, he says, because even the particular, like the universal, causes the cognition of identity. Again, even the universal is particular because one universal differentiates itself from another universal and thus generates the cognition of difference among the two. In this manner, the universal is the particular and *vice versa* and hence both are non-different.[83]

Then, he proceeds to show the non-difference of the universal and the individual in which the former inheres. He asks the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians as to whether through having the relation of inherence with the universal Existence (*sattā*), it is an existent substance that becomes existent (real) or a non-existent substance that becomes existent (real). The non-existent, like the sky-lotus, could not become existent. And that which is already existent needs nothing to make it existent (real).[84] Again, if it were argued that the universal is posited over and above the individuals (i.e. individual substances, qualities and actions) in order to account for the cognition of identity with regard to the latter, Jinabhadra asks as to why then the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians do not posit something over and above the universals since we have the cognition of identity with regard to them also. Just as universals are regarded as capable of causing the cognition of identity with regard to themselves, the substances, qualities and actions too should be regarded as capable of causing the cognition of identity with regard to themselves. There is no need of posting an independent category called the universal over and above the individual substances, qualities and actions.[85]

At last he states the Jaina position. According to it the universal is nothing but the similar characteristics of different individuals.[86]

83. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, 2685–2693.
84. Ibid, 2694
85. Ibid, 2697
86. Ibid, 2696

This means that the universal according to Jinabhadra, is numerically different in each individual. The characteristics of one thing could not be regareded as numerically identical with those of another. The actual word 'similar' used by him implies all this. But he has not raised the question as to what causes the cognition of similarity in the case of qualities. The substances are cognised as similar due to their having similar qualities. But what is there in these qualities that causes the cognition of identity with regard to them? To the best of my knowledge, it is Prabhācandra who for the first time gives an answer to this question.[87]

In Akalaṅka and Prabhācandra one finds an elaborate discussion on the nature of the universal from the Jaina view-point.

On Perception: The Bhagavatīsūtra enumerates the traditionally accepted five types of *jñānas*. Out of these five, *ābhinibodhika* is divided into six species—five due to five senses and one due to mind.[88] *Ābhinibodhika jñānas* due to five senses are equivalent to sense perception while the *ābhinibodhika jñāna* due to mind includes in its fold all the *jñānas* (of course except the *jñānas* acquired through Testimony or *Śruta*) that are ordinarily known as *parokṣa*. In the Sthānāṅgasūtra the five types of *jñānas* beginning with *ābhinibodhika* are divided into two — *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* — and *ābhinibodhika* is brought under the head of *parokṣa*. This is so because the *Āgamas* consider only those cognitions to be *pratyakṣa* for which the self has not to depend on anythings else, while cognitions normally called *pratyakṣa* are actually *parokṣa* in the sense that the self acquires them through the media of sense organs. One thing to be noted here is that this *ābhinibodhika jñāna* is recognised to be either *śruta-niḥsṛta* (backed by learning) or *aśruta-niḥsṛta* (not backed by learning)[89]. But this division does not seem to represent the old tradition and it might be inspired by the division of sense perception into *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* that was introduced by the other schools of thought. The Nandisūtra enumerates five *jñānas ābhinibodhika* etc. and classifies them either under the head of *pratykṣa* or under the head of *parokṣa*. *Ābhinibodhika jñānas* due to five senses, and *avadhi*, *manḥparyāya* and *kevala* are classed as *pratyakṣa*; of course the former five are called *indriya-pratyakṣa* and the latter three are called *no-indrya-pratyakṣa*. On the other hand, *ābhinibodhika* due to mind along with *śrutajñāna*, is here put under the head of *parokṣa*. Each one of all the six *abhinibodhika jñānas* (the five due to five senses and the one due to mind) is said to have four stages viz. *avagrah* etc.[90] Anuyogadvārasūtra too, like

87. Vide chapter on 'Problem of Universals.'
88. Bhagavatīsūtra 88. 2. 317.
89. Sthānāṅgasūtra, 71
90. Nandisūtra, 35

Nandisūtra, recognises two types of *pratyakṣa*—*indriya* and *no-indriya*—and the former is said to be of five kinds viz. *śrotrendriyapratyakṣa* etc.[91] As for Jinabhadra, he treats the knowledge born of five sense organs as *pratyakṣa*—though of the *sāṁvyavahārika* type,[92] Vācaka Umāsvāti, however, staunchly follows the old *āgamic* tradition and regards such knowledge as *parokṣa*.[93] It is noteworthy that taking the advantage of *āgamic* view-point, Jinabhadra points out that sense-perception closely resembles inference in so far as like the latter it too involves memory of the relation of the previously experienced things.[94] It is in Siddhasena Divākara that we for the first time find a systematic and logical treatment of the topic. He defines *pratyakṣa* as *aparokṣa*;[95] moreover, he devides even *pratyakṣa* into *svārtha* and *parārtha*.[96]

Now we come to the concept of the four stages of *indriya pratyakṣa*, as we find it treated from the time of Āgamas down to that of Akalaṅkadeva. In the Nandisūtra we do not actually find the definition of *avagraha*. Only its synonyms and an illustration to explain it are given.[97] It seems to quote Āvaśyakaniryukti where it is said 'atthāṇam uggahaṇaṁ.'[98] What is important is the fact that it considers *avagraha* as instantaneous.[99] Moreover, *avagraha* is said to be of two types—*vyañjanāvagraha* and *arthāvagraha*. In this connection it is pointed out that *vyañjanāvagraha* is not possible in the case of visual sense organ.[100] It is to be noted here that the possibility of *vyañjanāvagraha* is not granted by the Jaina tradition in the case of mind also. Umāsvāti gives synonyms of *avagraha* and states that it is an indeterminate cognition.[101] Pūjyapāda defines it as 'the first cognition after the instant of the contact of the object with the sense organ,'[102] and further says, 'on the contact of the object and the sense organ there occurs *darśana* and the cognition of the object thereafter is *avagraha*, for instance, the cognition 'this is white

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91. Anuyogadvārasūtra, 144
92. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, 95
93. Tattvārthasūtra, I. 11. and Bhāṣya thereon
94. honti parokkhāiṁ maisuyāiṁ jivassa paranimittāo /
    puvvovaladdhasambandhasaraṇao vā' ṇumāṇaṁ va // Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, 94
95. Nyāyāvatārasūtram, 4
96. pratyakṣeṇānumānena prasiddhārthaprakāśanāt /
    parasya tadupāyatvāt parārthatvaṁ dvayor api // Ibid, 11
97. Nandisūtra, 30 and 35
98. Ibid, 36
99. Ibid, 36
100. Ibid, 27
101. tatrāvyaktaṁ yathāsvam indriyair viṣayāṇām ālocanāvadhāraṇam avagrahaḥ / avagraho graho grahaṇam ālocanam avadhāraṇam ity anarthāntaram / Tattvārthabhāṣya, I. 15
102. viṣayaviṣayisannipātasamanantaram ādyaṁ grahaṇam avagrahaḥ / Sarvārthasiddhi, p. 111.

colour' by the organ of sight is *avagraha*.'[103] What is worthy of note is the fact that he regards *vyañjanāvagraha* as indeterminate and *arthāvagraha* as determinate.[104] Jinabhadra discusses some crucial points regarding *avagraha*. Regarding the statement of the Nandisūtra that *avagraha* is instantaneous, Jinabhadra observes that it is only the *arthāvagraha* that is instantaneous, and that *vyañjanāvagraha* involves a lengthy process; at last he expressly says that the statement of the Nandi has reference only to *arthāvagraha*.[105] Jinabhadra seems to refute the view of Pūjyapāda who holds that *arthāvagraha* is determinate. He is not prepared to allow the slightest determinateness in *avagraha*, because he thinks that even a slight determinateness is enough to put it into the category of *apāya*.[106] In the Nandisūtra there occurs a statement to the effect that in the last moment of the *vyañjanāvagraha* there emerges a cognition such as 'this is sound', though the exact nature of the sound is not cognised there. This is called *avagraha*. Jinabhadra interprets this statement as recording only the occurrence of the cognition and not its specific content.[107] Jinabhadra quotes the view of some thinkers who held that the *avagraha* of a newbron child cognises only the general features while that of a person sufficiently familiar with the objects cognises the particular characteristics even in one single instant. But he refutes the view on the ground that it will entail the postulation of an indefinite number of *avagrahas* each varying according to the richness of the knowledge of the cogniser. The richer the knowledge of a person the more will be the number of particular characteristics cognised in his *avagraha*. But this is certainly a fantastic position. Jinabhadra further quotes an opinion which regarded *arthāvargaha* as arising in the wake of *ālocana* which cognises the general features (*sāmānya*) (this *ālocana* being identified with *vyañjanāvagraha*) and as cognising its object as excluded from everything else. He criticises the theory on the grounds already given and says that this *ālocana* cannot be identified with *vyañjanāvagraha* inasmuch as the latter has nothing whatsoever for its object while the former has 'general feature' for its object. It (*ālocana*) can, therefore, be nothing but a type of *arthāvagraha* under a distinct nomenclature.[108] Akalaṅka refutes this view of Jinabhadra in his Rājavārtika.[109]

103. viṣayaviṣayisannipāte sati darśanaṁ bhavati / tadanantaram arthagrahaṇam avagrahaḥ / yathā cakṣuṣā śuklaṁ rūpam iti grahaṇam avagrahaḥ / Ibid, p. 111.
104. arthāvagrahavyañjanāvagrahayor vyaktāvyaktakṛto viśeṣaḥ / Ibid, 117.
105. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, 333–334
106. Ibid, 255–256
107. Ibid, 253
108. Ibid, 273–277
See also Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 38.
109. kaścid āha — yad uktaṁ bhavatā viṣayaviṣayisannipāte darśanaṁ bhavati, tadanantaram avagraha iti; tad ayuktam availakṣaṇyāt / na hyavagrahād vilakṣaṇaṁ darśanaṁ astīti / atrocyate — na; vailakṣaṇyāt / Tattvārthavārtika, p. 61,

This raises another problem. It is as follows. Jainism regards *darśana* and *jñāna* as two independent faculties of the self. What is the difference between the nature of the two? In the Bhagavatīsūrta it is said that *upayoga* (consciousness) is the defining characteristic of the self. This *upayoga* can be *sākāra* (determinate) as well as *nir-ākarā* (indeterminate). The former is called *jñāna* and the latter *darśana*.[110] It is but natural that the former takes place after the latter has taken place. Now if *darśana* were to precede *Matijñāna* which includes *vyañjanāvagraha* and *arthāvagraha*, *darśana* should take place even before *vyañjanāvagraha*. But this is absurd. How can we have *darśana* of an object even before our senses are stimulated by the object? The following four are some of the solutions that have been offered, in the course of historical development, by way of solving the problem. (i) *Darśana* is some kind of cognition that intervenes between *vyañjanāvagraha* and *arthāvagraha*. *Vyañjanāvagraha* means mere sense-object contact or sense-stimulation. *Darśana* that arises in its wake means an indeterminate cognition of an external object, indeterminate in the sense that here merely the bare existence of the object is cognised. That is, at this stage one becomes conscious merely of the fact that the source of these sensations is something external. *Arthāvagraha* is a somewhat more developed consciousness than what we have in *darśana* because in *arthāvagraha* we cognise even secondary general features. *Arthāvagraha* is a determinate type of cognition. This alternative seems to be acceptable to Pūjyapāda and Akalaṅka. (ii) *Darśana* is identical with *arthāvagraha* only. *Vyañjanāvagraha* has no object at all. Here we become conscious of sensations only. We are not aware of their source. This state may be compared with the state of mood. So, Jinabhadra is right when he says that *vyañjanāvagraha* has no object at all. In other words, it is merely self-awareness, that is, awareness of mere sensations. Even the upholders of the first view would not have anything to say against this. But for the upholders of this second view *arthāvagraha* is indeterminate and cognises no particularity whatsoever; it grasps merely the bare existence of the object, and this is *darśana*. This alternative is acceptable to Jinabhadra. Perhaps Umāsvāti would not have objected to this alternative because he, like Jinabhadra, considered even *arthāvagraha* to be indeterminate. (iii) Darśana is included in *vyañjanāvagraha*. It is of course the culminating point of *vyañjanāvagraha*. This is the only difference between this and the first alternatives. (iv) A noteworthy solution is offered by Vīrasena. He says, "What comprehends an external object of the nature of universal-cum-particular is *jñāna* and the comprehension of the self of the same nature is *darśana*."[111]

110. Bhagavatīsūtra, XVI. 7.

111. sāmānyaviśeṣātmakabāhyārthagrahaṇaṁ jñānaṁ tadātmakasvarūpagrahaṇam darśanam iti siddham / Dhavalā, I. 1. 4. This view may be taken as an old one because Āc. Kundakunda in his Niyamasāra (160-170) seems to refer to it and refute it.

It can be seen that in the first three alternatives *darśana* is conceived as a process that ensues after *avagraha* of some sort has already taken place; as for the fourth it changes the very basis on which the problem is to be considered.

Īhā: From the Nandisūtra we gather that *īhā* follows in the wake of *avagraha* and knows the object distinctly. The Nandisūtra gives an illustration to prove this. In *avagraha* a person simply hears a sound while in *īhā* he cognises the nature of the sound also.[112] The Nandisūtra, moreover, states that the process of *īha* never exceed one muhūrta.[113] It gives the following synonyms of *īha*: *ābhogaṇatā, mārgaṇatā, gaveṣaṇatā, cintā, vimarśa.*[114] These synonyms make clear the nature of īhā. Umāsvāti observes that while *avagraha* is an indeterminate cognition of the object *īhā,* seeking to acquire a determinate cognition of the same, weighs the alternatives that suggest themselves in this connection. Umāsvāti gives the following synonyms of *īhā: ūhā, tarka, parīkṣā, vicāraṇā, jijñāsā.*[115] Pūjyapāda defines *īhā* as the striving for a specific characteristic of the object cognised by *avagraha.*[116] Jinabhadra says, '*Īhā* means enquiry for the distinctive feature.' Jinbhadra draws a fine line of distinction between *saṁśaya* and *īhā*. 'The mental state which relates to many (mutually contradictory) objects, which is stupefied owing to its incapacity for exclusion (of the false), and which seems to retire into a perfectly supine condition, is non-cognition (*a-jñāna*) of the nature of doubt. And the mental state which strives for the ascertainment of the truth by means of reason and logic, which is destined to be successful, and which tends towards the acceptance of the true and avoidance of the untrue is called *īhā.*'[117] Later logicians Pūjyapāda, Akalaṅka etc. follow him.

Apāya: The Āvaśyakaniryukti defines *apāya* as 'determinate cognition.'[118] Nandisūrta gives the following synonyms of *apāya*: *āvartanatā, pratyāvartanatā, avāya, buddhi, vijñāna.*[119] Umāsvāti defines *avāya* as the stoppage of the process of 'weighing up' that characterizes *īhā.* Following are the synonyms of *avāya* given by him: *apagama, apanoda,*

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112. se jahānāma kei purise avvattaṁ saddaṁ suṇijjā teṇaṃ saddo tti uggahie, no ceva ṇo jāṇai ke vesa saddāi, tao īhaṁ pavisai, tao jāṇai — amuge esa sadde,...Nandisūtra, 36.
113. Ibid, 35
114. Ibid, 32
115. avagṛhīte viṣayārthaikadeśāc cheṣānugamanaṁ niścayaviṣayajijñāsā ceṣṭā īhā / īhā ūhā tarkaḥ parīkṣā vicāraṇā jijñāsā ity anarthāntaram / Tattvārthabhāṣya, I. 15.
116. avagrahagṛhīte'rthe tadviśeṣākāṅkṣaṇam īhā/ Sarvārthasiddhi, p. 111
117. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, 183-184; See Studies in Jaina Philosophy, p. 41
118. vavasāyaṁ ca avāyaṁ ...
Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, 179 (Niryuktigāthā)
119. āuṭṭaṇayā paccāuṭṭaṇayā avāe buddhī viṇṇāṇe, se taṁ avāe/ Nandisūtra, 33

apavyādha, apeta, apagata, apaviddha, apanutta.[120] These synonyms (as also his subseqent definition of *dhāraṇā*) make it clear that in Umāsvāti's eye *avāya* consists in excluding the non-existing character of the object cogiused——not also in positively asserting the existing ones. Pūjypāda defines *apāya* as 'cognition of the true nature on account of the cogniton of the particular characteristics'.[121] Jinabhadra seems to criticise Umāsvāti's view that the function of *apāya* is only the exclusion of the non-existing characteristics. He observes that irrespective of whether a cognition simply excludes the non-existing characteristics, or simply determines the existing ones or performs both these functions, it is *apāya* and nothing elese.[122]

Dhāraṇā: The Nandisūtra states that *apāya* is followed by *dhāraṇā*, which means retention of the perceptual judgment for a number of instants, *saṁkhyeya* (countable) or *asaṁkhyeya* (uncountable).[123] It gives the following synonyms of *dhāraṇā: dhāraṇā, sthāpanā, pratiṣṭhā, koṣṭha.*[124] Āvaśyka-niryukti also defines *dhāraṇā* as 'retention.'[125] The view of Umāsvāti is somewhat different. As he has not assigned to *apāya* the function of a positive assertion of the existing characteristics, he considers it to be the function of *dhāraṇā*. That is way he defines *dhāraṇā* as the final determination of the object; and considers *pratipatti, niścaya, avabodha, avadhāraṇa, avasthāna* as the synonyms of *dhāraṇā.*[126] Pūjyapāda defines *dhāraṇā* as 'the condition of non-oblivion in future of what has been cognised by *avāya* (perceptual judgment).[127] At one place Jinabhadra agrees with Pūjyapāda on the nature of *dhāraṇā.*[128] But at another place he recognises *dhāraṇā* to be threefold. The absence of the lapse of the cognition of the object (*avicyuti*), the resultant emergence of mental trace (*vāsanā*) and the recollection of the object again in future (*anusmaraṇa*)–all these which follow in the wake of *avāya* (perceptual judgment) constitute

120. avagṛhīte viṣaye samyagasamyag iti guṇadoṣavicāraṇādhyavasāyāpanodo'pāyḥ/ apāyo'. pagamaḥ apanodaḥ apavyādhaḥ apetam apagatam apaviddham apanuttam ity-anarthāntarm/ Tattvārthabhāṣya, I. 15

121. viśeṣanirjñānād yāthātmyāvagamanam avāyaḥ/ Sarvārthasiddhi, p. 111.

122. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, 186

123. ...... tao dhāraṇaṁ pavisai. tao ṇaṁ dhārei saṁkhejjaṁ vā kālaṁ asaṁkhejjaṁ vā kālaṁ/ Nandisūtra, 36

124. Ibid, 34.

125. dharaṇaṁ puṇa dhāraṇaṁ ... / Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, 179 (Niryuktigāthā).

126. dhāraṇā pratipattir yathāsvaṁ matyavasthānam avadhāraṇaṁ ca / dhāraṇā pratipattir avadhāraṇā avasthānaṁ niścayaḥ avagamaḥ avabodha ity anarthāntaram / Tattvārthabhāṣya, I. 15.

127. avetasya kālāntare'vismaraṇakāraṇam dhāraṇā / Sarvārthasiddhi, p. 111

128. tassāvagamo'vāo aviccui dhāraṇā tassa/ Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, 180

dhāraṇā.[129] Akalaṅka considers only *saṁskāra* or *vāsanā* to be *dhāraṇa.*[130]

On Inference : The Bhagavatīsūtra and the Anuyogadvārasūtra divide valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) into four categories viz. perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), analogy (*upamāna*), and verbal testimony (*āgama*);[131] the Anuyogadvārasūtra further gives their sub-divisions in detail.

It recognises three types of *anumāna—pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *dṛṣṭasādharmyavat* and explains them giving proper instances. According to it, *pūrvavat anumāna* enables us to recognise a formerly experienced thing through its formerly experienced sign.[132] Thus it is nothing but recognition (*pratyabhijñā*). *Śeṣavat anumāna* is said to be of five types—one which enables us to infer a cause from its effect, the second that enables us to infer an effect from its cause, the third that enables us to infer a substance from its quality, the fourth that enables us to infer a whole from its part and the fifth that enables us to infer a locus from what resides in this locus. All these five are illustrated.[133] *Dṛṣṭasādharmyavat anumāna* is stated to have two sub-types—the *sāmānyadṛṣṭa* and the *viśeṣadṛṣṭa.*[134] It seems that former closely tallies with *upamāna* and the latter with *pratyabhijñā.*

Again, from the point of view of the temporal position of the object inferred, the *anumāna* is said to be of three types—one that grasps a

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129. tayaṇantaraṁ tayatthāviccavaṇaṁ jo ya vāsaṇājogo /
kālantare ya jaṁ puṇar aṇusaraṇaṁ dhāraṇā sā u // Ibid, 291

130. smṛtihetur dhāraṇā saṁskāra iti yāvat / Akalaṅkagranthatrayam, p. 3.

131. se kiṁ taṁ pamāṇaṁ / pamāṇe cauvvihe paṇṇtte—taṁ jahā paccakkhe aṇumāṇe ovamme āgame jahā aṇuogaddāre tahā ṇeyavvaṁ pamāṇaṁ/Bhagavatīsūtra, V.3.191-192

132. māyā puttaṁ jahā naṭṭhaṁ juvāṇam puṇarāgayaṁ/
kāī paccabhijāṇejjā puvvaliṅgeṇa keṇaī//
taṁ jahā——khatteṇa vā vaṇṇeṇa vā laṁchaṇeṇa vā maseṇa va tileṇa vā, se taṁ puvvavaṁ/ Anuyogadvārasūtra, 144

133. se kiṁ taṁ sesavaṁ? sesavaṁ paṁcavihaṁ paṇṇattaṁ taṁ jahā kajjeṇaṁ kāraṇeṇaṁ guṇeṇaṁ avayaveṇaṁ āsaeṇaṁ / se kiṁ taṁ kajjeṇaṁ ? saṅkhaṁ saddeṇaṁ...se taṁ kajjeṇaṁ / se kiṁ taṁ kāraṇeṇaṁ ? tantavo paḍassa kāraṇaṁ ṇa paḍo tantukāraṇaṁ.../ se kiṁ taṁ guṇeṇaṁ ? suvaṇṇaṁ nikaseṇaṁ, pupphaṁ gandheṇaṁ.../ se kiṁ taṁ avayaveṇaṁ ? mahisaṁ siṅgeṇaṁ, kukkuḍaṁ sihāeṇaṁ.../ se kiṁ taṁ āsaeṇaṁ? aggiṁ dhūmeṇaṁ, salilaṁ balāgeṇaṁ, vuṭṭhiṁ abbhavikāreṇaṁ, kulaputtaṁ sīlasamāyāreṇaṁ.../ Ibid, 144

134. se kiṁ taṁ diṭṭhasāhammavaṁ ? diṭṭhasāhammavaṁ duvihaṁ paṇṇattaṁ taṁ jahā sāmaṇṇadiṭṭhaṁ ca visesadiṭṭhaṁ ca / se kiṁ taṁ sāmaṇṇadiṭṭhaṁ ? sāmaṇṇadiṭṭhaṁ jahā ego puriso tahā bahave purisā jahā bahave purisā tahā ego puriso, jahā ego karisāvaṇo tahā bahave karisāvaṇā jahā bahave karisāvaṇā tahā ego karisāvaṇo, se taṁ sāmaṇṇadiṭṭhaṁ / se kiṁ taṁ visesadiṭṭhaṁ ? visesadiṭṭhaṁ se jahāṇāmae keī purise kaṁci purisaṁ bahuṇaṁ purisāṇaṁ majjhe puvvadiṭṭhaṁ paccabhijāṇejjā — ayaṁ se purise; bahuṇaṁ karisāvaṇāṇaṁ majjhe puvvadiṭṭhaṁ karisāvaṇaṁ paccabhijāṇijjā — ayaṁ se karisāvaṇe / Ibid, 144

past object, another that grasps a present object and third that grasps a future object.[135]

In the *Sthānāṅgasūtra* four types of *hetu* (probans) are recognised : 1. positive *hetu* having positive *sādhya* (probandum,), 2. positive *hetu* having negative *sādhya*, 3. negative *hetu* having positive *sādhya* and 4. negative *hetu* having negative *sādhya*.[136]

Regarding the members of the syllogism nothing is said in the original *Āgamas*. But Āc. Bhadrabāhu discusses this topic in his *Niryukti* on the Daśavaikālikasūtra. Though, at the time of answering the question as to what is the exact number of the members of the syllogims, he states that it is five [137] or ten, [138] yet elsewhere he has also opined that either mere *udāharaṇa* or *udāharaṇa* and *hetu* – these two only are enough to draw the conclusion.[139] Thus according to him, the number of the members of the syllogism is either two or three or five or ten. One noteworthy thing is that he gives two sets of ten members.[140] The following table will make his position clear.

2	3	5	10	10
Pratijñā	*Pratijñā*	*Pratijñā*	*Pratijñā*	*Pratijñā*
Udāharaṇa	*Hetu*	*Hetu*	*Pratijñāviśuddhi*	*Pratijñāvibhakti*
	Udāharaṇa	*Dṛṣṭānta*	*Hetu*	*Hetu*
		Upasaṁhāra	*Hetuviśuddhi*	*Hetuvibhakti*
		Nigamana	*Dṛṣṭānta*	*Vipakṣa*
			Dṛṣṭāntaviśuddhi	*Pratiṣedha*
			Upasaṁhāra	*Dṛṣṭānta*
			Upasaṁhāraviśuddhi	*Āśaṅkā*
			Nigamana	*Tatpratiṣedha*
			Nigamanaviśuddhi	*Nigamana*.

Thus in the *Āgamas* the information regarding inference is scattered and meagre; we do not find a systematic treatment of the subject; whatever is found there on the subject seems to be very simple and primitive. It is plausible to surmise that the religious mind of the age accepted the authority of the sacred texts and rejected as mere speculation pure

135. tassa samāsao tivihaṁ gahaṇaṁ bhavadi taṁ jahā atīyakālagahaṇaṁ paḍuppannakālagahaṇaṁ aṇāgayakālagahaṇaṁ / Ibid, 144
136. ahavā heū cauvvihe pannatte taṁ jahā — atthittaṁ atthi so heū 1, atthittaṁ ṇatthi so heū 2, ṇatthittaṁ atthi so heū 3. ṇatthittaṁ ṇatthi so heū 4 / SthānāṅgaSūtra,
137. DaśavaikālikaNiryukti, 89–91.
138. Ibid, 92 et seq.
139. Ibid, 49
140. Ibid, 92 et seq. and 137

reasoning unsupported by scripture. This might have led to a lack of serious consideration of the problems of logic. Yet the logical mind of man seems to have been fairly active and terminology of the science to have been in vogue even in those early days.

In Umāsvāti and Kundakunda we find nothing important on the subject. We come across a systematic treatment of the subject for the first time in Siddhasena Divākara's Nyāyāvatāra. He defines *anumāna* as knowledge free from illusion and one that determines the probandum through the probans which is invariably connected with the probandum.[141] He recognises two types of *anumāna—svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna*.[142] The latter is defined as a verbal statement of the probans that is invariably connected with the probandum (the former being just the cognition of this very probans characterized in this very manner).[143]

He states that the thesis etc. constitute the members of the syllogism.[144] Statement of the thesis is deemed necessary by him because otherwise one's opponent might think that one has arrived at a conclusion quite contradictory to what one had actually intended to arrive at. Siddhasena illustrates his view by citing the instance of an archer who aims an arrow at a target without mentioning what that target is; his shot may be right, but the person who has come to see the archer's skill may think it to be wrong.[145]

Then there is the need for demonstrating the relation of invariable concomitance between *hetu* and *sādhya*. This relation may be stated, says Siddhasena, either positively (*tathopapattyā*) or otherwise (*anyathānupapattyā*)[146]

He does not seem to accept *udāharaṇa* (illustration) as an integral part of a syllogism. He prefers *antarvyāpti* to *bahirvyāpti*. He seems to say that when the conclusion is proved through *antarvyāpti*, there is no need of *udāharaṇa;* and that when there is no *antarvyāpti* between the probans and the probandum there is no use of *udāharaṇa* either.[147]

He defines *udāharaṇa* as a case where the necessary connection between *hetu* and *sādhya* is well ascertained.[148] He recognises two kinds of *udāharaṇa* – homogeneous and heterogeneous.[149]

141. Nyāyāvatāra, 5
142. Ibid, 11
143. Ibid, 13
144. Ibid, 13
145. Ibid, 15–16
146. Ibid, 17
147. Ibid, 20
148. Ibid, 18
149. Ibid, 18–19

Then, he points out that the fallacy of either the thesis or the reason or the illustration makes the syllogism fallacious. He enumerates five types of fallacious thesis. (i) *Pratipādya-siddha,* (ii) *Pratyakṣa-bādhita,* (iii) *Anumāna-bādhita,* (iv) *Loka-bādhita* and (v) *Svavacana-bādhita.*[150]

He is of the opinion that the condition ensuring the validity of *hetu* is just one and it is its otherwise unaccountabitity (i. e. its unaccountability in the absence of the *sādhya*). And the fallacies of the reason occur when the fulfilment of this condition in the case of a reason is either unproved (*apratīta*) or doubtful (*saṁdigdha*) or contradicted (*viruddha*). Thus there are three fallacies of the reason according to him.[151]

The fallacies of the illustration are first grouped by him into two classes as he recognises two kinds of illustrations. The fallacies of homogeneous illustration arise when the illustration is destitute of the *sādhya* or *hetu* or both or when there is a doubt as to whether it could be the abode of the *hetu* or *sādhya* or both. The purpose of looking for a homogeneous illustration is to have at least one instance where both the *sādhya* and *hetu* are proved to reside, but this purpose is not served in the cases in question. In the very same fashion six types of fallacies of illustration can be formulated for the cases where a heterogeneous illustration is offered.[152]

'Till the epoch of Siddhasena Divākara the Jainas must have used methods of disputation as presented in their scriptures or might have borrowed the same from contemporary schools of thought; but that must certainly have occasionally led to confusion owing to the difference in philosophical tenets. A manual, therefore, based upon the tenets of Jaina philosophy was badly needed'.[153] And it is Siddhasena Divākara who gave first manual of Jaina logic.

He has made a remarkable advance on the *āgamic* treatment of the subject. He deals, of course in brief, with all the points on the subjects. Some of the notable features of his theory of inference are his emphasis on the inclusion of a statement of the thesis in all syllogism, his giving importance to the statement of *vyāpti* rather than to the statement of illustration, his recogniton of *antarvyāpti,* etc. All this suggests his acquaintance with the Buddhist logic of Diṅnāga and his opposition to some of the tenets of this logic.

On Testimony: The Anuyogadvārasūtra recognises two types of *āgamas* (scriptures) – empirical (*laukika*) and transcendental (*alaukika*). The non-Jaina *śāstras* like the *Vedas*, the *Mahābhārata,* the seventy-two sciences

150. Ibid, 21
151. Ibid, 22
152. Ibid, 24–25
153. Dr. P. L. Vaidya's Introduction to the Nyāyāvatāra, p. xliii

of arts are included in the first type. The second type comprises the Jaina *śāstras* only. With regard to the first type of *śāstras* it is stated that they are a fanciful creation of the persons of perverse attitude. But the *śāstras* falling under the head of transcendental *āgama* are composed by omniscient beings. It seems that in very early times only the words of a *Jina* (i. e. an omniscient person) were regarded as *pramāṇa* (valid), but gradually even the words of a *śrutakevalin* or a *daśapūrvī* came to be regarded as *pramāṇa*.[154] Of course, the words of the latter were regarded as *pramāṇa* not independently but on the ground that they are always in consonance with *āgamas*. It is a belief of the Jainas that only the *caturdaśapūrvadhara* and *daśapūrvadhara* are invariably possessed of the right attitude;[155] hence, there is no possibility of their stating things that may go against the *āgamas*. Eventually, even the instructions of *sthaviras* not found in the *āgamas* but visualised by them on the strength of their genius came to be regarded as *pramāṇa*.[156] Thus the *alaukika āgama* is further divided under two heads – *aṅgapraviṣṭa* and *aṅgabāhya*. One important thing to be noted here is that in the Daśavaikālikaniryukti it is explicitly stated that though the words of a *Jina* are infallible and valid, one should also at times offer a logical reason (*hetu*) and an illustration (*udāharaṇa*) in their support.[157]

The above discussion shows that the *prāmāṇya* or otherwise of *āgamas* depend on the right or wrong attitude of the *author*. But there is another criterion also to determine the *prāmāṇya* or otherwise of the *āgamas*. All the words are neutral, that is, neither *pramāṇa* nor *apramāṇa*. It is the attitude of the *knower* that makes them *pramāṇa* or *apramāṇa*. Thus *prāmāṇya* or *aprāmāṇya* of words depends upon the attitude of the knower. If his attitude is right, whatever he knows becomes right and if his attitude is wrong his knowledge also becomes wrong. Similarly, if the ultimate result of the knowledge of the *mithyā* (*laukika*) *śruta* (i. e. false scripture) on the part of a *mithyādṛṣṭi* (i. e. a person of perverse attitude) is the abandonment of perversity then the *mithyā śruta* in question is to be treated as a *samyak śruta* (i. e. right scripture).[158]

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154. suttaṁ gaṇadharakathidaṁ taheva patteyabuddhakathidaṁ ca /
sudakevaliṇā kathidaṁ abhiṇṇadasapuvvakathidaṁ ca // Mūlācāra, 5.80

155. coddasa dasa ya abhiṇṇe niyamā sammaṁ.../ Bṛhat Kalpasūtra, 132

156. gaṇahara-therakayaṁ vā ādesā mukkavāgaraṇato vā /
dhuva-calavisesato vā aṅgā'ṇaṅgesu ṇāṇattaṁ // Ibid, 144

157. jiṇavayaṇaṁ siddhaṁ ceva bhaṇṇae katthaī udāharaṇaṁ /
āsajja u soyāraṁ heū vi kahiñci bhaṇṇejjā //
DaśavaikālikaNiryukti, 49

158. Bhārahaṁ Rāmāyaṇaṁ...cattāri a Veā saṅgovaṅgā, cāiṁ micchadiṭṭhissa micchatta-pariggahiāiṁ micchāsuaṁ, cāiṁ ceva sammadiṭṭhissa sammattapariggahiāiṁ sammasuaṁ/ ahavā, micchadiṭṭhissavi cyāiṁ ceve sammasuaṁ / kamhā ? sammattaheuttaṇao, jamhā te micchadiṭṭhiā tehiṁ ceva samachiṁ coiā samāṇā kei sapakkhadiṭṭhio cayanti / NandiSūtra, 42.

Umāsvāti gives the following synonyms of *śruta: āptavacana, āgama, upadeśa, aitihya, āmnāya, pravacana* and *Jinavacana.* He recognises two types of scriptures – *aṅgabāhya* and *aṅgapraviṣṭa. Sāmāyika* etc. are included in the first type and the twelve *aṅgas* are included in the second type. What is the basis of this distinction? It is their being the work of different types of teachers.[159]

Regarding *āgama*, Kundakunda observes: 'He who is free from all defects and is possessed of all pure attributes is the supreme authority. The defects are hunger, thirst, fear, anger, attachment, delusion, anxiety, old age, disease, death, perspiration, fatigue, pride, indulgence, surprise, sleep, birth and restlessness. One free from all these defects and possessed of sublime grandeur such as omniscience in called the Perfect One. Words proceeding from his mouth, pure and free from the flaw of internal inconsistency, are called *āgama*(i.e. verbal testimony). In that *āgama* the principles are enunciated.'[160] Here an absence of hunger and thirst and some such things constitute some of the marks of an *āpta* (i.e. reliable person). Thus this definition of *āpta* is based on the Digambara tradition. It is noteworthy that Kundakunda recognises coherence or internal consistency as an essential feature of a true scripture.

A systematic treatment of logic starts from Siddhasena Divākara. In his short treatise Nyāyāvatāra he defines *śabda* or verbal testimony as the valid knowledge that arises from a right understanding of the words (*tattvagrāhitayā*) denotative of real things and are not contradicted by perception or by one's own accepted system.[161] Words characterised by the above-mentioned two characteristics come from the mouth of an *āpta* — i.e. authority. What is the purpose of verble testimony? It is to instruct, to relate to the hearers the nature of reality, to be beneficial to all men and to remove false notions.[162]

159. śrutam āptavacanam āgamaḥ upadeśa aitihyam āmnāyaḥ pravacanaṁ jinavacanam ity anarthāntaram / tad dvividham aṅgabāhyam aṅgapraviṣṭaṁ ca / tat punar anekavidhaṁ dvādaśavidhaṁ ca yathāsaṅkhyam / aṅgabāhyam anekavidham / tadyathā sāmāyikaṁ, caturviṁśatistavaḥ, vandanaṁ, pratikramaṇaṁ, kāyavyutsargaḥ, pratyākhyānaṁ, daśavaikālikaṁ, uttarādhyāyāḥ, daśāḥ, kalpavyavahārau, niśītham ṛṣibhāṣitānīty evamādi / aṅgapraviṣṭaṁ dvādaśavidhaṁ / tadyathā ācāraḥ, sūtrakṛtaṁ.../ atha śrutajñānasya dvividham anekaṁ dvādaśavidham iti kiṁkṛtaḥ prativiśeṣa iti? atrocyate vaktṛviśeṣād dvaividhyaṁ / Tattvārthabhāṣya, I. 20

160. vavagayaasesadoso sayalaguṇappā have atto //
chuhataṇhabhīruroso rāgo moho cintā jarā rujāmiccu /
svedaṁ kheda mado rai viṇhiyaṇiddā jaṇuvvego //
ṇissesadosarahio kevalaṇāṇāiparamavibhavajudo /
so paramappā uccai tavvivarīo ṇa paramappā //
tassa muhaggadavayaṇaṁ puvvāvaradosavirahiyaṁ suddhaṁ /
āgamamidi parikahiyaṁ teṇa du kahiyā havanti taccatthā // Niyamasāra, 5–8

161. dṛṣṭeṣṭāvyāhatād vākyāt paramārthābhidhāyinaḥ /
tattvagrāhitayotpannaṁ mānaṁ śābdaṁ prakīrtitaṁ // Nyāyāvatāra, 8

162. Ibid, 9.

In the Daśavaikālikaniryukti it is said that *āgama* stands in need of no proof; it is self-established; *hetu* and *udāharaṇa* are necessary only to elucidate the *āgama*. It did not occur to the persons of this age that even the *āgama* needs to be examined. They thought that it was composed by an omniscient person and was therefore infallible. But how would one know that it is really composed by an omniscient person when the author had left the world long ago? Some such consideration seems to be at the back of the mind of Kundakunda when he states that the words of an *āpta* are free from internal inconsistency. He means to say that a particular work should be considered to have been composed by an *āpta* if there do not occur in it contradictory statements. But is it not possible to speak the untruth consistently? In other words, is it not possible to have coherence in the body of knowledge in spite of its being wholly wrong? It thus seems that Siddhasena Divākara took a step in the right direction when he stated that in order to be *pramāṇa* verbal testimony must not only be self-consistent or coherent but it must also not be in conflict with perception.[163] Later logicians like Samantabhadra,[164] Akalaṅka[165] etc, follow him in this matter. One more thing catches our attention in Siddhasena Divākara. Words denotative of real things and consistent with perception as well as with the whole body of the speaker's knowledge generate valid knowledge in the hearer provided the latter understands the import of these words rightly. Even the words of an *āpta* may cause wrong knowledge if the hearer is not a proper person. Thus in order to generate valid knowledge in the hearer words should not only come from a reliable person but they should also reach a person who is capable of understanding their true import.[166] Can we surmise that the two ways of determining the validity of *āgama* are here assimilated into one by Siddhasena Divākara in his characteristic style? Thus in Siddhasena we find a considerable advance on the *āgamic* treatment of the problem.

In Jinabhadra nothing important is to be found on the subject. Of course, one would be surprised to know that at one place he explicitly states that *āgama* is a case of *anumāna*.[167] It is difficult to find such a view in the works of later logicians.

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163. a-dṛṣṭeṣṭavirodhakam / Ibid. 9

164. sa tvam evāsi nirdoṣo yuktiśāstrāvirodhivāk / Āptamīmāṁsā, 6

165 śruteḥ pramāṇāntarābādhanaṁ pūrvāparāvirodhaś ca avisaṁvādaḥ / Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 14.

166. Nyāyāvatāra, 8

167. sārikkha-vivakkhobhaya-muvamā"gamameva savvam aṇumāṇaṁ / Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, 470 b.

DHARMAKĪRTI AND AKALAṄKA

After having surveyed rapidly how the Buddhist and Jaina traditions on the problems concerned had developed upto the times of Dharmakīrti and Akalaṅka who are their respective representatives let us see how these two representatives are closely related to one another.

According to tradition Dharmakīrti was born in the South India, in the village of Trimalaya, in a Brahmaṇa family and received a Brahmaṇical education. He then became interested in Buddhism. Desiring to receive instruction from a direct pupil of Vasubandhu he arrived at Nālandā where Dharmapāla, pupil of Vasubandhu, was still living, although very old. His interest in logical problems was aroused, but Diṅnāga was no more alive; he therefore directed his steps towards Īśvarasena, a direct pupil of the great logician. He soon surpassed his teacher in the understanding of Diṅnāga's system. The remaining part of his lilfe was spent in teaching, public discussion, active propaganda and composition of works. He died in Kaliṅga in a monastery founded by him, surrounded by his pupils.[168] Dr. Mahendrakumara assigns Dharmakīrti to the period between 620 A.D. and 690 A.D.[169] Pt. Dalsukhbhai holds that the time of Dharmakīrti can be placed somewhere between 550 A.D. and 600 A D.[170]

His seven works we have already mentioned. They bear the stamp of a logician of the first order. He expresses his ideas in a compact style. His arguments are a hard nut to crack. 'It is the style of Dharmakīrti to deal with a particular topic not only in a single work at various places but to deal with the same topic in his various works... This shows dynamic quality and inexhaustible fertility of his mind. It was not his way to give out everything at one stretch; novel arguments are adduced whenever he finds occasion to discuss the incidental topics, just as ripples created in a tank give rise to newer ripples. This explains his discussion of the same topics in a different way at different places. It is note-worthy, however, that consistency of the latter with the former is maintained throughout his discussions just as ripples in a pool of water have rhythmic growth. It can be remarked that though Dharmkīrti has (generally) no system of exposition on the whole, still he is quite systematic in his ideas. In his elucidation of topics he does not deviate from his fundamental views, as for instance, according to Dharmakīrti, the universal (*sāmānya*) is a concept; though he discusses the universal at various places in a single work or the same in various works, he will never lose sight of the basic idea about the universal; and wherever occasion arises he supplies

168. Buddhist Logic, I, pp. 34–35
169. Dr. M. K. Jaina's Introduction (Hindi) to Siddhiviniścaya, p. 27
170. Pt. D. Malavania's Introduction (Hindi) to Dharmottarapradīpa, p. 45

new arguments to establish the conceptual characteristic of the universal. The same holds good about other topics also (momentarism etc.). The reader will find the discussion of one topic in newer garbs in his various works.'[171] While reading the auto-commentary of the Svārthānumāna-pariccheda of the Pramāṇavārtika one finds a model of scientific style—simple, compact, exact and full of meaning.

Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti were like a great impelling force responsible for the development of Medieval Indian philosophy. Their works on logic inspired the philosophers belonging to other schools to have a systematic logic of their own consistent with their own metaphysical tenets and to establish their cherished metaphysical theories on the strength of logic. As a result there arose great logicians in almost every school. Akalaṅka, the Jaina logician is one of them. As is the case with other outstanding figures, the brilliant personality of Akalaṅka too is surrounded by legends. But it is almost certain that he flourished beween 720 A. D. and 780 A. D.; that he belonged to Mānyakheṭa: that he was a son of Puruṣottama, a minister of Śubhatuṅga of Mānyakheṭa; that he stayed in the Buddhist *Maṭha* to study Buddhist philosophy and that he had debates with a Buddhist teacher at the court of king Himaśītala of Kaliṅga. Akalaṅka composed several works on logic—Laghīyastraya, Nyāyaviniścaya, Pramāṇasaṁgraha, Siddhiviniścaya. These are his original works. On all these he himself wrote short commentaries. Moreover, he wrote commentaries on the Tattvārthasūtra of Vācaka Umāsvāti(-mi) and Āptamīmāṁsā of Āc. Samantabhadra. They are respectively named as Rājavārtika and Aṣṭaśatī.[172]

How greatly he was influenced by Dharmakīrti will be clear from what follows. Akalaṅka's commentaries on Laghīyastraya and Pramāṇasaṁgraha closely resemble the Vṛtti on the Svārthānumāna-pariccheda, written by Dharmakīrti. Like Dharmakīrti, Akalaṅka generally does not repeat the words of Kārikās in the Vivṛti but explains merely the purport of the Kārikā. It seems that here Akalaṅka follows the style of Dharmakīrti.

Again, Nyāyaviniścaya, written in verses and prose, is designed after Pramāṇaviniścaya of Dharmakīrti. The original version of Nyāyaviniścaya is not available. Dr. Mahendrakumara restored the verse part of it from the commentary of Vādirāja, but the restoration of Vṛtti is impossible in the absence of a commentary on it.

The medieval period of Indian philosophy is surcharged by the demolishing and daring logic of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. Dharmakīrti even uses derogatory terms against his rivals; as for example, the

171. Pt. D. Malavania's Introduction to Svārthānumānapariccheda, p. 13.
172. For details of Akalaṅka's life, date and works one may refer to Dr. M. K. Jaina's Introduction to Siddhiviniścaya.

Jaina position is dubbed by him as *aślīla, ākulapralāpa* etc.[173] It was in order to combat especially the caustic remarks of Dharmakīrti that Akalaṅka felt the necessity of systematising the Jaina thought. Before attempting a refutation of other systems, particularly Dharmakīrti's, he endeavours to point out the strength of his own position. As a result we have from his pen works systematising Jaina philosophy in general and Jaina logic in particular.

In his writings Akalaṅka is very satirical and sarcastic about Buddhists, particularly about Dharmakīrti keeping in view the euphemistic criticism of Syādvāda resorted by Dharmakīrti.[174] He replies in forceful words. The examples of scathing attack on Dharmakīrti are innumerable in his works. Pramāṇasaṁgraha embodies denunciatory expressions such as *jāḍyahetavaḥ, paśulakṣaṇam, alaukikām, tāmasam* which were used by Dharmakīrti himself.[175]

There is hardly any doubt about the fact that Akalaṅka imbibes the method, style and spirit of Dharmakīrti. He has studied not only almost all the original works of Dharmakīrti but also the commentaries on them. This becomes clear from the words that Akalaṅka quotes from the works of Dharmakīrti and his commentators.[176]

Akalaṅka sometimes bodily takes the sentences of Dharmakīrti (sometimes introducing minor changes therein) and makes use of them in connection with constructing his own ones. Many a time he quotes Dharmakīrti's theory under refutation in the latter's own words but without mentioning him by name. His general practice however is to present Dharmakīrti's idea and then refute it. In his original works one comes across refutations of Dharmakīrti off and on.[177] This obviously suggests that the main purpose that remained constantly before Akalaṅka in composing his original works should have been to save the Jaina philosophy from the Buddhist's and particularly Dharmakīrti's attacks.

Even in his style Akalaṅka imitates Dharmakīrti. For, like the latter he too is compact, exact and difficult to understand.

Thus Akalaṅka is strongly influenced by Dharmakīrti. This peculiar relationship obtaining between the two naturally suggests the problem of studying the content of Akalaṅka's criticism of Dharmakīrti. This we shall do with refernce to the main problems of metaphysics and logic.

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173. Svārthānumānapariccheda, pp. 59–60
174. sugato'pi mṛgo jāto mṛgo'pi sugatas tathā /
tathāpi sugato vandyo mṛgaḥ khādyo yatheṣyate //
tathā vastubalād eva bhedābhedavyavasthiteḥ /
codito dadhi khādeti kim uṣṭram abhidhāvati // Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 80
175. Ibid, pp. 115—116
176. Dr. M K. Jaina's Introduction (Hindi) to Siddhiviniścaya. pp. 30–36
177. Ibid, pp. 27–28.

CHAPTER II

CRITERION OF REALITY AND ITS APPLICATION

The quest for reality is eternal. Generally all philosophers agree in holding that it is only Existence that is real. To say that Non-existence exists is a contradiction in terms. Similarly, it is logically impossible to say that Existence is not. But in Nāsadīya Sūkta it is said that even Existence was not in the beginning.[1] This is quite unintelligible. Even the commetators seem to have been puzzled. They, having taken the help of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, interpreted the statement in the sense that Existence in its manifest aspect was not then.[2] We cannot on that account call it absolutely non-existent; for, it is the positive being from which the whole universe arises. In the Upaniṣads we find some statements to the effect that Existence has come out of Non-existence.[3] Here again the commentators had recourse to the Sāṅkhya philosophy and interpreted Existence in the sense of manifest reality and Non-exisence in the sense of unmanifest reality.[4] A men of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika bias would have interpreted the Non-existence under consideration in the sense of a state of non-existence of all effects in their own ultimate constituent reals viz. atoms. Although the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas are believers in the theory of the creation of a totally new effect out of its specific cause (rather causal aggregate) (*asat-kāryavāda*), they nevertheless deny that a thing can come out of a non-existent cause. Nobody is prepared to accept absolute Non-existence as an ultimate cause of the universe. In the same Upaniṣad it is emphatically stated that in the beginning there was only Existence (*sat*).[5] In the Ṛgveda itself we are told that Existence is the only reality which is called by various names.[6] The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas would say that it is true that Non-existence (*asat*) cannot be the ultimate cause of the universe, but that does not mean that it is not real. Non-existence is also real.[7] They have given the status of an independent

1. Ṛgveda, X. 129.
2. tathā no san naiva sadātmavat sattvena nirvācyam āsīt / Sāyaṇabhāṣya thereon.
3. asad vā idam agra āsīt / tato vai sad ajāyata / Taittirīya Up., II. 7.
   asad evedam agra āsīt / Chāndogya Up., III. 19.1.
4. asad iti vyākṛtanāmarūpaviśeṣaviparītam avyākṛtaṁ brahma ucyate;.../ tataḥ asataḥ vai sat pravibhaktanāmarūpaviśeṣam ajāyata utpannam / Śāṅkarabhāṣya on Taitt. Up., II. 7.
   asat avyākṛtanāmarūpam idaṁ jagat aśeṣam agre prāgavasthāyām utpatteḥ āsit, na tv asadeva; 'katham asataḥ saj jāyeta' iti asatkāryatvasya pratiṣedhāt / Śāṅkarabhāṣya on Chā. Up., III. 19. 1.
5. sad eva somya idam agra āsīt / Chā. Up., VI. 2. 1.
6. ekaṁ sad viprā bahudhā vadanti / Ṛgveda, I. 164.
7. kiṁ punas tattvam? sataś ca sadbhāvo'sataś cāsadbhāvaḥ / Nyāyabhāṣya, p. 2.
   See also Nyāyadarśana (Bengali), Vol. I, p. 13.

category *(padārtha)* to Non-existence *(abhāva)*. They have gone to the extent of objectifying all thought-forms.[8] But we should note that they too recognise that Non-existence is not Being *(sattā)*; moreover, they hold that its apprehension is dependent upon that of Existence.[9] According to the Sāṅkhya[10] and the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā[11] schools the Non-existence of a thing in another means the bare existence of the latter. For example, the non-existence of a jar on the table means the existence of the table *per se*. Hence non-existence is the bare existence of the locus *(adhikaraṇa-kaivalya)*. The Buddhists maintain that reality is not split into existence and non-existence; it consists of existence only. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā,[12] and the Jaina[13] schools of thought agree in so far as they hold that all things have two characters, a positive and a negative. A thing exists positively in itself and is characterised negatively by the absence of other things in it. The crux of the whole discussion is that almost all schools, except the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, agree as regards the essential point that only an existence can be real; the differences pertain to its characteristic features. The Sāṅkhyas and the Buddhists do not accept a negative element in the formation of the nature of a real; for them, non-existence is but of the form of its own locus. The Jainas and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas, on the other hand, do accept such a negative element; for them, non-existence is an attribute of its own locus and hence relatively identical with this locus. Thus we conclude that it is only the existent that is real.[14]

Now the question is as to how an existent entity can be known. Vātsyāyana says that if anything is cognised as being or existent then

8. 'The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, as it emerged at the end of its long-sustained duel with the Buddhist systems, very rigorously established the objectivity of relation (samavāya), of whole (avayavin), of the universal (sāmānya), and even of non-existence (abhāva). It minimised and even denied the work of thought. It objectified and externalised all thought-forms, and put them up as categories of the object.' The Cultural Heritage of India, III, p. 38
9. tad evaṁ sataḥ prakāśakaṁ pramāṇam asad api prakāśayati / Nyāyabhāṣya, p. 2.
10. The Sāṁkhyas applied their idea of pratikṣaṇa-pariṇāma and viewed ghaṭābhāva as a pariṇāmakṣaṇa of bhūtala.
na hi bhūtalasya pariṇāmaviśeṣāt kaivalyalakṣaṇād anyo ghaṭābhāvo nāma / Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī, p, 34.
11. tathā hi prābhākarāḥ bhāvāntaram eva bhāvāntarāpekṣayā abhāva iti vyavahriyate / Saptapadārthī, p. 76.
12. svarūpa-pararūpābhyāṁ nityaṁ sadasadātmake /
vastuni...// Ślokavārtika, Abhāvavāda, Śl. 12.
13. sad eva sarvam ko necchet svarūpādicatuṣṭayāt /
asad eva viparyāsān na cen na vyavatiṣṭhate // Āptamīmāṁsā, kā. 15.
14. Akalaṅka rightly observes that Non-existence is neither the object of affirmation nor the object of negation.
dravya-kṣetra-kāla-bhāvāntaraiḥ pratiṣedhaḥ saṁjñinaḥ sataḥ kriyate, na punar asataḥ tadvidhipratiṣedhaviṣayatvāt / Aṣṭaśatī, p. 193

it must be an existent.[15] We can establish the existence of a thing through the means of valid knowledge.[16]

But this is hardly satisfactory. We want to know the essence of reality, existence. What is the nature of it? What is its differentia? This is one of the most difficult questions to answer. We cannot expect the persons born at a period as early as the age of the Vedas, Āgamas or Sūtras to answer this question in specific precise terms. The predominent tendency of this age is just to enumerate the categories and rest content with that. For example, in the Jaina Āgamas in answer to the question as to what knowledge is, we are told that knowledge is of five types. Scientific division and sub-division is an essential primary stage in understanding the nature of reality. So in that early period it was quite natural that the query regarding the essence of reality should be answered as it was. Thus the Sāṅkhyas would say that both the *Puruṣa* and the *Prakṛti* are equally real; Vedāntins would declare that *Brahman* or *Puruṣa* alone is real *par excellence*, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas would announce that their seven categories are real[17] but that the term *artha* is reserved only for three categories viz. substance, quality and action.[18] The early Buddhists would say that all *Dharmas*, past, present and future are real while the Jainas would insist that all the five (or six) *Dravyas* are real.

Though the philosophers have not as yet formulated the definitions of reality, they have described what according to them are reals. A scrutiny of these descriptions leads us to deduce that the real is either absolutely changeless, or absolutely momentary or a variable constant. *Puruṣa* and *Brahman* admit of no change whatsoever; the *Sāṅkhya Prakṛti* and the Jaina *Dravyas* (sentient as well as non-sentient) are variable constants. *Dharmas* of Buddhism are absolutely discrete momentary points; some of the categories of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas are absolutely changeless while some undergo change.

Later on they tried to formulate definitions of reality.[19] The Vedāntins defined it as that which exists for all time, without admitting any

15. 'sat', 'sat' iti gṛhyamāṇaṁ yathābhūtam aviparītaṁ tattvaṁ bhavati / Nyāyabhāṣya, p.2.
16. saṁvid eva hi bhagavatī viṣayasattvāvagame śaraṇam / Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 22.
prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇāddhi // Sāṁkhyakārikā, 4.
17. dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyābhāvāḥ sapta padārthāḥ /
Tarkasaṅgraha, p. 2.
18. artha iti dravya-guṇa-karmasu / Vaiśeṣikasūtra, VIII. 2. 3.
19. Ratnakīrti in his Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi gives almost an exhaustive list of the various definitions of reality.
darśane darśane nānāprakāraṁ sattvalakṣaṇam uktam āste, arthakriyākāritvaṁ, sattāsamavāyaḥ, svarūpasattvam, utpādavyayadhrauvyayogitvaṁ, pramāṇaviṣayatvaṁ, sadupalambhapramāṇagocaratvaṁ, vyapadeśaviṣayatvam ityādi.../
Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts, p. 20.

change whatsoever (*kūṭastha*). According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas the real is that which is related to *sattā* (Being) through an internal relation. The Buddhists define reality as momentary, while the Jainas defined it as characterised by origination, decay and persistence.

After such definitons came to be formulated and discussed, the different schools of thought vigorously attacked the concept of reality upheld by the rival ones. The Jaina definition is criticised on the ground that contradictory attributes can never be predicated of one entity.[20] The Buddhist and Vedāntist definitions are attacked on the ground that an absolutely momentary or an absolutely changeless entity is beyond the ken of our experience. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika definition is criticised on the point that it is not applicable to some of their own categories which are called real *(sat)* by them.[21] This is sheer polemics. The rival schools attack one another just in order to save their own position. But there is no one criterion acceptable to all, on the basis of which a scientific examination could be conducted of the definitions in question.

A man of sharp intellect will never be satisfied with mere definitions and polemics. He will point out that with the help of a definition one may attribute the epithet 'real' *(sat)* to anything one chooses. But the real question is whether this definition applies to the thing which a common man considers to be real. Fortunately the Buddhists suggested a definition which seems to satisfy this (rather exacting) demand. Thus they declare causal efficiency[22] to be the criterion of reality. We would expect the Vedāntins, Vijñānavādins and Śūnyavādins to reject this criterion,[23] but even they in a sense accept it. As for the realist systems

20. naikasminnasambhavāt / Brahmasūtra, II. 2.33.
21. satām api syāt kvacid eva sattā / Anyayogavyavacchedadvātriṁśikā, 8.
22. The word arthakriyā occurs in such an early work as Lalitavistara, but it has no philosophical significance. It is used in the sense of 'the being useful (to others)' (Sir Monier Williams). Dasgupta notes that it is found in Candrakīrti's commentary on Nāgārjuna but has no philosophical significance (History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 155). Dharmakīrti seems to be the first philosopher to give it a truly philosophical significance.
23. "An objection has been raised that reality cannot be supposed to consist in causal efficiency, as causal efficiency exists even in such unreal fictions as sky-lotus and the like. These fictions certainly generate an impression in the mind and thus have causal efficiency in that respect, but they cannot be accepted as real on that account. Moreover, in dreams and illusions, unreal things are seen to have practical efficiency. The false snake in the rope is as much a cause of trepidation as the real one......The Buddhist replies that predication of causal efficiency relates to an objective reality and does not include subjective fictions......It will be a sheer perversion of facts to apply to these mental fictions the standard of reality, which belongs to objective facts......When we deny causal efficiency to these ideal fictions, we deny it in the sense of their being objective reality...Causal efficiency therefore stands unrefuted as the test and definition of reality, as reality connotes real substantive facts and not subjective fictions."
The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, pp. 7–8
Vide Tattvasaṅgraha, Verses 425–427.

they readily accepted it as a criterion of reality. That is why Ratnakīrti in his Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi says that though the different philosophical systems endorse different criteria of existence or being, he would open his argument with the universally accepted such criterion, namely, causal efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*).[24]

Here it will be useful to have a bird's eye-view of the treatment of this problem in the pre-Dharmakīrti Buddhist literature, a treatment that might have provided Dharmakīrti with food for thought and enabled him to formulate a full-fledged doctrine of Causal Efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*). Nāgārjuna showed that causality is transcendentally ideal by demonstrating its impossibility in all the four possible alternatives. We may consider the effect to be something caused by itself (*svataḥ utpatti*), or to be something caused by factors other than itself (*parataḥ utpatti*), or to be both, or to be neither. His dialectical criticism discloses the inherent flaw in each conception. The first alternative represents the Sāṅkhya view of causation while the second represents the Buddhist and to some extent the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of causation. In Candrakīrti's elaboration and elucidation of Nāgārjuna's criticism of the first alternative we have some arguments that can be used to show that an eternal cause like *Prakṛti*, that is, a cause which is eternal and yet undergoes change, cannot produce an effect.[25] But what about the absolutely changeless cause? In this connection we find in Āryadeva's Catuḥ Śataka strong arguments disproving the concept of an absolutely changeless cause. As a matter of fact, the chapter named Nityārthapratiṣedhabhāvanāsandarśana refutes the view that there can exist an absolutely changeless thing. Nāgārjuna, while criticising the second alternative, suggests some main arguments that show the impossibility of a momentary cause.[26] Candrakīrti has elaborated them and added some new points of his own.[27] In the Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu we are told that God etc. are non-causes as they cannot account for order etc. of the world-process.[28] Moreover, we should note that Vasubandhu criticises the Vātsīputrīya concept of soul by saying that such an eternal, uncaused and unchanging entity would be without any practical efficiency which alone is what ensures the reality of an entity. Dharmakīrti being a Vijñānavādi-cum-Sautrāntika could not deny causality like Nāgārjuna; on the contrary, he actually made causal efficiency the test of reality. Dharmakīrti had before him the arguments of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti that were directed against the doctrine of a momentary

24. kevalaṁ yad etad arthakriyākāritvaṁ sarvajanaprasiddham āste.../ Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts, p. 21.
25. Mādhyamikakārikāvṛtti (=Prasannapadā), p. 14, also p. 22.
26. Mādhyamikakārikā, I. 3, 5, 11; also xx. 2–4, 20.
27. Mādhyamikakārikāvṛtti, pp. 78–82.
28. neśvarādeḥ kramādibhiḥ / Abhidharmakośa, II. 64.

cause and also the arguments of Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Candrakīrti that disproved the doctrine of an eternal cause. This perhaps is why he cautiously formulated his thesis that only momentary things are causally efficient. Furthermore, with a view to showing the impossibility of causal efficiency in eternal things he utilised and elaborated the arguments of Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Candrakīrti, who had already come out against the doctrine of an eternal cause. He, for the first time, formulated a dilemma of simultaneity and succession and showed that the horns of this dilemma could in no way be escaped by the eternalist; as an illustration in point we may refer to the criticism of God and *Jāti* (universal) undertaken by him in his Pramāṇavārtika. We can at least surmise that Dharmakīrti's task was facilitated by Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Candrakīrti. Of course, Dharmakīrti took up the suggestion from his predecessors and made causal efficiency the sole test of reality. The ultimate existent, says he, is efficient. [29] The inefficient is the unreal and we have nothing to do with it just as a prospective bride has nothing to do with the beauty or ugliness of a eunuch. [30] He is probably the first philosopher [31] to define reality in terms of causal efficiency. But he has not stopped at that. He is not content with merely giving the criterion of reality. He, with his formidable logic, shows its applicability to momentary things and its inapplicability to non-momentary things. Here lies the greatness and genius of Dharmakīrti. He holds that only momentary things are causally efficient, that is, none but momentary things can produce an effect. Let us follow his logic.

Dharmakīrti's Position : The common belief is that though seeds etc. are by nature the producers of sprout etc. they do not produce these sprout etc. by themselves but stand in need of certain additional causes like water etc. in order to do that. But this is a misconception. For, a seed that is efficient to produce a sprout does actually produce a sprout while a seed that does not actually produce a sprout is not by nature the producer of a sprout. We must, therefore, conclude that a seed that actually produces a sprout is different in nature from a seed that does not actually produce a sprout. Certainly, it is impossible for an entity to come to possess a nature that is different from its inherent nature. That is to say, if a seed is always of the nature of 'producer of a sprout' it

29. sa pāramārthiko bhāvo ya evārthakriyākṣamaḥ // Pramāṇavārtika, III. 165
30. Ibid, III. 210-211
31. It is interesting to note that the causal efficiency in the form of a capacity to produce successful activity was first recognised by Vātsyāyana as a criterion to be applied to test the validity of knowledge, – a performance essentially not much different from Dharmakīrti's acceptance of causal efficiency as a criterion of reality. Vātsyāyana explicitly states that knowledge is valid (arthavat) when it leads to successful activity in relation to its object (pravṛttisāmarthyāt).

should produce a sprout not only when it does actually do so but also earlier.

Hence our contention is that the seed of the moment immediately preceding the moment of sprout-production is alone of the nature of 'producer of a sprout'; as for the seeds of the earlier moments, they are the causes of the cause of a sprout inasmuch as the sprout-producing seed is produced by these seeds-of-the-earlier-moments (occuring one after another in the form of a series).

Thus the sprout-producing seed and seeds of the earlier moments are not identical in nature because the seed of a particular moment is produced by the seed of the immediately preceding moment. That is to say, seeds of the different moments have got different causes, and hence they cannot be identical in nature.

One might ask: "If the seed of the moment immediately preceding the moment of sprout-production is capable of producing a sprout why does it not do so singly? That is to say, such a seed should not stand in need of any accessory." To this our reply is that the seed of the moment immediately preceding the moment of sprout-production does actually produce a sprout, and to do so is its nature while nothing can change the nature of an entity. It comes to this that the fact that the sprout-producing seed is always found to be placed in the midst of certain particular accessories does not disprove that this seed rather than the seed of any earlier moment possesses the capactty to produce a sprout.

One might say: "If each and every member of a causal aggregate is capable of producing the effect concerned why should all these members together (and not anyone of these members) be required in order to produce this effect?" To this our reply is that there takes place no intelligent planning on the part of the members of a causal aggregate, and this is why these members never take a decision to the effect 'since each one of us is capable of producing this effect let some one of us should do the job and the rest retire.' It is on account of their respective causes being what they are that the members of a causal aggregate are born as possessing their respective natures and as occurring at their respective places, but since the production of an effect on the part of these members is not a voluntary affair they produce this effect without discussing the matter among themselves. Nor can you blame the effect for its being produced by so many members (and not by any one of them), for to be produced by these many members is the nature of this effect.

One might ask: "If the members of a causal aggregate are all capable of producing an effect why is it that they produce one particular

effect rather than any other." To this our reply is that the members of a particular causal aggregate are competent to produce that effect alone which they do actually produce. Hence there arises no question why a causal aggregate should produce this rather than that effect. It is on the basis of our empirical observation that we conclude as to what particular causal aggregate produces this or that effect; there is therefore no sense in arguing that a causal aggregate is free to produce this rather than that effect.

Thus each particular member of a causal aggregate possesses the capacity to produce without hindrance one common effect, and as soon as these different members come together (i. e. as soon as they are born) they produce this effect. It is only in this sense that a causal aggregate is called the support of the effect it produces. That is to say, since a real entity cannot last for more than one moment the members of a causal aggregate are not in a position to prolong their existence till the effect concerned is produced and then to act as the support of this effect in the literal sense of the term. Thus it is that when there is produced a particular state of visual consciousness the fact that the effect in question is a state of consciousness is determined by one member of the concerned causal aggregate, the fact that this effect is a state of colour-consciousness by another member, while the fact that the effect is a state of particular-formed colour consciousness by a third member; but in spite of all this, the conscious state in question remains an unitary entity.

One might say, "If a real entity produces the effect it does as soon as it comes into existence then there seems to be no sense in maintaining that different entities co-operate in producing a particular effect, and this is because momentary entities can find no time to produce novelty in one another (while co-operation on the part of several different entities is impossible unless they produce some novelty in one another)." To this our reply is that co-operation on the part of several different entities does not always mean their producing some novelty in one another; and to the question as to what this co-operation always means our reply is "joint performance of one common function." Thus seed, (water, soil, manure) etc. of the moment immediately preceding the moment of sprout-production, co-operate in producing this sprout as soon as they come together. As a matter of fact, since 'joint performance of one common function' is what co-operation really means, and since joint production of an effect is undertaken by the causal aggregate as it stands at the moment immediately preceding the production of this effect, what really co-operate in producing an effect are the members of the concerned causal aggregate as they stand at the moment immediately

preceding the production of this effect. And at the moment immediately preceding the production of an effect the members of the concerned causal aggregate are found to possess their respective natures that are due to their respective causes being what they are; that is to say, it is logically impossible for these different members to acquire a novelty (which acquisition is equivalent to developing a new nature) as a result of their coming together. Nor can it be maintained that these different members jointly produce some novel entity whose novelty accounts for these members co-operating in the production of the effect concerned; for, to maintain that will be to deny that these members are an immediate cause of this effect (while the phenomenon under investigation is the immediate production of an effect as a result of a mutual co-operation on the part of the members of the concerned causal aggregate.) We, therefore, conclude that the accessories come into existence (in whatever form they do and at whatever place and time they do) as determined by their respective causes, and hence it is in the very nature of things impossible for any of them to occur at any other time or at any other place; and the effect in question (i.e. the effect for whose production the causal aggregate in question is competent) ensues as soon as this cause proper and these accessories come together (i.e. as soon as they are born). This is what we mean when we say that co-operation stands for a joint performance of one common function.

One might ask: "But what is it that renders the members of a causal aggregate competent to produce the effect concerned?" To this our reply is: "The respective causes of these members." Then one might ask: "But why is it then that these members produce this effect not when they are alone but only when they are together? For if each of these members is competent to produce this effect it should not be impossible to find a case where someone of these members produces this effect singly." To this our reply is that things which look similar are not necessarily of the same nature. For example, seeds which produce a sprout and those which do not, look similar but they are of different natures. Thus theoretically we can say that an entity which belongs to a particular type porduces a particular effect irrespective of everything else; but in practice we distinguish between two entities, which look similar and behave differently, by observing the accessories that are available to them. And this misleads us into thinking that here is a case of two entities behaving differently not because they belong to two different types but because two types of accessories are available to them.

Thus as soon as colour, eye etc, come near each other they produce visual consciousness, but this coming near stands in need of certain specific causes, and it is because these causes are not available always

and everywhere, visual consciousness does not take place always and everywhere. That is to say, why eye etc. produce visual consciousness occasionally and not always is not that they occasionally undergo some novelty as a result of coming near each other but that the factors which bring them near each other are not always available.

On this logic it becomes obvious that causal relationships can obtain only between entities that are becoming different every moment but never between entities that are each of them (allegedly) perdurable. And this is so because it is impossible for one entity to possess more than one nature. For, an entity that performs a function is capable of performing that function while an entity that does not perform a function is incapable of performing that function. To say that an entity lasts for two moments is to say that it performs no function during the first moment of its career while performing a function during the second moment. And this, on our logic, is to attribute two natures (i. e. a self-contradictory nature) to one entity. One might say: "An entity performs a function when the requisite accessories are available to it. That is to say, there is nothing incongruous in maintaining that an entity refrains from performing its function so long as the requisite accessories are not available to it." Then we ask: "Is this (allegedly perdurable) entity capable or incapable of performing its appropriate function single-handed ? If it is capable of doing so why does it refrain from doing so ? And how can an entity which is not performing a function be called capable of performing this function ?" The opponent might reply: "It is our common experience that weavers etc. who are capable of producing cloth etc. do not always produce the cloth etc." But this means that our simpleton opponent is in a playful mood and will like us to repeat one perfomance again and again. For, we have already shown that an entity which actually performs a function is alone capable of peifoming that function just as seed of the moment immediately preceding the moment of sprout-production is alone capable of producing a sprout.

That an entity which actually performs a function is alone capable of performing that function is a conclusion we are compelled to grant on the ground that it is impossible for an entity to possess more than one nature. This conclusion is corroborated by the examples of seed etc. (which produce sprout etc. at the last moment of their career as seed etc. and not at any earlier moment).

It might be said that at the last moment of their career seed etc. come to acquire the capacity to perform their respective functions. But we shall like to enquire if this "capacity" is or is not a part of the nature of these seeds etc. If it is a part of their nature, it proves our thesis that seed etc. of the last moment are different in type from those

of the earlier moments; if it is not a part of their nature, seed etc. should always remain incapable of producing sprout etc.

Again, we would like to ask as to why this (allegedly perdurable) entity performs its appropriate function only when the requisite accessories are available to it. One might reply: "It is so because we have seen it to be so." But in that case the 'seeing' of our almighty opponent is indeed highly competent; for, we are being told that entities which are by nature incapable of performing a function start performing it as soon as this "seeing" occurs. A logical corollary to this position is that an entity will perform no function and remain issueless in case it happens not to catch the attention of our worthy opponent. We are already worried about the fate of an entity like this.

The opponent might say: "We do not mean to suggest that it is on account of our 'seeing' that things perform their respective functions not singly but assisted by the requisite accessories. Our contention is that on observation we find such to be the state of affairs." To this we reply: "That is true. We also grant that the members of a causal aggregate are 'capable of performing a function' in the sense that on coming together they find it impossible not to immediately perform the function concerned. But our question is whether 'to immediately perform the function concerned' was since ever the nature of these members, or this nature came to be generated in them at the moment when they did actually perform the function concerned? The reply to this question should be that 'to immediately produce the effect concerned' was since ever the nature of the members of a causal aggregate, and this is because the (allegedly) perdurable entities which are unperished and unborn for a considerable period of time can at no time lack what is natural to them. And this reply will be as absurd as one's saying that one's mother is barren. For, it is senseless to maintain that 'to perfom a particular function' is the nature of a particular entity but that this function is not actually performed by this entity until certain conditions are fulfilled."

One might say: "It is the nature of an entity to perform a particular function when the requisite accessories are available to it. That is, it is not self-contradictory to maintain that it is the nature of an entity to perform a particular function but that this entity does not perform this function until certain conditions are fulfilled." But to say this is to admit that an entity not accompanied by the requisite accessories is different in nature from the same (rather similar) entity accompanied by those accessories. And the two entities which have got two different natures must be two different entities (and not one identical entity). Certainly, even when it is with the help of the requisite accessories that an entity

performs a function this performance on its part is due not to the nature of others (but to its own nature). And 'its own nature' must belong to an allegedly perdurable entity even when the requisite accessories are not available to it; hence there arises the contingency of this entity performing its appropriate function always (and not only when the requisite accessories are available to it).

One might ask: "But granting that a real entity must be momentary, why is it that an entity capable of performing a function does not perform this function so long as the requisite accessories are not available to it ?" To this our simple reply is that it is so because the entity capable of performing a function is not born so long as the requisite accessories are not there to be availed of. One might then ask: "Why this ban on the birth of an entity so long as the requisite accessories are not there to be availed of ?" To this our reply is that it is so because an entity is by nature momentary. That is, the entity capable of performing a function must come into existence just on the eve of this function while the requisite accessories must be available to this entity at the time when it comes into existence.

We have already shown how the members of a causal aggregate jointly perform one common function. It has been shown that the members of a causal aggregate are incapable of occuring otherwise. This is to say, it is the nature of an entity (necessarily momentary by nature) to produce under the conditions, which, in turn, is the same thing as saying that the entity capable of producing an effect is not born until the requisite accessories are there to be availed of. In the case of a momentary entity there cannot arise a contingeney of two natures belonging to it. For, here the entity that performs a particular function is the entity that comes into existence at the moment immediately preceding the moment of the occurrence of this function. That is, since no other entity can have the same nature as this entity (because no other entity performs the function this entity does) and since no other entity can have the same cause as this entity (because no other entity can be born at the same place and at the same time as this entity) there is no possibility of our confusing the nature of this entity with that of another entity. All this goes to prove that if an entity is regarded as non-momentary there arises a question why this entity performs its appropriate function at one time rather than any other; on the other hand, no such question need arise if an entity is regarded as necessarily momentary.

One might say: "'To immediately produce the effect concerned' is no doubt the nature of a (perdurable) cause which stands in need of no accessories to produce this effect. But it is the effect which needs the services of certain accessories, and this is why an effect is produced not

by the cause taken singly but by the cause assisted by the requisite accessories." But even this view does not remove the self-contradiction pointed out above, for here too we are told that a cause is capable of producing the effect concerned single-handed but that this effect is not produced until this cause is assisted by the requisite accessories. As a matter of fact, to grant that a cause does not produce the effect until it is assisted by certain accessories is to go against the position that 'to immediately produce the effect concerned' is the nature of a cause. The opponent might say: "All that I mean to maintain is that a cause does produce the effect (and not that it does so immediately). But even if capable of producing the effect concerned all alone, a cause, in order to produce this effect, needs the services of the requisite accessories. How can it then be possible for a cause to dispense with the services of the requisite accessories?" To this our reply is that it is precisely by dispensing with all accessories that a cause can prove that it is capable of producing the effect concerned all alone. As for the assertion that the services of certain accessories are required by the effect (and not by the cause), it is merely a way of saying that a cause does not produce the effect all alone, a statement which it is difficult to reconcile with the position that a cause is capable of producing the effect all alone. These incoherent outcries of our opponent are the result of an intense feeling of jealousy having taken possession of his heart, and this is why he deserves neglect.

Thus we conclude that 'co-operation' in the form of 'joint performance of a common function' is possible only on the part of momentary entities. For, certainly a non-momentary entity cannot perform a function all alone (while it is equally incomprehesible why it should require the services of the accessories); and if it can, the role of accessories in an act of causation remains unaccountable.

There are certain cases of causation where the accessories do produce a novelty in the cause proper. For example, before the seed produces a sprout, water etc. produce novelty in this seed, and before raw rice produces cooked rice, fire, etc. produce a novelty in this raw rice. But even in these cases the accessories do not produce a novelty in the cause proper as it stands at the moment when these accessories first come in cantact with it; for, it is impossible to produce a novelty in a momentary entity that has already come into existence (out of its cause). What actually happens is that the seed-series preceding the moment of 'contact with the accessories like water etc.' is different in type from the seed-series succeeding this moment; similarly, the raw-rice-series preceding the moment of 'contact with the accessories like fire etc.' is different in type from the raw-rice-series succeeding this moment.

This difference has to be posited because the seed-series would have continued to remain a seed-series had water etc. not come in contact with it; similarly, the raw-rice-series would have continued to remain a raw-rice-series had fire etc. not come in contact with it. It is as a result of coming in contact with water etc. that the seed-series is replaced by a sprout-series though not immediately after this contact takes place; similarly, it is as a result of coming in contact with fire etc. that the raw-rice-series is replaced by a cooked-rice-series though not immediately after this contact takes place. This is what we mean when we grant that in these cases of causation the accessories do produce a novelty in the cause proper. Let us not forget that even before the accessories were available to a seed this seed was different every moment but we call the seed-series of the later period a different type of series in contrast to the seed-series of the period preceding the moment of 'contact with the accessories.' This incidentally explains why it is often said that in the period succeeding the moment of the seed's contact with the accessories a later member in the seed-series possesses a greater novelty than an earlier one. Another example of this sort of 'production of novelty' is provided by our experience that on entering a comparatively darker room from a comparatively brighter one we at first are unable to see anything. But since after sometime we are in a position to see things there is warrant (no compulsion) to suppose that in this case the accessories that an eye requires for producing visual consciousness go on producing in this eye a greater and greater novelty throughout the interval when we are seeing nothing.

However, in the case of a causal aggregate which produces the effect concerned immediately after the members of this aggregate come together there is no possibility of the accessories producing a novelty in the cause proper. For example, visual consciousness is produced as soon as eye, object, light, etc. come together, and hence there is no possibility of object, light, etc. producing a novelty in the eye in order that it produces visual consciousness. In a case of this type the different members of the concerned causal aggregate are brought together at one place (this 'bringing together' having certain particular cause of its own—*utsarpaṇa-pratyaya*), and as soon as they are thus brought together at one place the effect concerned comes into existence. Here it is very obvious that 'co-operation' on the part of the different members of a causal aggregate means only 'joint performance of a cammon function' on their part (and not 'production of a novelty in the cause proper by the accessories.').

On the other hand, in the case of such a causal aggregate where the accessories produce a novelty in the cause proper we find that the

series represented by the cause proper (i. e. 'series occurring at the locus of the cause proper') undergoes a change of nature as a result of the accessories being made available to this cause proper. In this case the coming together of the different members of the causal aggregate is not immediately followed by the emergence of the effect concerned. What happens here is that the members of the causal aggregate are replaced moment after moment by entities which are outwardly similar to these members. But out of these entities one which represents the cause proper has acquired a 'novelty' that is peculiarly suited for the emergence of the effect concerned at a later moment. With each passing moment this novelty goes on being augmented and finally we reach the moment which is immediately followed by the emergence of the effect concerned. It is the causal aggregate of this moment which is the (immediate) cause of the effect concerned; the causal aggregate of a moment earlier, the 'cause of this cause,' the causal aggregate of two moments earlier, the 'cause of the cause of this cause,' and so on and so forth. After the emergence of the effect concerned there remains no series to be called by the same name as the cause proper, for at the locus of the cause proper there now arises a series called by the same name as the effect concerned. As a matter of fact, in the type of cases under consideration this is a useful rule of thumb to mark out a cause proper from among the total causal aggregate.

One might say: "You maintain that the accessories produce a novelty in the cause proper which, in turn, produces the effect concerned. But it is difficult to conceive how the accessories produce a novelty in the cause proper. For, these accessories (and the cause proper of the moment when the accessories come near it) do not themselves possess a 'novelty' that might enable them to produce a 'novelty' in the cause proper (of the next moment onwards); and if the accessories (and the cause proper) need not themselves possess a novelty in order to produce another 'novelty' in the cause proper why should they not be in a position to produce the effect itself without the cause proper possessing any novelty? And if all this is granted there should be no difficulty in seeing how on receiving assistance from the requisite accessories a non-momentary cause proper produces the effect concerned; for, now there will not arise the contingency of the cause proper having developed a new 'nature' as a result of receiving assistance from the requisite accessories.

And you cannot maintain that at the moment when they come together the accessories (and the cause proper) already possess a 'novelty' that enables them to produce another novelty in the cause proper (of the next moment onwards); for, that will lead to an infinite regress (inas-

much as a similar question will arise concerning the origin of the novelty possessed by these accessories and the cause proper). Nor can you maintain that the accessories (and the cause proper), inasmuch as they are always capable of joining hands in order to produce a novelty in the cause proper, are eternally possessed of the novelty we are talking of. For, we find that the effect concerned is produced when the requisite accessories come together to assist the cause proper and that it is not produced when these accessories do not come to assist the cause proper. This would not have happened in case the accessories (and the cause proper) were always capable of joining hands in order to produce a novelty in the cause proper.

Thus we conclude that the accessories produce in the cause proper no novelty that might be said to enable it to produce the effect concerned (after several moments)."

To this our reply is that we are never tired of repeating our thesis again and again; if that be how people are convinced of its correctness. And this thesis is that 'co-operation' on the part of the several members of a causal aggregate in producing the effect cancerned does not consist in these members producing a novelty in one another. Hence it is no objection against our position that we suppose the accessories (and the cause proper) to be devoid of a novelty and yet capable of producing a novelty in the cause proper. That is, it is the nature of a causal aggregate that it produces the effect concerned without its members producing a novelty in one another.

One might ask: "In that case, how is even 'performance of one common function' possible on the part of the various accessories (and the cause proper)? For, if these accessories (and the cause proper) can produce a novelty in the cause proper even without producing a novelty in one another, it should be possible for any one of them to produce this novelty in the cause proper. And if that be granted it should be possible for any one of these accessories (or for the cause proper) to produce the effect itself (which, according to you, is due to a novelty having been generated in the cause proper by the accessories)." To this we have already given a reply. For, it is our contention that in all entitative series whatsoever novel entities come into existence every moment (though this novelty often remains concealed from us owing to the similarity that obtains between the several members of one particular series). But in order to produce a particular effect certain particular types of entities must come together at one place. This is why accessories must come near the cause proper if they are to produce a novelty in the cause proper and thus to enable it to produce the effect concerned. And since this 'coming together near

the cause proper' is not always possible on the part of the various accessories they do not always produce this novelty in the cause proper. It is, therefore, meaningless to expect that any one of the accessories (or the cause proper) might produce a novelty in the cause proper and thus enable it to produce the effect concerned. Moreover, we have already urged that causation is of two types, viz. (i) the type where the accessories produce a novelty in the series represented by the cause proper (and thus enable the cause proper to produce the effect concerned after an interval of time), and (ii) the type where the accessories produce no such novelty in the cause proper and the effect concerned comes into existence as soon as the accessories are made available to the cause proper. An instance of the first type is the production of a sprout by seed etc, and an instance of the second type is the production of visual consciousness by eye etc.

In any case, the novelty that the accessories produce in the series represented by the cause proper is not produced as a result of some novelty having been produced in the accessories (and the cause proper) at the time of their coming together. Thus since the mere coming together of the accessories and the cause proper produces a novelty in the series represented by the cause proper our thesis leads to no infinite regress.

Nay, if a non-momentary cause possesses the capacity to immediately produce the effect concerned it should be possible for it to produce the effect even without requiring the services of the requisite accessories. On non-momentarist hypothesis it is not necessary that the requisite accessories should always be available to a cause proper, but if "to immediately produce the effect concerned" is the nature of this cause proper it should be producing the effect concerned at all times (i.e. even when no accessories are available to it). On the other hand, if a non-momentary cause lacks the capacity to immediately produce the effect concerned it should continue to lack this capacity even when the requisite accessories are available to it. The idea is that an entity cannot change its nature.

Thus it is inconceivable how the non-momentary members of a causal aggregate can co-operate in producing one common effect. Nor can a non-momentary cause proper be said to receive assistance from the accessories not for itself but for the series represented by itself. This is so because there is no sense in talking of 'series' in the context of the non-momentarist hypothesis. Thus logic demands that the non-mometarist should grant the possibility of a cause proper producing the effect concerned all alone. But as a matter of fact, we find that in most cases of causation the series represented by the cause proper comes to develop

a 'novelty' as a result of this cause proper coming in contact with the requisite accessories; for example, this is how a seed produces a sprout. Under such conditions, if the non-momentarist grants that the cause proper does not produce the effect concerned except when assisted by the accessories he has granted that the cause proper develops a new nature as a result of coming in contact with these accessories; on the other hand, if he insists that a cause proper always possesses an identical nature he cannot explain why this cause proper produces the effect concerned at one time rather than any other. Thus causal efficiency cannot be shown to characterise an alleged non-momentary entity. This is so because there are difficulties in conceiving that a non-momentary entity produces all its effects all at once while there are also difficulties in conceiving that it produces them in succession one after another. Hence it is established that whatever is real is momentary.

From this (i. e. from the fact that causal efficiency is possible only in the case of a momentary entity) it naturally follows that the destruction is natural to an entity. One might say: "It cannot be so as in reality we find that destruction takes place when and only when certain causes are present there to bring about this destruction." To this our reply is that the idea of destruction having a cause makes no sense. For, real entities are born as perishable entities on account of their respective causes being what they are, and hence nothing that is extraneous to a real entity can bring about the destruction of this entity. That the alleged cause of an entity's destruction is impotent to do anything will become evident from the following consideration :– (i) The cause of destruction cannot bring into existence the 'nature' of the perishable entity, for, this nature has already come into existence as a result of this entity's cause being what it is. (ii) The cause of destruction cannot bring into existence something over and above the entity destroyed, for, to grant that will mean that the entity in question is not in fact destroyed and should be present there to be seen by all. Nor can it be said that the cause of destruction brings into existence a new entity which, in turn, conceals the entity destroyed; for, we can conceive of no reason why the entity said to be destroyed should continue to exist in a concealed form. (iii) Nor can it be said that the cause of an entity's destruction brings into existence the 'absence of this entity.' For, in that case we can raise the question whether this 'absence' is or is not something over and above the entity destroyed. If this 'absence' is something over and above the entity destroyed this entity should continue to exist even when the 'absence' in question has been brought to existence; on the other hand, if this 'absence' is not something over and above the entity destroyed there is no sense in calling this 'absence' an inde-

pendent product of the alleged 'cause of destruction'. As a matter of fact, when an entity is destroyed nothing happens to this entity, but it is simply no more. And since a happening that does not take place requires no cause, the destruction of an entity requires no cause. Moreover, it will be superfluous to posit a 'cause of destruction' for an entity that is perishable by nature; for, what is perishable by nature must perish automatically.

The general rule is that an entity possesses the 'nature' it does on account of this entity's cause being what it is, and hence no additional cause is required to bring this 'nature' into existence. Take for example, a beam of light, a liquid substance, a hot substance, a hard substance, etc. These light etc. are born as light etc. and hence they require no additional cause in order to become light etc. For, if an entity lacks what is natural to it, it will have to be treated as an essenceless entity. The idea that an entity is essenceless is absurd. Similarly, if an entity is non-durable by nature it is on account of this entity's cause being what it is, and hence this entity requires no additional cause in order to become 'non-durable.'

One might urge: "That destruction requires cause can be understood on the analogy of seed etc. For, even though seed etc. are by nature the producers of sprout etc. they do not produce these sprout etc. single-handed but stand in need of certain additional causes like water etc. in order to do that. The same thing may be said of an entity's destruction." To this we reply that we have already shown that the analogy of seed etc. is not apt. Thus we argue that wherever and whenever an entity is present it is present as possessed of whatever nature belongs to it, that is, there is no possibility of a change coming about in the nature of an entity as a result of this entity coming in contact with something extraneous to itself. Hence if an entity is perishable by nature it requires no cause in order to perish (for, in that case it will perish irrespective of whatever else is the case). And if an entity is non-perishable by nature then it will require no cause in order to perish (for, in that case nothing can make this entity perish). That it is impossible for an entity to possess two natures (e.g. 'being perishable' and 'being non-perishable') we have already shown.

Certainly, if an entity becomes different as a result of coming in contact with something extraneous to itself it should be said to have undergone a change of nature, but two natures cannot belong to one entity. For, entities are differentiated from one another on the basis of their natures being different from one another. Hence if an entity is born non-perishable it can never perish,

In this background is to be understood the phenomenon of copper etc. — which are ordinarily found to be hard — turning liquid as a result of being heated. That is, we should not think that heating brings about a change in the nature of copper. For, what happens is that fire-conjunction produces such a novelty in the copper series that after an interval of time we have a liquid substance series in place of a hard substance series.

One might say: "A real entity as produced by its cause is in fact not perishable by nature, as is evident from the fact that it continues to exist until something extraneous comes near it and destroys it. Thus destruction is not this entity's nature but its mere going out of existence as soon as something extraneous comes near it and destroys it." Against this we urge our old difficulty. For, we would ask the opponent if the real entity he is speaking of is eternal or perishable by nature. If he says that this entity was eternal at the time of its origin but became perishable later on he is clearly admitting that this entity has got two natures. As a matter of fact, if an entity eternal by nature can at all perish it should perish always; otherwise, it should perish never. And in neither of these cases is there any need for positing for this entity a 'cause of destruction.' This is so because an entity capable of perishing will perish automatically while an entity incapable of perishing will perish never.

It cannot be the case that an entity is eternal in the beginning but becomes perishable later on; for, an entity must have but one nature. That is, an entity alleged to be eternal cannot perish without first becoming a perishable entity, and this, in turn, is because eternality and perishability are two mutually contradictory characteristics. Thus if one maintains that a real entity must perish he ought also to maintain that a real entity is perishable by nature. And in that case, no real entity will require a 'cause of destruction.'

In this manner we have established that destruction being natural to a real entity, no real entity stands in need of a 'cause of destruction.' Hence we are entitled to make two generalisations viz. (i) whatever is real is perishable by nature; and (ii) whatever is (allegedly) non-perishable is unreal.[32]

Akalaṅka's Refutation: Akalaṅka shows Dharmakīrti's position to be untenable by mostly applying the method of *reductio ad absurdum*. He rightly points out that causal efficiency in momentary things cannot be

32. Hetubindu, p. 57.1.3 – 57.1.16 and pp. 58.1.17 — 63.1.9

proved[33] by the method of perception as the momentary things themselves are not perceived (as momentary). Even if it be granted for argument's sake that the causal efficiency of momentary things is perceptible, it is not possible for any one to say decisively that it is invariably related to the momentary things (because these momentary things are not perceptible). Thus the momentary things are not real as they cannot be proved causally efficient. This may imply that non-momentary things are causally efficient and hence real. So, Dharmakīrti should prove the causal efficiency of momentary things by some other method of knowledge. He may try to show it to be perceptible in a different manner. He may, like his followers, say that the causal efficiency of momentary things is nothing but their existence, and their existence is directly perceived; from this it naturally follows that their causal efficiency is also directly perceived. Akalaṅka replies that if existence is causal efficiency, then non-momentary things are surely causally efficient since every one perceives their exisence. To say that momentary things are causally efficient because their apprehension is distinct from the apprehension of the non-momentary things is illogical. X's apprehension is distinct from Y's means Y's apprehension is distinct from X's. Hence on the basis of that illogical reason it can equally be held that non-momentary things are causally efficient. Moreover, if it is held that existence and causal efficiency are non-different, it cannot be said that there obtains a relation of *vyāpya-vyāpaka* between them. If they are one, causal efficiency becomes the nature of things. Hence Dharmakīrti should have argued thus: "Causal efficiency being the very nature of things, no thing will be there where there is no causal efficiency." The causal efficiency of momentary things cannot be regarded as perceptible. If it were perceptible there would not have been any difference of opinion regarding it and Dharmakīrti and his followers would not have been required to employ the method of inference to prove it.[34]

33. Bhadanta Yogasena, mentioned as a rival by Kamalaśīla in Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā, was the first to point out that the momentary thing is not causally efficient (Tattvasaṅgraha, k. 429 ff). Other philosophers followed him in refuting the view that only momentary things are causally efficient. The first Vedicist philosophers to refute the application of the criterion 'the capacity to perform a function' to momentary things seem to be Vācaspati and Jayanta. (Tātparyaṭīkā pp. 541–561 and Nyāyamañjarī, II, pp. 25–39). So far as our knowledge goes, in the Jaina tradition Akalaṅka is the first to refute momentarism on the basis of this criterion. Here we would like to note the interesting fact that there were like Yogasena some other Buddhist philosophers who did not accept the reality as momentary. Their views are recorded and criticised by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in the Tattvasaṅgraha and Pañjikā on the same respectively (Tattvasaṅgraha, k. 1786 ff).

34. Siddhiviniścaya, p. 190.

If a cause which is efficient at the moment immediately preceding the moment of the production of an effect and which goes out of existence then and there can produce the effect, then nobody can prevent the non-momentary cause from producing the effects. This is so because the existence of the cause is not opposed to the production of the effect. As a matter of fact, the effect must be present along with its cause.[35]

If one thing being present there, the other thing comes into existence the former is the cause and the latter its effect. This principle which Dharmakīrti has accepted is not applicable to his momentary causes. The principle implies the presence of the effect along with its cause. And the presence of the momentary effect along with its momentary cause means their co-production. This leads the momentarist to the absurdity of the production of all serial effects in one single moment which means the effacement of a continuum.[36] In order to intelligently grasp this polemic between Akalaṅka and Dharmakīrti on the problem of causation we must be quite clear in our mind as to the precise point at issue. Since Akalaṅka is of the view that an effect is but a new modification occurring in a pre-existing and continuing substance he can well hold that this substance is the cause of the modification in question. This is very much like the *upādānakāraṇa* of the Pariṇāmavādī philosophers like Sāṅkhyas and Vedāntins. For Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, a cause and its effect are both momentary while the effect immediatly succeeds the cause. Hence Akalaṅka argues that Dharmakīrti's

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35. pūrvaṁ naśvarāc chaktāt kāryaṁ kinnāvinaśvarāt /
kāryotpattir virudhyeta na vai kāraṇasattayā // Ibid, p. 193.

"But the Jaina philosopher maintains that neither sequence nor synchronism alone can account for the law of causation but that both combined give us the correct estimate of the operation of causality. That the relation of cause and effect does not hold good between two coexistent facts, such as the two horns on a cow's head, is admitted by the Jaina also. But the absence of synchronism between the cause and the effect at the moment of the latter's emergence would make the effect independent of the cause. The effect was not in existence when the cause was in existence and it comes into existence when the cause has ceased to exist. So if the effect is independent of the cause when it comes into existence and is not found to be dependent upon the cause either before or after, the bearing of the cause upon the effect becomes a fiction."- Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism, p. 28.

Nyāyavārtikakāra, while refuting the theory of universal flux, says that in this theory causation becomes impossible as the presence of the effect along with the material cause becomes inconceivable on the momentarist hypothesis. (Nyāyavārtika, pp. 409-410). For Pariṇāmavādins the cause and the effect are neither absolutely synchronous nor absolutely successive. From the point of view of the underlying substance (dravya) the cause and the effect can be said to be synchronous (even identical) and from the point of view of the passing modes (paryāya) they can be said to be successive.

36. yasmin saty eva yadbhāvaḥ tat kāryam itarat kāraṇam iti kṣaṇikatve na sambhavaty eva sahotpattiprasaṅgāt kutaḥ santānavṛttiḥ? Siddhiviniścaya, p. 193

position rules out the possibility of there being an *upādānakāraṇa* in the just explained sense of the term. From this Akalaṅka concludes that Dharmakīrti's theory of causation is not at all a theory of causation. From the mometarist hypothesis it naturally follows that the cause does not produce the effect when it is efficient, i.e., at the moment immediately preceding the moment of production of the effect; but on the contrary the effect comes into being when the cause has completely disappeared. This means that when the effect is present the cause is absent. This breaks the fundamental rule of caustion, namely, wherever and whenever the effect is present, the cause must be present. Not the presence of cause but, in fact, the absence of it is contradictory to the production of the effect. Secondly, the cause must produce the effect when it is efficient. This rule also is violated. Akalaṅka says that we may grant that the momentary cause can produce the effect even when it itself is absent but that it must produce a particular effect at that particular time which is appropriate for the production of this effect and at no other time. Dharmakīrti's possible reply to this is that it is not that the cause produces the effect but that the effect itself comes into being (immediately after the cause). Akalaṅka points out that the same thing can be said with equal cogency with regard to a non-momentary cause. The non-momentary cause does not produce the effects, but the effects themselves, one after another, come into existence at their destined time. This will give no scope to Dharmakīrti for refuting the non-momentarist thesis that effects one after another come into being out of a non-momentary cause.[37] To produce the effect at the time when it is destined to come into being is the nature of the cause. The non-momentary cause producing different efflects at their destined times does not become different in nature at those different times. That Dharmakīrti should not object to this can be proved on the basis of an example cited by himself. According to him a lamp, producing many effects (namely, drying up of the oil, the burning of a wick, radiation of heat etc.) which are different from one another on account of their difference in place and nature, retains its original unitary nature; but then what can prevent a non-momentary cause from retaining its unitary nature even while producing many effects different from one another on account of their difference in time etc.? Dharmakīrti might say that that which does not immediately precede (in time) the effect is not the cause of that effect, because it is the very nature of the cause to produce the effect in the immediately next

37. tataḥ prāk tatkaraṇasāmarthye anutpannaṁ tadabhāva eva bhāvi tatkāryam iti mṛtvāpi aṅgīkartavyam /...tadetat kāraṇaṁ kāryotpattau tatkālaṁ vā tiṣṭhatu mā vā bhūt prāk tatkaraṇasamarthaṁ paścān na karoty eva / na vai paścāt karoti abhāvāt / tat svayaṁ paścād bhavati ity atrāpi pratiniyatakālam apekṣya yato yathāsvaṁ krameṇa kāryaṁ bhavati / Ibid, p. 193.

moment. The rejoinder of Akalaṅka to this is that this is inconsistent with the Buddhist view that it is not binding on the cause to produce the effect at the spatial point which is next to its own. When Dharmakīrti does not expect the cause to produce the effect at the next spatial point why should he expect it to produce the effect at the next temporal point?[38]

Dharmakīrti should not consider what immediately precedes the effect to be the cause of it just as he does not consider that which is separated from the effect by a gap of time to be the cause of it; for, both are similar so far as their utter non-existence at the time of the presence of the effect is concerned. Dharmakīrti may suggest that that which is immediately antecedent to the effect is different from that which is merely antecedent and hence the former produces the effect while the latter does not. Akalaṅka points out that both being non-existent are essenceless. Hence to say that one non-existent is different in nature from another non-existent amounts to the absurdity of saying that sky-flower is different in nature from the hare's horn. It is only in the case of existents that we can say that one of them is different in nature from another and on that account one produces a particular effect while the other does not. If the effect is held to come into existence as a result of the absence of something (say X) that immediately precedes the effect, then the effect should be existent at all moments save the moment of X's existence because at all those moments there is the 'absence of X.'

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38. yathā kṣaṇikaṁ pradīpādi kāraṇaṁ svabhāvanānātvam antareṇa svabhāvadeśādibhinnam anekaṁ kramabhāvi tailadaśānanadāhādikāryaṁ karoti tathā akṣaṇikaṁ kālabheda-bhinnam.../ yad anantaraṁ yan notpannaṁ na tat tatkāryam akṣepakāritvāt kāraṇasya. ity ayuktaṁ deśavyavadhāne'pi tathāprasaṅgāt / Ibid, p. 194.
It is noteworthy that this type of criticism of the momentarism occurs in Udayana's Ātmatattvaviveka, pp. 139–151.
The reply to this criticism is given by Ratnakīrti in his Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi (Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts, p. 46). na caivaṁ samānakālakāryāṇāṁ deśabhede'pi dharmibhedo yuktaḥ, bhedasādhakapramāṇābhāvāt / indriyapratyakṣeṇa nirastavibhramāśaṅkenābheda-prasādhanācca /
Read also the quotation from Dr. Mukerjee's 'Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux' (p. 23). 'This analogy of difference in place cannot be extended to difference in time, as contradiction is a relation of opposition constituted by two mutually incompatible attributes and time and place relations have no direct bearing upon it. The principal factor of contradiction is mutual incompatibility and as permanent efficiency has been redargued by the dialectical necessity of constant production or non-production, permanent efficiency and variable production have been found to be mutually incompatible. But as there is no incompatibility in the fact that the seed produces a sprout in a particular place but is inactive outside that place, we cannot regard the seed per se as different entities. On the contrary, the unity of the seed is attested by strong, unmistakable perceptual experience, which must be accepted as absolutely authentic as there is no invalidating evidence, a priori or a posteriori.'

If the momentarist wants to avoid this contingency, he will have to accept that the effect comes into being by itself, that is, without any cause whatsoever; there is no other alternative for him. If he were to accept this, his effect will lose its distinctive character, namely, to come into being depending on the cause (*pratītya-samutpāda*). Dharmakīrti should not qualify one non-existent by calling it 'immediate antecedent' and thus seeking to differentiate it from another non-existents. The reason is that the non-existents are essenceless and hence in no way can they be differentiated from one another. As a matter of fact, it is only the existents that can be qualified and thus differentiated from one another; and hence to qualify non-existents involves the contingency of turning non-existents into existents.[39] Again, if the causality of a cause is supposed to lie merely in its immediate antecedence in relation to the effect concerned then the law of causation will lose all force; for, certainly not everything which immediately precedes a particular thing is the cause of it.[40]

When according to Dharmakīrti there is no change in the nature of a momentary cause even though it produces different effects with the assistance of accessories, why should he object to the non-momentary cause producing many effects with the assistance of accessories, without undergoing any change in its nature? Even the momentary cause which is by nature capable of producing an effect in the immediately next moment produces many effects depending on different totalities of conditions and that too without admitting any change in nature. To illustrate, one *rūpa-kṣaṇa* which produces *rūpa-, rasa-, gandha-, sparśa-kṣaṇas* on account of different totalities viz. one in which *rūpakṣaṇa* is the material cause and *rasakṣaṇa* etc. are auxiliary causes, the second in which *rasa-kṣaṇa* is the material cause and the others are auxiliary causes, the third in which *gandha-kṣaṇa* is the material cause and the others are auxiliary causes, the fourth in which *sparśa-kṣaṇa* is the material cause and the others are auxiliary causes—remains identical in nature because no novelty is produced in it by the other co-operators, nor does it produce any novelty in them. With equal cogency it can also be said about the non-momentary cause that it remains identical in nature even though it,

39. aprāptakāryakālatvād yathā vyavahitam akāraṇam /
taduttaraṁ vā tatkāryaṁ na ca jātes tadatyaye //
vyavahitasya kāryotpattau vyāvṛttyaviśeṣād upayogo na viśeṣyeta, nivṛtter niḥsvabhāvatvāt / bhāvasyaiva kathañcid viśeṣopapatteḥ / ...tato'nena pūrvasyābhāve bhavatā aniṣṭe'pi bhavitavyam abhāvasya sarvatrāviśeṣāt / anyathā svata eva niyatakālaṁ kāryalakṣaṇam ativarteta / abhāvasya ca bhedāyogāt / na hi ānantaryam abhāvaṁ viśeṣayati arthasvabhāvānvayāpatteḥ / Siddhiviniścaya, p. 195

40. nairantaryamātrāt prabhavaniyame sarvatra sarveṣām aviśeṣe kuta eva niyamaḥ / Ibid, p. 458

on account of the services of different accessories, produces different effects one after another.[41] Dharmakīrti argues that an eternal cause, because it gives rise to ever new effect every moment, is not really one-indivisible 'uni-natured' whole. Akalaṅka rightly points out that an identical difficulty arises in the case of a momentary cause. A momentary cause is multi-natured because it gives rise to a number of effects, just as a number of different objects have different natures of their own. Unless the cause possesses the multiplicity of capacities it cannot produce multiple effects, just as knowledge of colour etc. is impossible unless the object of knowledge possesses a multiplicity of capacities. A lamp, because of its multiple capacities, burns up a wick and dries up the oil at one and the same moment. The same object looks different to different observers because causal aggregates are different in each case; there is no other explanation for this difference in perceptual cognitions which are distinct or otherwise according as the object under view is near or distant. This is a real dilemma for Dharmakīrti. If he admits the multiplicity of capacities in the object of perceptual cognition he cannot evade conceding a similar multiplicity of nature in the lamp that produces a number of effects. On the other hand, if he sticks to his belief in unitary nature of the lamp, the said multiplicity of perceptual cognitions remains unaccounted for. If a momentary 'uni-natured' cause can produce a variety of effects all at once, why could not an eternal uni-natured cause similarly produce these effects one after another? For, so far as the cause proper is supposed to be unaffected by its accessories the two cases are on par. It need not be objected that the cause proper would cease to act as a cause if the accessories that arise from time to time are enough to produce the desired effect, for causation is not an intelligent act on the part of the cause proper, and moreover, this difficulty equally remains with the cause proper of a momentary causal aggregate. A seed does not desist from generating the sprout—its natural function—simply because soil, water etc. act as its accessories; for, if it were so the seed would no more be a cause of the sprout. Certainly, among the members of a causal aggregate there is no such jealousy as might lead to their non-cooperation.[42] Again, there comes a damaging attack from Akalaṅka against Dharmakīrti's logic. He says, "If all things are absolutely distict from each other and possess no underlying bond of unity there can be no universal rule that nothing else but clay, passing through various intermediary stages, assumes the form of a jar. But it is obvious to any one that clay—not thread—produces

41. sāmagrīvaśāt kāryabhede'pi yathā akṣepakāriṇāṁ kṣaṇikānāṁ svabhāvabhedo na bhavati anādheyāpraheyātiśayatvāt tathaiva kālāntarasthāyināṁ kramotpitsukāryaviśeṣe'pi svabhāvabhedo mā bhūt / Ibid, p. 197

42. Aṣṭaśatī, pp. 183–184

a jar while thread—not clay—cloth. It cannot be said that here (in the case of clay-series culminating in jar) there is non-observation of distinction because distincts are mistaken for similars owing to ignorance inherent in man. In the Buddhist view there can be no real similarity; all things are absolutely distinct. Hence the Buddhist has no right to talk of similarity. If the cognition of the material cause turning into an effect is illusory, the law of causation stands invalidated as in dream-experience. If an effect is utterly non-existent before its coming into existence the rule that thread must produce cloth and not jar becomes meaningless. If the members of a series are absolutely distinct from one another while one series is absolutely distinct from another and yet it be possible to talk of an act and its fruit, then one can as well describe the roundness of a hare's horn though no intelligent man would believe him."[43]

We see the thing perishing at the last moment. From this Dharmakīrti infers that it must be perishing even from the moment of its birth. The same nature which it possesses at the last moment it must possess at the beginning, that is, at the time of its coming into existence. Akalaṅka points out that similarly on seeing the existence of word, lamp and lightning in the beginning we should infer their existence even after their so-called destruction; complete destruction being impossible they abide in some subtle imperceptible state. Again, Akalaṅka rightly observes that even in these cases of word, lamp and lightning where an entity seems to vanish for good, it is reasonable to posit the existence of the series of their effects even after their so-called destruction just as it is reasonable to posit a prior cause for them even when no such cause is actually visible; for, otherwise their origin remains a mystery. Dharmakīrti recognises an imperceptible prior cause for words, lightning etc. since otherwise it would be a case of uncaused production; what is the harm then in positing (imperceptible) existence for the effects of these word, lightning etc. since otherwise it would be a case of entities turning into non-entities? Akalaṅka, therefore, concludes that all momentary change is possible only in an entity that is somehow abiding. Change is not possible in things that are destroyed completely the moment

43. saty api prabhavalakṣaṇe pūrvapūrvasya uttarībhavanaṁ mṛtpiṇḍa-sthāsa-kośa-kuśūlādiṣu sakalalokasākṣikaṁ [siddham / tan na] svamanīṣikābhiḥ sadṛśāparāparotpattivipralambhāvadhāraṇāvaklṛptim āracayatāṁ mā upādānaniyamo bhūt kāraṇāntaravat tadanvayābhāvāviśeṣāt sarvathā vailakśaṇyāt/...[saṁvṛtimātreṇa upakalpitād upādānaniyamāt kāryotpattāv anāśvāsadarśanāt svapnavat /] tad atyantāsataḥ kāryasya utpattes tantubhyaḥ paṭādir eva na punaḥ kuṭādir iti nirhetuko niyamaḥ syāt /...vilakṣaṇānām atyantabhede'pi svabhāvataḥ kila asaṅkīrṇāḥ santatayaḥ karmaphalasambandhādinibandhanaṁ śaśaviṣāṇasyeva vartulatvam āracitaṁ kaś cetanaḥ śraddadhīta ? Aṣṭaśatī, pp. 189–191
The bracketed portion indicates Aṣṭasahasrī.

they are born without leaving any trace behind just as it is not possible in a non-entity like sky-flower.[44] Akalaṅka envisages a possible objection that the idealist Dharmakīrti may raise against the non-momentarist thesis that the effects must co-exist with its (material) cause. Dharmakīrti may say that from the statement that the effect must co-exist with its cause it naturally follows that the former can never be perceived without the latter. Thus the absurdity of the non-momentarist stand becomes manifest. Do we ever perceive milk at the same time when we perceive curd? If even at this stage the non-momentarist sticks to his guns and accepts that the effect can never be perceived without the perception of its cause then one more contingency will arise. The effect will become identical in nature with its cause as there is a rule to the effect that if one thing is never perceived without another then the former thing should be identical in nature with the latter. Akalaṅka should have replied to this as follows: In so far as we perceive matterness (*pudgalatva*) in curd we perceive its material cause, namely, the milk too, because milk is nothing but matter, only in a different particular form. And from the point of veiw of substance (*dravya*) curd and milk can be held to be identical. Instead of replying in this positive manner, he establishes his position by showing the absurdity of Dharmakīrti's rule on his own ground. He points out to Dharmakīrti that consciousness of the external object is never found without the self-consciousness yet both are not identical in nature as the former is invalid (illusory) while the latter is valid (authentic).[45] Akalaṅka now tries to show that the reasons put forth by Dharmakīrti to prove things momentary are fallacious. According to Dharmakīrti the reason 'possessing vital airs' adduced to prove soul in a living body is fallacious as over and above the class of entities possessing soul and the class of entities not possessing it there is no third group where vital airs are found, that is, there is no possibility of any similar case (*sapakṣa*).[46] Akalaṅka points out to Dharmakīrti that his reasons 'existence etc.' adduced to prove momentariness fare no better than the reason 'possessing vital airs' adduced to prove soul in a living body. Here too, besides a class of momentary things and a class of non-momentary things there is no third group where we are sure of the presence of the reasons. Dharmakīrti should not put forth 'word' as a similar case because there the reasons 'existence etc.' are found but we are not sure of the

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44. tad evam ādau sthitidarśanāc chabda-vidyut-pradīpāder ante'pi sthiter anumānaṁ yuktam/...Aṣṭaśatī, p. 186

45. kāryakāraṇayoḥ sahāvasthāne dadhikṣīrādiṣu sahopalambhena abhedādiprasaṅga iti c,et saṁvido vibhrametarasvabhāvayoḥ sahabhāve'pi sahopalambhāder abhāvāt / Siddhiviniścaya, p. 198

46. Nyāyabindu, III 97–98

momentariness of 'words'. Dharmakīrti may reply that words are undoubtedly momentary as they have different natures at every moment. If we do not accept that word becomes different at every moment it would be impossible for us to explain the fact that its causal factors viz. conditions larynx etc. which occupy higher and lower regions in the body, operate one after another. Akalaṅka replies that the fact of causal conditions operating one after another only proves that here we have a case of something undergoing modifications. In other words, it is only the fact of things undergoing modification that can explain the phenomenon of conditions operating one after another. Thus the reasons 'existence etc.' adduced to prove momentariness of a thing prove quite the reverse of it, viz. variable constancy of a thing just as, on Dharmakīrti's showing, the reason 'composite nature of the things' adduced to prove soul by Sāṅkhyas proves quite the reverse of it viz. composite nature of soul.[47]

Akalaṅka takes Dharmakīrti to task for his thesis of causeless destruction. The argument which proves the uncaused character of an entity's destruction also proves the uncaused character of its existence. The state which does not depend on anything else is a state which is natural to an entity. Hence just as a thing is perishable by nature because it must vanish; similarly, it is existent by nature because it must exist. If existence is something apart from the entity existing and hence requiring a cause, this entity cannot be said to be existent. And there can be no causal relation between an existent and its existence which are simultaneous with each other; for, on the Buddhist's logic a cause is always prior to its effect; on the other hand, a prior cause of existence must be something non-existent (which is an absurd position). Nor can there be the relation of identity between an existent and its existence; for, in that case it would be futile to seek for a cause of existence which is already existent in the existent. And if it is right to posit a cause for an existing something there would be *regressus ad infinitum*. But at the same time it is impossible to bring into existence what is not existent by nature just as it is impossible to produce what is not producible by nature. Thus it is proved that existence is uncaused and hence natural to an entity. No cause is required to produce an existent thing as the production of an already existent thing serves no purpose. Again, it is inconceivable to posit a cause for the production of a non-existent thing. Thus we cannot assign any cause to the production either of an existent thing or of a non-existent one. In the case of a thing whose nature it is to come into being, the cause of production is useless; and, a thing which naturally exists requires no cause for its existence. Thus it is established that even according to the Buddhist's

47. Siddhiviniścaya, p. 206

logic neither production nor destruction nor existence (persistence) should require a cause as they are all natural to things. Dharmakīrti says that the destruction of a thing being not dependent on others is the nature of this thing inasmuch as it is a rule that that for which a thing is not dependent on others is the nature of this thing. For example, to produce the appropriate effect is considered to be the nature of an efficient causal totality on account of its being not dependent on others for the production of this effect. Akalaṅka's answer to this is that if it be so, then for the same reason a thing should need no cause for its production and persistence either inasmuch as these two are equally natural to this thing; certainly if these two require a cause they cannot be regarded as natural to this thing. A thing being existent needs no cause for its continued stay. Similarly, the thing whose nature it is to come into being, depends on nothing for its production. If it is not the nature of a thing to come into being, and to persist, it, like the sky-flower, would never be produced and would never persist. Thus the very same logic that the Buddhist applied in the case of destruction proves that not only is destruction natural to things but origination and persistence too are so.[48]

Akalaṅka's Own Position: Though Akalaṅka has shown that causal efficiency cannot be possible in the case of an absolutely momentary entity, yet he does not concede that it can be possible in the case of an absolutely changeless (*kūṭastha*) entity. Akalaṅka refutes the view of absolute eternalism as follows: Reality cannot be absolutely eternal. If the reality is eternal, there can be no modification anywhere, there can be no cause or effect anywhere, and nowhere can there be valid knowledge or its result in the form of acceptance, rejection or indifference. Valid knowledge manifests reality. And reality is manifested by valid knowledge. If both valid knowledge and reality are eternal they cannot be related to each other as the manifester and the manifested. The eternal is unchanging. If reality is eternal it can never be produced just like the *Puruṣa* of Sāṅkhya. If modification is real, reality cannot be eternal. Modification consists in the destruction of some one mode and the production of some other. But there is neither production nor destruction in what is eternal. However, modification is known by valid knowledge; so it is real. Therefore reality cannot be eternal. If there is no modification there can be no right actions or wrong actions, merit or demerit, bondage, transmigration, or liberation, or the agent, the self. Thus eternalism leads to a denial of the self (*Nairātmyavāda*). Reality cannot be eternal as the Advaita Vedānta holds.[49] Thus both the cases—absolute momentarism and absolute eternalism are equally good or

48. Ibid, pp. 202–203
49. Aṣṭaśatī, pp. 179–181

equally bad for Akalaṅka. As a matter of fact, in both these cases there arise insurmountable difficulties. For the Jaina, however, there is no difficulty, for on the non-absolutist hypothesis things can act as possessed of the three-fold characteristics of the abandonment of previous form, the acceptance of a new form, and the retention of their own identity. Let us study in detail Akalaṅka's non-absolutist conception of reality. Reality is neither substance alone nor modes alone but is characterised by both.[50] A substance and its modes are not absolutely different just as the Vaiśeṣika philosopher's substance and its qualities are; nor are they absolutely identical, one engulfing the other and thus giving rise to the Vedānta eternalism or Buddhist momentarism. There obtains a relation of identity-cum-difference between them.[51] They are identical is so far as one is not found without the other; they are different in the sense that they can be mentally differentiated. Thus the Jaina philosopher's substance is not absolutely changeless, nor are its modes absolutely discrete. The previous mode is related with the posterior mode; between them there obtains a relation of relative identity as between the cause-continuum and effect-continuum.[52] One mode cannot be absolutely different from another as there runs through them one and the same substance, a situation which makes possible the psychical phenomena of recognition and memory.[53] There arises a question as to the precise sense in which a substance can be said to be permanent, for we have been told that it itself changes in a way. Akalaṅka says that a substance is permanent in the sense that it never loses its essence and not in the sense that it is absolutely static. It undergoes change no doubt but it retains its essential nature; it is in this sense that it can be said to be permanent--not in the sense of being absolutely changeless. From this it follows that reality is dynamic, it is always in motion, it always transforms itself without giving up its essence.[54] The process of transformation involves origination, decay and persistence. Hence reality is said to be of this triple nature.[55] This means that reality

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50. dravyaparyāyātmā arthaḥ... / Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 3
51. atyantābhedabhedau na tadvataḥ... / Ibid, p. 48
52. atyantābhedabhedau na...parasparam / Ibid, p. 48
    tādātmyaniyamo hetuphalasantānavad bhavet / Ibid, p. 45
53. tadayaṁ bhāvaḥ svabhāveṣu kuṇḍalādiṣu sarpavat /...anyathā smaraṇapratyabhijñā'bhāvaḥ syāt / tadevaṁ parasparapariṇāmaparigrahavivartāhitavividhaparyāyair avasthāntaram anubhavati /
    Ibid, p. 112
54. Note the derivation of the word 'dravya': adravad dravati droṣyaty anekānekaṁ svaparyāyam / Ibid, p. 45
    For the history of the concept of Dravya one may refer to 'Advanced Studies in Indian Logic & Metaphysics', pp. 112–113.
55. sadotpādavyayadhrauvyayuktaṁ sat / Ibid, p. 45

originates, decays and persists at one and the same time; this sounds contradictory.[56] Akalaṅka, along with other Jaina philosophers, declares that the contradiction is apparent and it can be removed easily if we take into consideration the different aspects of the same phenomenon. We can say that clay in the form of lump has been destroyed, clay in the form of pot has originated and clay qua clay has remained what it was (i.e. persisted); and all this at one and the same time.[57] From this it becomes clear that the destruction or production of one thing (form) means the production or destruction of another thing (form), and this necessity of one being dependent on the other suggests that there is some common bond between them and this is the persistent substance. Thus it follows that there can be no origination without destruction and persistence, nor destruction without origination and persistence, nor persistence without origination and destruction;[58] again, if one of these is said to be causeless, the other two should follow suit. Akalaṅka maintains that all these three can be said to have a cause and also be said not to have it for he is of the view that a *pariṇāma* can be said to be beginningless from the point of view of the substance (*dravyārthikanaya*) and to be possessed of a beginning from the point of view of the modes (*paryāyārthikanaya*).[59] In other words, destruction etc. are automatic in the sense that the ultimate reality undergoes change of its own accord, but they are not automatic inasmuch as a cause can be assigned to the particular cases of destruction etc. All these three are identical in so far as they refer to one and the same substance. Again, they are different in so far as they give rise to different cognitions. Thus their difference is shown with the help of the different psychological reactions which a phenomenon (e.g. breaking up of a jar) produces at one and the same time in

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56. utpādasthitibhaṅgānāṁ yugapan nāsti sambhavaḥ / Catuḥśataka, p. 246
57. Tattvārthavārtika, p. 497
58. utpādaḥ kevalo nāsti sthitivigamarahitatvād viyatkusumavat / tathā sthiti-vināśau pratipattavyau / Aṣṭaśatī, p. 211
59. dravyārthika-paryāyārthikanayadvayavivakṣāvaśāt sarveṣu dharmādidravyeṣu sa ubhayaḥ [anādir ādimāṅś ca] pariṇāmo'vaseyaḥ / Tattvārthavārtika, p. 503
Compare: pravāho nādimān eṣaḥ....../ Nyāyakusumāñjali, I, p. 20
Pūjyapāda, Akalaṅka and Siddhasena—all these three commentators of the Tattvārtha-sūtra differ from Umāsvāti who holds that a beginningless transformation takes place only in arūpi-dravyas such as Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa and Jīva while the rūpi-dravyas undergo ādimān pariṇāmas. See Tattvārthasūtra, V. 42, 43, 44 and Auto-commentary on them; and also Sarvārthasiddhi V. 41 and Ṭīkā by Siddhasena V. 43, p. 440.
It is interesting to note that Jainas divide the pariṇāma into two types: prayoga-pariṇāma and visrasāpariṇāma, the first brought about by a sentient agency and the second by a natural transformation (i.e. without the aid of any sentient agency). Vide Sarvārthasiddhi and Rājavārtika on the Tattvārthasūtra V. 22.

different persons who observe it. When a vase of gold is broken up and a crown is made of the same gold, the man desiring the former becomes sorry, while the man wanting the latter becomes happy, while one wanting only the gold remains neutral. Thus the thing has three different aspects.[60] Akalaṅka and Vidyānanda discuss the relation of these three to the thing (reality) of which they are predicated. The passage[61] in point has been very lucidly explained by Dr. S. Mookerjee in his 'Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism'; we quote his words below: "If persistence, cessation and birth were each of them identical with the substance of which they are predicated, then, being identical with the same substance, all of them would be identical with one another. Thus persistence would be the same thing as cessation and birth, cessation would be identical with persistence and birth and birth would be identical with cessation and persistence. So the triple character is reduced to an identical single mode. And if each of these modes were regarded as numerically different from the substance and also from one another, and if each of them were believed to be real, then again each of these modes would have triple character. An infinite vicious series would be inevitable as each of the triple modes would have another triple character and so on to infinity unless the triple modes were severally and jointly asserted to be unreal characterisation. Either a single mode in the place of the triple character, or an infinite regress, or its unreality is to be asserted. But the Jaina answers the critic by asserting the non-absolutistic position. So far as persistence etc. are regarded as identical with the substance, it is legitimate that persistance and cessation and birth should be regarded as identical. And if attention is concentrated on the aspect of difference of these modes from the substance and from one another, then each of them would have a triple character. There is no reason for the infinite series, as difference is not absolute. The modes are identical with the substance only so for as the substance is focussed in the modes. The modes are not absolutely different from substance, as in that case the modes would not belong to the substance. The mode is a mode of the substance because the identity of subsance is focussed

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60. kāryakāraṇayor utpādavināśau kathañcid bhinnau bhinnalakṣaṇasambandhitvāt sukha-duḥkhavat / syād abhinnau, tadabhedasthitajāti-saṅkhyādyātmakatvāt puruṣavat / utpādavigamadhrauvyalakṣaṇaṁ syād bhinnam askhalannānāpratīteḥ rūpādivat / ... pratītibhedam itthaṁ samarthayate / ghaṭaṁ bhaṅktvā maulinivartane ghaṭamaulisuva-rṇārthī tannāśotpādasthitiṣu viṣādaharṣaudāsīnyasthitim ayaṁ janaḥ pratipadyata iti / nirhetukatve tadanupapatteḥ / Aṣṭaśatī, p. 210-211

Kumārila also gives this example to prove three aspects – production, destruction and continuance – of the thing (reality). Vide Ślokavārtika, Vanavāda 21–22.

1. Aṣṭaśatī, pp. 112–113.

in it and not annulled. To take an example, clay is transformed into a jar, and so the former is regarded as the cause of the latter. The jar is different from clay no doubt, but the jar could not be a jar unless it were the same substance as clay. So difference and identity both being inseparable moments in the relation, a mode as identical with the substance may have the same predicates with the substance and as different from the substance may each of them behave as an independent reality and as such may have the triple characteristic. The reduction of the triple character to a unitary character is also a matter of point of view. The mode and the substance may be viewed as identical and also as different, as they are both in one. Thus the consequences, alleged to be inevitable by the opponent, are not inevitable, as they are based upon exclusive identity and exclusive difference. But the indentity is not exclusive of difference and vice versa, as both are the attested traits of reality. A mode and a substance are different because they are two, and they are identical because one is not independent of the other. If identity is to be asserted on the evidence of experience, difference also should equally be asserted on the strength of the same evidence. The compartmental way of looking at things leads to the affirmation of one and to the negation of the other since it concentrates on one and ignores the other. The besetting sin of philosophers has been the habit to put the telescope upon the blind eye and then to deduce that the other aspect is not real. The Jaina philosopher voices the necessity of using both the eyes and of seeing the obverse and reverse of the coin of reality."[62]

Concluding Remarks: Dharmakīrti establishes his view with the help of consistent and forceful arguments. Akalaṅka is a match for him. He refutes his veiws with equally strong logical arguments. He rightly observes that two discrete moment can never be related as cause and effect. Moreover, if the cause and its effect were absolutely different without having any permanent essence running through them, the law of causality would remain self-condemned, that is, anything would, then, come out of anything. Even the idea of continuum introduced in this connection by the Buddhist cannot help him; as a matter of fact, the idea does not go well with his idea of total destruction. Identity is necessary for all change. 'Without the permanent, no relations in time are possible.' The Buddhist philosopher holds that there is a relation of succession between the cause-moment and the effect-moment. But this relation of succession is not possible without there being something in the cause, that persists in the effect also. The possibility of any succession implies relative permanence. This is exactly the Jaina view.

62, The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism, pp. 74-76.

Again, really speaking, there is no possibility of change in the Buddhist philosophy. According to it, one moment is replaced by another, that is, by the one that follows immediately, but the former is not changed into the latter. This is so because the former moment is completely destroyed without there being any trace of it left behind. Thus the Buddhist's moments are as static as the Sāṅkhya's *Puruṣa* or the Vedāntist's Absolute viz. *Brahman*. Having a high regard for the keen logical acumen evinced by the Buddhist, we have to say that their doctrine of Absolute Destruction is neither appealing to the human heart nor free from logical errors; it does not solve the problem; it creates new problems as is shown by Akalaṅka.

As regards the Jaina theory of change one has to say that it is very difficult to conceive a thing which is both permanent and changing. The idea seems to be that in an element there are two aspects—one static and the other dynamic. But how can it be visualized that some parts of an element remain static when others are changing? For certainly, all these parts are organically related with one another and they form a unity. It is impossible to point out physically a static part in an element. To avoid this difficulty the Jainas might say that what is called a static part of an element is not really static but that the element undergoes 'homogeneous change' with respect to this part. But then we will point out that the expression 'homogeneous change' involves a contradiction in terms. It seems that in Jaina philosophy permanence has negative connotation. It means 'not to cross certain limits in the course of change.' There are certain limits that an element can never transgress in the course of change. A thing, under appropriate conditions, can change itself into any other thing, provided the latter thing is not primarily and essentially of a different nature. Whether there is one primary and essential nature or two or more is a question falling outside the scope of this chapter. But we may observe that in deciding this question, there is no other way except to assert dogmatically that there is only one ultimate real or two or more; in other words, it might be said that it is a question of temperament rather than of logic.

The tendency to regard reality as permanent-cum-changing i. e. variable constant is very strong and as old as the Upaniṣads.[63] There we find statements to the effect that the external world is a transformation of *Brahman*, the ultimate principle. Bhartṛprapañca's reported philosophy of *Brahmapariṇāma* is based on such Upaniṣadic statements. The old

63. Prof. Belvalkar is of the opinion that the Nāsadīya Sūkta (Ṛgved, x. 129.) contains the earliest germ of what later developed into the Pariṇāmavāda or the doctrine of evolution. See History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 24.

Sāṅkhya philosophy which accepts just twenty four principles likewise upholds the doctrine of variable constancy only.[64] The addition of an absolutely changeless *Puruṣa* to these twenty four principles suggests the influence of the Absolutistic trend that was current side by side. Jainas too treat all substances, including even the soul, as variable constant. Even ether (*Ākāśa*), the principle of motion (*Dharma*) and the principle of inertia (*Adharma*) are conceived by them as characterized by variable constancy. The early Buddhists could not free themselves from this doctrine of *pariṇāma*. In the Aṅguttaranikāya it is told that the life of a thing extends to four moments. In the first moment it comes into existence; in the second moment it endures, in the third moment what is permanent assumes another state or mode and in the fourth moment it is destroyed. The employment of the phrase '*ṭhitassa aññathattam*' here implies the acceptance of the doctrine of *pariṇāminityatā*. But the later Buddhist logicians avoided all such ideas indicative of the influence of *pariṇāmavāda*; stated that the moment of production and moment of destruction coincide i. e. they are not different; banished *Brahman*, *Prakṛti* and *Dravya* from the realm of reality. For them, there is nothing that undergoes changes, but there is merely the change. In other words, there is no *Brahman*, *Prakṛti* or *Dravya* but merely the *vikāras* or *paryāyas*. At the most, there is the series of modes. Here series are not independent entities. They are nothing independent of the modes or point-instants. *Pariṇāmavāda* is reduced to momentarism by the rigour of logic. We have to admit that the doctrine of variable constancy, though appealing to the human heart and attractive to common sense, could not stand the rigour of logic. Logic reduces it either to absolute eternalism or to absolute momentarism. The Buddhists have reduced it to momentarism. Under the influence of the rigour of Buddhist logic even the Naiyāyikas have to accept, on the basis of the difference in time (and place), an element of difference even in the eternal changeless substances like ether, soul etc. This their performance is not essentially different from that of the Jainas who have sought to establish the variable constancy of ether (*Ākāśa*), principle of motion (*Dharma*) and principle of inertia (*Adharma*). Between the Buddhist concept of reality as momentary and the Jaina concept of it as variable constant, the former seems to be more logical than the latter, though the judgement of common sense logic tends to side with the latter.

64. It is interesting to note that probably the earliest lucid and systematic explanation of the Pariṇāmavāda is to be found in the Yogabhāṣya on the Sūtra: etena bhūtendriyeṣu dharma-lakṣaṇā'va sthāpariṇāmā vyākhyātāḥ/ III. 13

CHAPTER III
PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS

The problem of universals has attracted the attention of almost all philosophers, eastern and western.[1] Indian philosophers wanted to explain the notion of sameness (similarity, concordance) that we have with regard to the individuals of a certain class. Hence they are constrained to believe in some condition or cause that can give rise to the notion of similarity. On these two points, namely, that there is the notion of sameness and that there is a condition of it, all philosophers agree.[2] This condition of the notion of sameness or similarity is called 'universal.' Call it the universal or anything you like; wise persons do not quarrel about names. But there is a great deal of scholastic discussion on the question as to what is the actual nature of the condition or cause of the notion of similarity or sameness, that is, of the universal (*jāti* or *sāmānya*).

Before discussing the nature of the universal, it is essential to mention that, really speaking there are only two main views on this question—one taking the universal to be objectively real and the other taking it to be a mental creation. The second view is upheld by the Buddhist philosophers, while the first one is upheld by all the remaining schools of Indian philosophy.

It is difficult to decide as to what the materialist Cārvāka view on the nature of the universal is. The only extant work of this school is the Tattvopaplavasiṁha. There the author undertakes a refutation of the view which regards the universal as objectively real, by pointing out the absurdity of all the three possible alternatives, namely, its identity with concerned individuals, or its difference from them or

1. The various views are held in Western philosophy on the nature of universals. Plato and Aristotle are well known for their theories. In the medieval Western philosophy the problem of universals was in the foreground; Realism, Conceptualism and Nominalism—three radically different schools of philosophy crystallized in this connection as a result of a prolonged discussion. Even in modern philosophers like Stout, Russel, Price, Blanshard etc. one finds this problem discussed.
In India too this problem attracted the attention of thinkers at a very early date. The author of the Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā (p. 282) quotes the old views on the nature of universals. We are told there that according to Vājapyāyana it is a padārtha; for Vyāḍi it is a dravya; and Pāṇini considers it to be both padārtha and dravya.

2. sāmānyaṁ tac ca piṇḍānām ekabuddhinibandhanam //
tannimittaṁ ca yatkiñcit sāmānyaṁ śabdagocaram /
sarva evecchatīty evam avirodho'tra vādinām // Ślokavārtika, Ākṛtivāda, 3-4

both.[3] This means that he is bent on refuting the views of all those philosophers who would treat the universal as objectively real. As a matter of fact, he adopts and employs all those arguments by which the Buddhists attacked the concept of universal as objectively real. But elsewhere in 'the Examination of the Definitions of Perception' the author refutes all the arguments put forth by the Buddhists to prove the conceptual nature of the universals.[4] Thus showing that the arguments of either group are unsound the author has pointed out the soundness of his view viz. *Tattvopaplava.* His aim is not to enunciate and propound any positive view of reality but to refute each and every historically evolved view of reality. Hence, it is not possible to say decisively what could be the Cārvāka view regarding the universal. Nevertheless, since according to the Cārvākas that alone is real which can be perceived and is therefore physical we might say that they could not have accepted the reality of *jāti* which is *ex hypothesi* non-physical.

According to the Vaiśeṣikas the universal has an independent objective reality. The universal called Being (*sattā*), though one,[5] resides in many individuals.[6] Kaṇāda has tried to prove its objective reality over and above that of substance, quality and action.[7] But one of his aphorisms contains the statement that 'universals and particulars are relative to our understanding.' Some interpret it to mean that according to Kaṇāda the universal is not an objective reality; it is conceptual; it is merely a logical category; it is merely a hypothetical reality.[8] In contrast to this interpretation there is another one which seems to be more correct. According to this second view the aphorism cannot be interpreted as maintaining that universals are relative in the sense of being unreal; for, the general tendency of the system is very realistic. Thus according to that system things can be relative and real at the same time.[9] The aphorism simply means that the generality of

3. Tattvopaplavasiṁha, p. 4
4. Ibid, p. 46
5. sad iti liṅgāviśeṣād viśeṣaliṅgābhāvāc caiko bhāvaḥ / Vaiśeṣikasūtra, I.2.17.
6. sad iti yato dravya-guṇa-karmasu sā sattā / Ibid, I. 2.7.
7. dravya-guṇa-karmabhyo'rthāntaraṁ sattā / guṇa-karmasu ca bhāvān na karma na guṇaḥ / sāmānyaviśeṣābhāvena ca / Ibid, I. 2. 8–10
8. 'Although the later Vaiśeṣikas regarded sāmānya and viśeṣa as two distinct realities over and above Dravya, Guṇa, Karma in which they were supposed to inhere, they seem to have originally meant as merely logical categories ('buddhyapekṣa' i.e. relative to thought as Kaṇāda calls them Vsū I. 2.3.) or at the most, as hypothetical realities assumed to account for certain Ideas which none can dispute viz. coordination (anuvṛtti) and differentiation (vyāvṛtti).'—A. B. Dhruva's Introduction to Syādvādamañjarī, p. lxxxiv. See also Athalye's Notes on Tarkasaṅgraha, p. 90, and Dr. Radhakrishnan's Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 213.
9. āpekṣiko vāstavaś ca kartṛ-karaṇādivyavahāraḥ/ Nyāyakandali, p. 197

universals has different degrees, and these degrees are relative to each other.

Praśastapāda proves the eternality of the universal on the ground that it has an objective reality independent of substance, quality and action.[10] If the universal be regarded as identical with substance, quality and action it would be destroyed when one specimen of them is destroyed; as a result there would never arise a notion of similarity or sameness in connection with the other substances, qualities and actions that are not yet destroyed. But Praśastapāda does not consider it to be ubiquitous (*sarvagata*). According to him universal is confined to the members of the concerned particular class, that is, a universal exists in the associated particular members only and not also in the intervening space.[11] The relation between a universal and the associated individuals is that of inherence which is one and eternal.

There are two kinds of universal, higher (*para*) and lower (*apara*). The 'higher' universal is that of Being (*sattā*). It is the cause of the notion of sameness or similarity (*anuvṛtti-pratyaya*) only and, hence it is called 'the universal' (more correctly though barbarously, includer) only. The 'lower' universals are those of substance, quality and action. They cause the notion of similarity as well as dissimilarity and hence are called universal-cum-particulars (more correctly though barbarously, includer-cum-excluder).[12]

The nature of a universal as conceived by the Naiyāyikas is just the same as that by the Vaiśeṣikas.[13] Though Uddyotakara, like the Vaiśeṣikas, treats a universal as something that exists in a select group of individuals,[14] Jayanta holds it to be ubiquitous. Jayanta feels that if a universal, one and inhering in many, were not regarded as ubiquitous it would be impossible for the Naiyāyikas to consider it to be one, for, it, being an impartite whole cannot reside in many individuals partly. Moreover, he says that it is ubiquitous because our notion of similarity or concordance directs us that way. He says that though a universal is all-pervading it is not perceived in empty space because the individuals

10. lakṣaṇabhedād eṣāṁ dravya-guṇa-karmabhyaḥ padārthāntaratvaṁ siddham/ ata eva ca nityatvam/ Praśastapāda-bhāṣya, p. 678

11. svaviṣayasarvagatam abhinnātmakam anekavṛtti eka-dvi-bahuṣv ātmasvarūpānugamapratyay-akāri svarūpābhedena ādhāreṣu prabandhena vartamānam anuvṛttipratyayakāraṇam / Ibid, p. 677

12. bhāvo'nuvṛtter eva hetutvāt sāmānyam eva/ dravyatvaṁ guṇatvaṁ karmatvaṁ ca sāmān-yāni viśeṣāś ca/ Vaiśeṣikasūtra, I. 2. 4–5

13. Nyāyasūtra, II. 2. 69 and Bhāṣya thereon. Nyāyavārtika, pp 315-334

14. nānabhyupagamāt kena sarvagatatvaṁ jāter abhyupagamyate, api tu svaviṣaye sarvatra vartata iti sarvagatety ucyte / Nyāyavārtika, p. 315

that are its seat are absent there in such space. It is only through the individuals that a universal can reveal itself. Again, it is not revealed by all individuals because only a select group of individuals is capable of revealing it.[15]

Those who believe in the objective reality of the universal urge that the universal, an object of the notion of co-ordination, is as much real as the particular, an object of the notion of exclusion. If the objective reality of particulars is held to be established on the strength of the notion of exclusion then the objective reality of the universal should also be accepted on the strength of the notion of concordance or inclusion. While apprehending a thing if we do not co-ordinate it with the objects similar to it and if we do not exclude it from those dissimilar to it, we cannot have a true idea of its individuality. The determinate knowledge of anything requires not only the knowledge of its exclusion (*vyāvṛtti*) from the dissimilar things but also the knowledge of its assimilation with the similar ones. To know a jar we must exclude it from non-jars and at the same time co-ordinate (*anuvṛtti*) it with other jars. Mere negation or exclusion without any positive content cannot enable us to know a thing. When we know a jar as jar we not only exclude it from cloth etc. but also assimilate it with the objects of the same class. When the state of affairs is like this it does not behove us to hold the particular—object of exclusion—to be alone real and the universal—object of assimilation—to be a mental creation.[16] Moreover, the existence or non-existence of an objective reality can be determined by the arbitration of experience alone and the dictum that excess in knowledge presupposes corresponding excess in the objective order should be accepted by all believers in external reality.[17] It thus conclusively follows that there is a sameness of reference in our cognitions of different cows and this identity of reference, linguistic and psychological alike, can be accounted for only on the assumption of a universal element superadded to the particulars.[18]

Even the Prābhākaras assert the objective reality of the universal on the basis of the notion of similarity or sameness.[19] They too, like

15. sarvasarvagatā jātir iti tāvad upeyate/
sarvatrāgrahaṇaṁ tasyā vyañjakavyaktyasannidheḥ //
sarvatra vidyate jātir na tu sarvatra dṛśyate/
tadabhivyañjakā yatra vyaktis tatraiva dṛśyate// Nyāyamañjarī, p. 285
16. Ibid, p. 283; Nyāyakumudacandra, p. 289
17. viṣayātiśayavyatirekeṇa pratyayātiśayānupapatteḥ/ Nyāyamañjarī, p. 286
18. tasmād ekasya bhinneṣu yā vṛttis tannibandhanaḥ/
sāmānyaśabdaḥ sattādau ekādhikaraṇena vā// Ślokavārtika, Ākṛtivāda, 24
19. saṁvid eva hi bhagavatī viṣayasattvāvagame śaraṇam/Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 22

the Naiyāyikas, consider it to be one, eternal and something different from the concerned individuals.[20] They accept even the view that the objective reality of the universal can be proved by the fact of a series of similar judgments, say, 'it is a cow,' 'it is a cow' etc. etc. (*ekākāraparāmarśa*). But on some points they differ from the Naiyāyikas. Firstly, they hold that the relation of inherence that obtains between the universal and the individual is not eternal.[21] Secondly, they do not admit the existence of the highest universal—*sattā* as acknowledged by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. Since we perceive a number of individual substances as having certain characteristics in common we have to admit that those substances have one universal in common. But we have no such consciousness of pure being or *sattā;* we do not perceive a number of things as merely 'existing:' and so we cannot admit that there is such a universal as pure Being or *sattā.* When we speak of an individual object as existing (*sat*), we do not mean that it has a class-character called being (*sat*); what we do mean is that the individual has an existence *per se* (*savarūpasattā*).[22] Thirdly, according to them qualities and actions cannot have universals. To illustrate, there cannot be a universal whiteness in particular white colours, say of a conch, a shell, milk etc. This is the reason why they do not recognise the relation of *saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya*[23] which is held by the Naiyāyikas to obtain between a sense-organ and a universal residing in a quality or an action. The considerations behind the employment of this phrase are as follows: The relation between a sense-organ and a substance is called *saṁgoya*, that between this substance and its quality is *samavāya*, and that between this quality and the universal residing in this quality is *samavāya* again. Fourthly, they do not believe in the universal wordness (*śabdatva*) and hence they reject the relation of *samaveta-samavāya*[24] which is held by the Naiyāyikas to obtain between the auditory sense-organ and the universal 'wordness' residing in a word. The considerations behind the employment of this phrase are as follows: The relation between the auditory sense-organ and a word is called *samavāya* and that between the word and the wordness residing in it is *samavāya* again. Fifthly, they deny possibility of there being a universal *Brāhmaṇatva.*[25]

20. Ibid, pp. 17-32
21. samavāyaṁ ca na vayaṁ kāśyapīyā iva nityam upemaḥ/ vinaṣṭāyām api vyaktau na jātir anyatra yāti na ca tatrāvatiṣṭhate na vinaśyati kevalaṁ tadvyaktisamavāyas tasyā nivartate/ Ibid, p. 26
22. Ibid, pp. 29-30
23. yat tu saṁyuktasamavetasamavāyād guṇatvādigrahaṇam iṣṭaṁ tad api teṣām abhāvād evāyuktam/ Ibid, p. 46
24. samavetasamavāyāc ca śabdatvagrahaṇam apy evam evānupapannam/ Ibid, p. 46
25. anayaiva ca diśā brāhmaṇatvādijātir api nivāritā/ Ibid, p. 30

They ask: what common characteristic, impossible to be found in any other human being, is there in the individuals called Brāhmaṇas? There is none. Hence there cannot be a universal Brāhminhood or *Brāhmaṇatva*. The Naiyāyikas[26] and the Bhāṭṭas[27] have tried to prove it. The Buddhists[28] and Jainas,[29] who in their religious and social outlook, are deadly against casteism, vehemently refuted the view that there is universal *Brāhmaṇatva*. Śālikanātha, an adherent of the Prābhākara school of thought, agrees with the Buddhists and the Jainas on this point, but he, as an orthodox believer in the Vedas, was bound to support the view that Brāhmins have special privileges over other individuals and thus ultimately to strengthen their classpride. He could not share the objective of the Buddhists and Jainas, namely, the abolition of classpride. Śālikanātha accepts some families to be Brāhmin on the authority of the worldly tradition and explains the application of one name 'Brāhmin' to many individuals on the basis of their being born in those family lines.[30]

The Sāṅkhyas hold that the whole material universe is nothing but a transformation (*pariṇāma*) of *Prakṛti*. *Prakṛti* runs through all the variety of effects. Hence we can say that according to them *Prakṛti* is a universal.[31] But though they, like the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, consider the universal, namely, *Prakṛti* to be one, eternal, ubiquitous and something that runs through all the associated individuals, they differ from them in so far as they do not hold it to be absolutely different from these individuals that are but its own modifications. According to the Naiyāyikas the different individuals are not the effect but the substrata of the universal concerned, while according to the Sāṅkhyas all that is perceived to be distinct from *Puruṣa* is the effect, the manifestation, the transformation of *Parkṛti*. The Sāṅkhyas have not posited an absolute difference between a cause and its effect as the Naiyāyikas have; they consider them to be identical.[32]

According to the Śaṅkara Vedānta, each one of the five categories viz. quality, action, universal, particularity and inherence is identical with substance[33] which is nothing but *Brahman*. For this school *Brahman*

26. ......brāhmaṇatvādijātir bhavati..... ../ Nyāyamañjarī, p. 389
27. Ślokavārtika, Vanavāda, 25-29
28. Dhammapada, gāthās 393, 396
29. Nyāyakumudacandra, p. 777
30. Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 31
31. sāṅkhyais tu......traiguṇyarūpasya sāmānyasya abhyupagamāt/ Nyāyapraveśapañjikā, p. 84
32. avyatiriktaṁ sāṅkhyadarśanena/ Karṇagomiṭīkā. pp. 194, 223
33. atha bhavati dravyādhinatvaṁ guṇādīnām/ tato dravyabhāve bhāvād dravyābhāve'bhāvād dravyam eva saṁsthānādibhedād anekaśabdapratyayabhāg bhavati/ Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya, II. 2. 17

is the only ultimate reality, and it is thus a universal in the sense that all individuals whatsoever are but its *vivartas* i.e. illusory modifications. The view is in a way akin to that of the Sāṅkhya according to which however, the individuals are real modifications of the one underlying reality viz. *Prakṛti*. As against this, the Naiyāyikas regard the universal as absolutely different from the substance. For Śaṅkara the highest universal Being (*sattā*) and Substance are one and the same thing. He admits no real universal other than being—which is *Brahman*. But from the empirical point of view he concedes the existence of other universals. There are universals corresponding to cows and other substances, qualities and actions; these universals are not born. Only individual substances, individual qualities, individual actions are generated; but their universal essences are not born.[34] They are the archetypal forms, as it were, of the individual substances, qualities and actions. But these archetypal forms are not eternal in the sense in which *Brahman* is eternal; for, the universals residing in the individual substances, qualities and actions have a mere empirical existence; they are the evolutes of Nescience and as such phenomenal appearances from the standpoint of *Brahman*.

The later Śaṅkarites, however, do not recognise even the empirical existence of the lower universals which, according to them, can neither be perceived nor inferred.[35] They will say that the perceptual knowledge 'this is a jar' is a proof only of its object having a jar-form and not also of this object possessing the universal jarness. When there are no lower universals in existence it is futile to hunt for an inference that can prove their existence. The perception of a similar form in certain different individuals cannot be regarded as a proof of the existence of a corresponding universal.[36]

Even the grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari's view that it is Logos (*Śabda-brahma*) which is the only reality implies that for him Logos is a universal inasmuch as the whole universe is the manifestation of it and it permeates the whole universe,[37] but this also in the same sense in which *Prakṛti* and *Brahman* are universals.

Kumārila views the universal as real. He does not hold with the Buddhists that the universal is non-different from, or identical with,

34. na hi gavādivyaktīnām utpttimattve tadākṛtīnām apy utpattimattvaṁ syāt, dravya-guṇa-karmaṇāṁ hi vyaktaya evotpadyante nākṛtayaḥ/ Ibid, I. 3. 28
35. pratyakṣād anumānād vā na jātiḥ seddhum arhati/ Tattvapradipikā, p. 303
36. ghaṭo'yam ityādi pratyakṣaṁ hi ghaṭatvādisadbhāve mānaṁ, na tu tasya jātitve'pi/ jātitvarūpasādhyāprasiddhau tatsādhakānumānasyāpy anavakāśāt / Vedāntaparibhāṣā, p. 30
37. anuviddhaikarūpatvād vicibudbudaphenavat/
vāçaḥ sārm apekṣante śabdabrahmodakādvayam// Quoted in Syādvādaratnākara, p. 91

the individual. Nor does he hold with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Prābhākaras that the universal is different from the individual. According to him, the universal is both different from, and identical with the individual.[38] Jayanta rightly points out that the Bhāṭṭas being afraid of the dilemma posed by the Buddhists, namely, whether a universal is present in the concerned individuals wholly or partly, have formulated the doctrine of identity-cum-difference.[39] If these words of Jayanta make one think that there is no need of being afraid of those Buddhist arguments as they cannot lead us near the truth then one is mistaken. How to explain the puzzling appearance of the universal and at the same time avert the attacks of the Buddhists—this consideration brought an intellectual pressure on the Bhāṭṭas who, as a result, could not help formulating the doctrine of identity-cum-difference. Had they, like Jayanta, posited an absolute difference between the universal and the individual, they could not have escaped the Buddhist attacks. In giving answer to the Buddhists, Jayanta, instead of taking recourse to clean logic, just tries somehow to stick to his own position.[40] No neutral unbiased person can be satisfied with the solution offered by Jayanta. Hence if, for the fear of the Buddhist attacks, the Bhāṭṭas, going against the Naiyāyikas, adopted a new position in solving the problem of the universal, we ought to judge that in doing so they were trying to be nearer the truth, that is, nearer the true solution of the problem.

According to Kumārila a real is of the nature of both a universal and a particular. He argues that since of these two one without the other is impossible, it is imperative for us to consider a real to be of the nature of both.[41] Unlike the Śaṅkara Vedāntins, he does not consider a real to be merely of the nature of a universal, nor does he hold with the Buddhists that it is merely of the nature of a particular. Again, dissenting from the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas, he does not declare the universal and the particular to be quite different from one another mainly because he noted that whenever we cognise a thing we cognise it as distinct from some individuals and as similar to some others at one and the same time.[42]

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38. tasmāt pramāṇabalena bhinnābhinnatvam eva yuktam/ Śāstradīpikā, p. 100
39. etat tu vṛttivikalpādibhyo bibhyateva abhyupagataṁ tatrabhavateti tiṣṭhatu/ Nyāyamañjarī, p. 284
40. Ibid, p. 284
41. nirviśeṣaṁ na sāmānyaṁ bhavec chaśaviṣāṇavat/
sāmānyarahitatvāc ca viśeṣās tadvad eva hi// Ślokavārtika, Ākṛtivāda. 10
42. sarvavastuṣu buddhiś ca vyāvṛttyanugamātmikā/
jāyate dvyātmakatvena vinā sā ca na siddhyati// Ibid, 5

If an object was regarded by Kumārila as identical with both a universal and a particular, he could not hold the two to be absolutely different. Hence he refuted the view according to which the universal and the particular are absolutely different. According to his own position the universal is of the nature of the particular and the particular is of the nature of the universal because neither of these is found to be without the other. From this it naturally follows that Kumārila does not view the universal and the particular as absolutely different.[43]

Jayanta has proved that a universal like ether (*ākāśa*), is ubiquitous; Kumārila supports this view as a possible alternative[44] but his own established position is that a universal should be regarded as present in a select group of individuals.[45] It is often seen that in the course of philosophical discussions Kumārila accepts mutually contrary views provided none of them is detrimental to the validity of the Vedas. This happens because his prime aim is to demonstrate the authenticity of the Vedic injunctions pertaining to rituals; all other discussions are secondary and, in a way, of the nature of a digression. It is at the time of such digressive discussions that Kumārila accepts and supports a number of possible, though contrary, views, provided they seem logical to him. This is the reason why he supports both the views—one regarding the universal as ubiquitous and the other regarding it otherwise.

Since Kumārila holds that the universal is identical with the individual,[46] the universal, according to him, cannot be absolutely one but both one and many. Kumārila believes that there is no contradiction in calling it one and many, if we make assertion from different points of view. He has also stated that there is no contradiction whatsoever in holding the universal and the particular to be different from as well as identical with each other.[47]

Cowness *qua* cowness is one but *cowness in tawny cow* is different from *cowness in white cow*. In this manner, universal *qua* universal is one but it is many as we concentrate our attention on the individual with which it is identical. Similarly, even the particular can be said to be one and many without involving any contradiction. An individual *qua* individual is different from another individual but from the point of view of the universal with which it—as well as the other individual—is

43. Ibid, 11
44. Ibid, 26-30
45. piṇḍeṣveva ca sāmānyaṁ nāntarā gṛhyate yataḥ/
na hy ākāśavad icchanti sāmānyaṁ nāma kiñcana// Ibid, 25
46. kasmāt sāsnādimatsv eva gotvaṁ yasmāt tadātmakam/
tādātmyam asya kasmāc cet svabhāvād iti gamyatām// Ibid, 47
47. Ibid, 54-57

identical it is one with that other individual.[48] Kumārila is of the opinion that if we predicate two contradictory attributes of a thing from two different points of view then this predication will not involve any contradiction.

Though the thing is of the nature of both the universal and the particular, sometimes universal remains latent and the particular is cognised while at other times the particular remains latent and the universal is cognised—this happens as we look at the thing from two different points of view. But when one cognises in a thing both the universal and the particular at one and the same time there is neither the assimilative consciousness nor the consciousness of dissimilarity or exclusion but the whole is presented to the consciousness, without any fissure in it. This experience can be had at the time of pure trance (*Nirvikalpaka Samādhi*). At that stage the thing becomes inexpressible. From this we can deduce that the thing is neither exclusively of the nature of the universal, nor exclusively of the nature of the particular but is of the nature of the both— it is an organic unity of both the universal and the particular.[49]

If, according to the Bhāṭṭas, there obtains a relation of identity-cum-difference between the universal and the individual, it naturally follows that they could not accept the universal to be absolutely eternal as did the Naiyāyikas. Pārthasārathi says that the universal is both eternal and non-eternal. The universal *qua* universal is eternal, but from the point of view of the individuals with which it is identical it can also be considered to be non-eternal. Not only is the universal both eternal and non-eternal, but the individuals too are both eternal and non-eternal—eternal from the point of view of the universal with which they are identical and non-eternal from the point of view of individual *qua* individual—their own nature.[50]

Kumārila, like the Naiyāyikas and Prābhākaras, holds the universal to be perceptible.[51] He sides with the Prābhākaras in denying the existence of the highest universal *Sattā*[52] cherished by the Naiyāyikas. But he agrees with the Naiyāyikas in holding that even individual qualities and individual actions can be the seat of a universal—the view which is not favoured by the Prābhākaras. This is the reason

48. ekatve'py ākṛter yadvad bahutvaṁ vyaktypekṣayā/
bahutve hı tathā vyakter ekatvaṁ jātyapekṣayā//
ekānekābhidhāne ca śabdāḥ niyataśaktayaḥ/ Ibid, Vanavāda, 85-86
49. Ibid, Ākṛtivāda, p. 59-63
50. Śāstıadīpikā, p. 101
51. Ślokavārtika, Vanavāda, 24
52. Ibid, Ākṛtivāda 19-24

why the Bhāṭṭas have acknowledged the tertiary relation of *saṁyukta-tādātmya-tādātmya*. What the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers call *saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya* the Bhāṭṭas call *saṁyukta-tādātmya-tādātmya*, and this, in turn, is because the relation which is named *samavāya* by the former is named *tādātmya* by the latter and we have already explained the relation called *saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya*.

One can easily see that there is a marked difference between Prabhākara's concept of the universal and Kumārila's concept of it. Prabhākara's concept tends towards and resembles the corresponding Nyāya concept, while Kumārila's concept is tinged with the doctrine of non-absolutism. The Mīmāṁsā school is not primarily concerned with philosophy. It is mainly occupied with the ritualistic interpretation of the Vedic hymns. Hence the Mīmāṁsakas had no established tradition of ontology before them as did the Vaiśeṣikas and the Sāṅkhyas. This is the reason why Prabhākara and Kumārila drifted a lot from one another on ontological and philosophical points. When there arises a controversial point in the field of ontology or philosophy it is quite likely that one will support this tradition and the other that according to their respective temperaments. The above discussion makes it amply clear that Kumārila is deeply influenced by the Jainas, the upholders of the theory of non-absolutism.[53] To suggest—as might possibly be done—that the Jainas have learnt the theory of non-absolutism from Kumārila would be a blunder. Even before the advent of Kumārila, the theory of non-absolutism was well-known among the Jainas. Both Sanmatitarka and Nayacakra establish the theory of non-absolutism; the former of these texts is decidedly a pre-Kumārila work while the latter—and even a commentary on it—should be accepted to be pre-Kumārila on the ground that in it—or in its commentary—we do not come across any reference to Kumārila's Ślokavārtika.

Kumārila, unlike the Jainas, does not always remain loyal to the theory of non-absolutism. This is the reason why though he supports the non-absolutistic view as to the nature of the universal, he also seeks to justify the corresponding Vaiśeṣika view regarding the nature of the universal.[54] This means that though Kumārila is not a staunch adherent of the doctrine of non-absolutism, he certainly has a tendency to endorse that doctrine.

Kumārila himself says: It is not the aim of the Mīmāṁsā school to formulate its own categories and to propound a new philosophy; for it the well-known categories will suffice. Hence we Mīmāṁsakas have shown the difference between the universal and a row as common people

53. mīmāṁsakās tu prāyeṇa sarvatra jainocchiṣṭabhojīti/ Syādvādaratnākara, p. 833
54. Ślokavārtika, Vanavāda, 33 et seq.

see the difference between them. If this difference is proved false we would not be perturbed.[55] From this it is clear that Kumārila has borrowed the non-absolutistic description of the the universal from the Jainas. But it is worthy of note that though Kumārila's description of the universal closely resembles the one given by the Jainas he differs from the latter on one important point, namely, that for Kumārila the universal is an independent category while for the Jainas it is nothing but similar attributes or qualities.

It is interesting to note that in Śabdanityatvādhikaraṇa of the Ślokavārtika there is a reference to a view according to which qualities themselves are eternal and can serve the purpose of the universal.

Dharmakīrti on the Problem of Universals: All things are firmly established in their own nature. They do not mix themselves with others; otherwise there would arise the contingency of one thing being another, that is, of x being non-x which is a glaring contradiction. The generality is regarded by some as *constituting the very nature* of things; but in reality this is not so, because in that case the things would become devoid of thingness—particularity. That is to say, there would then remain generality only because particularity is contradictory to generality which according to this view constitutes the nature of things. Hence, Dharmakīrti concludes that things are confined to their own unique selves and never mix or confuse themselves with others. In other words, things have only their own unique nature, they do not have any general nature.

To avoid the above-mentioned difficulties, some hold that the universal is an entity different from and connected with many individuals. As a matter of fact, such an entity could not become the universal *belonging to* these individuals as according to this view it is quite different from them. Moreover, this view involves the contingency of the numbers two etc., conjunction and effect-substance becoming universal (for on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, each of these three entities is one-residing-in-many). Again, by mere connection with a third thing two things cannot become similar to each other; at the most, those two things can be said to be *attached to or possessed of* that third thing and nothing more than this. The illustration in point is the several idols of different gods having one thread tied around their necks. Just as these idols do not give rise to the notion of their similarity (identity) on the ground that they

55. Ibid, 97
The Buddhists have argued that there is no universal over and above the individuals which are supposed to be its seat just as there is no row over and above the individuals forming the row. Kumārila's point is that the common man does make a distinction between the status of a universal and that of a row.

possess a common thread even so individuals do not give rise to the notion of their similarity on the ground that they possess one independent entity called the universal. Our own Intellect confusing the natures of two things gives rise to the notion of their similarity and it is not the case that some third thing connecting the two things gives rise to the notion of their similarity.

It might be urged that the illusion of silver in shell arises, because our Intellect has apprehended the *universal* brightness that resides in both of them; without the apprehension of the universal the psychic phenomenon of illusion would never take place; it is a necessary condition for its rise. But this contention is untenable. One individual is mistaken for another because they produce similar effects and not because there is some entity called universal common to them. Shell is mistaken for silver because both of them produce similar impressions on the mind. Moreover, Number (two etc.), Conjunction *(saṁyoga)* and Effect-substance *(kārya-dravya)* reside in many, that is, they are common to many, like the (alleged) universal, and if the things having them are not mistaken one for the other, why should the things having the universal be mistaken one for the other. Thus there is no entity called universal over and above the individuals. Even if there be an independent entity called the universal, that too will remain confined to its own self and will never mix itself with others, i.e., individuals. So all things are totally different from others—not excluding those that are allegedly similar to the former. They are unique in their nature.[56]

But all the same, it is not that there is no universal at all. The point to be stressed is that it is not a reality, it is a conceptul construction, a mental figment. It is nothing but the exclusion of the things from their opposite.[57] The Intellect *(vikalpikā buddhi)* while arising, connects, by force of its innate constructive capacity, things which are

56. sarva eva hi bhāvāḥ svarūpavyavasthitayaḥ/ te nātmānaṁ pareṇa miśrayanti, tasmād aparatvaprasaṅgāt/ yad eṣām abhinnam ātmabhūtaṁ rūpam na tat teṣām, tadānīṁ teṣām abhāvāt/ tad eva hi syāt, tasyaiva bhāvāt, tadvyatiriktasyānyasyābhāvāt/ tasyaiva ca punar bhedavirodhāt/ tac cātmani vyavasthitam amiśram eva/ arthāntaram apy anekasambandhe'pi na tat teṣāṁ sāmānyam, atadrūpatvāt/ dvitvādi-saṁyoga-kāryadravyeṣv api prasaṅgāt/ na hi sambandhināpy anyena anye samānā nāma tadvanto nāma syuḥ/ bhūtavat kaṇṭhe guṇena/ nābhinnapratyayaviṣayā bhūtavat/ tadātmānam eva hi buddhiḥ saṁsṛjantī sāmānyaviṣayā pratibhāsate naikasambandhināv iti/ bhūtavat/ taddarśinyāḥ sā bhrāntir iti cet/ taddarśanīti kutaḥ? nirbījabhrāntyayogād iti cet/ ta eva tadekakāryā bījam, saṅkhyā-saṁyoga-kāryadravyādimatsu bhūtādiṣv abhāvāc ca/ tan na tathā sāmānyabuddhau niveśābhāvāt sāmānyam anyat/ sati vā tasyāpi svātmani vyavasthānād amiśram evānyena/ tasmād ime bhāvāḥ svajātīyābhimatād anyasmāc ca vyatiriktāḥ, svabhāvena ekarūpatvāt/ Svārthānumānapariccheda, p. 16.

57. asaṁsṛṣṭānām ekā'saṁsargas tadvyatirekiṇāṁ samānateti/ Ibid, p. 24.

really discrete.[58] Cognition that arises depending upon the things excluded from their opposite *(atadvyāvṛtta)* is conceptual and constructive *(vikalpikā)*. It is what we call Intellect *(vikalpa-buddhi)*. This Intellect being constructive conceals the unique nature of things, superimposes the image of identity—which is its own creation—on external things, and thus connecting them makes them appear as though they are similar. It is the nature of things excluded from their opposite to give rise to constructive Intellect and it is the nature of this Intellect to construct the image of identity. This Intellect is called an illusion as it conceals the unique nature of things by imputing its own nature, the constructed image of identity, on the external things. Those things whose natures are concealed by this constructive Intellect appear as though similar—having this or that nature in common, even if in reality they are absolutely discrete and have nothing common amongst them. In compliance with constructed mental image, that imputed identity is called the universal of the mental images (of things) which appear as though having an external reality on account of our previous experiences of the things whose mental images they are.[5] As a mental concept the universal is real; but as an external thing it is not real, because it is merely a mental image constructed by the Intellect.[60]

It might be argued that if the universal is held to be of the nature of *ideal* things as presented by constructive Intellect we will have to accept that it has existential reality; and hence it could not be said that it is of the nature of exclusion or negation. But Dharmakīrti emphatically asserts that it is of the nature of negation because the cognition of similarity arises on our grasping the given things as being excluded from their opposite. Intellect grasping the constructed mental image appears as though grasping the objective reality on account of its being by nature illusive. Intellect is said to have exclusion or negation as its object because it arises in connection with the given things that are being excluded from their opposite.[61]

58. buddhir anādivāsanāsāmarthyād asaṁsṛṣṭān api dharmān saṁsrjantī jāyate/ Ibid, p. 22
59. buddhiḥ khalu tadanyavyatirekiṇaḥ padārthān āśritya utpadyamānā vikalpikā svavāsanā-prakṛtim anuvidadhatī bhinnam eṣāṁ rūpaṁ tirodhāya pratibhāsam abhinnam ātmīyam adhyasya tān saṁsrjantī sandarśayati/ sā caikasādhyasādhanatayā anyavivekināṁ bhāvānāṁ tadvikalpavāsanāyāś 'ca prakṛtiḥ yadevam eṣā pratibhāti/ tadudbhavā sā ceyaṁ saṁvṛtiḥ saṁvṛyate'nayā svarūpeṇa pararūpam iti/ te ca tayā saṁvṛtabhedāḥ svayaṁ bhedino'py abhedina iva kenac'd rūpeṇa pratibhānti/ tadeṣāṁ buddhipratibhāsam anurundhānaiḥ buddhiparivartināṁ eva bhāvānām ākāraviśeṣaparigrahād bahir iva sphuratāṁ sāmānyam ity ucyate/ Ibid, p. 24.
60. tasyā abhiprāyavaśāt sāmānyaṁ sat prakīrtitam/
tad asat paramārthena yathā saṅkalpitaṁ tayā// Ibid, p. 24
61. katham idānīm anyāpohaḥ sāmānyam? sa eva khalv anyāpohaḥ/ tam eva gṛhṇatī sā prakṛtivibhramāt vikalpānāṁ vastugrāhiṇīva ca pratibhāti/ sā hi tadanyavivekiṣv eva bhāveṣu bhavantī vivekaviṣayeti gamyate/ Ibid, p. 25

The Intellect constructs the image of identity on the basis of exclusion. The exclusion of the given things from their opposite gives rise to the cognition of similarity, because exclusion is common to all the excluded things. Thus there is no objectively real universal corresponding to the reflection of identity borne by the Intellect.[62]

The individuals themselves could not be regarded as intermingled with one another, because in that case there would remain no difference among them and consequently the existence of the universal itself would become impossible. Moreover, anything over and above the individuals is not cognised. If the universal is regarded as imperceptible, the Nyāya view that in verbal cognition an individual is cognised through the universal would become absurd. Again there arises, a question as to how the cognition of similarity could arise in relation to the individuals that are absolutely different from the universal. In other words, how could the universal cause the cognition of similarity in relation to the individuals which are absolutely different from it? If, in reply, it is said that this difficulty does not arise because the universal is related to the individuals, then Number (two etc.), Conjunction and Effect-substance too being related to the individuals could equally lead to the cognition of similarity in relation to them—which means that it is not necessary to posit an independent entity called the universal. It might be contended that conjunction etc. cannot generate the cognition of similarity in relation to the individuals because they are not of the nature of a universal. But this contention is improper. The whole discussion is being conducted to decide this very thing, viz. the nature of the universal, and hence it is not advisable to bring in what is not as yet proved, to solve the difficulty.[63]

It might be suggested that the existence of the universal could not be denied; it exists because it is of the nature of knowledge inasmuch as it is a mental image. But this suggestion is fantastic. For, how can that which is identical with knowledge be considered as connected with or inherent in the external things like Substance, Quality and Action? The nature of knowledge is not there in the external things. It might be pleaded that the universal does not in fact inhere in the individuals; yet we judge it to do so. We judge the universal—which is a mental image—to be an independent entity residing in many individuals. But this suggestion gives rise to the question as to what then causes the generation of a particular mental image (concept) in connection with some select individuals only. It could not be causeless because otherwise

62. tasyāḥ ka āśraya ity anyāpoha ucyate/ tasya vastuṣu bhāvād avirodhāt/ Ibid, p. 25
63. Ibid, p. 25, l. 15-20

the mental image would arise in connection with all the individuals. Moreover, in treating the universal as identical with knowledge, the universal (as something objectively real) becomes impossible inasmuch as the knowledge generated by one individual cannot be the same as that generated by another individual. Thus the universal cannot be said to pervade either the discrete pieces of knowledge (mental images) or the discrete individuals. How then could it be called the universal?[64]

Therefore, the cognition of similarity in things is a false conception. Things are not similar by virtue of any entity either different from them or non-different from them. Exclusion of some individuals from all others is the source of this false conception. This false conception grasping the exclusion of the things from their opposite make them look like similar by virtue of its constructive capacity.'[65] It might be objected that the things being discrete could not generate the cognition of their similarity, even through their exclusion from the opposite. For unique particulars it is impossible to generate one common (or unitary) effect. This objection is based on non-observation. It is the very nature of things to generate one common effect. To illustrate, visual sense organ, object, light, attention—or soul, visual sense organ, mind, object and their contacts,—though not having in them (even according to the Naiyāyikas) any universal entity allegedly responsible for the production of a common effect, produce such an effect, namely, cognition of colour. Similarly, *Śiṁśapā, Khadira* etc. though different from one another and having no universal entity *(treeness)* in them can produce by their very nature a common effect, viz. cognition of identity in them or some other common effects which could be achieved by wood, for example, burning, constructing a house etc. according as they receive help from the necessary accessory causal factors; but water etc. though equally different from one another cannot bring about the above mentioned effects just as ears etc. are not capable of bringing about the perception of colour etc. Here is another illustration. Certain medicinal herbs, though each of them is unique, are seen to be capable of removing fever, collectively or severally but not so the other things. Herbs like *Guḍuci* etc. collectively or severally bring about a common effect viz. removal of fever. For this purpose, they, though each of them is unique, do not require an independent entity called universal because it is their very

64. Ibid, p. 25, l. 24-32

65. tasmān mithyāvikalpo'yam artheṣv ekātmatāgrahaḥ/
na hy arthāḥ vyatiriktenāvyatiriktena vā kenacid ātmanā samānāḥ/ tathaiṣāṁ grahaṇaṁ mithyāvikalpa eva/
itaretarabhedo'sya bījaṁ saṁjñā yadarthikā//
so'yam itaretarabhedas tasyaikatvapratibhāsino mithyāvikalpasya bījam/ tam eva gṛhṇan eṣa vikalpaḥ svavāsanāprakṛter evaṁ pratibhāti/ Ibid, pp. 25-26

nature to produce that common effect. On the other hand, curds, lead etc., though each of them equally unique, cannot bring about that effect. The view that different individuals produce one common effect because they possess one entity called universal is unsound. For, the universal being an unalterable entity could not produce any effect. Let us grant for argument's sake that the universal generates an effect. But this would involve further absurdity. The universal being an unalterable eternal entity there would not be any difference in the effect viz. rapid or slow cure, nor would there be any gradedness in the medical properties of those herbs even when they happen to be produced at different places and times. If the common effect is considered to be variable, then its cause, the universal would also become variable—which amounts to the absurdity of the universal being deprived of its own nature viz. being one and eternal. No novelty could be produced in the universal by others on account of its being eternal. Nor could the universal generate novelty in others because it is changeless and eternal. Let us concede that it produces the effect. In this case, it would produce all its effects simultaneously because it being of an unaugmentable nature would not wait for the accessory to come. If it does not produce all its effects at once it would not be regarded as efficient to generate those effects, that is, it would never produce those effects. But the individuals, each having been produced with its own peculiarity on account of a difference in time, place and rearing, can generate effects peculiar to them and that too at different times; this involves no contradiction whatsoever. Some select individuals are called similar (or identical) because they possess *in common* the *exclusion* from their opposite. They are excluded from their opposite because they, though each of them unique, generate a *common effect* which their opposite are not efficient to produce or because they, though each of them unique, are produced by a *common cause* which is not the cause that has produced their opposite.[66]

Some one might raise a question: Through the universal which is nothing but exclusion from the opposite, what are cognised as similar—the unique particulars or the mental images? The particulars could not be known as similar because they are not the object of conceptual cognition. Nor could it be opined that the mental images are known as similar because then the conceptual cognition of similarity would not lead to successful activity; only the unique particulars are efficient; the mental images are not efficient. Again, if only mental images are known as similar, that is, if only they have the universal, then the universals like momentariness etc. would not be perceived in external unique things and consequently momentariness etc. would not be regarded

66. Ibid, pp. 26-27

as constituting the nature of external unique things; they would constitute the nature of unreal mental images only.[67]

Dharmakīrti points out that these contingencies do not arise at all. He emphatically asserts that the conceptual cognition of similarity really grasps the mental images as similar. The conceptual cognition that arises depending upon the impression left by the experience of the external thing seems to have this thing for its object even when in reality it is not its object; it superimposes externality on the internal mental image because the mental image is generated by the revival of impressions left by the experience of the external thing itself. It appears as though grasping similarity or identity in things on account of its being produced by things having a common effect. It contains the mental image of identity—this identity in things is nothing but their exclusion from their opposite.[68]

The mental images contained in the conceptual cognition (Intellect) appear as though having an objective reality, as though one in many individuals and as though efficient even if not really efficient, for the practical people at large conduct their successful purposive activity judging them to be so; otherwise, that is, if they were to judge the mental images as mental images they would not act at all. These mental images, on account of their appearing as efficient to produce a particular effect, seem as if excluded from things not efficient to produce that effect. These mental images are not things, not something objectively real, because they do not conform to the test of reality, namely, causal efficiency *(arthakriyākāritva)*. Through the universal of the nature of exclusion, only the mental images contained in the Intellect are grasped as similar, because they having external reality imputed on them appear as excluded from some things; things themselves are not grasped as similar by the universal because things are not grasped by or reflected in the Intellect or conceptual cognition. As regards the objection that the conceptual cognitons that grasp the mental images could not lead to successful purposive action, Dharmakīrti observes that it is not the case that no conception leads to purposive activity. Those conceptions that arise strictly bound up with the things, lead invariably to the achievement of the desired end, though they do not grasp the things themselves. The illustration in point is as follows: The illusion of a gem in the lustre of the gem leads to the attainment of the gem because the lustre is strictly bound

67. kiṁ punar anena bhedalakṣaṇena sāmānyena svalakṣaṇaṁ samānam iti pratyeyam, athānyad eva? kiṁ cātaḥ? yadi svalakṣaṇaṁ kathaṁ vikalpasya viṣayaḥ? anyato vā katham arthakriyā? svalakṣaṇe cānityatvādyapratīter atādrūpyam/ teṣāṁ cāvastudharmatā/ Ibid, p. 27

68. Ibid, p. 27

up with the gem whose effect it is. On the other hand, other conceptions do not lead to the attainment of the desired things because though these conceptions arise depending upon the aspects of things themselves, they having given up the pursuit of those aspects as cognised by perception grasp some similarity in things, in reality quite different, and as a result superimpose on one thing the character or nature belonging to another thing. The illustration in point is as follows. The illusion of a gem in the light of a lamp does not lead to the attainment of the gem because the gem and the light of a lamp are not strictly bound up with one another: they are not related either causally *(kāraṇa-sambandha)* or essentially *(svabhāva-sambandha)*. So, Dharmakīrti concludes that the objects of conceptual cognition being mental images are not efficient; but some of them being bound up with things themselves indirectly lead to successful purposive action, while others not so bound up cannot even indirectly lead to it. He proves even the fact that the unique particulars are not lacking in the nature of momentariness etc. It is so because for him momentariness is not something different and distinct from the momentary thing itself.[69]

It might be urged that if there were no independent universal, then there would remain nothing to connect the naturally discrete individuals and as a result there would not arise a recognition to the effect 'this is verily that' in connection with the individuals. Dharmakīrti replies, without caring for the repetition, that things, though discrete, produce one common effect just as visual sense-organ, colour etc. though quite different from one another produce one common effect viz. visual perception. Things differing from one another by their very nature generate, in a person who observe them producing a common effect, a wrong conceptual cognition. This conceptual cognition involves verbal expression; it has 'exclusion from the opposite' as its object; it contains the judgment of identity viz. 'this is verily that;' it identifies the discrete things on account of the revival of the impressions left by the previous experience. Otherwise, that is, if cognition of similarity or identity even in things discrete were regarded as due to an independent universal and not as due to a common effect, the cognition of similarity even in discrete things would never arise. To illustrate, we never identify different persons simply because they hold the same staff one by one. Though only some select few hold the same staff one by one, we do not have the cognition of the form 'this person is verily that person' or 'this person is verily similar to that person', when we, having seen the staff held by one of them, see it held by another person. In fact, there we have the cognition of the form 'this staff is here'. This conclusively proves

69. Ibid, p. 27

that cognition of identity or similarity in different individuals is not due to our grasping one independent entity called universal in many individuals.[70]

It might be argued that this same difficulty would arise even in the theory of Exclusion. Dharmakīrti retorts that this difficulty does not arise in the theory of Exclusion because according to this theory the cognition of identity or similarity arises on account of illusion. It might be urged that in the cognition of identity, there is no possibility of illusion as there is no cause for it. Dharmakīrti points out that the things themselves that produce a common effect are the cause of illusion; for, they, through previous experience, generate the Intellect which has a natural constructive capacity and that, by its very nature, creates illusion. Even in illusions like that of water in mirage, those things themselves are the cause of illusion as they generate the experience on which remotely depends the judgment of identity viz. 'this (mirage) is water.' And there is nothing like an independent universal in the water and mirage both, to make mirage look like water. If there were an independent universal residing in them both, then Intellect grasping an existent thing, namely, the universal in question, could not be an illusion. If it is argued that it is a case of illusion because there we superimpose on a thing perceived (i.e. on mirage) the characteristic of water not belonging to it, then in that case that illusory cognition would not be regarded as grasping the universal. It would then grasp that very characteristic which it superimposes on the thing (i.e. mirage) because it is not possible for cognition to superimpose an ungrasped characteristic. If it were possible for it to do so, it would be possible for, say, the illusory cognition of water in mirage to superimpose any characteristic whatsoever, even the characteristic of fire on mirage. Again, as that superimposed characteristic is not there in the thing perceived, namely mirage, it could not be the universal. It might be urged that the superimposition of a foreign character on a thing is possible only when the universal of that thing is grasped; othewise there would arise an over-absurdity *(atiprasaṅga)*. Dharmakīrti asks the opponent as to why it is not held that we superimpose the characteristic of one thing on another thing only when we have observed them producing a common effect. Even those who believe in an independent universal must allow for the capacity of things to generate a common effect. Thus the things themselves generate the cognition of their identity, even though they are unique. So, where is the need for an independent entity called universal in the production of this conceptual cognition? It might be asked as to why this conceptual cognition does not

70. Ibid, p. 32, l. 14-24

grasp the thing as it is without mixing or confusing it with others. Dharmakīrti replies that conceptions do not have the capacity to grasp the things as they are because they are the products of Nescience. As a matter of fact, illusions do not necessarily require some external entity for their generation. They arise simply on account of Nescience which is something internal. To illustrate, the illusion (rather hallucination) of hairs arises even when there is nothing whatsoever over there before the cogniser.[71]

It might be urged against this that if illusions were to take place simply on account of Nescience, then there would arise the contingency of all the perceptual cognitions becoming equally illusory. Dharmakīrti replies that such a contingency would not arise because conceptions alone constitute the nature of Nescience, and as a result Nescience operates in the province of conceptions alone; it is the very nature of Nescience to mistake one thing for another. But the perceptual cognitions are not conceptual. Or, says Dharmakīrti, even the perceptual cognitions are illusory inasmuch as they reflect in the form of a duality—of subject and object—what is in fact non-dual, viz. pure consciousness.[72]

If all cognitions are equally illusory what is the ground for our saying that these cognitions are valid and those not? Dharmakīrti points out that the validity or invalidity of cognitions is established on two grounds: (i) Though all cognitions are equally illusory, some are established as valid because they remove the source of illusion as also because they lead to successful purposive actions while others are established as invalid because they do not remove the source of illusion as also because they do not lead to successful purposive actions. (ii) Though all cognitions are illusory, those that are conducive to quisecence are held to be valid. To illustrate, it is well known that good persons, in order to check the rise of passions in them, consider all women to be their mother or sister in spite of the fact that not all of them are their mother or sister. To explain (i) Dharmakīrti says that the determinate knowledge of *that* water in respect of *this* water and that of water in respect of mirage are both equally illusory because both are generated by things altogether different from the things that these pieces of knowledge judge them to be; yet one leads to a successful purposive action—viz. the removal of thirst while the other does not because one is generated by the thing *(jala-svalakṣaṇa)* capable of a purposive action—

71. vibhramabalāt tu tathā jñāne na virodhaḥ/......na vai bāhyāpekṣā eva bhrāntayo bhavanti/ kintu viplavād āntarāt/ Ibid, pp. 32-33

72. avidyodbhavād viplavatve cakṣurvijñānādiṣv api prasaṅgaḥ/ na/ tasyāḥ vikalpalakṣaṇatvāt/ vikalpa eva hy avidyā/ sā svabhāvenaiva viparyasyati/ na caivam indriyajñānāni vikalpakāni/ na vā teṣv apy eṣa doṣo'dvayānāṁ dvayanirbhāsād iti vakṣyāmaḥ/ Ibid, p. 33

viz. the removal of thirst, while the other is generated by the thing *(marīcikā-svalakṣaṇa)* incapable of that purposive action.[73]

It might be asked as to how knowledge can arise from a thing which is not capable of purposive action. Dharmakīrti answers that conceptual cognitions do not necessarily remain bound up with things by which they are generated. Hence they do not always judge the things as they are. The illusory cognition of water in mirage is considered to be generated by the mirage inasmuch as the perception of mirage invariably precedes it and not in the sense that the mirage directly generates it imparting its own form to it. It is directly generated by the impressions of mirage that are the seeds of the illusion of water in mirage. These impressions are revived mainly due to the inability of the cogniser to ascertain the characteristic features of mirage; the perception of mirage, etc. are merely auxiliary causal conditions for their revival. Hence Dharmakīrti concludes that the cognition of identity or similarity arises on account of conception which is by its very nature illusory and not on account of the perception of something like universal, be it identical with or different from the individual, because in either of the cases the universal, just like an individual itself, would not be running through the concerned individuals.[74]

Again, even according to the opponent himself the cognition of identity or similarity cannot arise from the universal only. That is to say, it does not behove him to say that the cognition of identity is generated by the universal only. If the cognition of identity were always to grasp the universal only, there would arise the contingency of the impossibility of the knowledge of individuals through the universal. This is to say, if the cognition of identity were always to grasp the universal only, then the individuals could never be grasped by this cognition. And if the individuals were never cognised as related to the universal, then it would become impossible for us to have a determinate knowledge that these individuals are related to this universal; and if we do not have this type of determinate knowledge then how could we proceed towards the individual even after having grasped the universal?[75]

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73. sarveṣāṁ viplave'pi pramāṇatadābhāsavyavasthā āśrayaparāvṛtter arthakriyāyogyābhimata-saṁvādanāt/ mithyātve'pi vā praśamānukūlatvāt/ mātṛsaṁjñādivat/ marīcikāyāṁ jala-jñānasyānyasya ca vibhinnabhāvotpatter vibhramasya cāviśeṣe'py abhipretārthakriyāyogyā-yogyotpatteḥ arthasaṁvādetarau/ Ibid, p. 33

74. Ibid, p. 33

75. parasyāpi na sā buddhiḥ sāmānyād eva kevalāt/
na hi paropy enāṁ buddhiṁ kevalaṁ sāmānyabhāvinīṁ vaktum arhati/
nityaṁ tanmātravijñāne vyaktyajñānaprasaṅgataḥ//
yadi hi nityam anayā buddhyā sāmānyam eva gṛhyeta apratītaiva vyaktiḥ syād anena jñānena/ Ibid, p. 33

To explain, if the cognition grasping the universal were not having the individual as its object, then the two could never be grasped as related with one another and consequently it would become impossible for us to say 'this universal is possessed by this individual', or 'this individual is qualified by this universal.' And so, through the cognition of the universal we could not have the cognition of the individual qualified by the universal just as through the cognition of one thing we never have the cognition of another thing.[76]

It might be argued that the individuals with the aid of the universal generate the cognition of identity. Even the individuals are the cause of the cognition of identity as they are the objects of that cognition. But they are not the sole cause of it. As they, aided by the auxiliary cause namely, the universal, generate the cognition of identity, they are cognised as qualified by the universal.[77]

Dharmakīrti asks the opponent as to whether that one identical entity called universal nullifies the difference or multiplicity characterizing those individuals. If it does not nullify the difference or multiplicity, then the mutual difference characterizing the individuals would remain and as a result these individuals would not generate the cognition of their identity. In fact, the mutual difference obtaining between the individuals is given by the opponent as the reason why the individuals do not generate the cognition of identity.[78]

The opponent might go on insisting that the individuals though mutually different and multiple can produce the cognition of identity if they are aided by the universal. It is not that many individuals being mutually different cannot generate the cognition of identity; for, the mutual difference obtaining between individuals is not contradictory to their generating the cognition of identity. It is the single-handedness of the individual, that is contradictory to their generating the cognition of identity. So, it is not implausible to hold that with the aid of the universal, the individuals invariably generate the cognition of identity.[79]

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76. yadā sāmānyagrāhiṇo vijñānasya na bheda ālambanabhāvenopayujyate, tadā na tau kadācid api śliṣṭau gṛhītav iti 'idam asya sāmānyam, ayaṁ vā tadvān' iti na syāt/ tathā ca tatpratipattyā tadvati pratipatti na syād arthāntaravat/ Ibid, p. 33

77. ekavastusahāyāś ced vyaktayo jñānakāraṇam//
syād etat——bhavanti vyaktayas tasyālambanabhāvena kāraṇaṁ na tu kevalāḥ/ yadā punar āsām ekaṁ sahakāry asti tadā tatsahitā gṛhyanta iti/ Ibid, p. 34

78. kiṁ caiteṣāṁ bhedānāṁ tenaikena nānātvaṁ nirākriyate/ nānātvaṁ hi teṣv ekajñānākāraṇatve kāraṇam ucyate/ Ibid, p. 34

79. na brūmo'nekam ekaṁ pratyayaṁ na janayati bhedād iti/ na bhedo jananavirodhī/ kiṁ tarhi? kaivalyam/ tenaikasahitā janayanty eva/ Ibid, p. 34

Dharmakīrti, in answer, says that if this is so, the individuals would not be grasped by the cognition of identity that grasps the universal because the individuals could not be considered to be efficient to generate the cognition of identity which is being generated by the universal alone even when the individuals are being destroyed one by one. When the state of affairs is like this, how could it be determined that the individuals are efficient to generate the cognition of identity. It could not be determined because (i) though the individuals are being destroyed one by one, the cognition of identity arises; (ii) when the universal is present, the cognition of identity is present; (iii) and when the universal is absent, the cognition of identity is absent. This, on the contrary, proves that the individuals are not efficient to generate the cognition of identity and that the universal alone is efficient to generate it.[80]

The opponent might reply as follows: This contingency does not arise. To illustrate, even when some one colour from a group of colours like blue etc. is removed, there takes place visual perception; but this does not mean that even those colours which remain in the group are inefficient to produce visual perception. Similarly, in the case of individuals too, the cognition of identity occurs even when the individuals are being destroyed one by one, but this does not mean that they are always incapable of producing the cognition of identity.[81]

Dharmakīrti observes that the illustration contradicts the position illustrated. This is as follows. It is easy to establish that colours like blue etc. forming a group are efficient to produce visual perception on the strength of our observation of their efficiency to produce visual perception even severally. But the individuals, whether taken singly or collectively, are not efficient to generate the cognition of identity. Thus since we have observed that a colour is capable of producing visual perception, we can, without contradiction, hold that colours, even when forming a group, are efficient to produce it. But different is the case with the individuals. They never generate the cognition of identity without the aid of the universal. Hence they are certainly not efficient to generate the cognition of identity and as a result cannot be regarded as an object of the cognition of identity.[82]

It might be argued that the individuals are efficient to generate the cognition of identity because a universal alone, independent of an

80. tābhir vināpi pratyekaṁ kriyamāṇāṁ dhiyaṁ prati//
tenaikenāpi sāmarthyaṁ tāsāṁ nety agraho dhiyā/
katham idānīṁ vyaktīnāṁ tatra jñāne sāmarthyagatiḥ? pratyekaṁ tāsām abhāve'pi tadbhāvād asati sāmānye'bhāvād itarathā ca bhāvāt/ Ibid, p. 34

81. naiṣa doṣaḥ/ yathā nīlādiṣv ekāpāye'pi cakṣurvijñānaṁ bhavatīti na samūhe'pi teṣām asāmarthyam/ tathehāpi pratyekam ekāpāye bhavatīti na sarvadā asāmarthyam/ Ibid, p. 34

82. Ibid, p. 34

individual, is not able to produce the cognition of identity. The weaver, without a shuttle, cannot weave cloth. Of course, he can weave it even when the shuttles in the world are being destroyed one by one. But this does not mean that he alone, independent of all shuttle whatsoever, is efficient to weave cloth. Similarly, it cannot be held that a universal alone, independent of all individual whatsoever, generates the cognition of identity, even though the cognition of identity arises even at the time when the individuals are being destroyed one by one. The universal, assisted by some one individual from among the so many, generates the cognition of identity.[83]

It might be contended that the universal is posited because it is found contradictory to hold that different individuals can generate one common effect without there being any one universal in them. But Dharmakīrti pointedly asks: if the mutually different individuals are competent to assist one universal, then what is wrong with the cognition of identity so that it cannot be generated by these mutually different individuals? Why should the individuals require this unnecessary intermediary, the universal? Just as the individuals, though mutually different, have the capacity to assist one universal, even so let the individuals, though mutually different, generate the cognition of identity.[84]

Moreover, if the individuals were to assist the universal, then that universal would become an effect of those individuals, for to assist means to produce. Dharmakīrti proves this as follows: The thing (cause proper; here the universal) whose nature remains unaugmented and the same as it was before its contact with the auxiliaries (here, the individuals) cannot really require any auxiliary, for that would involve over-absurdity. If the auxiliaries were to generate a thing quite different from the cause proper, then what is the use of these auxiliaries to the cause proper? It might be urged that the auxiliaries produce a thing that the cause proper contains or supports. But this would raise a question as to how there could be a relation of the supported and the supporter *(aśrayāśrayībhāva)* between two things which are not mutually related as the receiver of an increment and the producer of an increment, for otherwise there would arise over-absurdity. If it is said that the cause proper produces an increment in the thing generated by the cause proper's auxiliaries then that increment produced by the cause porper in the thing generated by the cause proper's auxiliaries would invariably be related to the cause proper; hence these so-called auxiliaries to the cause

83. Ibid, p. 34
84. Ibid, p. 34-35

proper cannot be treated as its auxiliaries simply on the ground that they themselves produce a thing in which the cause proper merely generates a novelty (i.e. there is here involved a reversal of roles). If it is held that the cause proper which contains the thing genereted by its auxiliaries depends on or requires the aid of those auxiliaries in order to generate the novelty in that thing, then there arises a question as to why the cause proper which by its very nature does not receive additament from others should depend on others. It might be urged that the cause proper is naturally related to the thing whose nature it is to be generated by the auxiliaries. This is untenable. Moreover, first to say that it is impossible for others to produce a novelty in the cause proper and in the same breath that the cause proper requires the assistance of others is quite contradictory. From this it naturally follows that whatever relations there may be, obtaining between whatever things and at whatever time, they are all subsumed just under causal relation; that is, there is nothing like the relation of the cause proper and the auxiliary *(upakāryopakārakabhāva)*. It is so because the auxiliaries can render no assistance to the cause proper if they are to produce a thing quite different from the cause proper, and also because a static thing whose nature remains unaugmentable can never be assisted by others.[85]

From the above discussion it follows that if the universal assisted by the individuals were to generate the cognition of identity, there would evidently arise the contingency of the universal becoming an effect of the individuals. If the universal alone, irrespective of the assistance received from the individuals, were to generate the cognition of identity, it will follow that the individuals are always inefficient to generate the cognition of identity—with the result that they would not be grasped by that cognition of identity. It might be argued that since the individuals are cognised by the cognition of identity, they are efficient to generate it. But the question as to how the individuals that do not generate the cognition of identity can be grasped by it is the very question that is being discussed in order to decide the fate of the independent universal; for, it is a rule that that which does not generate a piece of cognition is not its object; otherwise there would arise an over-absurdity. And it is also a rule that that which is not the object of a piece of cognition cannot be grasped by it. It might be urged that according to the rule that that which is not the producer of a piece of cognition cannot be the object of it, the past and the future individuals can never be grasped by cognition as they being non-existent are not able to generate cognition. Dharmakīrti replies that he won't mind if those cognitions are without any objects. Even in the absence of objects there can arise cognition

85. Ibid, p. 35

grasping their mental images. These cognitions grasp the mental images of the things because they are generated by the impressions left by the experience of the respective things. The efficiency of the things to generate cognition is established on the basis of the correspondence of the presence and absence of the cognitions with the presence and absence of the things themselves and not on the basis of the correspondence of the presence and absence of the cognitions with the presence and absence of the mental images of things. This is so because (i) even in the presence of the thing, there arises no mental image of it as is the case with the universal accepted by the opponent; (ii) and even in the absence of the thing there is the mental image of it as is the case with the illusions, like that of hair.[86]

The opponent might urge that he does not deny the fact that many can produce one common effect. What he means to say is that the cognition grasping the individuals assumes the forms of individuals and as a result it cannot reflect identity. But there arises the cognition of identity; so, there should be an independent entity, the universal, to be grasped by the cognition of identity.[87]

Dharmakīrti too does not hold that the object of 'cognition of identity' is individual; but all the same he emphatically declares that there is no necessity to posit an independent entity, universal as its object. The cognition of identity does not grasp the individual. There are three reasons for this belief: (i) The cognition of identity arises even in the absence of individuals. (ii) The reflection borne by perceptual cognition is of a type different from that of the reflection borne by conceptual cognition. (iii) A thing cannot have two contradictory natures viz. identity and difference. Hence it is not that the cognition generated by the individuals and grasping the individuals reflects identity. Though the cognition of identity does not grasp the individuals yet it urges a person to action with reference to them on account of the illusion involved in each and every cognition of identity viz. the identification of the object of conception with that of perception. The characteristic viz. identity that is reflected in the cognition of identity is not there in the individuals. Things are reflected as identical simply because they are excluded from their opposite or inasmuch as they all have 'exclusion from the opposite' in common; and this identity being of the nature of exclusion is essenceless. It has been already pointed out that the conceptual cognition grasping this very identity becomes illusory.[88]

86. Ibid, p. 35

87. na brūmo'nekam ekakāryakṛn na bhavatīti/ kiṁ tarhi? na bhinneṣu padārtheṣv arpitatadākārā buddhir abhinnapratibhāsinī syāt/ Ibid, p. 35

88. Ibid, p. 35

Again, Dharmakīrti asks the opponent as to how there can arise the cognition of identity in relation to different individuals. Promptly comes the answer from the opponent that this is possible because there is an independent etity called universal in all of them. Dharmakīrti asks: If it be so, then why do we not perceive that universal while perceiving the individuals? If it is replied that the universal is percieved by us when we experience the perceptual cognition as reflecting colour and structure, then it is to be pointed out that this is not how the universal is cognised by us because colour and structure are qualities.[89]

Some hold that the universal is nothing but the structure of the thing. But in that case the universal residing in one thing cannot be there in another thing, because the structure, like the unique nature, is never different from the thing itself. Hence even they cannot talk of the cognition of identity in relation to the individuals; for, what they posit as universal, the object of this cognition of identity, is different in each individual.[90]

Dharmakīrti changes his position and even admits that the so-called cognition of identity grasps the individuals inasmuch as we grasp the individuals as *similar*. So, there is no need of an independent universal. The so-called cognition of identity is in fact not a real cognition of identity. As a matter of fact, a real cognition of identity does never arise in connection with the individuals because this so-called cognition of identity grasps these individuals as similar. If the cognition of identity were to grasp them as identical then to say that they are similar is not proper. It might be asked as to what in that case would be proper to say. Dharmakīrti points out that in that case to say 'this is verily that' would be proper. If it be argued that even though the cognition of identity grasps the individuals as identical we grasp them as similar because the cognition of identity grasps the individual and the universal both, then Dharmakīrti observes that even in that case our cognition should be of the form 'it (the universal) is in this (individual)' and not of the form 'the individuals are similar.' If it be said that the similarity of the individuals is itself the universal, then there would arise a question as to how a thing quite different from the individuals can be the similarity of them. It might be contended that a thing quite different from the individuals can constitute the similarity of them because it is related to them; but Dharmakīrti refutes this by pointing out that a thing that is quite different from others cannot have any relations with them as that would involve over-absurdity.[91]

89. Ibid. pp. 35-36
90. Ibid, p. 36
91. pratibhāso dhiyāṁ bhinnaḥ samānā iti tadgrahāt // Ibid, p. 36.

It might be asked as to what it is then that gives rise to the cognition of the form 'the individuals are similar.' Dharmakīrti says that it is the common effect. The capacity to produce a common effect is the similarity of individuals. We do not cognise two natures, viz. particular and general, when we perceive an individual. Why then should we deceive ourselves by conceiving two things when we do not actually perceive them? The individuals which, producing a common effect, attain the status of an object of conceptual cognition, are mixed up with one another by this conceptual cognition on account of an illusion. This is the correct explanation of the cognition of identity, having the form 'these individuals are similar.'[92]

It might be urged that though the perceptual cognition is an effect of the individuals, yet it differs in respect of each individual. That is to say, just as the individuals themselves differ from one another even so the perceptual cognitions grasping them differ from one another. So, how can the individuals be regarded as having a comnon effect? The perceptual cognition grasping the individuals is the effect of them and that differs in respect of each individual. Even the so-called common effect like the fetching of water, etc. of the individuals like pots, etc. differs in respect of each individual on account of each individual differing from other individuals. Hence the individuals can have no common effect.[93]

Dharmakīrti says that though a common effect differs in respect of each individual, it is regarded as identical because the so many individuals produce an identical common effect, namely, the cognition of their identity that judges them to be identical. As the individuals generate the effects (viz. perceptual cognitions) that are judged to be identical and as these perceptual cognitions are, on this account, considered to give rise to the cognition of identity, the individuals too are regarded as generating, by their very nature, the conceptual cognition reflecting identity.[94] But in reality the conceptual cognition has

92. Ibid, p. 36.

93. ... nanu dhīḥ kāryaṁ tās?ṁ sā ca vibhidyate//
pratibhāvam/ tadvat tatpratibhāsino vijñānasyāpi bhedāt katham ekakāryāḥ? taddhi tāsāṁ kāryaṁ tac ca bhidyate/ yadapy udakāharaṇādikam ekaṁ ghaṭādikāryam tad api pratidravyaṁ bhedāt bhidyata eveti naikaṁ bhedānāṁ kāryam asti/ Ibid, p. 36

94. naiṣa doṣaḥ/ yasmāt——
ekapratyavamarśasya hetutvād dhīr abhedinī/
ekadhīhetubhāvena vyaktīnām apy abhinnatā//
... tad api pratidravyaṁ bhidyamānam api prakṛtyaikapratyavamarśasyābhedāvaskandino hetur bhavad abhinnaṁ khyāti/tathābhūtapratyavamarśahetor abhedāvabhāsino jñānāder arthasya hetutvād vyaktayo'pi saṁsṛṣṭākāraṁ svabhāvabhedaparamārthaṁ svabhāvata ekaṁ pratyay[illegible] tīty asakṛd uktam etat/ Ibid, p. 36.

exclusion for its object. The identity of things means their capacity to generate a common effect and to generate a common effect, in turn, simply means to be excluded from the things generating effects other than that. It is this exclusion and not an independent entity called universal that is common to several things.[95]

If the universal were real then it should be either identical with or different from the individuals. But it can be neither identical with nor different from them. If it were identical with them, then how could it be possible for one and the same individual, say, a cow to give rise to two quite opposite cognitions—viz. the cognition of its identity with other cows and that of its difference from lion etc.? Again, if it were identical with the individual then how could a thing, say, a cow be identical with and different from one and the same individual, i.e., another cow? Certainly, how can the unitary thing be regarded as an object of two quite opposite cognitions—one of identity and another of difference? For cognitions having different reflections can be caused by different objects only—the universal and the particulars; but according to this first alternative they are taken to be identical. And then even the universal, because of its being identical with the individual, would have the same fate as that of the individual, that is, even the universal would become a unique particular. Again, on the hypothesis that a universal (say, *gotva*) is identical with an individual (say, *śābaleya*), it cannot be said that the former (i.e. *gotva*) is present and the latter (i.e. *śābaleya*) is absent in another individual cow (say, *bāhuleya*); for that would contradict this hypothesis. And that which is confined to one individual and is not present in any other individual cannot be universal. From this it follows that the unitary individual should have either the universal or the particular as its nature.[96]

Again, if a universal were different from the concerned individuals, it could not be the universal belonging to these individuals. So, the universal is unreal.[97]

On the other hand, these difficulties do not arise in the theory of exclusion inasmuch as the 'exclusion of the opposite' is present in all the individuals. Just as one individual cow, *śābaleya* is different from its opposite, lion etc. even so another cow, *bāhuleya* is also different from

95. tasmād ekakāryataiva bhāvānām abhedaḥ/ sā ca atatkāryaviśleṣaḥ eva/ Ibid, p, 37

96. Ibid, pp. 42-43

97. yo'pi bhinnam eva sāmānyam āha, tasyāpi——
abhedavyavahārāś ca bhede syur anibandhanāḥ// Ibid, p. 43

those opposite individuals. Thus there would not arise the contingency of its being not present in all the concerned individuals.[98]

Dharmakīrti again attacks the Nyāya position from a different angle. Existence in others means either the state of being supported by others or being manifested by others. But neither of them is possible in the case of the universal. When it is said that the existence of one universal in many individuals makes possible the application of one word to many individuals, what is the meaning of this 'existence in many'? Does it mean the state of being supported by others? For example, berries exist in the bowl. Here existence means the state of being supported by others. Or, does it mean manifestation, so that it can be said that the universal exists in the individuals because it is manifested by them? Let us take the first alternative.

The universal being eternal no novelty can be produced in it by others and hence it cannot require any supporter. If the universal were regarded as non-eternal then it would not be one but many on account of there being a new universal every moment; as a result, it would be as much impossible for the universal to generate the cognition of identity as it is for the individuals. Of what avail are the supporters, the individuals, to the eternal universal? It might be urged that they do nothing to the eternal universal but that since it inheres in them they are called its supporters. This raises the question as to what this inherence is. It might be said that it is nothing but the relation of the support and the supported between two things which are never found separate. But Dharmakīrti points out that that which does nothing to the other cannot be considered to be the support of it, because otherwise there would arise over-absurdity. All relations obtaining among the things—including even inherence, conjunction and inherence in one common substratum—are nothing but the derivatives of one fundamental relation, viz. causal relation. This is so because two things not producing any novelty in one another or not receiving any increment from a common substratum cannot have any connection; and this unconnection means absence of relation. When the state of affairs is like this the individuals that are regarded as the support of the universal are no support at all as they cannot produce any novelty in the eternal changeless universal.[99]

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98. sarvatra bhāvād vyāvṛtteḥ naitc doṣāḥ prasaṅginaḥ/
... sarvabhāvānāṁ svasvabhāvavyavasthiteḥ/
yad rūpaṁ śābaleyasya bāhuleyasya nāsti tat//
atatkāryaparāvṛttir dvayor api ca vidyate/ Ibid, kā 139, 141, 142.

99. vṛttir ādheyatā vyaktir iti tasmin na yujyate/
nityasyānupakāryatvān nādhāraḥ ... // Ibid, p. 45
Sec also the auto-commentary thereon.

It might be asked as to how then the *kuṇḍa* (i.e. bowl) not generating *badaras* (i.e. berries) be considered to be the supporter of these *badaras* (i.e. berries). Dharmakīrti emphatically says that the *kuṇḍa* does generate *badaras.* A *badara,* being heavy, moves, by its very nature, continuously downward. In one continuum each previous *badara-kṣaṇa* generates, by its very nature, its next *badara-kṣaṇa* at the downwardly next spatial point; but the *kuṇḍa* as an auxiliary cause has the capacity to generate the next *badara-kṣaṇa* too at that same spatial point which was occupied by its material cause, the previous *badara-kṣaṇa.* This shows that the *kuṇḍa* is efficient to generate all the *badara-kṣaṇas* of one continuum at one and the same spatial point. The capacity to produce the effect at another spatial point is the very nature of a heavy thing; but the novelty, namely, the efficiency to produce a momentary effect at the same spatial point, is produced in the heavy thing by its support. The *kuṇḍa* is called the support of a *badara* because it, as an auxiliary to the cause proper, the previous *badara-kṣaṇa,* generates the next *badara-kṣaṇa* at the same spatial point that was occupied by its material cause. Otherwise, the sentence 'here there are *badaras* in this *kuṇḍa'* would be meaningless. It might be contended that this sentence conveys merely the conjunction of two things, the *kuṇḍa* and a *badara.* Dharmakīrti asks as to how it can be proved that that conjunction is theirs only. The opponent might answer that that conjunction is theirs only because it is generated by them or because it inheres in them. Dharmakīrti again questions him as to why it is not generated by either of them or as to why it does not inhere in any one of them. The natural explanation of this is that both of them are inefficient to generate it. It might be argued that one of them without the other is inefficient to produce it but one accompanied by the other is efficient. The two not producing any novelty in one anonther cannot be said to develop a quality 'conjunction' through mere connection with one another. It might be said that the two together, assisting one another, produce some novelty in one another and as a result become efficient to generate 'conjunction.' But how can one assist another if they are not related as cause and effect? According to the opponent a *badara* is produced by another *badara* and not by the *kuṇḍa.* So, a *badara* cannot be regarded as an effect of the *kuṇḍa.* If it be held that the *kuṇḍa* produces something other than a *badara* then it cannot be considered to be producing a novelty in the *badara.* Thus in any case an inactive eternal thing cannot assist the other; this is indicated beforehand. So, it is proved that all those relations which are differentiated one from the other on the basis of the different modes of production adopted by the cause are ultimately rooted in the cause-effect relation only. Thus one thing's being a support of another thing is nothing but its efficiency to produce that

other thing. The efficiency to generate the universal is not there in the individuals. The individuals' being a support of the universal is not characterised by the production of the universal, because the universal is eternal, not an effect of anything. It might be contended that being the support of the universal means being the cause of its presence (existence). The individual is called the support of the universal because it is the cause of its presence and not because it is the cause of its production. This contention is baseless, because the universal is present even in the absence of individuals. Moreover, the universal does not possess the characteristic to fall. Only in the case of things characterised by a tendency to fall, even that which does not generate them can become, by arresting or stopping their downward motion, the cause of their presence at some spatial point in the vertical line of downward motion. Even this would seem plausible only so long as nobody raises question with regard to the stoppage-of-motion. This stoppage-of-motion, which the establisher of the presence of the falling body at some stage in the vertical line of downward motion performs, is certainly not a different thing from the falling body. If it were quite different thing from the falling body then the establisher of the presence of the falling body at some spatial point would be engaged in the stoppage-of-motion only; so how could it be said that the establisher performs the stoppage-of-motion *of* the falling body? The establisher would perform the stoppage-of-motion only, and not the stoppage-of-motion of the falling body; hence the body would fall continuously in spite of there being an obstructor or supporter. If the stoppage-of-motion were identical with the falling body then the falling body receiving the additament would become an effect of the establisher—which is not acceptable to the opponent.[100]

It might be argued that as a result of the presence of the establisher, there arises merely the absence of downward motion of the falling body. It does not positively generate any additament in the falling body. On this view the stoppage-of-motion means the mere absence or non-existence of motion. But how can non-existence be produced by anything? If to say that a thing produces non-existence means that it does not produce any positive thing, then it means that this thing does nothing. But how can an inactive thing be the establisher of the presence of, anything? Hence the falling body thus not being established by any thing would

100. ... . pravisarpataḥ//
śaktis taddeśajananaṁ kuṇḍāder badarādiṣu/
na sambhavati sāpy atra tadabhāve'py avasthiteḥ//
na sthitiḥ ... ... / Ibid, pp. 45-46.
See also the auto-commentary thereon.

never stop at any stage, would continuously fall. So, Dharmakīrti concludes that even the stoppage of downward motion is nothing but the generation of momentary effects in one continuum at the same spatial point which was occupied by their material cause, the immediately preceding homogeneous thing.[101]

Let us concede that the stoppage of downward motion of the falling body is not of the nature of production and also that by undertaking such stoppage of downward motion of the falling body something becomes the establisher of the presence of the falling body at some stage in the vertical line of downward motion. But there arises the question as to what is the precise nature of the presence (existence) of the eternal unchanging universal—establishing which the individual becomes the establisher of the presence of the universal. The presence or existence of the universal is nothing but its non-deviation from its own nature; and that is not dependent on the support, the individual, because it is eternal and unchanging.[102]

Thus Dharmakīrti concludes that the universal does not have a support and that the existence of the universal in the individuals cannot mean its being supported by the individuals.[103]

It might be argued that though the universal is present everywhere it is as such unmanifested; it generates the cognition of itself with the help of the individuals only; so the existence of the universal in the individuals means the manifestation of the universal by them. Dharmakīrti refutes this view as follows: To manifest means to generate. Only that thing which produces another thing belonging to a different continuum and capable of generating the cognition of its own self is the manifester. On the other hand, in the case of the 'generator' or 'producer', the capacity of the effect to generate the cognition of its own self is not implied or suggested. A thing is called 'producer' or 'generator' if it merely produces the effect. If the thing that acquires the capacity to generate the cognition of its own self from the other thing were not regarded as generated by the latter, then that capacity should be the very nature of that thing and hence should be possessed by it even before the arrival of the manifester; thus it should not depend upon the manifester to generate the cognition of its own self. If this capacity were regarded as different from the thing manifested then the manifester would manifest that capacity and not the thing possessed of that capacity. In fact to say that the manifester does not generate the manifested involves a contradiction. Again, to say that a static thing (like a universal) requires

101. Ibid, p. 46.
102. Ibid, p. 46.
103. Ibid, p. 47.

assistance from another thing (like an individual) to generate the cognition of its own self is a contradiction in terms.[104]

It might be argued that to manifest does not necessarily mean to generate. Though smoke is not the producer of fire it manifests fire simply because it is an effect of fire. Of course, it is true. But here it is not the case that real fire, depending on smoke, generates the cognition of its own unique self. The mental, conceptual or inferable fire cannot generate the perceptual cognition of fire. The inferential cognition of fire arises on the strength of mental impressions or conceptions, and not on the strength of the real, objective fire. It is so because the inferential cognition of fire arises even in the absence of fire, through the inferential mark. Conceptual cognitions do not require the corresponding objective things in proximity (either spatial or temporal) nor are they produced by these objective things.[105]

It naturally follows that the things which, while directly generating cognition concerning themselves, require in that generation the assistance of another thing certainly acquire a new nature from that other thing. But it is not possible for the eternal unalterable universal to acquire a new nature from any other thing. Nothing can manifest the universal.[106]

It might be contended that the individual manifests the universal not because it has produced any additament in the universal. Then, how does it manifest the universal? It manifests the universal by producing some novelty in the sense-organ that grasps that universal. This view is illogical. The sense organs in which there is produced some novelty by the colleyrium etc. acquire some eminence with regard to perceptual cognitions as is proved by the difference in those cognitions in the presence and absence of the colleyrium etc. The individuals could not like colleyrium etc., produce any novelty in any sense-organ because in the presence as well as in the absence of the individuals the cognition of the universal remains the same without any variation. Again, really speaking it is the novelty produced in the object of cognition, the universal, that enables the cognition, by producing a corresponding novelty in it, to grasp the object, the universal, in spite of the sense-organ remaining the same all the while. It follows from this that the novelty produced in the sense-organ is not a real causal factor in the generation of the cognition of the object, the universal.

104. Ibid, p. 47, l. 3-14

105. Ibid, p. 47, l. 15-19

106. tasmād ye viṣayāḥ sākṣād upayogena vijñānaṁ janayantas tatra param apekṣante, te'vaśyaṁ tata ātmānaṁ pratilabhante/ na cāyam ātmapratilambhaḥ sāmānyasya nityasya kutaścit saṁbhavati/ tasmān na tat kenacid vyaṅgym/ Ibid, p. 47

If it were held that the novelty produced in the sense-organ by the individual enables the sense-organ to perceive the object that was imperceptible before, then there arises the question as to why that novelty does not enable the sense-organ, say, eyes, to perceive all the universals viz. *sattva, dravyatva, śuklatva, gotva, viṣāṇitva* etc. that were imperceptible before. It might be urged that since the novelty produced in the sense-organ by the individual is confined to one universal only, it does not enable the sense organ to perceive the remaining universals. But this is not proper. On this view there should not arise even a doubt regarding those universals that are considered to be proper to be manifested by the individuals, nor should there arise the determinate knowledge of only one universal on perceiving an individual; for, an individual is equally efficient to manifest all the universals. Irrespective of whether the individual produces a novelty in the sense-organ or not, if it is the nature of the universal to generate the cognition of its own self then there being no deviation from this nature it would produce the cognition of its own self without depending upon the alleged novelty produced in the sense organ by the individual. The opponent might urge that the universal is not alone efficient to generate the cognition of its own self because it requires the assistance of the sense organ in which a novelty has been produced by the individual for the generation of the cognition of the universal. But doing all this is impossible on the part of the universal that is eternal and changeless.[107]

Moreover, if the manifester of the universals were regarded as the possessor of those universals, then torch etc. that manifest the universals like cowness etc. would also possess those universals. That thing which causes the cognition of an object is considered to be a manifester of that object. Even torch etc. cause the cognition of the universals like cowness etc. because we cognise an object as cow etc. through the eyes whose capacity to see is enhanced by light. Hence even torch etc. would possess the universal like cowness etc. Even the manifestation of the universal by the individual is nothing but the individual being the cause of the cognition of the universal, because it is not possible for anything to generate any novelty in the nature of an eternal universal. It might be argued that the manifestation of the universal by the individual is nothing but its having the relation of inherence with the individual. But how can there be the relation of inherence (characterised by the relation of the support and the supported) between two things that are not related as cause and effect? Let us concede, for argument's

107. añjanāder iva vyakteḥ saṁskāro nendriyasya ca//
pratipatter abhinnatvāt tadbhāvābhāvakālayoḥ/ Ibid, pp. 47-48
See also the auto-commentary thereon.

sake, that the universal has the relation of inherence with the individual but even then there would reamin difficulties. Merely its relation with the individual would come into being as soon as the individual is born but there would not be any change in the nature of the eternal universal itself; it remains as it was before its having the relation of inherence with the individual; hence the universal would not generate the cognition of itself even after its having the relation of inherence with the individual just as it did not generate it before its having that relation with the individual. If it is held that it is solely the inherence of the universal in the individual that causes the cognition of the universal through the individual, then there would arise the contingency of there arising the cognition of all the universals that inhere in the individual. Hence Dharmakīrti points out that to manifest a thing means to cause the cognition of that thing. And like the individual, the torch etc. too manifest the universal. Therefore the contingency that not only the individuals but so also the torch etc. would possess the universal manifested by them stands.[108]

After this long and terse discussion, Dharmakīrti arrives at the conclusion that neither the state of being supported by the individual nor that of being manifested by it constitutes the existence of the universal in the individual.[109]

Again, Dharmakīrti continues, those who regard the universal as an objective category existing in its own right can have only two alternatives—either to hold that it exists in the corresponding individuals only *(svāśrayamātragata)* or to hold that it is all-pervading *(sarvagata)* like ether. The first alternative is exposed to damaging objections. If a universal were to exist only in the corresponding individuals, we cannot conceive how it can attach itself to a thing which is not yet born. The pot-universal existing in the existent pots cannot be supposed to unite itself with the pot that is just produced, because it is inactive and stationary.[110] Nor can it be urged that it was existent even earlier, for that contradicts the thesis accepted for the time being. Nor can it be said that it comes into existence alongwith the concerned individual, because the universal is eternal.[111] Moreover, the universal being

108. vyañjakasya ca jātīnāṁ jātimattā yadīṣyate//
prāpto gotvādinā tadvān pradīpādiḥ prakāśakaḥ/ Ibid, p. 48
See also the auto-commentary thereon.

109. tannādheyatā na vyaktir vṛttiḥ sāmānyasyeti/ Ibid, p. 48

110. api cāyaṁ sāmānyam arthāntaraṁ kalpayan svāśrayamātragataṁ kalpayet, sarvagataṁ vākāśādivat/ tatra yadi svāśrayamātragataṁ ghaṭatvādiśūnyeṣu pradeśeṣu ghaṭādyutpattau kathaṁ teṣu bhinnadeśadravyavartinaḥ sāmānyasya sambhavo yasmāt tatpūrvadravyād utpitsudravyaṁ na yāti niṣkriyatvopagamāt/ Ibid, pp. 49-50

111. na ca tatrāsīd asti paścād...Ibid, p. 50

impartite, there is no possibility of its remaing in the earlier existing individuals by some parts and uniting itself with the newly produced one by another part.[112] Again, the universal cannot leave the former to join the latter, because it inheres in both of them. Thus there would ensue a series of absurdities one after another if the first alternative is accepted.[113]

Even the second alternative is beset with many difficulties. If the universal is ubiquitous, why is it not seen everywhere? It might be said that though it is all-pervading it is not seen everywhere because it requires the individuals to manifest its own self. But this view is not sound. The universal being eternal does not require the assistance of individuals and as a result it would be seen always or never. This would be the only conclusion because the universal has but one nature as also because there is no possibility of its acquiring an additional nature. Yet let us grant for argument's sake that the ubiquitous universal is revealed by the individuals. But this too involves the same difficulty. Its revelation in one individual should make it seen everywhere—even in places devoid of all individuals—as it is one and all-pervading. Moreover, the perception of the revealed is not possible without the perception of the revealer. But why in the case of the universal and the individual the reverse of this is accepted? The view that the universal, though ubiquitous, is not perceived in the places devoid of its revealers or manifesters, i.e. of the concerned individuals is not tenable because the universal being eternal there cannot obtain the ralation of the manifester and the manifested between it and these individuals. It might be contended that the manifester here does not bring about any change in the manifested but it only affects the cognitive faculty of the cogniser. In other words, that on whose cognition the cognition of another thing becomes possible is the manifester and the other thing the manifested. Cognition of pot is not possible without the cognition of light; so, light is called the manifester of pot. Dharmakīrti observes that even in this sense the individual is not the manifester of the universal. For, how can the individual be regarded as a revealer of the universal and at the same time as something perceptible through the perception of the universal? Thus there arises the contingency of the individual itself becoming the manifested and the universal becoming the manifester, because just as without the perception of a lamp a pot remains unperceived even so according to the Naiyāyikas without the perception

112. na cāṁśavat// Ibid, p. 50

113. jahāti pūrvaṁ nādhāram
utpitsudeśād bhinnadeśam/ tayoś ca vartata iti/ Ibid, p. 50

of the universal the individual somehow remains unperceived.[114] Thus the universal cannot be all-pervading, nor can it exist in the corresponding individuals only. The conception of universal as an objective reality is fraught with many difficulties.

It might be contended that without positing the universal as an objective real we cannot account for the cognition of identity in relation to the individuals. Dharmakīrti refutes this view by drawing our attention to the cases where we have the cognition of identity without there being any one universal in the concerned individuals. Take the example of our applying one name 'cook' 'reader' etc. to many individuals and our cognition of identity in relation to them without there being any universal like cookhood or readerhood inherent in them. Thus nomenclature and conceptual thought cannot be made the ground for supposing the existence of an objective universal. Action cannot be supposed to be the ground of the cognition of identity—the bond uniting the stray, discrete particulars—inasmuch as action varies with each individual. The action of one is not the self-identical action of another, and as continuity and identity are the characteristic features of the supposed universals action cannot be a universal. And if action, though variable and inconstant, be believed to be the cause and ground of the cognition of identity and an application of one common name to many, there is no reason why the individuals should be denied this efficiency. So, like the individual, even action cannot cause the cognition of identity.[115] Moreover, action being discontinuous, a person cannot be called a cook, when he does not actually perform the cooking operations.[116] Neither the past nor the future actions can be responsible for this cognition of identity in relation to different individuals, for these actions are simply non-existent. How can the non-existent which is essenceless be the cause of the cognition of identity? Only the existent is causally efficient.[117]

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114. vyaktaivaikatra sā vyaktyā'bhedāt sarvatragā yadi//
jātir dṛśyeta sarvatra na ca sā vyaktyapekṣinī/
vyañjakāpratipattau hi na vyaṅgyaṁ sampratīyate//
viparyayaḥ punaḥ kasmād iṣṭaḥ sāmānya-tadvatoḥ/ Ibid, p. 51
See also the auto-commentary thereon.

115. pācakādiṣv abhinnena vināpy arthena vācakaḥ//
bhedān na hetuḥ karmāsya ... .../ Ibid, pp. 51-52
See also the auto-commentary thereon.

116. ... ... sthityabhāvāc ca karmaṇaḥ// Ibid, p. 52
See also the auto-commentary thereon.

117. atītam anāgataṁ vā nimittīkṛtya tayoḥ pravṛttir iti cet/ karmāpi nāsat jñānābhidhānayoḥ nimittam/ tayoḥ anaimittikatāpatteḥ asiddhiḥ nirūpākhyaṁ kathaṁ nimittaṁ syāt? kārya-kāraṇalakṣaṇatvād vastutattvasya/ Ibid, p. 52.

It might be suggested that the individual actions may be variable but the universal belonging to actions *(karma-jāti)* is imperishable and this becomes the ground of the cognition of identity in relation to the agents performing those actions. This view is abusrd for many reasons. First, it can never be possible that the universal belonging to the things of one type should become the ground of the cognition of identity in relation to the things of another type. For example, cowness can never be the ground of the cognition of identity in relation to horses and of the application of the word 'horse' to many horses. Secondly, the universal beloning to actions remains neither in the individual actions nor, indirectly, in their agents when these individual actions themselves cease to exist. Thus, when the individual actions cease to exist, the universal belonging to actions cannot have even an indirect relation with the agents, that is, a relation not even through the individual actions. So, when the universal belonging to actions has no relation with the agents, it should not generate the cognition of identity in relation to these agents, otherwise there would arise over-absurdity.[118]

Nor can it be held that neither the actions themselves nor the universal belonging to these actions should be the cause of the cognition of identity, but that it is the efficiency (*śakti*) of the agents or substrates *(dravya)* that should be its cause. Dharmakīrti refutes this view as follows: The efficiency is non-different from the individual cooks etc. Otherwise, this efficiency being useful in the desired purposive activity, viz. cooking etc., the agent or substrate would become useless. If it be urged that agent is also useful because he sets the efficiency to work, then there is no need of this independent efficiency; the agent himself would perform the function. If this is not accepted and another efficiency is posited to make the agent efficient to set the first efficiency to work then there would be an endless series of efficiencies. So, the agent himself should be regarded as efficient to set the first efficiency to work. If he himself is efficient to set the first efficiency to work why should he not be regarded as efficient to directly perform the function? What is the use of the good-for-nothing intermediary independent efficiency? Thus it is proved that efficiency is not different from the agent that performs the function of cooking. But these agents are different from one another. So the efficiency of each would be different and consequently it cannot serve as a ground of the cognition of identity.[119]

In spite of all this if one is to posit a distinct universal, say, for example, cookhood and the like, a cook should have been recognised

118. Ibid, p. 52.
119. na ca śaktir ananvayāt/ Ibid, p. 53
See also the auto-commentary thereon.

as cook even when he was born, for the universal is there for all time. The relation of the universal with the individual being eternal; just as the highest universal—*Sattā*—is recognised as soon as an individual is born, even so cookhood etc. also should be recognised as soon as the concerned individual is born. It is a rule that all the universals that are competent to relate themselves to an individual by way of inherence do so as soon as the individual is born. Otherwise, they would not unite with the individual later on just as they did not unite with it formely when it was born. If it is held that formerly it was devoid of the nature that relates it to the universal, then it should remain devoid of that nature throughout its life and hence it should become unintelligible and seem farfetched to hold that it acquires later on that nature which relates it to the universal.[120]

It might be urged that all the proper universals relate themselves, by way of inherence, to an individual as soon as it is born but that all are not revealed in it as soon as it is born because the individual requires the assistance of an action to reveal them. Here Dharmakīrti points out that the individual (substance) being static, changeless, or even durable it would not acquire additaments. So, why should it depend on actions that cannot produce any additament in it? If it is held that the individual receives some increment from the actions then it would become momentary, for the actions that impart additament to it being momentary it would acquire a new additament every moment. The individual thus being momentary would be destroyed at the same place where it is produced; how can then it itself undertake an action so that it might be said that depending on an action it manifests the universal?[121]

But all the same Dharmakīrti does not think that the cognition of identity is causeless. His contention is that there is no objective cause for it. Its cause is internal. On account of the rise of the respective mental impressions there arises the cognition of identity in relaton to the concerned individuals. Thus the cognition of identity has no objective basis. Though the individuals are perceived as discrete and unique, Intellect conditioned by certain conventions groups certain individuals under one head, i.e. superimposes identity on them, as a result there arises the cognition of identity in relation to them. Again, there is no

120. sāmānyaṁ pācakatvādi yadi prāg eva tadbhavet//
vyaktaṁ sattādivan no cen na paścād aviśeṣataḥ/ Ibid, p. 53
See also the auto-commentary thereon.

121. kriyopakārāpekṣasya vyañjakatve'vikāriṇaḥ//
nāpekṣātiśaye'py asya kṣanikatvāt kriyā kutaḥ/ Ibid, p. 53
See also the auto-commentary thereon

general nature in the individuals on the basis of which there might arise the cognition of identity, for two contradictory natures—general and particular—cannot be possessed by or be predicated of an individual at one and the same time. Yet the cognition of identity is not causeless as it arises occasionally. Its cause are mental impressions. A particular cognition of identity arises in relation to a particular set of individuals due to the rise of mental impressions. The point to be stressed is that there is no external cause for it. It cannot be urged that it would not arise if there were no external cause for it, for there arises the cognition of identity in relation to the things grasped by a sleepy person or by a person with diseased eyes. Nay, it arises even in relation to the absolutely non-existent things like the hare's horn without any general nature or universal belonging to them; there is no possibility of a general nature or universal belonging to them as they themselves do not exist. Similarly, there can arise the cognition of identity in relation to the discrete individuals lacking an actul general nature or universal but having an identity superimposed on them by Intellect conditioned by convention. It cannot be urged that if there resides no general nature or universal in the individuals, the selfsame cognition of identity would arise in relation to *all* the individuals, i.e. the cognition of cowness would then arise not only in relation to the cow-individuals but in relation to the other individuals as well, for it is already made clear that it is the nature of some individuals only to generate a common effect. Moreover, we ask the believers in the reality of the general nature or universal as to why it is that only *nimba, kadamba, khadira* etc. possess the universal treeness while *śābaleya, karka* etc. do not possess it. The opponent will have to say that only *nimba* etc. have the capacity or nature (*pratyāsatti*) to possess the universal treeness. Dharmakīrti says that it is this same capacity which makes only some individuals efficient to produce a common effect; there is no need of postulating an independent universal or general nature.[122]

The opponent might urge as follows: If there were no general nature *(bhāvānvaya)* in things except their 'exclusion from the opposite,' then the effect of one individual could not be said to be also the effect of another individual as the individuals are absolutely discrete. The generative nature of one individual is not there in another; so, many individuals cannot have a common effect. Again, whatever common nature, according to the Buddhist, the individuals have is not efficient to generate a common effect, because it being of the nature of negation is essenceless. Only the existent real is efficient. But the efficient nature of one individual is not found there in another; so, one could not

122. Ibid, pp. 53-54

generate the effect which the other generates. Nor could it be said that the efficient nature of one is that of another also. For, if it were so, then from the point of view of this efficient nature one would become identical with the other, and ultimately this would amount to the acceptance of a general nature..[123]

Dharmakīrti vehemently refutes this. He observes that if it is held that many individuals generate a common effect because they have a general nature, then even one individual out of many should generate the effect as the general nature is present even when any one of them is present. The general nature remains present even when any one individual is present because the general nature does not vary; if it varies then it ceases to be general. The general nature is present in each one of the individuals; so, in the presence of just one individual, the the general nature should not disappear. On the other hand, the peculiarities or modes or additaments that they come to possess when they are present all together disappear as soon as any one of them is removed. But these modes are not regarded by the opponent as the generator of the common effect, because he considers the invariable general nature to be the cause of it. Since according to the opponent the cause of the common effect is invariable and eternal and since the variable and changing is not considered by him to be the cause of it, this effect should be brought about even in the presence of any one individual—which is not the case. From this it naturally follows that it is only the individuals that generate a common effect because in the absence of any one of them it fails to be brought about. The effect that is being produced by many co-operating inividuals does not come into existence even if just one of them is absent. When all of them are present, the effect arises. Contary to this, eventhough their general nature is present, the effect does not arise. The effect is defined as that which comes into existence only when the cause concerned is present there, and in case an effect does not come into existence the absence of the cause concerned should be the reason. But the general nature is not absent even when just one individual is present; the fact that though the general nature is present the effect concerned does not come into existence suggests that this general nature is not efficient to generate this effect. That on whose being present the effect comes into existence and on whose being absent it does not come into existence is its cause (as the effect necessarily comes into existence on its being present). To think otherwise would lead to over-absurdity. Hence Dharmakīrti concludes that it is only the individuals that are efficient to generate the common effect

123. na nivṛttim vihāyāsti yadi bhāvānvayo'paraḥ//
ekasya kāryam anyasya na syād atyantabhedataḥ/ Ibid, p. 54
See also the auto-commentary thereon.

and not the general nature as is conceived by others. Only particulars are real as they are efficient. The generality is unreal as it is inefficient.[124]

It might be argued that as there is no general nature in the individuals, the efficient nature of one should be quite different from that of another and hence they cannot produce a common effect. Yet, if they are held to be the generators of a common effect then not only the select individuals but all the individuals that are there in the world should equally be the generators of that effect as they are all equally discrete.[125]

Dharmakīrti again emphasises that though all individuals are discrete only some, and not others, are efficient to generate a common effect because it is only their nature to generate that common effect. And the nature of the things should not be questioned. This nature the things have due to their respective causes being what they are. These causes, again, produce the things of such a nature on account of their own respective causes being what they are—there is a beginningless series of causes.[126]

Moreover, if all things are regarded as identical then they should come into existence and pass away simultaneously.[127] The believer in the general or identical nature, in order to avoid this contingency, might say that they are different also. But if this be so, then the general nature that persists even when the particular (individual) is destroyed cannot be considered to be the nature of that particular.[128] Thus the particular is different from the universal and does not depend on the universal. Hence the universal being quite different from the particulars there should not arise the cognition of identity in relation to the

124. yadyekātmatayā'nekaḥ kāryasyaikasya kārakaḥ//
ātmaikatrāpi so'stīti vyarthāḥ syūḥ sahakāriṇaḥ/
nāpaity abhinnaṁ tadrūpaṁ viśeṣāḥ khalv apāyinaḥ//
ekāpāye phalābhāvād viśeṣebhyas tadudbhvaḥ/
sa pāramārthiko bhāvo ya evārthakriyākṣamaḥ//
sa ca nānveti yo'nveti na tasmāt kāryasambhavaḥ/ Ibid, pp. 54-55
See also the auto-commentary thereon.

125. svabhāvānanvayāt tarhy ekasya janakaṁ rūpam anyasya nāstīty ajanakaḥ syāt/ janakātve vā bhedāviśeṣāt sarvo janakaḥ syāt/ Ibid, p. 55

126. tenātmanā bhinnam api hetuḥ kaścin na cāparaḥ/
svabhāvo'yam ... ... // Ibid, p. 55

127. abhede tu syātām nāśodbhavau sakṛt/ Ibid, p. 55

128. Ibid, 56

particulars. In that case how can we say that this universal belongs to these particulars or that these particulars contain this universal?[129]

It might be urged that the same contingency would arise in the case of 'exclusion' also. It may equally be asked as to whether the 'exclusion from the opposite' is destroyed along with the particular (individual) or not. If the first alternative is accepted, the cognition of identity would become impossible. If the second alternative is accepted then the exclusion would become absolutely different from particulars and as a result it would give no rise to the cognition of identity in relation to the particulars.[130]

Dharmakīrti points out that the exclusion being essenceless the formulation of these alternatives in connection with it is not proper. Again, as the cognition of identity, being an illusion, has no corresponding external object, it is illegitimate to ask as to whether its object persists when the particular is destroyed.[131]

The question might be raised as to how the sprout-generating nature of one seed can be there in another seed if they have no general nature or universal belonging to them and are unique only. Dharmakīrti observes that they do have the sprout-generating nature; he does not deny it. He only wants to emphasise the point that the sprout-generating nature of one is quite different from the sprout-generating nature of another. The other seed too generates a sprout but it does so by its own nature and not by the nature of some other seeds. All the discrete seeds that generate a sprout do so by their own respective natures and not by the natures of others. There is no contradiction whatsoever in holding that the individuals, though discrete, by their own natures generate a common effect. As the sprout-producing nature of one seed is different from the sprout-producing nature of another seed, they cannot be held to be identical or possessed of a general nature or a universal; but that does not mean that they do not produce a common effect, the sprout. It is not a rule that it is only one individual that can generate an effect. The discrete individuals are certianly efficient to generate a common effect. But the effect-generating nature of one is not the same as the effect-generating nature of another. However, merely on this account

129. ... ... ato na syāt sāmānyabhedadhīḥ/
tadidam arthāntaram anāyattam ajanyatvād——asya idaṁ sāmānyaṁ bhedo veti vyapadeśaṁ nārhati/ Ibid, p. 56

130. anyāpohe'py eṣa tulyaḥ prasaṅga iti cet/ Ibid, p. 56

131. nivṛtter niḥsvabhāvatvān nāsthāna-sthānakalpanā//
upaplavaś ca sāmānyadhiyas tenāpy adūṣaṇā/ Ibid, p. 56
See also the auto-commentary thereon.

they cannot be regarded as inefficient to generate a common effect. It might be argued that the individuals are no doubt efficient to generate a common effect but they possess both unique natures and a general nature while their efficiency to generate a cammon effect is due to this general nature of theirs. Dharmakīrti says that he has already shown that the individuals cannot generate a common effect by their general nature, for the general nature being present even in the presence of just one member from the aggregate the effect should emerge even in the presence of this one member alone but in fact it does not do so.[132] Again, if the things have a general or indentical nature, then there should not arise the sense-reflection (perception) of difference, nor the illusory cognition in which a cogniser attributes a foreign nature to the thing before him. It might be said that though all things are identical we cognise difference in them; but then there would not be any difference in reality and as a result there would never arise the different perceptual cognitions. Hence Dharmakīrti concludes that the difference in perceptual cognitions etc. is due to individuals only. In perceptual cognition we do not have the reflection of identity or universal or general nature so that it might be said that due to this reflection we have the notion or judgement of identity later on.[133]

Only the particular is real; it has an objective reality. Others namely, universals are only its exclusion from the different types of things. The particular is the cause and the effect. It is unique. To attain or avoid it the people act. The efficient alone is real and the particular alone is efficient. What we call universal is nothing but its negation from others.[134]

Again, just as in the Sāṅkhya philosophy though all things are equally identical in nature not anything produces anything, even so in the Buddhist philosophy though all things are equally discrete not anything produces anything. Though all things are equally discrete some are alone efficient to generate a particular effect because they have alone got the nature to produce that effect on account of their respective causes being what they are. Thus there is no contradiction

132. yat tasya janakaṁ rūpaṁ tato'nyo janakaḥ katham//
bhinnā viśeṣāḥ janakāḥ asty abhedo'pi teṣu cet/
tena te'janakāḥ proktāḥ ... ... // Ibid, pp. 56-57
See also the auto-commentary thereon.

133. yo'yam abhinnān sarvārthān manyate tasyāyam artheṣu buddhipratibhāsabhedo viruddhadharmādhyāsaś ca na syāt/ sati vā tasminnabhede'pi na kaścid bhedaḥ syāt/ tathā cāyaṁ pravibhāgo na syād ekātmavat/ tasmād ayaṁ bhinnapratibhāsādir viśeṣa eva/ na cātrāparam abhinnaṁ pratibhāsaṁ paśyāmo yadbalenābhedaprtītiḥ syāt/ Ibid, p. 57

134. yad arthakriyākāri tad eva vastv ity uktam/ sa ca viśeṣa eva/ yat punar etat sāmānyaṁ nāma tat tasyaivāparasmād bhedaḥ/ Idid, p. 57

whatsoever in their producing a common effect. But if the things are regarded as having an identical or general nature then one and the same thing would become efficient as well as inefficient with respect to one and the same effect. *Prakṛti* in the form of seed is efficient to produce the sprout but the same *Prakṛti* in the form of fire is inefficient to generate it.[135]

It might be argued that though all things are identical they produce different effects because they have one entity like *Prakṛti* underlying them; for that one entity responsible for the production of those different effects produces them after having undergone certain modifications. But here arises the question as to how it should be possible to predicate numerous modes of one self-identical unitary entity, *Prakṛti*? If it is held that it itself acquires certain peculiarities then its identity would vanish.[136]

It might be urged that it is identical as well as different, i.e. is of the nature of universal-cum-particular. But in that case it should become either absolutely particular or absolutely general. If the discrete things are regarded as having generality on account of their own nature being identical, then since their nature is identical, how can the particularity of one thing be regared as different from that of another thing? Thus the things should become absolutely identical in nature. If it is said that the particularities have no general nature, then it should be pointed out that it is not proper to consider the things of the nature of particularity to be having a general nature. If the things were regarded as having a general nature then they would not have their own particular nature. Thus the things should become absolutely particular, discrete. One and the same nature cannot be both perishable and imperishable. These are two contradictory natures and hence cannot be predicated of one thing.[137]

It might be contended that even particularity and generality are neither absolutely identical nor absolutely different as we establish them by discrimination and distinction i.e. by abstraction—saying this is generality and this is particularity[138]

135. yathā'bhedā'viśeṣe'pi na sarvaṁ sarvasādhanam/
tathā bhedā'viśeṣe'pi na sarvaṁ sarvasādhanam/
bhede hi kārakaṁ kiñcid vastudharmatayā bhavet//
abhede tu virudhyete tasyaikasya kriyākriye/ Ibid, pp. 57-58

136. paryāyeṇātha kartṛtvaṁ sa kiṁ tasyaiva vastunaḥ/ Ibid, p. 58
See also the auto-commentary thereon.

137. atyantabhedābhedau hi syātāṁ tadvati vastuni//
anyo'nyaṁ vā tayor bhedaḥ sadṛśāsadṛśātmanoḥ/ Ibid, p. 58
See also the auto-commentary thereon.

138. na hi kvacid asyaikāntiko bhedo'bhedo vā, vivekena vyavasthāpanāt—sāmānyaṁ viśeṣa iti/ Ibid, p. 58

Dharmakīrti observes that if the generality and particularity were different then the natures that make them different would make them absolutely different. If the natures depending on which we make a distinction between the generality and particularity were the natures making them different then the two would become absolutely different because these are their own natures. If these two natures are different, then the generality and particularity would become different in an absolute fashion as their natures are different in an absolute fashion. It is said that the nature of a thing is the very being of this thing.[139]

Once the particular and the universal become absolutely different the particulars would be devoid of the universal and the universal would be devoid of the particulars because there obtains no relation between those that are absolutely different.[140]

After this refutation of the Sāṅkhya view of generality, Dharmakīrti again concludes that all things are discrete by their own nature and identical by virtue of their exclusion from the opposite.[141]

Dharmakīrti remarks that while refuting the Sāṅkhya concept of the universal (general nature) he has refuted the Jaina concept of the universal also. Yet he says something more with regard to this Jaina concept.[142]

Jainas hold that the camel is somehow curds and somehow not. But such a view would put a man in a fix, for he would then not be able to take a decision as to what is avoidable and what is attainable. As all things are having two natures—their own and a foreign one—they would not have any differentiating nature. So, why should a man enjoined to eat curd not rush towards a camel? He should do so because even a camel is somehow curd and it is not that a camel is camel only. On this view everything would become somehow camel and even curd is somehow camel. It is not that curd is curd only, for on the view under consideration even camel etc. are somehow curd. Thus as in either of the two—camel and curd—no nature is absent and as they have in their own natures nothing that is not found elsewhere, they would be

139. yadi sāmānyaviśeṣayor yam ātmānaṁ āśritya sāmānyaṁ viśeṣa iti sthitis tenātmanā bhedas tadā bheda eva/ yasmāt tau hi tayoḥ svātmānau/ tau ced vyatirekiṇau vyartireka eva sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ, svabhāvabhedāt/ svabhāvo hi bhāva iti/ Ibid, pp. 58-59

140. ... ... tathā ca syān niḥsāmānya-viśeṣatā//
bhedasāmānyayor yadvad ghaṭādīnāṁ parasparam/
vyatireke ca bhedasāmānyayor na bhedaḥ sāmānyavān, na sāmānyaṁ bhedavat, sambandhābhāvāt parasparaṁ ghaṭādivad ity uktam/ Ibid, p. 59

141. cintyete svātmanā bhedo vyāvṛttyā ca samānatā// Ibid, p. 59

142. etenaiva yad ahrikāḥ kim apy aślīlam ākulam//
pralapanti pratikṣiptaṁ tad apy ekāntasambhavāt/ Ibid. p. 59
See also the auto-commentary thereon.

devoid of any particularity whatsoever. Hence a man urged to eat curd may even eat camel.[143]

It might be argued that since there is some speciality in each of them the person enjoined to eat curd proceeds towards the modification curd and not towards the others like camel etc. But then this modification or speciality, which is the object of man's purposive action, should alone be regarded as curd. Curd is that thing which has the special nature characterised by the efficiency to generate the special fruit to be achieved by (the thing) what we call curd. Such a nature is not found elsewhere, that is, in camel etc., and that is why a man enjoined to eat curd does not proceed towards camel etc. Hence it is to be concluded that a thing has got no two natures—particular and general i. e. its own and an alien one. It has got its own nature only.[144]

The question might be raised as to what the words would convey if there were no real universal. Do they convey the unique particulars? Dharmakīrti himself admits that they could not convey particulars. The words convey that in connection with which we have fixed the convention (*saṅketa*) and the convention is formed in order that we can communicate successfully. At the time of communication the particular perceived at the time of the formation of convention is non-existent. Hence it is of no use to form convention in connection with the unique particulars. It might be urged that the words may convey (express) the unique thing even at the time subsequent to that of the formation of convention. This view is illegitimate. The word which is earlier (i. e. at the time of the formation of convention) conventionally connected with the unique thing should not be used later on (i. e. at the time of communication) to convey that particular, because a particular does not cover more then one unit of time, place or individuality. Hence convention is not made in connection with particulars.[145] When Dharmakīrti himself says all this, it naturally follows that one should accept the realist view that words express the universal which is all-pervading and eternal; for, this view does not involve the contingency of the absence, at the time of communication, of the thing in connection with which the convention is fixed.[146]

143. sarvasyobhayarūpatve tadviśeṣanirākṛteḥ//
codito dadhi khādeti kiṁ uṣṭraṁ nābhidhāvati/ Ibid, pp. 59-60

144. athāsty atiśayaḥ kaścid yena bhedena vartate//
sa eva dadhi so'nyatra nāstīty anubhayaṁ param/ Ibid, p. 60

145. śabdāḥ saṅketitaṁ prāhur vyavahārāya sa smṛtaḥ/
tadā svalakṣaṇaṁ nāsti saṅketas tena tatra na// Ibid, p. 29

146. sāmānyaṁ tarhi vyatiriktam avyatiriktaṁ vyāpi śabdair abhidhīyate/ tanna vyavahāra-kālābhāvadoṣaḥ/ Ibid, p. 30.

Dharmakīrti vehemently criticises the view that the words express the real independent universal (of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas). Dharmakīrti points out that we use words so that the hearer may proceed towards the things efficient to generate a purposive action after having avoided all other things that are inefficient to generate that purposive action. But the realist's universal being eternal and all-pervading is inefficient to generate any purposive action. So, how can it be held that we use words in order to convey such a universal ?[147]

It might be contended that the words express the universal in order that the efficient individuals might be indicated through it as it is not possible for words to express the individuals themselves. This view is absurd. How can one direct one's activity towards that which, though related to the expressed, is not itself expressed? Nobody cuts the staff-bearer when he is asked to cut the staff. It might be said that though the words express the universal we direct our activity towards the individuals because the performance of an action is not possible with reference to the universal. But this argument is even more absurd. On this argument the speaker should always become incoherent in his speech; for he is not actually expressing that with reference to which he wants the hearers to perform the relevant function. Moreover, no person who is asked to milk an ox, proceeds to milk a cow simply because he finds it impossible to perform the action of milking in the case of an ox. Again, it is not possible to indicate one thing by expressing another thing. On hearing the word staff we do not cognise the staff-bearer even though the two are related. It might be suggested that it is so because the staff and the staff-bearer are not invariably related with one another. But the same will hold good in the case of the universal too, because the universal exists even when the individuals are destroyed (one by one). At the most we may admit that the words like 'servant' etc. indicate another thing (master) because they are relative terms. But the words 'cow' etc. expressing the universals cowness etc. are not relative terms as the words 'master' etc. are. Yet, if they are regarded as relative terms then they would indicate, always and invariably, even those individuals (possessed of the concerned universals) that are destroyed. The opponent might say that the positon is agreeable to him inasmuch as a universal does have the capacity to be related even to the destroyed individuals. But it is to be noted that this involves a contingency viz. that the words 'cow' etc. would never urge us to action because they do not express, specifically and with

147. api pravartcta pumān vijñāyārthakriyākṣamān/
tatsādhanāyety artheṣu saṁyojyante'bhidhāyakāḥ//
tatrānaıthakriyāyogyā jātiḥ......../ Ibid, p. 30

qualification, the universal in whose case two states are possible—one the state of being accompanied by the concerned individuals and the other that of being not accompanied by the concerned individuals.[148]

As a matter of fact, no relation can obtain between the universal and the individuals, because they being not mutually related as cause and effect one cannot render assistance to the other. Thus as there is no relation between the universal and the individuals, the words expressing the universal cannot indicate the individuals. Hence it is of no use to employ words that express the universal only, for in that case they serve no purpose.[149]

To find a way out one might suggest that let the words express the individual qualified by the universal as it is capable of generating purposive action. But Dharmakīrti asks as to why the words do not express the individuals directly? If it is useful or fruitful to employ words for the sake of expressing the individual, then why are they not employed to express the individual directly? What is the use of intermediary, the universal? If it be said that the words are not employed to express the individuals directly because the latter being innumerable the formation of convention with respect to them all is not possible, that is, because it is not possible to connect a word with all of the concerned individuals, then this difficulty would persist even in the view that words express the individuals qualified by the universal. It is so because even through mediation of the universal nothing else but the individuals are to be expressed by words. And it is a rule that words can never express that in connection with which the convention is not formed. Hence, it is incumbent on the upholders of the present view to form convention with regard to the individuals. But that is not possible (as they themselves have shown). Moreover, it is never experienced (observed) that a particular word (say 'staff') conventionally connected with one thing (i.e. staff) can become automatically connected with another thing (i.e. staff-bearer) simply because these two things are related with one another. Again, it is already proved that there is no relation between the universal and the individual. The upholder of the present view might additionally urge that even the Buddhists themselves are of the opinion that convention is formed in connection with the universal—which, according to them, is of the form of the exclusion of the opposite—in spite of a full knowledge that their position would involve all the contingencies that are there in the view under consideration. Certainly, the theory that

148. Ibid, p. 30, l. 13-21

149. na ca jātivyaktyoḥ kaścit sambandho'nyonyam ajanyajanakatvenā'nupakārāt/ tato lakṣaṇam apy ayuktam/ tasmān na jātiśabdaniveśanam, phalābhāvāt/ Ibid, p. 30

words express the 'exclusion of the opposite' is on par with the theory that words express the individuals qualified by the universal, because even according to the former Buddhist theory the words express the excluded qualified by the exclusion. There is nothing special in the former theory of the 'exclusion of the opposite' inasmuch as the exclusion it speaks of is but a substitute for the universal and the 'individual qualified by the exclusion' a substitute for the individual qualified by the universal.[150]

Dharmakīrti's answer to this is strongly worded: Let those contingencies that arise in connection with the theory of *Tadvat* i.e. the theory according to which a word expresses the individual qualified by the universal equally vitiate our theory of *Apoha*; but let the universal be not an independent entity. Even those who believe in an independent entity called universal should accept the facthood of the exclusion of the opposite. If there were no exclusion of the things from their opposite, then even the realist's universal would lose its *raison d'etre*. This exclusion from the opposite constitutes the identity of the given things; hence let the individual things qualified by the exclusion be grasped by us through words. That is, the view that words express the things qualified by the exclusion is the most sensible. Of course, it is not that this view is absolutely free from all defect. It is humanly impossible to evolve a theory absolutely faultless. But there is no need of positing an independent entity called universal. The function assigned to the universal can very well be performed by the 'exclusion of the opposite'. And this exclusion is indispensable in both the theories. Moreover, we use a word in order that the hearer may act to achieve an intended object avoiding all others. Now, if the word were not to exclude the intended object from other objects, then how will it be possible for the hearer to act with reference to that intended object? Again, if a word were not to express the 'exclusion of the opposite' then activity and prevention of activity both being equally allowed with reference to any object, injunctions positive or negative would be useless and consequently the use of words would become a mockery. So words should invariably express the exclusion of things from their opposite. This exclusion is common to all the excluded things. Thus the exclusion has even the characteristic of the realist's universal, namely, 'remaining one while residing in many'. Hence it becomes clear that one who, having abandoned the exclusion, posits an independent entity called

150. .... tadvān alaṁ sa ca/
sākṣān na yojyate kasmād ānantyāc ced idaṁ samam//
tatkāriṇām atatkāribhedasāmye na kiṁ kṛtaḥ/
tadvaddoṣasya sāmyāc ced..........// Ibid, pp. 30-31

universal betrays merely his attachment to fiction or unreality. The realist's universal is not necessary for the following reasons: (i) the 'exclusion of the opposite' should necessarily be expressed by words; otherwise the usage of words would be in vain, (ii) the acceptance of the exclusion is indispensable; otherwise there would arise the contingency of the non-existance of the universal itself, (iii) the exclusion accomplishes the functions assigned to the independent universal—the functions, namely, of generating the cognition of identity in relation to many individuals and of making possible the application of one name to many individuals. To posit the universal according to one's own sweet will is not proper. On the other hand, words invariably and necessarily exclude the things from thier opposite. And it is to this exclusion that we Buddhists give the name 'universal' when we talk about the object of purposive action. Words express exclusion which makes possible the achievement of the object of purposive action.[151]

If the upholders of the independent universal were to concede that the exclusion of the things from their opposite is expressed by words, then, it is to be pointed out, says Dharmakīrti, that it is the only purpose for which the words are employed and for this purpose we require no independent entity called the universal.[152]

It might be contended that the words express the object of purposive action, no doubt, but that the object of purposive action is nothing but the reaist's universal. Dharmakīrti observes that it does not behove the realist to say so because the latter's universal is not capable of purposive action. Even in the *Tadvat* view, the efficient particulars being not directly expressed through words, words cannot urge a hearer to action with reference to the efficient particulars. If in spite of all this the realist were to consider the universal and the individuals qualified by it to be the object of purposive action, then why should he not consider exclusion and the thing qualified by exclusion to be the object of purposive action? The realist cannot suggest that it is so because exclusion being a fiction can never serve as a means to purposive action, for the same thing can be said against the realist's universal. Nor can the realist evade the difficulty by saying that the individuals qualified by the universal are capable of purposive action, for the case of things

151. ....astu jātir alaṁ parā//
tadanyaparihāreṇa pravartteteti ca dhvaniḥ/
ucyate tena tebhyo'syāvyavacchede kathaṁ ca saḥ// Ibid, p. 31

152. vyavacchedo'sti ced asya nanv etāvat prayojanam/
śabdānām iti kiṁ tatra sāmānyenāpareṇa vaḥ// Ibid, p. 31

qualified by exculsion is on par with that of the things qualified by the universal.[153]

Dharmakīrti emphatically asserts that the words express exclusion; the verbal cognition does not grasp the thing. On account of some illusion it judges the inefficient concept (mental image) to be the efficient thing and as a result urges a man to action. It might be urged that if it is illusory, it should not lead to successful purposive action. Dharmakīrti remarks that cognitions are in harmony with the conative activity provided they fulfil two conditions, namely, their generation by the things and their being bound up with the things. And these two conditions are fulfilled by the verbal cognitions as the concept or mental image which is there in them is generated by things and is bound up with things. Some one might urge that the verbal cognition should, then, not be considered to be an illusion as the concept in it is generated by the thing itself. Dharmakīrti observes that the verbal cognition is an illusion because the concept which is not a thing is judged by it to be a thing. Otherwise, the illusory cognition of a gem taking place on one's viewing the lustre of a gem would be a case of right knowledge; but nobody holds that it is a case of right knowledge and not an illusion, for here the gem's lustre is judged by it to be a gem. It might be said that if the verbal cognition is an illusion, then it should not lead us to successful purposive action or the attainment of the desired object. Dharmakīrti rightly points out that if it were so then even the illusory cogniton of a gem taking place on one's viewing the lustre of a gem could not lead one to the attainment of a gem. It is so, because it is the false reflection that is the differentia of the illusory cognition.[154]

The realist might contend that the verbal cognition leads us to successful purposive activity as it grasps the thing as it is. Dharmakīrti refutes this view by pointing out that as a matter of fact the verbal cognition never leads to successful purposive action inasmuch as its object, the eternal all-pervading universal, is inefficient. It should not be suggested that it can urge us to successful action with reference

153. nanūktaṁ pravṛttiviṣayaḥ pradarśyate iti/uktam idam ayuktaṁ tūktam/tathā hi na sā pravṛttiyogyeti niveditam etat/taddvāreṇācodite'vṛttir apy uktā/ tadvaccodane'pi vyavadhānam/ jātitadvatoḥ pravṛttiviṣayatve vyāvṛttitadvantau kiṁ neṣyate ? vyāvṛtter avastutvenā'sādhanatvāc cet/ tat tulyaṁ jāteḥ/ tadvataḥ sādhanād adoṣa iti cet/ tulyaṁ tad vyāvṛttimataḥ/ Ibid, p. 32.

154. avastugrāhī ca vyāvṛttivādināṁ śābdaḥ pratyayaḥ/ sa vibhramavaśād akārake'pi kārakādhyavasāyī pravartayati/ vastusaṁvādas tu vastūtpattyā tatpratibandhe sati bhavaty anyathā naivāsti/ vastūtpatter abhrāntir iti cet/ na/ atatpratibhāsinas tadadhyavasāyāt/ maṇiprabhāyāṁ maṇibhrāntidarśanena vyabhicārāt/ bhrānter avastusaṁvāda iti cet/ na/ yathoktenaiva vyabhicārāt/ vitathapratibhāso hi bhrāntilakṣaṇam/ Ibid p. 32.

to the particular which is not its object, as that would involve over-absurdity. Moreover, the modified view according to which the words express the efficient individuals qualified by the universal involves two difficulties: (i) the inability of words to express the individuals and (ii) the futility of positing an independent entity called universal.[155]

The realist might at last say that even though the universal is grasped by the verbal cognition, yet it is not the universal but Intellect reflecting the identity pertaining to the individuals that urges us to successful activity as it is related to the efficient individuals. Dharmakīrti observes that in believing so the realist has surely accepted the Buddhist view because Intellect reflecting the identity in question grasps neither the universal as it is nor the individuals qualified by the universal as they are—and is therefore a case of illusion.[156]

The hypothesis of universal is not necessary because it is the negation of the opposite that is expressed by words. So, it is proper to form even the convention for this purpose only, that is, to convey the negation of the opposite. That is to say, even the convention that is being formed for the purpose of conveying the exclusion of the opposite would seem proper and legitimate. We use words to urge a person to action towards a thing efficient to generate a purposive action by preventing him from others that are not efficient to generate that purposive action. If the exclusion of the opposite were not the meaning assigned to words at the time of the formation of convention, then the words would not convey the exclusion of the opposite at the time of communication, and as a result the hearer would not proceed towards an intended thing avoiding all other things.[157]

Though the words generate a wrong cognition, yet they are not considered to be in disharmony with things or conative activity because the things are naturally different from their opposite. This wrong cognition, as it arises, superimposes the general nature of its own on the external things which are truely devoid of that nature; it judges the

155. vastuni tu yathābhāvam arpitacetasaḥ pravṛttau grāhyasya sāmānyasyānarthakriyāyogyatvād apravṛttiḥ/ anyatra ca pravṛttāv atiprasaṅgāt/ tadvadgrahaṇe cāsāmarthya-vaiyarthyādayaḥ proktāḥ/ Ibid, p. 32.

156. jātigrahaṇe'pi sambandhāc chliṣṭābhāsā buddhiḥ pravartayatīti cet/ tadā na jātir na tadvān ekasyāpi svabhāvasthiter agrahaṇād iti paravāda evāśritaḥ syāt/ Ibid, p. 32.

157. pratiṣedhasya ca vidhānāt tatkalpanā'yukteti/ tasmāt saṁketaḥ api tadvidarthikaḥ eva yuktaḥ/ yo'yam anyonyaṁ viveko bhāvānāṁ tatpratītaya eva saṅketo'pi kriyamāṇaḥ śobheta/
atatkārivivekena pravṛttyarthatayā śrutiḥ/
yadi hi na tatpratītyarthaḥ saṅketas tasya vyavahārakāle'py asaṁsparśān nānyaparihā reṇa pravarteta/ na hi teṣāṁ tebhyo vivekaḥ śabdena codita iti/ Ibid, p. 37.

inefficient mental images to be the efficient things; it has the exclusion of the opposite for its source; and it ascertains the identity of things on the basis of this exclusion. The exclusion of the opposite is really there in the things and it is not possible for us to transgress it anyhow. The one independent universal is not there in them and it is not necessary at all. If that one independent universal were regarded as an independent thing, then the thing would fall beyond the reach of words and verbal cognitions for the following reasons. On this view the universal no longer remains the universal but becomes the thing, the particular, the individual. So, the words and verbal cognitions would not have their own object, the universal, and as a result they would not be held to grasp the individuals through the universal. But the realist holds that the words and verbal cognitions grasp the individuals through the universal. It is only on this account that we, says Dharmakīrti, say that words have the exclusion of the opposite for their object. This is so, because at the time of the formation of convention we have connected words exclusively with the things differing from their opposite and also because it is only after having avoided the unintended things that we proceed to act with respect to the intended efficient thing at the time of communication.[158]

The realist might urge that on the view that without knowing non-A we cannot know A, the knowledge of A would depend on the knowledge of non-A and vice versa with the result that the non-cognition of one (A or non-A) would mean the non-cognition of both (A and non-A) and this, in turn, would lead to the impossibility of convention (language). Let us explain the point. On the view that A means exclusion of non-A, A cannot be grasped as such i.e. excluded from non-A without the grasping of non-A; and even non-A cannot be grasped without the grasping of the non-A's nature, namely, its exclusion from A, without the knowledge of A. This being the case it would not be possible for us to form convention as no convention can be formed with regard to things that are not determinately known. In short, to connect a particular type of things with the word 'A' we should first

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158. sā ca śrutiḥ

akāryakṛtitatkāritulyarūpāvabhāsinīm//
dhiyaṁ vastupṛthagbhāvamātrabījām anarthikām/
janayanty apy atatkāriparihārāṅgabhāvataḥ//
vastubhedāśrayāc cārthe na visaṁvādikā matā/
tato'nyāpohaviṣayā tatkartrāśritabhāvataḥ// Ibid, pp. 37–38
See also the auto-commentary thereon.

exclude them from non-A, but how can this be possible before our knowning those former things as A?[159]

Dharmakīrti asks the realist as to whether or not he excludes the non-A from A when he makes convention with respect to A. In other words, those who, having posited one independent universal, point out the fallacy of mutual dependence in the view that convention can be fixed with regard to the exclusion of the opposite only, to them Dharmakīrti asks as to whether or not they exclude from universal A the universals of the form non-A when they fix convention even with regard to the universal A. If they were to say that they exclude from the universal A the universals of the form non-A when they fix convention with regard to universal A, then too there would arise the question as to how they can grasp something as non-A before knowing A. At the time of the formation of convention the cogniser knows neither A nor non-A. It is just to know them that he requires convention. Hence, how can he, knowing neither A nor non-A, know the exclusion from non-A at the time of the formation of convention? On account of his not knowing 'the exclusion from non-A' he would employ a particular word 'A' in connection with even the opposite universals of the form of non-A that are different from the universal A. Hence, at the time of communication it would not be possible for the hearer to act with reference to the intended thing by desisting from proceeding towards the unintended things, just as a word 'tree' does never urge us to proceed towards only a particular type of tree.[160]

The realist might contend that words do not convey anything to anybody through negation of the opposite. Then how do they convey the thing, the universal, say treeness? At the time of the formation of convention we utter a sentence, 'this is a tree' after having pointed out the thing, the universal treeness that is in view. Hence at the time of the formation of convention the word conveys to a person merely the perceived thing, the universal treeness, and even at the time of communication it conveys the same universal perceived at the time of the formation of convention while in addition indicating individuals

159. avṛkṣavyatirekeṇa vṛkṣārthagrahaṇe dvayam/
anyonyāśrayam ity ekagrahābhāve dvayāgrahḥ//
saṅketā'sambhavas tasmād iti kecit pracakṣate/ Ibid, p. 38.
See also the auto-commentary thereon.

160. teṣām avṛkṣāḥ saṅkete vyavacchinnā na vā yadi//
vyavacchinnāḥ katham jñātāḥ prāk vṛkṣagrahaṇād ṛte/
anirākaraṇe teṣām saṅkete vyavahāriṇām//
na syāt tatparihāreṇa pravṛttir vṛkṣabhedavat/ Ibid, p. 38.
See also the auto-commentary thereon.

related to it. Thus the realist theory that convention is made by assertion alone and without a previous negation of the opposites is free from the above-mentioned contingency that is pointed out in the theory of the exclusion of the opposite.[161]

Dharmakīrti observes that the realist cannot evade the fallacy of mutual dependence *(anyonyāśraya)* because even the convention which is held to be formed by assertion alone could be made in two ways—either by asserting 'this universal *also* is a tree' or by asserting 'this universal *alone* is a tree.' So, the contingency above pointed out cannot be avoided. To explain, a person who, having pointed out a thing, the universal treeness, asserts, 'this is a tree' cannot evade the two alternative ways of making assertion viz. 'this also is a tree' and 'this alone is a tree'; and either of these two ways involves the same difficulty of mutual dependence.[162]

The realist goes on insisting that the contingency in question would not arise inasmuch as we easily know the opposite of the perceived thing. When a person who has already seen one thing, the universal treeness, experiences in respect of another universal the intellect bearing quite a different reflection there arises in him, in accordance with his experience, the determinate knowledge of the opposite nature of the second universal; and consequently this determinate knowledge discriminates, in accordance with his experience, the former universal from the latter. The person who, after having been shown a thing, the universal treeness that is in view, has been told that this universal alone is tree knows merely by himself those individuals to be non-trees where he does not find the universal treeness. But this is not possible on the theory of exclusion as according to this theory the nature of the universal which is perceived in one individual is not there in any other individual. Hence on the theory of exclusion, even if a person is instructed by demonstration, he would not have in connection with another individual of the same type such a cognition as he had with respect to the individual actually shown to him at the time of the formation of convention.[163]

161. avidhāya niṣidhyānyat pradarśyaikaṁ puraḥ sthitam//
vṛkṣo'yam iti saṅketaḥ kriyate tat prapadyate/
vyavahāre'pi tenāyam adoṣa iti cet...// Ibid, p. 38.
See also the auto-commentary thereon.

162. ... ... taruḥ//
ayam apy ayam eveti prasaṅgo na nivartate/ Ibid, p. 39

163. na doṣo dṛṣṭaviparītasya sujñānatvāt/ ekaṁ hi kañcit paśyato'nyatra tadākāravivekinīṁ buddhim anubhavataḥ tato'nyad iti yathā'nubhavaṁ tadvivecano vaidharmyaniścaya utpadyate/ sa hy ayam eva vṛkṣa iti pradarśya vyutpādito yatraitan na paśyati tam evāvṛkṣaṁ svayam eva pratipadyate/ nedaṁ vyavacchedavācinaḥ saṁbhavati, ekatra dṛṣṭasya rūpasya kvacid ananvayāt/ darśanena pratipattau vyaktyantare'pi na syāt tathā pratītiḥ/ Ibid, p. 39.

Dharmakīrti points out that the same thing can be said with respect to the theory of exclusion. For, even according to this theory, when a person is having a cognition of identity, he by himself, even before the formation of convention, discriminates the things that are efficient to generate this cognition from those that are not. None but some select few generate a particular common effect like cognition etc. even though they are discrete by nature. Hence when a person is having a cognition of identity, he knows, merely by himself, the things that are the cause of it and those that are not.[164]

At the time of the formation of convention, the instructor connects a word with exclusion in order that the person instructed might, at the time of communication, know by himself the mental images of the things excluded at the time of the formation of convention as different from others, the mental images which appear as the cause of the cognition of identity and which, in addition, look identical on account of all of them being devoid of the nature that does not cause the cognition of identity. It is only on acocunt of an illusion that Intellect grasping, at the time of communication and through a word, this exclusion cognises as though there is one thing, the universal, residing in many individuals.[165]

As the things, invariably by their very nature and depending on some auxiliary, generate the cognition of their identity an instructor conventionally connects a word with the exclusion of those things—observed by the person instructed to be generating the cognition of identity even before the formation of convention—from others that do not generate that cognition of identity in order that the person instructed might, after having remembered the experience he had at time of the formation of convention, know through that word even at the time of communication the corresponding mental images only differentiating them from others that do not cause the cognition of identity, the mental images which, though not identical, are judged to be identical on account of their being a cause of the cognition of identity or on account of their being excluded from others that do not generate the cognition of identity, which are not grasped by him as different from the

164. evaṁ tarhi tatrāpi tulyam eva tat/ yasmād—
ekapratyavamarśākhye jñāna ekatra hi sthitaḥ//
pratipattā tadataddhetūn arthān vibhajate svayam/ Ibid, p. 39.
See also the auto-commentary thereon.

165. tadbuddhivartino bhāvān bhāvo hetutayā dhiyaḥ//
ahetur̄upavikalānekarūpān iva svayam/
bhedena pratipadyeteti uktir bhede niyujyate//
taṁ tasyāḥ pratiyatī dhīḥ bhrāntyaikaṁ vastv ivekṣate/ Ibid, p. 39

external things, or which are identified by him with the external things, and which are regarded by him as reflected identically in the intellect of both the hearer and the speaker. The conceptual cognition of identity cognising the exclusion of the opposite appears, only on account of, an illusion, as though grasping one thing, the universal. As a matter of fact there does not reside in many individuals an independent perceptible entity called universal, so that in spite of all the individuals being perceived to be distinct and different from one another we may, on the basis of the perception or otherwise of that universal (treeness) allegedly residing in some of these individuals, dichotomise them into trees and non-trees. There is no independent universal treeness residing in the individual trees because the universal treeness is not grasped (perceived) as distinct from the reflection of branches etc. just as the staff is perceived as distinct from the staff-bearer. And it cannot be argued that the universal though not perceived to be distinct from the individuals is there in them, for in that case the universal can never indicate the individuals. Is it possible for one thing to indicate another thing if the former thing is itself imperceptible ?[166]

By the way Dharmakīrti refutes the view according to which the structure is the universal. If the individuals were to be dichotomised into trees and non-trees on the basis of the possession or otherwise of a certain structure, then just one individual in the whole world—and no other—would be a tree, for it is not possible for us to perceive in one individual the structure perceived in another individual.[167]

The realist might concede that the words like 'pot' etc. exclude the opposite things but they may ask as to how it can be possible for the words like 'knowable' etc. to exclude the opposite. There is no thing like unknowable from which the knowable can be excluded, because the unknowable would be turned into knowable if the knowable were to be known only through the exclusion of their opposite, the unknowable. Is it ever possible to exclude a thing without knowing it ?[168]

Dharmakīrti answers this objection as follows: No person using words can evade either of the two—the assertion of the intended things and the negation of the opposite—because the words are used for the purpose of directing activity towards the intended things and preventing it from their opposite. If a person were to withdraw his attention from no thing and direct it to no thing, then there would remain only

166. Ibid, p. 39, l. 21–28

167. Ibid, p. 40

168. bhavatu nāma ghaṭādiśabdeṣv arthāntaravyavacchedaḥ/ atha jñānādipadeṣu katham ? na hy ajñeyaṁ kiñcid asti yato bhedaḥ syāt/ tato bhedena viṣayīkaraṇa eva tasya jñeyatvāt/ Ibid, p. 40

an indeterminate cognition. As a result in the whole course of one's worldly activities one would never utter a single word, as the utterance of words is invariably related to determinate cognition.[169] Even the words like 'knowable' etc., when used in a sentence or communication, exclude something, namely, a point of doubt, because if there were no doubt regarding the knowability of certain particular things, the use of the word 'knowable' would be in vain. In the case of the words like 'knowable' etc. the point of doubt arising in the mind of a dullwitted person is to be excluded, removed by those words. Does a person with no doubt in his mind require any instruction from others? And will one not be considered to be a mad person if one uses words that do not remove doubts from the minds of hearers? It is only to remove doubts from the minds of hearers that the words are given conventional meanings.[170]

Kumārila and Uddyotakara attacked the Buddhist theory of exclusion by pointing out that if words were merely to negate the opposite then there would arise many a difficulty like infinite regress and others. With this criticism in view, it seems, Dharmakīrti observes that even according to the Buddhist logicians the words primarily assert their own object (difference) and merely by implication, i.e. secondarily, they negate the opposite. Having negated the opposite the words express the difference of the things in question from their opposite, a difference that makes the things in question appear to be similar. This difference of the things from the opposite is in the mind of Diṅnāga when he says, 'by negation of the opposite is known *a part of the thing.*' The negation of the opposite is known as soon as the difference of the things in question from their opposite is known. The difference of the things from their opposite means a concept. In verbal cognition nothing is qualified by the negation of the opposite. Nor does a word perform two functions—the assertion (expression) of the difference of the things from their opposite and the negation of the opposite—because the assertion (expression) of the difference of the things from their opposite necessarily implies the negation of the opposite on account of the things different from the opposite and the things opposite being mutually exclusive.[171]

169. śabdaṁ hi prayuñjānaḥ sarvo'nvayavyatirekau nātivartate/ tasya pravṛttinivṛttyarthatvāt/ yadi hy ayaṁ na kasyacit kutaścin nivartayet pravartayed vā buddhiṁ yathābhūtānujñānāt sarvavyavahāreṣu na kiñcid vyāhared vyāhārasyāvadhāraṇanāntarīyakatvāt/ Ibid, p. 40.

170. tathā vyavahāropanītānāṁ jñeyādiśābdānām api kenacid vyavacchedyena bhavitavyam, ananyāśaṅkāyāṁ prayogāyogāt/ tatra hi yad eva mūḍhamater āśaṅkāsthānaṁ tad eva nivartyam/ anāśaṅkamāno vā kiṁ parasmād upadeśam apekṣeta/ aśrotṛsaṁskāraṁ ca bruvāṇaḥ kathaṁ nonmattaḥ syāt? tatsaṁskārāyaiva śabdānāṁ kṛtasaṅketatvāt/ Ibid, p. 40

171. Ibid, kā. 126 b—129

Now, Dharmakīrti proves the essencelessness of this difference of the things from their opposite. This difference being essenceless is not a reality. To hold otherwise is not possible. As as matter of fact, the difference of the thing is not the thing itself i.e. it is not identity with the thing i.e. it does not constitute the essence of the thing because the difference of the thing is dependent on or relative to other things (i.e. its opposite) as is proved by the phrase—'the difference of this thing *from that thing*'. Nor is the difference of the thing quite different from the thing in question as is shown by the pharse 'the differece *of this thing* from that thing'. Thus this difference is proved to be essenceless and unreal.[172] So, to cognise it as constituting the essence of the thing is an illusion.[173]

The realist might urge against Dharmakīrti's position as follows: According to him both the exclusion and the realist's. universal are non-existent. So, it naturally follows that by words is expressed nothing but an impartite unique thing itself. And if the words were to express the impartite thing itself than all the words except one should be futile, because a word expressing its exclusion from one type of thing would then express its exclusion from all the other types of things or in other words because a word expressing one attribute of the impartite thing would then express all its attributes.[174]

Dharmakīrti points out why this contingency does not arise in his theory. It is only to remove the cases of illusions that make one thing appear identical with other things that the words are used in accordance with a fixed convention. The cause of a particular illusion which one word removes cannot be removed by any other word because it is conventionally fixed that a particular word would remove the cause of a particular illusion. The word never expresses the thing from which the superimposition is removed. If it were to express the thing itself then there would arise the contingency of the cognition of all its attributes through one word on account of the thing being capable of making known all its attributes as soon as it itself is expressed or known through a word. But the cognition of all the attributes of a thing does never arise through one word, because a word, in fact, expresses the mental image on which external

172. tenaivāparamārtho'sāv anyathā na hi vastunaḥ//
vyāvṛttir vastu bhavati bhedo'syā'smād itīraṇāt/ Ibid, p. 41

173. sa cāyaṁ bhedo'rūpaḥ/ rūpavattvena tv asya darśanaṁ kevalaṁ buddhiviplava eva/ Ibid, p. 41

174. kathaṁ tarhi abhinnasya vastunaḥ śabdena codane tasyaivānyato'pi bhedād anaṁśasyaikabhedacodane sarvabhedagates tatra śabdapramāṇāntarāṇi vyarthāni na syuḥ/ Ibid, p. 41

reality is imputed; and a mental image cannot possess the capacity of a thing to convey all its attributes.[175] On the other hand, if words and verbal cognitions, each grasping a particular attribute, were held to have external things for their objects then they, each grasping a particular attribute, would not refer to one and the same substance as that would involve a contradiction. How can a unitary thing have a multiplicity (of attributes)? But this difficulty would not arise if words were considered to be having mental images for their objects, because it is possible to *concieve* one thing having many attributes.[176]

The words express the exclusion only. When there are many things having a common effect, a person desirous of conveying that effect uses one word which invariably excludes those not producing that effect; he does not use a word to express the thing itself. Since to give a name to each and every individual is futile and since to do so is impossible on account of its involving an endless process, the elders desirous of conveying the effect which is produced by so many things, severally or jointly, use that word which invariably excludes the things that are not efficient to generate that effect. All things being confined to their own nature, the nature which is there in the particular cow *śābaleya* is not there in the particular cow *bāhuleya*. But the exclusion of things not efficient to generate a common effect viz. yielding milk is there in both of them. Hence even when we say that certain things have a common effect we mean nothing but their exclusion from those not generating the effect that they generate. When there arises the necessity to convey the fact that the effect visual perception is generated by the eye, the object etc. jointly and not severally we may coin a word to convey all of them at once in spite of there being no universal entity distinct and different from them.[177]

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175. tatraiva ca te śabdāḥ tais tais bhrāntikāraṇaiḥ saṁsṛṣṭarūpa ivābhāti yathāsaṅketaṁ vicchedāya vyāpriyante/ na caikasādhyaṁ vyavacchedam anyaḥ karoti/ saṅketapratiniyamāt/ na tu vicchinnaṁ kiñcid vastv ākṣipyate, yasyābhidhānād vastubalenākhile gatiḥ syāt/ śabdānāṁ buddhiviplavaviṣayatvāt/ tatra cāvastuni vastusāmarthyābhāvāt/ Ibid, p.42

176. na punar bhinnākāragrāhiṇāṁ jñānaśabdānām ekavastuviṣayatvāt nānāphalaḥ śabda ekādhāraḥ, vyāghātāt/ yathāvarṇite tu buddhipratibhāsāśraye na doṣa iti/ Ibid, p. 42.

177. ekakāryeṣu bhedeṣu tatkāryaparicodane//
gauravāśaktivaiphalyād bhedākhyāyāḥ samā śrutiḥ/
kṛtā vṛddhair atatkāryavyāvṛttivinibandhanā//
na bhāve sarvabhāvānāṁ svasvabhāvavyavasthiteḥ/
yad rūpaṁ śābaleyasya bāhuleyasya nāsti tat//
atatkāryaparāvṛttir dvayor api ca vidyate/
arthābhedena ca vinā śabdābhedo na yujyate//
tasmāt tatkāryatā'piṣṭā'tatkāryād eva bhinnatā/
cakṣurādau yathā rūpavijñānaikaphale kvacit/
aviśeṣeṇa tatkāryacodanāsambhave sati/
sakṛt sarvapratītyarthaṁ kaścit sāṅketikīṁ śrutiṁ//
kuryād ṛte'pi tadrūpasāmānyād vyatirekiṇaḥ/ Ibid, p. 43.

The realist might ask Dharmakīrti as to how one word can be applied to many individuals if they do not have one universal in them. A word conventionally connected with one individual cow, *śābaleya,* cannot convey another individual cow, *bāhuleya.* If a word conventionally connected with the one individual cow *śābaleya* were to convey another individual cow, *bāhuleya* which is not at all related to the former through a universal, then there would arise the over-absurdity that the word 'cow' should convey any individual, a horse, a lion or the like. Again, if at the time of the formation of convention the words were connected with discrete individuals then even at the time of communication they would convey the individuals as discrete only, and as a result we would not have the cognition of a class or identity.[178]

Dharmakīrti replies that even according to the realist, the people use one word in relation to many individuals either simply because there is one independent universal in them (without there being any purpose to be served thereby) or because the universal by itself (without the effort of man) suggests one word. But as a matter of fact, neither do the people use words without any empirical purpose in view nor does the universal itself by its natural force suggest one word. Why then, do the people apply one word to many individuals? Any person ever applying one word to many individuals should have some objective or aim in view. If many things produce a common effect then to convey all those things at once we should use one word; otherwise, that is, if we were to use a different word for each one of them, it would be a very lengthy procedure. It is not possible to convey the unique nature of each one of them. Nor will that effort be successful. The speaker merely wants to convey the things efficient to generate the intendened effect. He is free to convey them either by one word or by many words. The application of one word to many individuals being dependent upon or in accordance with the will of the speaker is beyond any criticism. The application of one word to many individuals is not impossible as it is dependent upon the will of the speaker. How can one word be applied to even one thing, the universal, if the speaker does not desire so? Again who can prevent him from applying one word to many if he wills so? It might be urged that there being no purpose to be served thereby, there should not be the application of one word to the many individuals. Dharmakīrti observes that there is a purpose behind it. It is the simultaneous cognition, by means of one single word, of all the individuals by virtue of their exclusion from all those that do not produce the effect they produce and not by virtue of some general nature or universal allegedly residing in them. As the things being unique do

178. Ibid, p. 43

not share the nature of one another, how can a word dependent on the general nature or the universal be applied to many individuals? This difficulty cannot be removed by the realist.[179] But as the exclusion from the things not producing the effect in question is common even to the discrete and unique things, let this common aspect (belonging to those things) be the cause of our applying one word to many things.[180] The hypothesis of one independent universal or general nature is unnecessary and violates the law of parsimony.

Akalaṅka's refutation of Dharmakīrti's conception of the universal: Only the thoughtless persons hold that the universal is nothing but the exclusion from the opposite. But how can even this exclusion of the opposite be possible if the individuals are devoid of any similarity or similar characters? So, in the form of the basis of exclusion, even Dharmakīrti should acknowledge the presence of the positive similar characters like existence etc. there in things. Let us elaborate this point. How can we exclude some select individuals from all others if the former do not possess some common (i.e. similar) characters or modifications. If the cow *śābaleya* has the same degree of difference from the cow *bāhuleya* as it has from a horse then why only are *śābaleya* and *bāhuleya* held to be having the exclusion of the opposite (of cow) and not the horse too? That is to say, what is the basis on account of which some individuals are selected to have the exclusion from the opposite in common? In fine, what is the principle of exclusion? If it is held that the difference that obtains between a horse and a cow is immensely greater than that which obtains between any two cows and hence the exclusion of the opposite that the cows possess is not possessed by the horses, then this is merely a round-about way of saying positively that the common (i.e. similar) traits or characteristics or modes that are there in any two cows are more numerous than those that are there in a horse and a cow. Thus it is only the common (i.e. similar) characters that urge us to classify things, to give them one name and generate the notion of similarity.[181]

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179. tadiyaṁ ekā śrutir bahuṣu vaktrabhiprāyavaśāt pravartamānā nopālambham arhati/ na ceyam aśakyapravartanā, icchādhīnatvāt/ yadi hi na prayoktur icchā katham iyam ekatrāpi pravarteta/ icchāyāṁ vā ka enāṁ bahuṣv api pratibaddhuṁ samarthaḥ/ prayojanābhāvād apravartanam iti cet/ uktam atra prayojanam—bhinneṣv apy ekasmāt pratītir atatprayojanabhedena, na punaḥ svabhāvasyaikatvāt/ Ibid, p. 44.
180. atatprayojanavyāvṛttis tu bhinnānām apy aviruddheti sa evārthābhedaḥ śabdābhedasya kāraṇaṁ bhavatu/ Ibid, p. 44
181. ataddhetuphalāpoham avikalpo'bhijalpati/
samānākāraśūnyeṣu sarvathā'nupalambhataḥ//
tasya vastuṣu bhāvādisākārasyaiva sādhanam/ Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 49

Again, Dharmakīrti's view that there arises the cognition of identity in relation to discrete individuals because the conceptual cognition conceals the discrete nature of the individuals is not proper. He himself says that this conceptual cognition reflects the difference inasmuch as it grasps the things as *similar* and not as *identical*. Thus since it does not conceal the difference that pertains to the individuals it should be recognised as valid, and the similarity that it finds in the different individuals should be recognised as real.[182]

Dharmakīrti might contend that the universal is of the nature of exclusion because the conceptual cognition reveals it to be so. Akalaṅka rightly observes that in the course of conceptual cognition we never discover the universal to be of the nature of exclusion. Dharmakīrti might urge that even the view that the universal is of the nature of similarity is illfounded. The similarity that is revealed to us in determinate cognition is an unreality because determinate cognitions are never valid. Akalaṅka refutes this position as follows. Dharmakīrti himself holds that the existence of an object is established by pure sensation and the existence of this pure sensation itself is established by the determinate cognition of the object in question. Hence even he should grant that the determinate cognition of similarity is ultimately due to the real similarity obtaining between the things themselves.[183]

Again, Akalaṅka asks Dharmakīrti as to why the people do not have the determinate knowledge of the uniqueness of particulars even though they perceive them as unique i.e. as excluded from all other things similar as well as dissimilar. If he were to reply that on account of their similarity we are unable to determine their uniqueness, then he has unconsciously spoken the truth. Now, we ask him if this similarity itself is of the nature of exclusion. He cannot say that similarity is nothing but exclusion as that would prove him incoherent and inconsistent in his talk. The exclusion of a thing from all other things, similar as well as dissimilar, that is, its uniqueness is not determined because it is similar to other things and this similarity is nothing but the exclusion of the thing from others. No sane man would talk like this. Moreover, the view that though there obtains no real similarity between things they are cognised as similar due to their exclusion from others involves the contingency of all the things of the world becoming equally

182. etena bhedināṁ bhedasaṁvṛteḥ pratipattitaḥ/
tatraikaṁ kalpayan vāryaḥ samānā iti tadgrahāt/ Ibid, p. 55

183. ataddhetuphalāpohaḥ sāmānyaṁ ced apohinām/
sandarśyate tathā buddhyā na tathā'pratipattitaḥ//
yan na niścīyate rūpaṁ jātucit tasya darśanam/
yathāniścayanaṁ tasya darśanaṁ tadvaśāt kila// Ibid, p. 49

similar inasmuch as each and every thing possesses the exclusion from all others.[184]

The similarity obtaining between things should be regarded as real. Otherwise the possibility of illusions would be altogether ruled out. As a matter of fact, on perceiving the similar nature that characterizes two things we are misled into attributing the specific nature of one to the other. For example, in the case of an illusion of silver in shell, we first cognise the concerned similar nature viz. glitter. This similar nature being connected with the specific natures of shell and silver both, it is quite possible that it revives the memory traces of silver and as a result the cogniser superimposes silverness on shell and mistakes shell for silver. If Dharmakīrti were to say that illusions arise without any external conditions at all then why should he not consider the movement of a ship and the speedy revolution of a fireband, which are respectively given by him as the external conditions of the illusory cognition of a moving tree and that of a fiery circle, to be of no use in causing those illusory cognitions? If he were to regard Nescience, which is internal, as the cause of illusion then his view that all things are unique may well be set aside; for the Śaṅkara Vedāntins would say that the cognition of difference is due to Nescience, the cognition of identity being alone true. Thus there would arise the contingency of the acceptance of quite a different view viz. the Vedānta view, if the internal Nescience is regarded as the sole cause of illusion. Akalaṅka concludes that a real similarity obtaining between things is necessary to account for illusions.[185]

Prabhācandra, the commentator of Akalaṅka, systematically criticises Dharmakīrti's concept of universal in his Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa. We give below an argument or two of his that do not occur in Akalaṅka's works so that we may have a practically complete picture of the Jaina criticism.

Dharmakīrti contends that though no real universal (or similarity) resides in individuals, the cognition of similarity arises due to an illusory identification of the different individulas on the basis of the

184. vyāvṛttiṁ paśyataḥ kasmāt sarvato'navadhāraṇam//
sādṛśyād yadi sādhūktaṁ tatkiṁ vyāvṛttimātrakam/
ekānte cet tathā'dṛṣṭer iṣṭaṁ vaktur akauśalam//
sarvaikatvaprasaṅgo hi....../ Ibid, p. 57.

185. ... ... taddṛṣṭaṁ bhrāntikāraṇam/
na ced vibhramahetubhyaḥ pratibhāso'nyathā bhavet//
tadakiñcitkaratvaṁ na niścinoti sa kiṁ punaḥ/
tathāpi darśanaṁ na syād bhinnākāraprasaṅgataḥ// Ibid, p. 47
See also Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, p. 470

consideration of one common effect produced by them. But Prabhācandra rightly observes that different individuals produce different effects and not one common effect. If it is said that even these different effects are identified on the basis of the consideration of one common effect produced by them in turn, then we would be involved in an infinite regress. Again, the cognitions produced by different individuals are different from one another, and so they cannot account for our experience of universality or similarity. Dharmakīrti might argue that we first wrongly treat as one the perceptions of different individuals because they generate one and the same effect, namely, an identical judgement, and then we treat as one the individuals themselves on the consideration that the perceptions (wrongly treated as one) are generated by these individuals. Thus according to him an illusory identity is superimposed on different perceptions because of the common effect viz. an identical judgment or the notion of similarity or universality produced by them, and an illusory identity is superimposed on different individuals on account of the illusory identity of their effects viz. perceptions. Thus an identity is superimposed on perceptions though they are unique and this superimposed identity again is superimposed on the specific individuals that are absolutely different from one another. Prabhācandra replies that this theory of the superimposition of a superimposition is indeed a nice hypothesis, which does not appeal to reason but to blind faith. As a matter of fact, perceptions which are unique can never produce a common effect viz. the judgment of identity or similarity. Had it been so, the perceptions of horses and other animals too would have generated the judgment of their identity or the universal notion of 'cow.' If it is said that only the perceptions of *Khaṇḍa, Muṇḍa* etc. generate the universal notion of cow because there is some peculiarity in them, then Prabhācandra rightly asks as to what this peculiarity can be except the grasping of common (similar) characters exhibited by those *Khaṇḍa, Muṇḍa,* etc.[186]

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186. ekakāryatāsādṛśyenaikatvādhyavasāyo vyaktīnām ity acāru kāryāṇām abhedāsiddheḥ vāhadohādikāryasya prativyakti bhedāt/ tatrāpy aparaikakāryatāsādṛśyenaikatvādhyavasāye'navasthā/ jñānalakṣaṇam api kāryaṁ prativyaktibhinnam eva/ anubhavānām ekaparāmarśahetutvād ekam, taddhetutvāc ca vyaktīnām apy upacaritopacāro'pi śraddhāmātragamyaḥ, anubhavānām apy atyantavailakṣaṇyenaikaparāmarśapratyayahetutvāyogāt, anyathā karkādivyaktyanubhavebhyo'pi khaṇḍamuṇḍādivyaktau ekaparāmarśapratyayasyotpattiḥ syāt/ atha pratyāsattiviśeṣāt khaṇḍamuṇḍādyanubhavebhya evāsyotpattir nānyataḥ/ nanu pratyāsattiviśeṣaḥ ko'nyo'nyatra samānākārānubhavāt, ekapratyavamarśahetutvenābhimatānāṁ nirvikalpakabuddhīnām aprasiddheś ca/ ato'yuktam etat—
ekapratyavamarśasy hetutvād dhīr abhedinī/
ekadhīhetubhāvena vyktīnām apy abhinnatā // [Pramāṇavārtika] Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, pp. 469-470.

Again, Prabhācandra rightly points out that if real similarity is not accepted by Dharmakīrti, then his statement to the effect that a cognition is valid if it bears a reflection similar to the form of the external object would be contradicted.[187]

Akalaṅka's own position: Akalaṅka does not go so far as to say that the specific individuals alone are real and that no real similarity obtains between them. According to him, there does obtain a real similarity between the individuals belonging to the same class; and this similarity is the real universal.[188] However this universal is not an independent entity. Our consciousness of similarity has for its object the similar characters or modifications. Neither an entitative independent universal nor merely the exclusion of the opposite is its object.

Akalaṅka, like Dharmakīrti, refutes the concept of an eternal all-pervading impartite entitative universal. He rightly observes that if such a universal were held to be revealed by an individual then once it is revealed it would remain revealed for ever and would be revealed everywhere in all the individuals, present, past and future.[189] Just as *Sattā*, *Samavāya*, *Viśeṣa* can exist even without any independent universal inhering in them even so all those entities that are called *arthas*, that is, *Dravya* (Substance), *Guṇa* (Quality) and *Karma* (Action) can exist without any independent universal called *Sattā* inhering in them. The concept of one entitative universal residing in many is thus not proper. Otherwise, even time, space, etc. would become universals.[190] Existence in many cannot be put down as a distinguishing mark of the universal because it would lead to over-absurdity; that is, in that case even the entities like Conjunction and Number (two etc.) would have to be treated as universals.[191] Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas certainly cannot escape the horns of the dilemma viz. whether their universal is ubiquitous or it is confined to

187. tasyānabhyupagme——
arthena ghaṭayaty enāṁ na hi muktvārtharūpatām/
tasmāt prameyādhigateḥ pramāṇaṁ meyarūpatā// [Pramāṇavārtika] ity asya ca virodhānuṣaṅgaḥ/ Ibid, p. 470.

188. Really speaking, according to the Jainas, there are two kinds of universal, one is called Ūrdhvatā-sāmānya and the orther Tiryak-sāmānya. By the first they mean the permanent substance that abide in the midst of the past, present and future modifications. The problem relating to this type of universal has been dealt with in the second chapter. By the second they mean the similar modifications or characters e.g. dewlap and the like in the cows.

189. nityaṁ sarvagataṁ sattvaṁ niraṁśaṁ vyaktibhir yadi//
vyaktaṁ vyaktaṁ sadā vyaktaṁ trailokyaṁ sacarācaram/ Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 50

190. sattāyogād vinā santi yathā sattādays tathā//
sarve'rthā deśakālāś ca sāmānyaṁ sakalaṁ matam/ Ibid, p. 50

191. nānaikatra......vṛttiḥ sāmānyalakṣaṇam/ atiprasaṅgataḥ......// Ibid, p. 56.

the cencerned individuals.[192] In either case there arise insurmountable difficulties. All these arguments of Akalaṅka closely tally with those of Dharmakīrti.

For Akalaṅka, the similar characters or similar modifications are what constitute the universal.[193] It might be asked as to how a characteristic that is similar but not the same can reside in many individuals and if it does not reside in many individuals how can it be called a universal? Akalaṅka replies that the things are necessarily similar to some and dissimilar to others. Again, he points out that it cannot be said that one character resides in many; it is so because it is identical with or embedded in the individuals. Nor can it be held that it is confined exclusively to one individual; it is so because like this individual another individual too possesses the character exactly similar to it.[194] The Jaina conception of universal is not vitiated by the defects that are pointed out in the corresponding Nayāya-Vaiśeṣika conception by forming the dilemma, namely, whether it is ubiquitous or it is confined to the concerned individuals, for according to the Jainas the similar character is numerically different in each individual of a class.[195] The universal and the particular, that is, the similar characters and the specific characters are both identical and different. The universal cannot exist without the particular and vice versa and in this sense they are identical but they are different also as we recognise them as distinct.[196] The things are not merely identical as they are different also; their difference is established by the cognition of difference in relation to them. Nor are they merely different or discrete as they are identical also; their identity is established on the strength of the cognition of identity in relation to them.[197] In the Jaina system the identity of things means their having similar characters. There is nothing contradictory about a thing having both similar and specific characters because otherwise two things would never become similar nor would they ever be grasped as similar.[198] Just as a body is not an independent entity over and above its limbs even so Existence (*sattā*) is not an independent entity

192. tadvyāptivyatirekābhyāṁ mataṁ sāmānyadūṣaṇam / Ibid, p. 55
193. tasmād abheda ity atra samabhāvaṁ pracakṣate/ Ibid, p. 57
194. samānapariṇāmaś ced anekatra kathaṁ dṛśiḥ //
na ced viśeṣākāro vā kathaṁ tadvyapadeśabhāk /
sadṛśāsadṛśātmā· aḥ santo niyatavṛttayaḥ // Ibid, p. 56
195. samānapariṇāme na tadekasyānupāyataḥ / Ibid, p. 55
196. na bhedo'bhedarūpatvāt nā'bhedo bhedarūpataḥ //
sāmānyaṁ ca viśeṣās ca tadapoddhārakalpanāt / Ibid, p. 54
197. saṁsargo nāsti viślcṣāt viśleṣo'pi na kevalam //
saṁsargāt sarvabhāvānāṁ tathā saṁvittisambhavāt / Ibid, p. 54
198. nekṣate na virodho'pi na samānāḥ syur anyathā // Ibid, p. 57

called universal over and above its species and sub-species. Though all things are equally existent only some, and not others, are having a particular set of similar characters, just as though legs, hands etc. belong to the same body or are parts of the same body a leg is similar to another leg and it is not that even a hand is similar to a leg.[199] A thing has both the similar and peculiar characters as is proved by perception etc. Otherwise the change would become impossible.[200] We never have the perception of a thing characterised either by the similar qualities only or by the peculiar ones only. Again, it is to be noted that in no way can the universal of the Śaṅkara Vedāntins (or the Vaiśeṣikas) go to characterize the particulars or the unique particulars of the Buddhists be characterized by the universal; but it is the nature of the things undergoing a similar transformation to have both the universal and the particular, that is, to have both the similar characters and the unique ones.[201] As the universal and the particular are never found without one another, it is to be concluded that a thing is of the nature of both the universal and the particular.[202] Moreover, as the things experience change, it is possible for a similar character to be common to many things and for one thing to have many modes or characters.[203]

Dissatisfaction with the Realist theory (upheld by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) and the Nominalist theory (upheld by the Buddhist) as to the nature of the universal led to the evolution of a radically different type of theory according to which the universal is not an independent entity, nor just an exclusion of the opposite. On this theory, the universal is defined as similar characters. This theory which may be labelled the Resemblance or Similiarity theory does not allow an universal to be a feature reproduced in a number of particulars and numerically identical in each of them. According to this theory, the qualities of any given object are as much particular and localised as the object itself. If I have two billiard balls, of the same composition, size and colour, one of them on the table in front of me, and the other on the mantelpiece behind me, then the redness and roundness of the one on the table are themselves on the table, and so are to be distinguished from the redness and roundness of the other, which are behind me on the mantelpiece. That is, although there is one sense in which the redness of both balls

199. sarvabhedaprabhedaṁ sat sakalāṅgaśarīravat//
tatra bhāvāḥ samāḥ kecin nāpare caraṇādivat/ Ibid, p. 50
200. ekānekam anekāntaṁ viṣamaṁ ca samaṁ yathā//......anyathā'pariṇāmataḥ/ Ibid, p. 50
201. na viśeṣā na sāmānyaṁ tān vā śaktyā kayācana//
tadbhāvā sadbhāvo'yaṁ samānapariṇāminām/ Ibid, p. 49.
202. aprasiddhaṁ pṛthaksiddham ubhayātmakam añjasā// Ibid, p. 49
203. anekatraikam ekatrānekaṁ vā pariṇāminaḥ// Ibid, p. 48

is the same, there is another sense in which they are different; each redness is private and peculiar to the particular billiard ball which it characterises; and the sense in which the redness of both balls is the same is better rendered by saying that the redness of one is exactly like the redness of the other.

In 'The Jaina Philosophy of Non-Absolutism' Dr. S. K. Mookerjee, the eminent scholar, lucidly explains the Jaina conception of the universal. But he finds a discrepancy between the view of Samantabhadra and that of the later Jaina philosophers beginning from Jinabhadra down to Yaśovijaya.[204] He interprets the text of Samantabhadra in such a manner as would prove him to hold that the universal, though dynamic, is one self-identical principle, that is, though there may be some differentiation in its own self, that does not effect its essential nature.[205] The later Jaina philosophers do not consider the universal to be something numerically identical in different individuals. It is merely similar characters or modifications and not one self-identical principle. In Vimaladāsa, the author of Saptabhaṅgītaraṅgiṇī, he finds a supporter of Samantabhadra's view.[206] While answering the question as to whether the universal is one or many he says that it is one and many both.[207] He further says that the statements of the masters prior to him are merely intended to refute the view according to which the universal is absolutely one in many individuals.[208] Again, he asserts that two things cannot be similar without there being some quality common to them. The face of a charming maiden is similar to the moon as they possess a common quality viz. beauty.[209] On the basis of these statements of Vimaladāsa Dr. Mookerjee judges him to hold the view that the universal is something numerically identical in the concerned multiplicity of individuals. And hence he considers him to be the supporter of Samantabhadra's view which, on Dr. Mookerjee's interpretation, regards the universal as numerically identical in the concerned multiplicity of individuals.

I beg to differ from the esteemed Doctor. It seems to us that there is no discrepancy whatsoever between the two views; in fact, there are no two views at all. Samantabhadra only proves that the things of the world are neither absolutely identical nor absolutely different.[210] At

204. Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism, pp. 302-308.
205. Ibid, pp. 295-301
206. Ibid, pp. 308-310
207. sattāsāmānyam ekānekam eva siddhānte svīkṛtam / Saptabhaṅgītaraṅgiṇi, p. 77
208. pūrodāhṛtācāryavacanānāṁ ca sarvathaikyanirākaraṇaparatvāt / Ibid, p. 77
209. anekavyaktyanugatasyaikadharmasyānaṅgikāre sādṛśyam eva durvacam...yathā—candrabhinnatve sati candragatāhlādakaratvādimukhe candrasādṛśyam........./ Ibid, p. 78
210. Āptamīmāṁsā, Pariccheda II

that juncture he observes that the things are identical in so far as they all are existent.[211] This statement of his does not allow us to say that he believes this existence to be something numerically identical in all individuals. He here argues merely to the effect that because the universal existence resides in all individuals they all are identical. But he has nowhere raised the question as to whether this universal is numerically identical or numerically different in these individuals. It was only after the time of Dharmakīrti, who refutes the realist's universal by posing the dilemma of its existence in the concerned individuals only or its existence everywhere, that not only the Jaina thinkers but so also their Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika colleagues were compelled to consider this point in a manner suited to their respective fundamental tenets. But even these later Jaina thinkers, inasmuch as they had to be consistent with their dictum that the judgement of experience should be deemed ultimate, could not treat the universal as numerically identical in all the concerned individuals. For the same reason Samantabhadra too would not have taken it as to be such. The ambiguity of the word 'common' (*eka*) occuring in the statement of Vimaladāsa seems to have misled Dr. Mookerjee. 'Common' may mean either numerically identical or exactly similar. When Vimaladāsa says that the face can be similar to the moon if there is some quality common to them both; he means by 'common' 'the exactly similar' and not 'numerically identical.' The beauty of the moon and the beauty of the face could not be numerically identical as one is in the moon in the sky while the other is in the face of the maiden walking on the earth.

Observations on Dharmakīrti's theory of universals: With regard to the theory of exclusion we must admit that Dharmakīrti has rendered a great service to the cause of metaphysics by logically throwing out from within its field the rubbish and the fiction that obstructs clear thinking. The concept of an enduring substance he refuted by the rigour of his logic and with an equally forceful logic he repudiated the reality of the realist's independent entitative universal. His theory of exclusion is wonderful and the arguments advanced against the independent entitative universal are illuminating. But we have to say, in spite of our great regard for the logician of a high order, that his theory is an example of how a logician is led to think in a pervert fashion for the fear of his being charged with being inconsistent with his other accepted doctrines. If positively stated, the theory of exclusion would become the similarity theory. Dharmakīrti himself says that he does not deny that the seeds possess the sprout-producing nature; what he wants to emphasize is that the sprout-producing nature of one seed is different from the sprout-producing nature of another seed. This amounts to

211. satsāmānyāt tu sarvaikyam......... Ibid p. 34.

saying that the seeds have a similar—not the same—nature. We can easily multiply such statements of Dharmakīrti. But the formulation of the theory in positive terms would involve farreaching consequences, consequences which Dharmakīrti does not want to face. He could not grant that two things may possibly possess a similar positive character because that would go against momentarism; moreover, in that case the universal would become an objective reality, a contingency which Dharmakīrti wants to avoid at all cost because otherwise the whole magnificent structure of Buddhist Logic would fall down. Akalaṅka's criticism of the theory of exclusion seems to be substantially correct, for he puts his finger at fundamental weak point of the theory when he argues that exclusion is impossible without there being similar positive characters in the things excluded.

Observations on the Jaina theory of universals: There are certain objections against this theory—the Similarity theory as we have called it. Let us examine and try to answer them.

(i) First, it is pointed out that there is a difficulty for the theory so far as it concerns the concept of 'similarity in a given respect,' a concept absolutely necessary for defining similarity. For in admitting that similarity is always similarity in a certain respect one is admitting that there must be something common to any pair of objects between which similarity holds. But *this* would be an *objection only if* one conceded that there is a literally identical something which resides in both the objects concerned, for then one would indeed be back in the arms of the Realist (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika). But the upholder of the Similarity theory does not concede that. Certainly if A is a red sphere and B is a red cube, there is a respect in which they resemble each other, there is something common to them both. They resemble each other in respect of each being red; what is common to them both is that each of them is red.

At this juncture the realist might urge that it is alright that A is like B in respect of each of them being red but there arises a question as to what makes the red of A and the red of B alike. At least here one cannot avoid accepting the entitative universal Red. One will have to admit that the red of A is similar to the red of B because the universal Red is common to them both.[112]

A reply to the objection is as follows: It is necessary to distinguish between (a) A (which is red) is like B (which is red) (b) and the red of A is like the red of B. We may be using the same word 'like' in rather different senses in these two sentences—i.e. the similarity between

212. Śāstradīpikā, p. 104

objects (A and B) may be of a logically different type from the similarity between their qualities (the red of A and the red of B). But the sense of each could be indicated ostensively, that is, by indicating examples of it. What is meant by saying that there is something common to A and B in virture of which they are alike is that the red of A is like (may be exactly like) the red of B. But the likeness between the red of A and the red of B is, it seems, a fundamental and not analysable.[213] One can say, if one likes, that in that case one is asserting an identity. There is no harm in that so long as we are clear that what we mean is that one quality is exactly like the other quality.

(ii) The second objection is based on the consideration that ultimately we would have to treat similarity as an universal in the realist sense because, although we can define other universals in terms of it, we cannot define it in terms of itself, and therefore we cannot avoid treating it as an universal of which there are instances, i. e. as a realist universal. For instance, we can define the universal Table in terms of the similarity holding between tables, Red in terms of the similaritary holding between reds of objects and so on. But what happens with similarity itself? We have a number of similarities holding between pairs of objects. What right have we to say that they are all similarities? If we try to treat them as we treated tables and reds, we shall be defining similarity in terms of similarities holding between similarities, and so on *ad infinitum.* The only way to avoid such a regress is to treat Similarity as a universal in the traditional realist sense, of which all similarities are instances. But if we admit that there is even one universal of this type, what reason can we offer for denying that other universals are of the same type? If Similarity is a universal of which this and that similarity are instances, why object to Red being a universal of which this red of A and that red of B are instances?

Now what does this difficulty come to? That we cannot define similarity in terms of itself, without involving overselves in an unending regress. But as a matter of fact what we are interested in doing, what we feel uncomfortable about if we fail to do, is to classify particular

213. nanu 'vyaktivat samānapariṇāmeṣv api samānapratyayasyāparasamānapariṇāmahetukatva-prasaṅgād anavasthā syāt tam antareṇāpy atra samānapratyayotpttau paryāptaṁ khaṇḍādivyaktau samānapariṇāmakalpanayā' ity anyatrāpi samānam—visadṛśapriṇāmeṣv api hi visadṛśapratyayo yadi tadantarahetuko'navasthā/ svabhāvataś cet; sarvatra visadṛśapariṇāmakalpanānarthakyam / na ca sadṛśapariṇāmānām arthavat svātmany api samānapratyayahetutve arthānām api tatprasaṅgaḥ; pratiniyataśaktitvād bhāvānām, anyathā ghaṭādeḥ pradípāt svarūpaprakāśopalambhāt pradīpe'pi tatprakāśaḥ pradīpāntarād eva syāt/ svakāraṇakalāpād utpannāḥ sarve'rthā visadṛśapratyayaviṣayāḥ svabhāvata evety abhyupagame samānapratyayaviṣayās te tathā kiṁ nābhyupagamyate alaṁ pratītyapalāpen? Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, p. 481

objects into kinds; and that we do by a dual process of noticing similarities and deciding that the similarities are sufficient for us to group the particulars between which they hold into the same kind; we accordingly so classify them and use the same general name to indicate the particulars of that kind. We can do exactly the same with similarities as we do with the qualities of objects. But why does this involve us in a vitious regress, requiring Similarity to be a universal in some other sense? The criticism seems to assume the principele that if A is similar to B and B similar to C, then both similarities must be the same and consequently both are instances of a universal Similarity.[214] But this is to take advantage of an ambiguity in the usage of the word 'same'. Suppose that A is a blue object, B is a blue object and C is a blue object and suppose that we are asked whether the similarity between A and B is the same as the similarity between B and C. The answer is that according to one usage of the word 'same' it is, according to another it may or may not be. According to one usage we say of any blue object that they are all of the same colour, and in saying that they are all of the same colour we are simply saying they are all blue; hence according to this usage we would say that the similarity between A and B is the same as the similarity between B and C. The other usage provides for the case where, say A is indigo blue, B is navy blue and C is sky blue; in this case and following this usage we do not say that the similarity between A and B is the same as the similarity between B and C.

In fact, the general question whether two similarities are the same cannot be understood until the usage according to which the word 'same' is being employed is made clear. If we are following the first usage then the similarity between A and B and the similarity between B and C must be the same, but all that is meant by saying that they are the same is that A and B and C are like each other in being blue; and therefore to say that the similarities in question are the same does not entail that they are the instances of a universal Similarity.

(iii) Dr. Mookarjee refutes this Similarity theory as follows. He raises a question as to whether similarity is an identical principle subsisting in the individuals thought to be similar or it is numerically different in each case. If the first alternative is granted then similarty becomes a universal in the traditional realist sense. The second alternative accroding to which the varying similarities are numerically different raises a further problem. Suppose that the similarity of A is numerically different from the similarity of B. But what makes A and B to be

214. Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism, p. 315

similar ? Let us take a concrete example. A cow is similar to another cow and a buffalo is similar to another buffalo. But if the similarity *qua* characteristic of one cow is numerically different from the similarity *qua* characteristic of another cow and again two similarities be numerically different from the similarity that characterises buffaloes, we can account for the difference of function of the two types of similarities by assuming a qualitative difference in each. We must admit that the similarity that obtains between cows is different qualitatively and numerically from the similarity that holds between buffaloes. So there are similarities which are functionally identical and different. The similarity that governs one class is functionally different from the similarity that governs another class. The difference of function naturally presupposes an intrinsic difference in the similarities and thus similarities must fall into definitive groups. The similarity of cows stands apart from that of buffaloes. But this grouping of types does not make an appreciable difference, procedural and ontological, from the classification of universals as propounded by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.[215]

Here Dr. Mookarjee seems to hold that the grouping of the functionally different similarities presupposes that an universal Similarty resides in them all—which amounts to the acceptance of the realist universal in a different garb.

The answer to this objection is already given in the answer to (ii). We may specially draw the attention of the reader to the following sentence occurring there–'we can do exactly the same with similarities as we do with the qualities of objects.' Again, we can show this objection to be unsound and illfounded by pointing out that it is possible to group similarities on the basis of their functional identity. Dharmarkīrti seems to be absolutely correct when he observes that functional identity does not presuppose that a numerically identical entity should reside in the things concerned. Following him, we too can say that functional identity of similarities does not presuppose that an universal Similarity (conceived in the realist sense) should reside in these similarities.

(iv) Again, Dr. Mookarjee raises the question as to whether similarity *qua* characteristic is different from the concerned individual or it is identical with it. If the first alternative is accepted then the individual would not be similar; and if the second alternative is accepted then similarity would be contained in the concerned individual only and hence it (i. e. the concerned individual) would again not be similar because similarity is unintelligible unless it is pointed out that it obtains between two terms. If it is argued that similarity is identical

215. Ibid, p. 313

with as well as different from the concerned individual then so for as it is identical with the two terms between which it obtains, those two terms themselves would become identical, that is, they would have some identical element in both of them. Thus enters from the back door the realist universal in the Similarity theory.[216]

This is sheer polemics. The difficulty pointed out does not really exist. The believer in the Similarity theory makes it clear that the similarity of one thing with the other must be similarity in some respect. A is similar to B in respect of both of them being red. But this does not mean that the red of A is not numerically different from the red of B. That red is an identical element in both of them means only this much that the red of A is exactly similar to the red of B.

(v) Again, Dr. Mookerjee refutes the Similarity theory as follows: 'The similarity of cow A is an attribute of it and is numerically different from the similarity that is the attribute of the cow B. But what makes A and B mutually similar? The two similarities are each self-contained and unless they can function as a transitive relation they cannot make A and B similar to each other. But if similarity be a relation between A and B, we do not see what advantage is gained by positing two self-contained similarities as the properties of A and B. Unless there be a relation of similarity holding the two together, A and B will not be similar; and if the relation be there what do the two similarities *qua* characteristics avail?'[217]

In reply to this we have to point out that when it is said that the similarity of A is an attribute of A and is numerically different from the similarity that is an attribute of B, the similarity here means similar qualities. A is red and B is also red. The red of A is numerically different from the red of B. One is in A and the other is in B; again, one red may be lotus-red and the other may be blood-red. But on the other hand, when it is said that A is similar to B similarity means the relation obtaining between the two objects A and B with respect to the similar quality red. For the Jaina, similarity in the first sense i.e. similarity *qua* characteristic i.e. similar quality is the universal. And this similar quality works as the ground of the similarity *qua* relation. In other words, without similarity *qua* characteristic i.e. similar character similarity *qua* relation cannot be possible. There cannot obtain the relation of similarity between two things if they have no similar characters in them. So, similarity *qua* characteristic which is the universal according to the Jainas could not be brushed aside in the way Dr. Mookerjee does.

216. Ibid, p. 311
217. Ibid, p. 314

Thus we see how the objections urged against the Similarity theory are hollow and how they vanish when we examine them with the help of concrete examples.

Conclusion: Let us now put down in short the points that emerge from this whole discussion. According to the Jainas the universal is nothing but similar qualities in things. Things look similar because they have similar qualities. The Jainas deem it improper to ask further as to why the qualities look similar and as to why only certain things possess similar qualities. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas go further and in order to account for the similarity obtaining between many things posit one self-identical impartite independent entity residing in these things and numerically identical in each of these things. The Jainas do not, of course, posit such an independent entity because experience does not warrant us to do so. Nevertheless, they refuse to treat all the individuals as absolutely particular or discrete because according to them these individuals do after all possess similar qualities or transformations. The Jainas emphatically assert that things are possessed of a positive similar nature. The similarity exhibited by things is regarded by Dharmakīrti and other Buddhist logicians as merely the exclusion of the opposite. But Akalaṅka and other Jaina logicians rightly observe that even this exclusion of the opposite would become impossible unless there reside some positive similar characters in the things themselves that are being excluded from the opposite. Thus the Jainas avoid two extremes—one of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system and the other of the Buddhist system—and accept the golden mean. In doing so, they, it seems, are substantially correct.

CHAPTER IV
IDEALISM VS. REALISM

From the last two chapters we gather that according to Buddhism a real is not pervasive, spatially or temporally and that according to Jainism it is permanent-cum-changing and universal-cum-particular. Thus we have discussed the form of reality. Now we raise a question as to what is the actual stuff or content of reality. Is it matter only or mind only or both?

This takes us straight to the eternal problem of materialism, idealism and realism. In India the philosophy of the Cārvākas represents the materialism as they believe in the existence of four or five gross material elements only. Can we surmise that the suggestions of these Cārvāka doctrines are found in the Upaniṣadic statements to the effect that in the beginning there was only fire or water or air and that the whole universe is derived from it? The Cārvāka does not consider the sentient principle to be as ultimate a reality as the material; for him the former is at the most a product of the material elements combined in a certain way.

Realism is the doctrine that people should find most appealing. It posits both the principles — the sentient as well as the material – as ultimate and does not regard the one as derivable from or reducible to the other. In certain Upaniṣads like Svetāśvatara and Kaṭha we come across the view that accepts the material principle *Prakṛti* or *Māyā* along with the sentient principle *Puruṣa* or *Māyin.* Among the systems of Indian philosophy all except the Cārvāka, the Mahāyāna Buddhism and the Advaita Vedānta accept the material principle along with the sentient; according to them they are both ultimate and one could not be derived from the other. In Buddhism the material principle is accepted under the name of *Rūpa.* The Jainas too recognise it and they term it *Pudgala.* The Sāṅkhya-Yogas accept the material principle which they call *Prakṛti.* The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas too accept the material substances as some of the ultimate substances. The Mīmāṁsakas follow them. The Buddhist realists —the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas — maintain that the gross physical objects are ultimately made up of atoms. The Jainas ultimately analyse matter into homogeneous atoms. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas ultimately analyse it into heterogeneous atoms; and the same view is held by the Mīmāṁsakas. The Sāṅkhya-Yogas view matter as consisting of three principles — *sattva, rajas* and *tamas* — the principles of manifestation, motion and inertia respectively.

As for idealism we may say that three types of it are found in India: objective idealism, absolute idealism and subjective idealism. By objective idealism we mean the philosophical theory that considers the sentient principle alone to be real, but it is a theory according to which the objective world being the manifestation or transformation of that very principle is also real — though, of course, not material. The change is also real according to this theory. And it does not degenerate into illusionism. Hence, it does not require the principle of Nescience and it is not necessary for it to establish the gradation of things into the transcendental and the empirical.

By absolute idealism too we mean the philosophical theory that considers the sentient principle alone to be real, but it is a theory according to which that principle is absolutely changeless and all-pervading, that is, it is beyond time and space. This being so, the material world of change and multiplicity is viewed as unreal; it is illusory, that is, it does not exist and yet seems to exist. Such an idealism has to make room for the principle of Nescience and the gradation of reality into the transcendental (*pāramārthika*), the empirical (*vyāvahārika*) and the fictitious (*prātibhāsika*). In compliance with the everyday life, it has to accord an empirical reality to the world while insisting that the Absolute is transcendentally real.

Subjective idealism, again is, a philosophical theory that considers the sentient principle alone to be real, but it is a theory according to which this principle is not absolutely changeless and all-pervading like the Absolute of absolute idealism. Here too the external, physical world is viewed as unreal; it is illusory. What is internal is grasped by us as external due to the internal force of illusion. The external world is accorded a status of empirical reality just to account for the worldly behaviour. Thus this form of idealism also requires the principle of Nescience and the gradations of things into the transcendental (*pāramārthika*), the empirical (*parinispanna*) and the fictitious (*parikalpita*).

The seeds of both the first two types of idealism are found in the Upaniṣads. But these texts mainly teach objective idealism. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (II. 1. 20) declares: 'As a spider might come out with his thread, as small sparks come from the fire, even so from this Soul come forth all *prāṇas*, all worlds, all gods, all beings.' In the Taittirīya Upaniṣad (II. 1.) again, we read: 'From this soul verily space arose, from space wind;...........' In the latter Upaniṣad there also occurs a passage beginning with the sentence — 'He desired: would that I were many. He performed austerity. Having performed austerity he created the world.' The universe or the world is an emanation or transformation of the *Brahman*. It comes out of *Ātman* or *Brahman* as sparks come out of

fire, as plants shoot forth on the earth or as threads come out from the body of a spider. *Brahmā* creates the world out of himself. He does not create it out of a pre-existing material. Bhartṛprapañca is on the right track when he seeks to build up his theory of *Brahmapariṇāma* on the basis of Upaniṣads themselves. Prof. P. T. Raju is also of the opinion that it is in this emanation theory that we find the roots of the later *Brahmapariṇāmavāda*. *Brahman* is the cause of names and forms, that is, of determinate objects. In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (I. 4. 7) we are told that the world of names and forms existed in an unmanifest condition in *Brahman* before creation. It was made manifest by him. Names and forms are not unreal appearances, as they are interpreted by Śaṅkara. Thus on the strength of all such passages we may say that in the Upaniṣads we find in an unsystematised form a doctrine of objective idealism. We have already said that the seeds of absolute idealism are also found in the Upaniṣads. Of course, it means only this much that there are passages in the Upaniṣads which may suggest and open the door for the doctrine of absolute idealism and for its concomitant doctrine of Nescience even though they do not explicitly teach any such doctrines. Here are some of the passages in question :

(i) yatra hi dvaitam iva bhavati, tad itara itaraṁ jighrati, tad itara itaraṁ paśyati........./ yatra tv asya sarvam ātmaivābhūt, tat kena kaṁ jighret, tat kena kaṁ paśyet.........? yenedam sarvaṁ vijānāti, taṁ kena vijānīyāt, vijñānāntarm are kena vijānīyād iti/ Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad, II. 4. 14.

(ii).........neha nānāsti kiṁ cana/ Ibid, IV 4. 19. See also Kaṭha Upaniṣad, IV. 11.

(iii) yathā, saumya, ekena mṛt-piṇḍena sarvaṁ mṛṇmayaṁ vijñātaṁ syāt, vācārambhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyam, mṛttikety eva satyam/ Chāndogya Upaniṣad, VI.1.4.

(iv) māyām tu prakṛtiṁ vidyān māyinaṁ tu maheśvaram /
Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, IV. 10.

(v).........tad etad ṛṣiḥ paśyann avocat :

rūpaṁ rūpaṁ pratirūpo babhūva,
tad asya rūpaṁ praticakṣaṇāya;
indro māyābhiḥ puru-rūpa īyate/
yuktā hy asya harayaḥ śatā daśa iti/
Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad, II.5.19.

(vi) yatra vānyad iva syād, tatrānyo'nyat paśyet, anyo'nyaj jighret, ... anyo'nyad vijānīyāt / Ibid, IV. 3. 31.

One can see that the doctrine of Nescience is not easily derivable

from such passages.[1] The third type of idealism viz. subjective idealism is propounded by a school of Buddhism called *Vijñānavāda*. Prof. Ranade sees the roots of this form of idealism too in one passage of Aitareyopaniṣad. The passage runs as follows: 'All the existence in this world ....are known by intellect and are based in intellect.' He makes too much of the word '*prajñāna*' actually used in the passage and feels that there is only an easy passage from the word '*prajñāna*' to '*vijñāna*'[2]. But we feel that his interpretation is not correct. Subjective idealism or *Vijñānavāda* is mainly a product of Buddhism; it emerges naturally and logically due to the inner dynamism of Buddhism itself.

Possible causes of the rise of Vijñānavāda: The trend of Buddhism had been subjective from the very beginning. Even the Vaibhāṣika denied the objective reality of many of the entities which are commonly taken to be real e. g. the whole *(avayavī)*, the permanent *(nitya)*, and the universal *(ekatva=sāmānya)* and had reduced them to mere ideas *(kalpanā)*. The Sautrāntikas, being critical realists, were aware of the subjectivity of phenomena to a much greater extent than the Vaibhāṣikas. They cut down the inflated list of categories accepted by the Vaibhāṣikas, and roundly declared many of the latter's reals to be idea *(prajñapti-sat)*. The past and future *dharmas* (moments) that are regarded as real by the Vaibhāṣikas are declared to be merely ideal by the Sautrāntikas. This certainly paved the way for idealism.

Moreover, so long as the doctrine of momentariness did not reach its climax, it was possible for the Buddhists to believe in the direct perception of external reality. But soon this climax was reached in the Sautrāntika philosophy. As a result, the Sautrāntikas have to believe in representative perception. In other words, according to them the external reality is inferable only. This fact in its turn led some Buddhists to reject the external reality altogether. The theory of representationism

1. 'These passages are clearly repugnant to the doctrine of Māyā.' Thibaut, Vedānta Sūtras, Part I. SBE, Vol. XXXIV, p. cxviii.
'The doctrine of Māyā is not to be derived in any reasonable way from a system which was pantheistic or cosmogonic and in which, therefore, the assumption that the world was illusory would have been ridiculous. A pantheism and still more a cosmogonism are under the danger of falling to the level of materialism but not of evoking an illusionism'. 'Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and the Upaniṣads' by Keith, Vol. II, p. 531.
'Is there anything in the early Upaniṣads to show that the author believed in the objective world being an illusion? Nothing at all.' Hopkins, J.A.O.S. xxii, p. 385.
'The opinion expressed by some eminent scholars that the burden of the Upaniṣad teaching is the illusive character of the world and the reality of the soul only is manifestly wrong and I may even say is indicative of an uncritical judgement'. R. G. Bhandarkar, 'Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism', p. 2, foot-note.
2. A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy, p. 181

entails the presence of three factors in the process of perception. There is the knowing mind, there are the ideas or mental images which the mind knows, and there is the external world of objects which causes ideas. The external objects impinge upon the sense-organs with the result that images are thrown upon the screen of consciousness and are there known as ideas. When the ideas in our minds agree or correspond with reality, then, the Sautrāntikas would say, we have knowledge. A moment's reflection shows this position to be untenable, for, if we do not know reality directly, how can we possibly know whether our ideas agree with it or not? Never having seen the original, we should have nothing with which to compare the reflections. Nor is this the end of the trouble. For, what ground does the Sautrāntika have for postulating an external reality at all? Thus the Sautrāntika by his insistence on the creative work of thought and his doctrine of Representative perception directly led to the emergence of idealism *(vijñānavāda)*.

Vijñānavāda may be viewed as a reaction against the *Mādhyamika* philosophy. The latter put undue emphasis on dialectics at the expense of meditation. Some reacted against the negativistic tendency of the Mādhyamikas and claimed to have discovered the ultimate principle—the Absolute Mind—in a state of trance. Thus though *Vijñānavāda* agrees with the *Mādhyamika* in rejecting the external world and in accepting the gradation of reality into the transcendental *(paramārtha)* and the empirical *(saṁvṛti sat)*, it differs from the latter as to the method of arriving at the ultimate and as to the name given to the ultimate reality which it posits in common with the latter.[3].

Pre-Dharmakīrti Vijñānavāda Literature : The popular exposition of this trend is embodied in the Sūtras. 'With the exception of Sandhinirmocana, the appearance of which was contemporaneous with that of the large Prajñā-pāramitā, the *Sūtras* of Buddhist idealism all belong to the period later than that of Nāgārjuna[4]'. The Sandhinirmocana has remained difficult of access. So, we can say only this much that it was composed earlier than other *Sūtras*. The Gaṇḍavyūha establishes the reality of the Absolute Mind by appealing to imagination and intuition. The Sūraṅgamā Sūtra is predominently psychological and discursive. In it, Buddha step by step leads Ānanda to the realisation that in the ultimate sense only the Absolute Mind exists. The Laṅkāvatāra is considered by E. J. Thomas to be the chief canonical text of subjective idealism *(Vijñānavāda)*. He says, "All things having been explained as mind or consciousness, the ultimate reality is then interpreted as the fundamental store conciousness and all other

3. A Survey of Buddhism, pp. 380-382
4. Ibid, p. 383

terms which have been applied to this reality are also used here. It is Suchness, *Tathāgata*, Buddhahood and mind but mind stripped of everything transient and phenomenal."[5] The doctrine of *Trisvabhāva* is also mentioned in this *Sūtra*. Out of the five categories listed in it, *nāma* (name) and *nimitta* (mark) are entirely unreal *(parikalpita)*; *vikalpa* may be considered to be relatively true *(paratantra)* as when the self-existence of an entity is *paratantra* or dependent on another; *samyag-jñāna* and *tathatā* are perfected or ultimate reals *(parinispanna)*. Thus the main doctrines of subjective idealism are found there[6].

The Alaṅkāras of Maitreyanātha constitute a veritable link between the *Mahāyānasūtras* and the new philosophy of *yogācāra*. The brothers Asaṅga and Vasubandhu only systematised the doctrines of an already existing school and it is in this sense that they are the founders of *Vijñānavāda*. Asaṅga has mainly done the commentarial work; he commented upon the works of Maitreya, his teacher. Vasubandhu wrote Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi to prove the sole reality of pure consciousness. His Trisvabhāvanirdeśa attempts to grade the things into the transcendental *(parinispanna)*, the empirical *(paratantra)* and the fictitious *(parikalpita)*—an associate doctrine of subjective idealism. Then comes Diṅnāga who wrote Ālambanaparīkṣā to demonstrate the unreality of external world, and the sole reality of consciousness. Let us follow the logic of Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi and Ālambanaparīkṣā, two systematic and short treatises; (this will enable us to form a comparative estimate of Dharmakīrti's treatment of the same problem as discussed in these texts).

In his Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi Vasubandhu rejects the reality of the external world and establishes pure consciousness as follows: All this worldshow is nothing but a manifestation of consciousness. The things that appear as contents of consciousness are absolutely unreal, that is, they have no objective existence, they are merely subjective ideas. The spatio-temporal determination of experienced things, the want of restriction of identical experience to one identical person, in other words the common experience of a large number of individuals and pragmatic satisfaction afforded by the experienced objects can be rationally explained in subjective idealism. So far as spatio-temporal determination is concerned this can be explained on the analogy of dream experience. In dream though there are not any bee, garden, woman or man and the like existing in reality, still they are experienced and that again in a determinate place and not everywhere. These again are observed in their place of occurrence at a determinate time and not for all times. As regards the common

5. The History of Buddhist Thought, p. 234
6. Ibid, pp. 234-235

experience, it can be accounted for on the basis of the simultaneous fruition of similar deeds performed by those percipients. As for the performance of the physical acts, it does not also presuppose the existence of actual objects. The experience of sexual intercourse and the discharge of the seminal fluid, though there is no actual contact between persons of opposite sexes, can be cited as an instance in point. All these fourfold determinations are capable of explanation on the analogy of hell where all the denizens see the guards of hell and so on and experience the torture inflicted by them when there are no guards etc. in reality. The fact that the Lord has affirmed the existence of matter and the like as bases cannot be made the ground of their objective reality because this assertion is motivated by a deep purpose, viz. the edification of him who has an ingrained belief in their reality. The Lord first initiates him into the doctrine of the nothingness of an individual self, showing him that there exists only two conditions viz. the root cause (i. e. the predisposition which, after having attained a state of development, gives rise to the cognition of matter), and the content which determines its structure, respectively described as the twofold basis — the subjective as the organ of sight and the objective as colour-matter. At a second stage the Lord instructs him on the sole reality of consciousness with a view to initiating him into the doctrine of the nothingness of things after having demonstrated their imaginary character.

The external object cannot be an indivisible unit, nor can it be a manifold of atoms, nor can it possibly be a conglomeration of the atoms, since the atoms *per se* are not capable of being established as real entities. It cannot be an indivisible unit since a unitary whole is never perceived apart and aloof from its constituent parts. Neither can it be supposed to be a manifold of atoms, because a manifold of atoms is nothing but many atoms and an atom being imperceptible *per se*, a plurality of atoms will also have the same character. Nor can it be supposed that these atoms coalesce with one another and thus become the object of perception, for an atom as a substantive unit has not yet been established as something real. The reasons for the latter are given below. If it be the hypothesis that one atom combines with six other atoms at one and the same time, it must be conceded that an atom is possessed of six facets. On the other hand, if it is maintained that six atoms combine with one atom in one and the same unit of space, a material body will have the dimension of an atom and not more. Again, the atoms being partless cannot come into conjunction with one another, and as a result there would ensue the contingency of the non-existence of the gross body. To avoid this difficulty the Vaibhāṣikas of Kashmir maintain that not atoms but the collocations of atoms do combine with one another by conjunction.

But they forget that the collocation of atoms is not something over and above atoms.

An atom being susceptible of differentiation in terms of the spatial divisions cannot logically be affirmed to be possessed of an indivisible unity. Let us grant for argument's sake that it is indivisible. In that case it cannot account for the phenomena of light-shade and coverture. If one tries to explain them with the help of the gross body, then he will fail because the body supposed to be formed by atoms is not different from atoms.

It has been contended that the existence or non-existence of a thing is decided by the verdict of a cognitive organ. If there were no external object how can we account for the emergence of such experience 'it is a case of perceptual cognition?' Vasubandhu says that for Sautrāntika realists everything is momentary. They believe that the perceptual cognition arises depending upon the proper sense organ and its proper external object. From this follows that at the time the perceptual cognition of an object emerges the object is no more. How can then this cognition be regarded as a case of perception of external object, when it grasps actually the non-existent object?

It might be contended that what has not been experienced cannot be recollected by mental cognition. Vasubandhu's reply is that it has already been set forth how visual perception and the like cognitions come into existence behaving as if they have got objects for their content even when no such objects do in fact exist. And the mental cognition induced by recollection emerges under the impetus of the previous cognition, impregnated with the same which gives rise to the conception of the coloured matter and the like. It is, therefore, evident that the intuition or experience of the external object is not proved by the emergence of recollection.

People do not realise the unreality of the objects of dream before they are aroused from sleep. Exactly in the like manner the ordinary people of the world are overpowered by the sleep of ignorance induced by the predispositions engendered by the prolonged repetition of false experiences (which are of the nature of constructions of untramelled imagination). Accordingly they do not realise the unreality of the experienced objects before they are awakened from the spiritual sleep.

It might be asked as to how Vasubandhu could explain the diverse determination of the course of conscious career of individual persons, which arises from the contact of sinful and righteous companions and also from the hearing of discourses on true and false religion, particularly when in his view physical contact with good and evil persons and their

discourse is not really existent. Vasubandhu replies that the reciprocal determination of the career of consciousness of all individuals without exception is due to the reciprocal influence of the respective conscious-centres on one another. The disparity of (moral) consequences is due to the loss of vigil and not to the influences of external object. Again, the phenomena of physical death is nothing but the interception of a homogeneous course of consciousness continuum under the operation of the law of homogeneous causation.

It might be contended: If all this phenomenal world order is of the stuff of pure consciousness as Vasubandhu supposes, then those persons who are credited with the power of reading other people's minds are they really acquainted with the minds of other persons or not? If they do not have this awareness, how can they be regarded as knowers of others' minds? If again they are acknowledged to be cognisant of others' minds, how can the knowledge of these knowers of others' minds be contrary to the nature of the object (to be known)? The answer is that it is just as erroneous as the knowledge of one's own mind, because it is not known as it is realisable by the enlightened soul. Both these types of cognition (the knowledge of one's own mind and that of other's mind) are vitiated by false contents inasmuch as they fail to transcend the conceptual differentiation of the knower and the known. This limitation is absent in pure consciousness.[7]

We have studied Vasubandhu's arguments that repudiate the reality of the external world and establish the sole reality of consciousness. Now, let us see how Diṅnāga rejects the reality of the external world. It is curious that the illustrious Diṅnāga whom Vidyabhusana calls 'the father of the medieval logic' writes a treatise on the unreality of the external world – Ālambanaparīkṣā.

Diṅnāga proves the unreality of the external world as follows: Neither atoms nor the gross body is the object of perception. This amounts to the fact that no external thing is the object of perception. This, in turn, means that there is no external thing at all. Atoms are not the object of perception, as perception does never represent the form of atoms. Even the aggregate (of atoms) is not the object of perception because it does not generate the perception. This is so because an aggregate is substanceless, essenceless, unreal like the double moon. Some hold that since the atoms exist substantially, their state of collocation (combination) is capable of being itself the object-condition of perception. The atoms are thus the object in another manner. The atomic form does not become the object but the combined form of atoms can.

7. The Nava-Nālandā-Mahāvihāra Research Publication, Vol. I., pp. 1-12 (Text) and pp. 370-389 (English Translation).

Diṅnāga wishing to refute the third position asks: 'What state of combination do you want to assert in the case of atoms? For, it is well-known that the pot, cup, etc. are combinations of atoms. What state then can exist in the atoms?' If it is said that it is the state of pot that exists in the atoms, then the perception of pot should arise in the presence of all combinations of atoms, that is, even in the presence of cup, etc. If it is answered that it is the state of cup that exists in the atoms, then the perception of cup should arise in the presence of all combinations of atoms, that is, even in the presence of pot, etc. As a result, the different perceptions (*pṛthagbuddhi*) called in a certain case 'perception of pot,' and in some other case 'perception of cup' would not arise. It could not be said that the different perceptions arise in accordance with the difference of pot form, cup-form and others present there in atoms, because the difference of forms is not found in what is called exiguous sphericity (*pārimāṇḍalya*) of atoms. Therefore, the difference in perception is due to the difference in aggregates that are essentially non-existent, unreal. The aggregates or gross bodies like pot, cup, etc. are only empirically real. For, if you remove one by one the atoms of the pot etc., the perception reflecting the image of the pot, cup, etc. would immediately vanish away. It is, therefore, rationally deduced that the objects of different perceptions do not exist externally. Diṅnāga, then, positively puts forward his own view regarding the object of perception. The object of perception, according to him, falls within the cognition itself, but it appears as if it were something external. In order to follow Diṅnāga's precise position on this question let us recall the Sautrāntika realist's definition of 'an object of knowledge', viz. 'that which imparts its form to knowledge and that which produces knowledge.' Now Diṅnāga would say that these two conditions are well fulfilled by that conciousness-moment which immediately precedes the knowledge concerned. That is to say, according to him this preceding conciousness-moment produces this knowledge and also imparts its own form to this knowledge. And thus it is logically concluded by him that the object of perception is nothing but the object-aspect of consciousness itself.

It might be asked as to how Diṅnāga would explain the statement that visual perception arises depending upon the visual sense-organ and object (*rūpa*). Diṅnāga answers that both the external object and the sense-organ are the forces or aspects of cognition itself. They do not exist outside cognition.[8]

Dharmakīrti proves Vijñānavāda : Dharmakīrti treats the subject in a portion of the Pramāṇavārtika, and that too in the midst of a serious

8. Ālambanaparīkṣā, Vṛtti and Vyākhyā.

discussion on empirical logic and ontology. Some of his arguments are new. His most important contribution on this subject is his independent treatise on the refutation of solipsism. Let us elucidate the arguments he offers in support of his own version of Vijñānavāda Idealism.

Forms of consciousness can be accounted for without there being any external object : Consciousness of an object or object-consciousness is nothing but a particularised state of consciousness. That is, it never refers to an external object as such. It cannot be said that object-consciousness is so called because it takes the form of an external object, for even in the absence of all external object, there arises particularised consciousness. The realist view that the form of consciousness cannot be accounted for unless an external object of that form be present over there is untenable. There are cases that go against this view. This conclusively proves that there is no need of external objects to account for the forms of concious-ness.[9] The Buddhist critical realists assert, on the basis of having observed a particular shape of consciousness, that there must be a corresponding external object of that shape. But this involves a self-contradiction. For they themselves admit that though we experience a reflection of gross form as opposed to atomic form which is real according to them, yet there is no real gross thing outside corresponding to the reflection.[10] If it is urged that that which produces (*tadutpatti*) the cognition of its own shape *(tat-sārūpya)* is the object of cognition, then the immediately preceding moment of consciousness would itself become an object of cognition as it fulfils those two conditions laid down by the critical realists in their definition of an object of cognition.[11] The realist argues that as determinate knowledge or judment of the type 'this is perceived' 'this is heard' does not arise with reference to the immediately preceding moment of consciousness, this moment of consciousness cannot be treated as an object of cognition. The idealist rejoins that as the preceding moment of consciousness fulfils those two conditions—and that because it produces the cognition concerned and it also transmits its own form (viz. *jñanā-kāra*) to this cognition coming into being in the succeeding moment—there should as well arise with reference to it a judgment of the type in question.[12]

Consciousness is self-luminous and requires neither an object other than itself to grasp nor another cognition to reveal its own self : Cognition of the blue arises

9. Pramāṇavārtika, II. 320
10. sarūpayanti tat kena sthūlābhāsaṁ ca te'ṇavaḥ// Ibid, II. 321
11. tatsārūpya-tadutpattī yadi saṁvedyalakṣaṇam /
saṁvedyaṁ syāt samānārthaṁ vijñānaṁ samanantaram// Ibid II. 323
12. Ibid, II. 324-325
See also Manoratha's comment on II. 325

without any external blue thing. It is merely the cognition of consciousness itself and not of any external object different from it. The perceptual character of cognition is nothing but the direct apprehension of consciousness itself. There is no cognised object apart from the cognition. The cognition cognises itself. And as a consequence the cognition does not require another cognition to make its own nature revealed. It is self-subsistent. The blue form is the very nature of consciousness; and it is self-luminous. Though the cognition of the blue is self-cognition, it is said to be the cognition of the blue object. This is merely a mode of expression. Just as light being self-luminous reveals its own nature even so the cognition too being self-luminous reveals its own self. It requires neither some external thing as an object nor some other cognition as a revealer of its own nature.

Consciousness is unitary : Moreover, if the cognition had an external thing for its object, that is, if the cognition and its object were of a different nature, they could not be related as the knower and the known. As a matter of fact, pure consciousness is devoid of the duality of the cognised and the cogniser. It arises in a particular form and shines in its own light. It is the deluded persons who cognise subject (knower) and object (known) as of different natures, for the cognition of this duality is an illusion. Both the subject and the object are unreal; what is alone real is pure consciousness lying beyond the duality of subject and object. Take, for instance, the cognition of a hair-like thing in the sky. Here there is no hair-like thing at all which could be called the object of cognition. It is merely the form of cognition which is non-different from the cognition itself. When there is no object, there can be no subject either, for the two are relative concepts. Thus in all cognitions the duality of subject and object is illusory. Pure consciousness is the only reality. It manifests its own light. Only on account of an illusion does consciousness appear as dual, that is, as object-consciousness and subject-consciousness[13].

The object is identical with the cognition concerned : How could the object be proved to be different from the cognition if the former were invariably cognised simultaneously with the latter? The object appears to be different from the cognition to those who are under a transcendental illusion, just as one moon appears to be double to a person having defective eyesight. Things that are different from one another, like the blue and the yellow, could not be invariably cognised simultaneously. There is no object that is not being cognised and there is no cognition that is not having the form of an object. That is, no object is found without some cognition and no cognition is found without some object.

13. Ibid, II. 326-331

Hence there is no difference between the two. In other words, it is inevitable that there be an identity between the cognition on the one hand and the object that is being apprehended at the time of the rise of cognition. The critical realists prove the existence of an external object by the method of difference only *(vyatireka)*. The cognition, they point out, does not take place in the absence of an object-condition (*ālambana-pratyaya*) even though all other conditions are present. So, the generation of cogniton necessarily implies the existence of an external object. The subjective idealist observes that this inference is incapable of proving the existence of an external object; for on his view what prevents a particular type of cognition from arising is the absence of an appropriate type of consciousness-moment immediately before, that is, of a consciousness-moment which is pregnant with an appropriate type of awakened *vāsanā*—the internal force of illusion.[14]

What causes forms in consciousness: Why should one reject the reality of an external object if it were there to be experienced by any one? But as a matter of fact an external object does not exist. The realist might urge that if an external object were not an existent thing, the idealist would have no right to use the sentence, 'an external object is experienced.' The idealist's reply to this is that when he uses that sentence, he means only this much that consciousness assumes different forms or is characterised by different forms at different times. It is forms that are said to be the objects of consciousness. This is a fact and the idealist does not mean to deny it; but he asks us to think out whether it is due to the presence of external objects or something else. Consciousness with no differentiation or characterisation or particularisation in it does not grasp the blue, etc. but as soon as it is particularised or defined it grasps the blue, etc. From this it follows that the blue and the consciousness of the blue are identical, that is, that the external blue thing simply does not exist. The diversity of cognitions is due to mental dispositions or forces and not due to the so-called plurality of external objects. Thus it is that the unitary consciousness, on account of illusion, is experienced as dual—i.e. as subject and object—and is remembered as such on the basis of this experience.[15]

Even according to the realists the nature of the external things is determined in accordance with the nature of experience and not in accordance with what this nature really is: Even according to those who believe in the reality of external things, the things that are pleasant or painful having

14. Ibid, II. 388-392
15. Ibid, II. 333-337

generated the cognitions of those respective forms, become their objects and the experience of these cognitions as possessed of a pleasant or painful form is also called the experience of objects pleasant or painful. In subjective idealism the object is an aspect of the cognition itself. This aspect is judged to be external, though it is not external. Thus what is really self-cognition is, through the force of an illusion, determined or judged to be the cognition of an object. As noted above, even according to realism there are cases where the experience of the cognition is the experience of the object. For example, things are known to be pleasant or unpleasant only on the basis of an experience of the pleasant or painful form or nature of the consciousness. Thus though there might be external objects, their nature would be determined in accordance with the nature of experience and not in accordance with what this nature really is. If it is contended that the object possesses that nature which is experienced by us then there would arise the contingency of one thing having many contradictory natures; because one and the same thing is experienced as pleasant by one, as painful by another and so on at one and the same time, or because the selfsame object is experienced as pleasant at one time and painful at another time by one and the same person.[16]

The fact that the same object causes different feelings in different persons proves that there is no extra-mental reality: The realist might ask as to what the cognition could grasp if there were no external thing. If it be said that the cognition grasps its own self, then why is it not held that it grasps the external thing? The idealist's answer to this is as follows. We may concede that there are external objects of different natures. But then one man's cognition of a thing should not differ from another man's cognition of that very thing. That is, one and the same thing should not be cognised by one person as pleasant and by another person as unpleasant and so on. It might be argued that one person cognises the pleasant aspect of a thing, another its unpleasant aspect and the third one its neutral aspect, simply because in each case the remaining aspects are veiled by the efficacy of previous actions or dispositions or forces *(vāsanā—adṛṣṭa)*. The idealist's rejoinder to the realist is that when such is the state of affairs it is not proper to hold that the cognition requires an external object; as a matter of fact cognition can well arise through the instrumentality of previous mental dispositions or forces taken all alone. Again, how could the *Adṛṣṭa* or previous dispositions or forces that make us perceive the multinatured thing as uninatured be regarded as causing the perception of the thing as it is? It might be argued that the cognition reflecting the pleasant or unpleasant aspect is conception

16. Ibid, II. 338-341

and not perception; and conception is by its very nature illusory; only the perception grasps the thing as it is. But this is not true. Even perceptions do not grasp the thing as it is. As for example a person whose senses are disturbed on account of the appearance of some sign or symptom of an approaching calamity perceives a thing where there is none.[17]

Forms in consciousness possible without the external objects to cause them. Even these forms are unreal: In the school of critical realists, the form of consciousness implies the existence of an external object that imparts its form to consciousness; again, an external thing, according to this school, acts also as a cause of cognition; and as characterized by these two features an external thing is treated as the object of cognition. These critical realists ask the subjective idealist as to how it could be said that knowledge grasps its object, if it arises without the shape of an external object. In idealism there can obtain no *sārūpya* or 'similarity of form' between a piece of cognition on the one hand and an external object on the other for according to it an external object does not exist at all. So how, on its view, could there be the cognition of an object? The idealist seems to reply that he has already given an answer to the question and yet if the opponent repeats the same question again and again he has to say that it just happens so.[18] The realist might again ask as to how it would be possible for the idealist to explain the trio of the cogniser, the cognised and the cognition. The subjective idealist readily replies that they are identical. He points out that even the critical realist regards them as identical in the case of the experience of love, hate, etc. The idealist simply asks him to extend this logic to all the cases of experience.[19] The idealist then continues that consciousness is in fact unitary but that through innate Nescience it appears to be possessed of a triple nature the cogniser, the cognised and the cognition. Indeed, to those whose vision is blurred by magic, small round potsherds look like coins and pebbles look like diamonds. Even to those whose senses are normal a distant small thing in a desert appears to be a big one. In this manner the determination of three—the cogniser, etc. is in accordance with what appears to us and not in accordance with what actually exists; this trio does not exist in consciousness which is unitary. The varied forms of a unitary thing, viz. consciousness, cannot be regarded as real, because that would deprive it of its unitary nature. Moreover, that would involve the contingency of one form (say blue or pleasure) becoming identical with another form (say yellow or pain) as

17. Ibid, II. 342-345
18. Ibid, II. 353
19. Ibid, II. 364-366

consciousness is unitary. But the forms are not identical with one another as they are seen differing from one another. If they were indentical the intellect congising them as such should have judged them to be so. Thus they could be neither indentical with one another nor different from one another. So, they are unreal; they do not really have that nature which is reflected in consciousness. They being neither one nor many represent a false show; they are illusory. The realist might urge that in subjective idealism illusion is an impossibility. After having perceived some similarity between two things we mistake one for the other superimposing the nature of the one on the other. But this perception of similarity is itself impossible in subjective idealism, for according to it not even one real thing is ever perceived by us. The subjective idealist replies that illusion occurs on account of the internal force of illusion or Nescience, A cognition bearing wrong reflections arises through some innate defects, without requiring the perception of similarity, etc. Thus the idealist proves that the object-aspect and the subject-aspect are essentially one.[20]

The theory of critical realist that the external object imparts its own form to the cognition is shown to be absurd: The subjective idealist raises a problem for the critical realist. The object and the sense organ both are the causes of congnition; therefore, just as the object imparts its own form to consciousness even so the sense organ too should impart its own form to it.

The realist answers as follows. The cognition is generated by both the object and the sense organ, yet on account of some special efficacy that is there in the object, the object imparts its from to the cognition and the sense organ does not. Though the sense organ, object, etc. together generate the cognition, yet that which imparts its own form to the cognition is regarded as the object and not others.

The subjective idealist, however, shows that critical realist's very thesis that the external object imparts its own form to the cognition is absurd. He asks him as to whether the cognition resembles the object *entirely* or *partially*. The acceptance of the first alternative would involve the contingency of the cognition becoming nonsentient inert matter. On the acceptance of the second alternative *each and every* cognition would grasp *all* the objects of the world as in some respect or the other at least it would resemble all the objects. This suggests that to concede the reality of an external object creates many problems; such an object, therefore, should be declared to be unreal. The forms of consciousness should be accounted for by the internal force of illusion or *vāsanā* and

20. Ibid, II. 354-363

hence even they should be treated as unreal. Only the pure consciosness should be regarded as ultimately real.[21]

The phenomenon of memory is cited to support the idealist position : The subjective idealist contends that the phenomenon of cognitions that grasp past objects prove his two theses : (i) The cognitions do not grasp the external object because the cognition of an object arises even in the absence of it. This would efface the subject also, as the two go together. Thus the subject and the object both are unreal. (ii) The cognitions cognise their own selves; they do not require an external object to cognise, nor another cogniton to make revealed their own nature. Cognitions are always self-cognised. Here in conceptual cognitions, the object being absent, the cognition cognises its own form. It is self-cognition. Even the universal is not the object of those conceptual cognitions as they reflect the colour, structure, etc. that are not there in the universal. Moreover, the idealist asks as to whether this universal is eternal or non-eternal. If eternal, then it could not generate the cognition. If non-eternal, then it is not the universal because the universal is regarded as eternal by the naive realist (the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika).[22]

Relations of causation and logical suggestion obtain between ideas only : The realist might ask as to how the subjective idealist would account for the real causation and logical suggestion (*jñāpya-jñāpakabhāva*), if there were no external objects. The real causation and logical suggestion would be impossible without external objects. The subjective idealist contends that relations of causation and logical suggestion obtain between ideas only and not between external things. The idea of fire generates the idea of smoke and it is not that the real external fire generates the real external smoke. It might be asked as to whether the idea of smoke generates the idea of fire when we infer fire from smoke, (to put it in accordance with the idealist position, the idea of fire from the idea of smoke). The subjective idealist replies that here in this case the idea of smoke does not generate the idea of fire but it simply logically suggests the previous existence of the idea of fire. Thus relations of logical suggestion and causation are not at all disturbed. The subjective idealist emphatically declares that we are not warranted to go beyond ideas.[23]

What is pramāṇa and what is phala in this form of idealism? If pure consciousness is the sole existing reality, then what is the means of knowledge and what is the resultant cognition? The *Vijñānavāda* idealists hold that there being nothing other than consciousness to be grasped

21. Ibid, II. 368-371
22. Ibid, II. 371-372 with Manorathavṛtti.
23. Ibid, II. 393-397

by the cognition, self-consciousness itself would be the result and the capacity of the cognition to cognise its own self would be the means. [24] Or, they say that the particular form of the cognition is the means because it is this form that determines the cognition as a whole; and that self-cognition is the result. Thus the means and the result are ultimately identical because they are merely two different aspects of consciousness.

Neither atoms nor the aggregates of atoms are real: A refutation of atoms and the aggregates of atoms amounts to the refutation of the external world as such, because external things are either atoms or the aggregates of atoms. Dharmakīrti disproves the reality of both atoms and the aggregates of atoms as follows: The separate atoms are never perceived. Some hold that when several atoms are generated—by their respective causes that immediately precede them—close to one another they manage to be perceived; on their view, the capacity to generate the perceptual cognition an atom cannot have without the presence of other atoms in its close vicinity. Dharmakīrti, in reply, says: "Perceptions of different types, e.g. visual, tactual, olfactory etc., can arise simultaneously but perceptions of one and the same type, e.g. two or three or four visual perceptions cannot possibly arise simultaneouly. So, how could the simultaneous visual perceptions of many atoms be possible?" It might be suggested that the cognitions of atoms that are in close vicinity of one another seem to be simultaneous owing to the speedy motion of mind from one to another. But Dharmakīrti points out that this also is not possible because on this ground the letters (*varṇas*) uttered in close succession would be heard simultaneously—which is not the case. Thus, the atoms, be they in isolation or in close touch with one another, cannot possibly be perceived. So, Dharmakīrti concludes that as the atoms are never perceived by us we have no right to assume their existence. [25] And when it is demonstrated that many atoms cannot be perceived simultaneously, the opponent should find some other reason by way of justifying the possibility of their perception. The opponent might say that the atoms in a group form an aggregate (*avayavī*) which is an independent entity over and above the constituent atoms. This aggregate being one whole, the constituent atoms could be perceived along with it. But Dharmakīrti denies the reality of such an aggregate. It is unreal because it could not be proved to be either identical with or different from its parts (*avayavas*). It could not be regarded as identical with its parts because that would involve an undesirable contingency, namely, that it

24. iti sā yogyatā mānam............phalaṁ svavit / Ibid, II. 366
25. Ibid, II. 194-198

would be wholly covered when only a part of it is covered.[26] Nor could it be regarded as different from its parts because in that case it would have some weight in addition to what its parts together possess.[27] Thus there being no atom nor an aggregate of atoms, the external world really does not exist. It is merely the unreal forms of unitary consciousness that make a false show.

Consciousness is nondual. Subject and object are unreal. The external world is only empirically real: Reality is pure consciousness. It manifests itself internally as subject and externally as object. But the distinction between the internal and the external is within consciousness itself. Consciousness is a unity. Its manifestation as subject and object is therefore only an appearance, not reality. The subject-aspect and the object-aspect of consciousness are mutually relative. One without the other is unreal. Reality which is this nondual pure consciousness ultimately transcends the subject-object duality. The duplication of consciousness into subject and object being false, it naturally follows that the diversity of sense data, viz. colour, etc. and feelings of pleasure, pain, etc. is equally false. Not only is their diversity unreal, but they themselves are unreal inasmuch as they come under the head of either subject or object.

The critical realist considers a thing to be real if it operates. Even on this view, the external things remain essenceless and unreal. There arises the question as to whether the operation is identical with or different from the thing. If the former, it would be a case of something coming out of nothing; if the latter, the operation could no longer be held out as a criterion of the reality of external things. As a matter of fact causal efficiency is a criterion of empirical reality only.

In persons ridden with the internal force of illusion, there arises the false cognition of the duality of consciousness on account of the proper cause of this cognition being present there, just as a person pressing his eyeball by his finger in a particular manner falsely cognises two moons instead of one. The pure consciousness transcending the duality of subject and object is not cognised (experienced) by the persons having a perverted vision. On account of Nescience, they always grasp it as bifurcated into subject and object. It is only when philosophers, in the manner of an elephant, close their eyes to the ultimate reality and descend on the phenomenal plane that they deal with external objects as a practical necessity.[28]

Just like the external object, the internal subject too is unreal. It

26. Ibid, I. 87
27. Ibid, IV. 154
28. Ibid, II. 212-219

is the ego-notion and is the root-cause of all suffering.[29] The real self is self-luminous consciousness; all impurities are adventitious.[30]

Dharmakīrti avoids solipsism : Dharmakīrti is conscious of the vulnerable point of idealism that is likely to be made a target of attack by the realist. The point is that a consistent idealism should result in solipsism. To defend his subjective idealism from this possible criticism Dharmakīrti wrote an independent tract in repudiation of solipsism, his Santānāntarasiddhi. Therein he shows that the subjective idealist can believe in the possibility of other minds or other possible experiences without involving himself in a self-contradiction. Let us see how Dharmakīrti proves the existence of other minds. Dharmakīrti proves the existence of other minds not on the basis of the *actual external* speech and bodily actions but on that of the *representations or ideas* of them. For him the external bodily actions and speech do not exist. There exist merely the ideas or representations of them. He has the experience of these ideas and he has the experience of his will and he experiences these ideas as caused by his will. So, he forms a rule to the effect that the representations of bodily actions and speech always have will for their cause. Now sometimes he experiences the representations in question but does not experience them as caused by his will. So, he naturally infers other minds in order to account for those representations. Realists might ask as to why he does not infer the external objects like tree, etc. from the representations of them. The idealist Dharmakīrti answers that we have no experience at all of the actual external tree, etc. and consequently no experience of the representations in question as caused by the external objects like tree, etc. So, we are not warranted to infer the external objects tree, etc. from these representations. But quite different is the case with respect to our inference of other minds from the representations of speech and bodily actions. We have repeatedly experienced that those representations are caused by our will. So, whenever they are not experienced as caused by our will we might legitimately infer other wills as their cause.

Akalaṅka's refutation: *The sahopalambhaniyama refuted:* Akalaṅka's arguments against Dharmakīrti's idealism are as follows. To prove the identity of the blue thing and its cognition Dharmakīrti gives the reason—'their being apprehended together.' This reason is fallacious. It is contradictory *(viruddha)* because the term 'together' always implies a difference between the things that go together; in other words, the probans 'being apprehended together' has for its probandum

29. mohaś ca mūlaṁ doṣāṇāṁ sa ca sattvagrahaḥ............/ Ibid, I. 198

30. prabhāsvaram idaṁ cittaṁ prakṛtyā''gantavo malāḥ// Ibid, I. 210

difference' (rather than 'identity').[31] Again, this probans is not free from the fallacy of unproved middle *(asiddha)*. The thing and its cognition between which two an identity is sought to be established by means of inference are never apprehended together. The thing blue is experienced *externally* in the form 'this is the blue', and the cognition of this cognition is experienced *internally*.[32] Again, Akalaṅka proves the probans to be *asiddha* in another way. Many persons perceive a blue thing at one and the same time. Now here though a person cognises *the blue* he does not cognise *the cognition of the blue* occuring in another person's mind. If the blue and the cognition of the blue were identical he would have perceived even the cognition of the blue occuring in another person's mind.[33] Moreover, the rule of concomitance in agreement is doubtful *(sandigdhānvaya)*. Cognition performs a double function; it reveals itself and its object. In its latter function it reveals the blue. In its former function it reveals the cognition of the blue. These two, namely, the blue and its cognition being disclosed together there is, of course, *sahopalambha* (simultaneous apprehension). But where is the identity of the two? The blue and the cognition of the blue are not the same. Again, in this inference the rule of concomitance in difference also is doubtful *(sandigdhavyatireka)*. That is, the rule that wherever there is an absence of identity between two things there is also an absence of their being apprehended together is doubtful. For, though there is an absence of identity between light and the heat of the sun, yet we experience them together.[34]

Akalaṅka observes that as there can obtain no relation between mere absences Dharmakīrti could not reply that by 'being apprehended together' he means the mere absence of separate apprehensions and that by identity he means simply the absence of difference. Only a positive thing can lead to the cognition of another such thing.[35] It could not be urged by Dharmakīrti that the term 'together' means identity or oneness of the two as in that case the probans and the probandum would become the same.[36] If Dharmakīrti were to say that 'their apprehension together' means 'their being grasped by one cognition'

31. Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 41
32. bahir antaś ca nīla-taddhiyor darśanāt kutaḥ sahopalambhaniyamaḥ siddhaḥ? Siddhiviniścayavṛtti, p. 416
33. sakṛd ekārthopanibaddhadṛṣṭīnāṁ parajñānānupalambhe'pi tadarthadarśanāt kuto niyamaḥ? Ibid, p. 416
34. Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 41
35. pṛthag anupalāṁbhād bhedābhāvamātraṁ sādhayet / tac cāsiddhaṁ, sambandhāsiddher abhāvayoḥ kharaśṛṅgavat / Aṣṭaśatī, p. 243
See also Siddhiviniścayavṛtti, p. 416
36. tadekopalambhaniyamo'py asiddhaḥ, sādhyasādhanayor aviśeṣāt / Aṣṭaśatī, p. 243

this probans too could not prove the identity of the things grasped by one cognition because it is declared by Dharmakīrti himself that one cognition can grasp many different things.[37]

Dharmakīrti is of the opinion that many perceptions of different types, i.e. visual, tactual, etc. can arise simultaneously. Again, according to him all cognitions are self-cognitive So, all the simultaneous perceptual cognitions would be cognised simultaneously. But they are not, on that ground, regarded as identical by Dharmakīrti.[38]

We perceive the world; we do not assume it: Dharmakīrti holds that he can do with consciousness alone for the following three reasons: (i) Even if we accept it alone, everything could be explained. (ii) All our purposes could be served merely by its acceptance. (iii) There is no difference of opinion with regard to its reality. Moreover, it is all the same whether we accept the external world or not; on the other hand, to assume the external world is to go against the law of parsimony. Akalaṅka rightly observes that the reality of the external world could not be ruled out because like consciousness it also is repeatedly experienced by us. The external world is not unreal as no counter-evidence competent to upset its reality is known to us. There is no doubt in our mind regarding its reality. The cognition of the external world is not a delusion created by imagination because it is not contradicted or sublated by other valid cognitions and also because it bears vivid and distinct reflection of the external world. If the ideas are accepted as real and the external world is denied reality we go against, says Akalaṅka, the supreme authority of experience. We do not assume the external world, we perceive it.[39]

Things are efficient; ideas are not efficient: Akalaṅka points out that it is only the external things that are efficient. Ideas are not efficient. We eat the sweet-balls but not the ideas of sweet-balls. If venom is not

37. yadi punar ekajñānopalambhaniyamo hetuḥ, asiddhaḥ anaikāntikaś ca, nīlasya sakṛd anekena jñānena upalambhasambhavāt, bahūnām api dravyāṇām 'ekajñānopalambhā-pratiṣedhāt / Siddhiviniścayavṛtti, p. 416

38. ekakṣaṇavartis aṁvittīnāṁ sākalyena sahopalambhaniyamād vyabhicārī hetuḥ. tathotpatter eva saṁvedanatvāt / Aṣṭaśatī, p. 244

39. ekena caritārthatvāt tatrāvipratipattitaḥ /
alam arthena cet naivam atirūḍhānuvādataḥ //
kalpanā sadasattvena samā kintu garīyasī /
pratītipratipakṣena tatraikā yadi nāpāra // Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 42
asaṁś ced bahirarthātmā prasiddho'pratiṣedhaḥ //
sandehalakṣaṇābhāvāt, mohaś ced vyavasāyakṛt /
bādhakāsiddheḥ spaṣṭābhāt katham eṣa vīniścayaḥ // Ibid, p. 39

an external reality but merely a form of consciousness or an idea how could there take place the phenomenon of death, on taking it? We do not die simply on account of our having the idea of venom.[40] If thoughts were things the thought of a hundred rupees in my pocket would be the same as the possession of so many rupees.

The idealist generalisation that all the reflections of external objects are caused by Nescience (Vāsanā) is proved wrong: Dharmakīrti noted some cases of the reflection of external objects without there being any actual external objects there outside, and on the basis of this he generalised that all the reflections of external objects are devoid of corresponding external objects. All the reflections of external objects are caused by *vāsanā* (the internal force of illusion). Akalaṅka refutes this view of Dharmakīrti. In the state of fear etc., the reflection of an external object is no doubt sometimes caused by *vāsanā* but in the case of the other states, that is, in the case of the placid state of mind, the reflection of an external object should not be regarded as caused by *vāsanā*; in this latter case the reflection is caused by an actual external object. The reasoning of Dharmakīrti is as fallacious as the one employed by the Naiyāyīkas to prove the existence of an intelligent creator of the world. Having seen that some things possessed of a structure have got an intelligent creator, the Naiyāyikas generalised that all things possessed of a structure should have an intelligent creator.[41]

Akalaṅka observes that even the reflections of bodily actions and speech occur in dreams when there are no actual bodily actions and speech there outside. So why should Dharmakīrti not conclude that all reflections of bodily actions and speech—in dreams as well as in waking states—are due to mere *vāsanā* (Nescience) and not due to other minds?[42]

What would be the determinant factor of the validity or otherwise of cognition if there were no external object corresponding to it? If there were no external objects, how would Dharmakīrti account for the fact that some cognitions lead to successful purposive activity and others do not? In other words, what would be the basis for our considering some cognitions to be valid and others to be invalid if there were no external object at all? The idealist Dharmakīrti should not reply that a difference in the previous dispositions (*vāsanā*) leads to a difference in the nature

40. na hi jātu viṣajñānaṁ maraṇaṁ pratidhāvati/ Ibid, p. 39
41. sanniveśādibhir dṛṣṭair gopurāṭṭālakādiṣu//
buddhipūrvair yathā tattvaṁ neṣyate bhūdharādiṣu/
tathā gocaranirbhāsair dṛṣṭair eva bhayādiṣu//
abāhyabhāvanājanyair anyatrety avagamyatām/ Ibid, p. 43
42. Aṣṭaśatī, p. 254

of the cognition that arises subsequently, for then he would have to concede that the cognition of other minds (*santānāntara*) is also due to the internal force of illusion or previous dispositions, without there being any actual other mind in reality.[43]

Even illusory cognitions have objective basis: Akalaṅka observes that Dharmakīrti should not declare that the cognition of external objects arises merely on account of Nescience because even the illusory cognitions offered by Dharmakīrti as illustrations to prove his idealist position are generated, of course indirectly, by external objects. In fine, Akalaṅka wants to point out that even illusory cognitions have objective basis. All the cognitions are always generated by external things, though some of them are so generated directly and some only indirectly. Akalaṅka asks Dharmakīrti as to why he does not accept Nescience (*vāsanā*) instead of the bodily actions and speech as the cause of the cognition of the bodily actions and speech. Dharmakīrti might contend that the bodily actions and speech are cognised in a particular locus and Nescience (*vāsanā*) could not explain the cognition of the bodily actions and speech in a particular locus if there were no external bodily actions and speech. Akalaṅka asks Dharmakīrti to adopt the same attitude towards external objects as he has done in connection with the bodily actions and speech. Moreover, the idealist Dharmakīrti is of the opinion that even the dream reflections of the bodily actions and speech are remotely related to the actual (bodily actions and speech of) other minds. Akalaṅka wants him to apply the same logic in the case of the dream-cognitions of external things. The dream-cognition of a particular thing is remotely related to that thing. Has anybody dreamt of a thing whose component parts he has never experienced externally? As a matter of fact, dream implies the experience of a real external world.[44]

The defects that are pointed out by Dharmakīrti in the external atoms and their aggregate are shown to be existing even in internal reflections: Dharmakīrti rejects the external world pointing out absurdities that are involved in the concept of it. One atom is contiguous with other atoms. If it is identical with the atoms close to it, the aggregate of all the atoms would

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43. vāsanābhedād bhedo'yaṁ siddhas tatra.........| Nyāyaviniścaya, kā. 100
tatrāpi santānabhedajñāne'pi siddho niścito vāsanābhedād bhedo'yam| tathā ca tato'pi kathaṁ tadbhedasiddhiḥ? mā bhūt, tadbhedasya tajjñānasatyatvaniścayasya ca vāsanābhedād eva bhāvāt| Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa, p. 402

44. ... ... na siddhyati|
tanmātrabhāvo dṛṣṭānte sarvatrārthopakārataḥ||
pāramparyeṇa sākṣād vā parāpekṣāḥ sahetavaḥ|
vicchinnapratibhāsinyo vyavahārādidhiyo yathā|| Nyāyaviniścaya, kā. 100-101
See also Vivaraṇa thereon.

assume an atomic size; if it is different from them an atom would have six parts. Again, let us take the case of a whole and its parts. Are they identical? If they are identical, the redness of a part would pervade the whole. If they are different, the question would arise as to whether the whole resides in each of its parts partially or wholly. The difficulties of both the alternatives are patent and requires no elaboration. Now Akalaṅka retorts that like external atoms, the internal atomic reflections too could not avoid the defects that are contingent upon their being contiguous with each other. A man perceives a multicoloured gem. Reflections of the blue, the yellow, etc. arise in contiguity with one another and are considered to be atomic in size. If the atomic reflections on the six sides of an atomic reflection of the blue were identical with the latter, the complex of all these atomic reflections would also be of an atomic size and if they are different from it, an atomic reflection would possess six parts or facets. Again, if all these atomic reflections were to form one variegated cognition, there would arise the question as to whether this one cognition resides in its constituent parts partially or wholly and so on. Moreover, Akalaṅka is of the opinion that the atoms are somehow perceptible also. Vidyānanda explains that they are perceived in the sense that their effects viz. the gross bodies (*skandhas*) are perceived.[45]

Consciousness is not non-dual: Akalaṅka observes that there is no non-dual pure consciousness. Consciousness never reveals itself as non-dual. We experience the duality of subject and object in it. From where does this duality come? It could not be held that its non-dual nature is revealed by something other than itself, because that would deprive it of its non-duality. That consciousness is non-dual means that it is beyond the subject-object duality. As soon as it is held to be the object of something other than itself it would no longer be called non-dual. It becomes one of the two terms. The object term implies the subject term and consequently duality. Moreover, even in the non-reflective state of consciousness it is experienced as dual only.[46]

Arguments against Vijñānavāda as given by others: We have elucidated the arguments of Akalaṅka against subjective idealism. Now we propose

45. Akalaṅkagranthatraya, pp. 41-42
dṛśyenātmanā kathañcit skandhākāreṇa adṛśyānām api paramāṇūnāṁ bahir api samavasthāne vipratiṣedhābhāvād antarjñeyavat/ tatra pūrvādidigbhāgabhedena ṣaḍaṁśādi-kalpanayā vṛttivikalpena vā parapakṣopālambhe svapakṣākṣepāt/ Aṣṭaśatī, pp. 253-254

46. advayaṁ dvayanirbhāsaṁ sadā ced avabhāsate/
na svato nāpi parato bhedaparyanuyogataḥ//
pratisaṁhāravelāyāṁ na saṁvedanam anyathā/ Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 36

self-luminous. So the object and its cognition are not identical.[54] According to the Naiyāyikas the relation that obtains between an object and its cognition is called *svarūpa-sambandha* or *viṣayatā*. It is a relation *sui generis*. The Jainas, on the other hand, hold that there obtains between an object and its cognition a relation called *yogyatā*.

There is a real external world: The forms of consciousness could not be accounted for without there being real external objects. We undoubtedly experience the blue and the like as *external* objects. Even the Yogācāra tacitly assumes the existence of external objects when he argues that internal cognitions appear "as if" they were external objects.[55] The difference of the cognised object and the cognizer in *one* cognition is not possible. Nor could it be held that one cognition cognises another cognition, for on the momentarist theory two cognitions cannot be related as the cognised and the cogniser. Certainly if they are simultaneous they could not have a relation between themselves, like the horns of a cow. And if they are produced in succession one of them could not apprehend the other, they being both momentary. So the acceptance of external things becomes inevitable.[56] The existence of external objects can be proved by the method of agreement and the method of difference.[57] A cognition is determinate because it apprehends a particular object. Though the cognition of the blue is produced in the presence of so many objects and though consciousness is common to all cognitions of objects, still the cognition of the blue is produced by the blue object and not by any other and it apprehends this object and not any other. The existence of the object cannot be denied. Again, it is certainly true that the eye produces the cognition of the blue; nevertheless, the eye is not the object of this cognition, but the instrument of this cognition. The cognition of the blue is produced by the blue object and not by any other because it is the Law of Nature that an object should produce an appropriate cognition.[58] Cognition is an act and so it must have an object.[59] Moreover, the consciousness of self implies the consci-

54. Nyāyamañjarī, Vol. II, p. 107. See also Syādvādamañjarī, p. 114.
55. ato bahirvad iti vadatā bāhyaṁ grāhyam eveti bhāvanīyam iti bhavadīya eva bāṇo bhavantaṁ praharet/ Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha, pp. 35-36
56. Nyāyamañjarī, p. 112.
57. Ibid, p. 109
58. yad apy anekasannidhāne nīlajñānam upajāyate yady api bodharūpatvam aśeṣasādhāraṇaṁ tathāpi nīlenaiva karmakārakeṇa tadupajanitam iti nīlaniṣṭham evāvatiṣṭhate, cakṣurādināpi tajjanitam iti cet satyaṁ janitaṁ na tu karmabhūtena tad utpādyate tadekaviṣayam eva bhavati, kuta eṣa niyama iti ced vastusvabhāvata eva.../ Ibid, p. 109
59. jñānam iti hi kriyāśabdaḥ/ tato jñāyate'neneti jñānaṁ jñaptir vā jñānam iti/ asya ca karmaṇā bhāvyam/ nirviṣayāyā jñapter aghaṭanāt/ Syādvādamañjarī, p. 111

ousness of a not-self. The self is a relative term. The self knows itself as it distinguishes itself from a not-self. Hence the not-self is as much real as the self.[60] Cognitions cannot possess externality and extension. For these are the qualities of physical objects, that is, of objects that are independent of cognition. Externality and extension are not the creation of imagination as their reflection is distinct and vivid.

It could not be argued that inasmuch as externality and extension cannot exist either in external objects or in our cognition they should be treated as false. For, the false is not inseparable from its cognition. If it were inseparable from its cognition then the cognition would become as false as the false itself. If the notion of externality and extension were considered to be false then all *ideas* of external objects would be equally false.[61] The idealist argues that the objects of cognition such as jar etc. do not exist in reality, because when we examine them by our reason we fail to apprehend them as distinct from one another. Gautama, Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati find this statement contradictory. Analysis presupposes the reality of the thing analysed. Uddyotakara says, 'If it is possible to analyse the nature of things, then things cannot be said to be unreal.'[62] One and the same object is apprehended by different persons as tree. An external object is public. It is not a private property of any mind. And so it should not be regarded as a creation of many minds nor should it be regarded as a creation of one mind. It exists in itself.[63] Localisation and projection involved in perception presuppose the existence of an object. *Vāsanā* cannot determine the places of objects unless they have already been perceived by cognitions.[64]

Even dream cognitions presuppose perceptions of the external world: The idealist submits that just like dream-cognitions and illusions the waking perceptions are without any foundation in external objects. But Malliṣeṇa, Kumārila, Pārthasārathi, Prabhākara, Uddyotakara and Jayanta point

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60. svayaṁ svasya saṁvedane'ham iti pratibhāsata iti cet nanu kiṁ parasyāpi saṁvedanam asti/ katham anyathā svaśabdasya prayogaḥ/ pratiyogiśabdo hy ayaṁ param apekṣamāṇa eva pravartate/ Ibid, p. 112.

61. Tattvavaiśāradī on Yogabhāṣya, pp. 193-194.

62. ko vyāghātaḥ? sahāsaṁbhavaḥ/ yadi buddhyā vivecanaṁ bhāvānāṁ, na sarvabhāvānupapattiḥ/ Nyāyavārtika, p. 520

63. bahucittālambanībhūtam ekaṁ vastu sādhāraṇaṁ, tat khalu naikacittaparikalpitaṁ, nāpyanekacittaparikalpitam kintu svapratiṣṭham/ Vyāsabhāṣya, IV. 15, p. 194

64. sati hy arthasadbhāve yaddeśo'rthas taddeśo'nubhavas taddeśā ca tatpūrvikā vāsanā/ bāhyārthābhāve tu tasyāḥ kiṁkṛto deśaniyamaḥ/ Syādvādamañjarī, p. 113.

out that dream cognitions themselves presuppose perceptions of external objects.[65]

The realists hold that though dreams and illusions certainly have an objective basis we regard them as invalid because they are contradicted by our waking cognitions.[66] The Yogācāra might urge that even waking cognitions are contradicted by yogic perception. Kumārila rightly points out that this is merely an appeal to credulity.[67] Cognitions apprehending external objects are valid since they are free from contradiction, just like the cognition of the falsity of a dream cognition. If the Yogācāra were to urge that the cognition of the falsity of a dream cognition is as well false then the dream cognition cannot be false and consequently cannot serve as an instance of false cognition.[68] Uddyotakara contends that in the absence of external object no distinction could be made between waking consciousness and dream consciousness. The Yogācāra might retort that in the latter the mind is deranged while in the former it is not. Now Uddyotakara asks him as to how he knows this. The subjective idealist might say that waking consciousness is vivid while a dream cognition is vague. Uddyotakara rightly says that there can be no distinction between vividness and vagueness if there were no real objects, distinct from cognition. Again, if there were no distinction between a dreaming state and a waking state then there can be no distinction between merit and demerit, virtue and vice; for, just as adultery committed in dream is not regarded as vice even so the same act committed in the waking condition should not, on the subjective idealist view, be regarded as vice.[69]

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65. svapnajñānam apy anubhūtadṛṣṭādyarthaviṣayatvān na nirālambanam / Ibid, p. 111
See Ślokavārtika, Nirālambanavāda, 108-111
tathā svapne viṣayagrahṇaṁ pūrvopalabdhaviṣayaṁ....../ Nyāyabhāṣya, IV. 2.34, p. 304
yac coktaṁ svapne jñānasyaivākāro'vabhāsata iti tad apy ayuktam/ tatrāpi hi bahir avabhāsatvāt saṁvidaḥ/ na sā bahirviṣayā na sambhavati/ Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 61
66. itthaṁ sarveṣu pakṣeṣu vaktavyaṁ pratisādhanam/
bāhyārthālambanā buddhir iti samyak ca dhīr iyam//
bādhakāpetabuddhitvād yathā svapnādibāhyadhīḥ/ Ślokavārtika, Nirālambanavāda, 79-80
67. yoginām jāyate buddhir bādhikā pratiyoginī//
...iha janmani keṣāñcin na tāvad upalabhyte/ Ibid, Nirālambanavāda, 91-93
68. Ibid, Nirālambanavāda, 80-81
69. cittavyatiriktaṁ viṣayam apratipadyamāno jāgratsvapnāvasthayor bhedaṁ paryanuyojyaḥ jāgradavasthāyāṁ viṣayā na santi svapnāvasthāyām apīti iyaṁ svapnāvasthā iyaṁ jāgrad avastheti kuta etat/ dharmādharmavyavasthā ca na prāpnoti yathā svapnāvasthāyām agamyāgamanād adharmotpattir na bhavaty evaṁ jāgradavasthāyām api na syāt/ atha nidropaghātānupaghātau bhedaṁ janayata iti pratipadyeta/ tadapi tādṛg eva nidropaghātaś cetaso vaikṛtyahetur iti katham avagamyate/ atha vijñānasya spaṣṭatām aspaṣṭatām ca bhedaṁ pratipadyeta/ viṣayam antareṇa jñānasya spaṣṭatā'spaṣṭatā ca vaktavyā/ Nyāyavārtika, IV. 2.34, p. 523.

Uddyotakara has even refuted the argument of Vasubandhu, based on the alleged experiences of the beings in hell by saying that we have no direct knowledge of the experiences of the so-called beings in hell. And so an appeal to their experiences is an appeal to blind faith [70]

The fact that the same object causes different feelings in different individuals does not disprove the reality of the object : The fact that the same object causes different feelings in different individuals does not disprove the reality of the object. The Sāṅkhya can easily account for it. He regards an external object as made up of three ultimate reals – *sattva, rajas and tamas* which are ever-changing by nature. But the same threefold object does not produce the threefold feeling of pleasure, pain and delusion in all persons. The object comes into relationship with the mind with the co-operation of the exciting causes, viz. merit, demerit, etc. and produces different feelings in different persons. *Sattva* in co-operation with *rajas* produces the feeling of pleasure when there is merit in the mind. *Sattva* free from *rajas* produces the feeling of indifference when there is right knowledge in the person. These exciting causes, viz. merit, demerit, nescience and right knowledge, do no exist, all of them, in all persons everywhere. This is the reason why the same object excites different feelings in different persons. Feelings are partly due to subjective conditions and partly due to objective conditions. [71] Kumārila [72] and Jayanta [73] explain the fact by appealing to *vāsanā*. They hold that an object has diverse forms. But that particular form is perceived by an individual which fits in with the deep-rooted disposition *(vāsanā)* awakened in his mind at the time. The external object in co-operation with a psychical disposition is thus the cause of an individual perceiving a particular form of this object.

The variety of perceptions is not due to the variety of Vāsanās : The Yogācāra holds that the variety of perceptions is due to the variety of *vāsanās*. This position is untenable for the following reasons: (i) The question arises as to what this *vāsanā* is. Is it identical with or different from consciousness. If it is identical with consciousness, it would have no variety as consciousness itself is formless and indeterminate. If it

70. Ibid, p. 523-524
71. sāṅkhyapakṣe punar vastu triguṇaṁ calaṁ ca guṇavṛttam iti dharmādinimittāpekṣaṁ cittair abhisambadhyate, nimittānurūpasya ca pratyayasyotpadyamānasya tena tena ātmanā hetur bhavati/ Vyāsabhāṣya, IV. 15, p. 195
See also Vyākhyā thereon.
72. vāsanāḥ sahakāriṇyo vyavasthākāradarśane// Ślokavārtika, Śūnyavāda, 215.
See also Nyāyaratnākara thereon.
73. pratiprāṇiniyatānekavidhavāsanāsahakārisāpekṣo hi tasya jñānasyātmalābha iti na sarveṣāṁ sarvasārūpyeṇa jñānam/ Nyāyamañjarī, Vol. II, p. 113

is different from consciousness, it is as good as an external object.[74] (ii) *Vāsanā* is nothing but a vestige or residuum (*saṁskāra*) left by a previous cognition of an object. Thus *vāsanā* presupposes the perception of a real object. The variety of perceptions accounts for the variety of *vāsanās*. But the variety of *vāsanās* cannot account for the variety of perceptions.[75] (iii) The Yogācāra regards the cognitions as momentary. So they cannot be related to one another as the impressor (*vāsaka*) and the impressed (*vāsya*).[76] (iv) The Yogācāra cannot provide any cause for the variety of impressions(*vāsanās*).If the variety of perceptions were held to be the cause of the variety of impressions, that would be a case of mutual dependence.[77] (v) What is the substratum of a *vāsanā* ? A momentary cognition cannot be this substratum, for it being momentary the *vāsanā* residing in it would be destroyed along with it. Moreover, *vāsanā* consists in the transference of a part of a thing to another thing. But the cognition being momentary, a part of the preceding cognition could not be transferred to the succeeding cognition.[78] If the stream of *vāsanās* is like the stream of cognitions, both being unbroken and continuous, and independent of each other, then impressions cannot produce cognitions, and cognitions again cannot produce impressions.[79] In Buddhism *vāsanā* itself is not possible. So, how can the variety of *vāsanās* be given as a reason to account for the variety of perceptions ? To account for the variety of perceptions external things should be accepted as real.

Atoms as well as the aggregates of atoms are real : According to the Naiyāyikas, a composite whole is perceived while the atoms being subtle are inferred from their effects. The whole exists in the parts taken together. It does not exist in each part. The whole is actually perceived to reside in its parts. So, it is needless to raise the question as to how the whole can exist in the parts. The whole is an object of valid uncontradicted knowledge. So, it is useless to consider the alternatives as to how it exists in the parts.[80]

74. keyaṁ vāsanā nāma? jñānād avyatiriktā cet sāpi svaccharūpatvān na jñānakāluṣyakāraṇaṁ bhavet, jñānavyatiriktā ced vāsanā tadvaicitryahetuś ca so'rtha eva paryāyāntareṇoktaḥ syāt/ Ibid, p. 113
See also Nyāyakandalī, p. 130 and Syādvādamañjarī p. 113
75. Nyāyamañjarī, Vol. II, p. 113
76. kiñca bhikṣupakṣe kṣaṇikatvena jñānānāṁ grāhyagrāhakabhāva iva vāsyavāsakabkāvo'pi nirākartavyaḥ/ Ibid, p. 113.
77. na cāsti vāsanābhedo nimittāsambhavāt tava/
jñānabhedo nimittaṁ cet tasya bhedaḥ kathaṁ punaḥ//
vāsanābhedataś cet syāt prāptam anyonyasaṁśrayam/
Ślokavārtika, Nirālambanavāda, 178-179
78. Ibid, Nirālambanavāda, 200 with Nyāyaratnākara thereon.
79. Ibid, Nirālambanavāda, 176–198 with Nyāyaratnākara thereon.
80. Nyāyamañjarī, Vol. II, pp. 115-116

The Jaina philosopher admits the existence of both the atoms and gross bodies. Atoms are perceived by us in the sense that we see atoms in seeing their effects viz. the gross bodies like jar etc. Again, they are perceived by the *Yogins*. We do not see the atoms because they are very subtle. We can prove the existence of atoms even by inference. Atoms exist because without them we could not account for the gross bodies. The Jaina avoids the horns of the dilemma—whether the whole resides in its parts wholly or partially—and holds that it exists in its parts *inseparably*.[81]

Thus we finish our rapid survey of the important arguments advanced against subjective idealism. The impressions that the arguments of the two parties have left on our mind are recorded in the two concluding paragraphs that follow.

Concluding Remarks : We have to admit that the logic of subjective idealism seems to be irrefutable. What we are directly aware of are our experiences. All the data of knowledge are personal experiences. As has been said, we are indeed 'shut up in the circle of our own ideas.' Dharmakīrti seems to be correct when he asserts that the being of a thing consists in its being experienced. An object is nothing independent of knowledge or experience. Experience is the only datum. He refuses to admit the existence of anything that could not be present in any experience at any time. And what is present in experience is nothing but sensations. To posit matter i. e. external objects is to posit a 'situation-believed-in' for which there are no verifiable grounds of belief in any possible 'situation-experienced.' He does find it rational to believe, on the basis of an inference, in experiences other than his own; but he is perplexed and baffled by the realists' claim that there are realities which are external to all possible experiences. Such realities are not given in experience nor are they warranted by reasoning. They are accepted by blind brute faith.

The so many arguments urged by the realists against subjective idealism do not stultify its main thesis, namely, that one cannot experience anything other than his own sensations. This thesis on which the superstructure of subjective idealism is built seems, as has been said, to be irrefutable. Only this much can be said against Dharmakīrti's idealism: It does not prove that there are no external objects. It only tends to show that we have no right to feel sure of their existence. But one might similarly say that Dharmakīrti has no right to feel sure of their non-existence. Just as the realist is not warranted to feel sure of their existence even so Dharmakīrti is not warranted to feel sure of their non-existence. Yet the former feels sure of their existence and the latter feels sure of their non-existence. Thus the acceptance of realism or idealism becomes only a question of temperament; logic or reasoning here becomes only a handmaid in the service of temperament,

81. Syādvādamañjarī, pp. 111-112.

CHAPTER V

ON THE PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL

In the first four chapters we have discussed the nature of reality. But the question as to how we can know this reality is of the utmost importance and it naturally arises at this stage. Are there any means with whose help we can know reality? If there are, how many are they and on what ground can we consider them to be valid? In what way can we know knowledge itself and especially its validity (*prāmāṇya*)? These are some of the general problems regarding knowledge. Before we discuss the particular means of knowledge – perception, inference and testimony – one by one in the next three chapters, we propose, in this chapter, to introduce in brief the various views adopted by the different systems of Indian philosophy on the problems of knowledge in general. Of course, we would especially refer to the views of Dharmakīrti and Akalaṅka.

Definition of valid knowledge (pramāṇa = pramā): Kaṇāda considers only that cognition to be valid whose cause is free from defects.[1] Vātsyāyana's word for cognition is *upalabdhi* and he defines *pramāṇa* as the means of *upalabdhi*.[2] But he is not unmindful of the fact that not every cognition but only that which presents an object as it is, is valid (*arthavat pramāṇam*). Vācaspati explains the word '*arthavat*' as 'non-contradictory to the nature of the object concerned' (*arthāvyabhicāri*). Vācaspati clearly explains what he means by the non-contradictory character of valid knowledge.[3] He puts this characteristic in the very definition of valid knowlenge.[4] The later Naiyāyikas follow him and observe that the cognition that presents an object with a character which it really has is valid. Nor would the Naiyāyikas hesitate to regard the coherence between the cognitive and conative activities as one of the characteristics of valid knowledge.[5] Thus with the Naiyāyikas the presentativeness, the non-contradictoriness (i. e. the correspondence between a cognition and its object) and the coherence between the cognitive and conative activities are the essential defining characteristics of valid cognition. The Prābhākaras define valid knowledge as immediate experience (*anubhūti*).[6] The

1. aduṣṭam vidyā/ Vaiśeṣikasūtra, IX. 2.12
2. upalabdhisādhanāni pramāṇāni/ Nyāyabhāṣya, I. 3
3. tathā hi pramāṇam arthavad iti nityayoge matup/ nityatā ca avyabhicāritā/ tena avyabhicārīty arthaḥ/ iyam eva cārthāvyabhicāritā yaddeśakālāntarāvasthāntarāvisaṁvādo'rthasvarūpaprakārayos tadupadarśitayoḥ/ Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā, p. 5
4. upalabdhimātrasyārthāvyabhicāriṇaḥ ... ... pramāśabdenābhidhānāt/ *Ibid*, p. 21
5. pramāṇato'rthapratipattau pravṛttisāmarthyād arthavat pramāṇam/ Nyāyabhāṣya, p. I
6. anubhūtiś ca naḥ pramāṇam/ Bṛhatī, I. 1.5

Bāṭṭas, under the influence of the Buddhists, hold that valid cognition invariably pertains to a novel object.[7] They follow Kaṇāda when they maintain that valid cognition is that cognition which originates from a non-defective cause.[8] It was perhaps Diṅnāga who for the first time pointed out that valid cognition is self-revelatory. In addition, he observed that valid cognition should represent the form of the object concerned *(viṣayākāra)*.[9] Dharmakīrti defines true knowledge as harmonious or non-discrepant (*avisaṁvādi*) in the sense that there is no conflict between the cognition of an object and the practical activity meant to obtain it.[10] Some may point out that according to Buddhism things being momentary an object indicated (apprehended) by a piece of cognition and an object attained (reached or determined) by us in the wake of this cognition could never be the same; thus there would arise the impossibility of there being a harmony between the cognitive and conative activities and consequently no knowledge would be considered to be valid. Dharmottara solves the difficulty by suggesting that while defining valid knowledge Dharmakīrti has kept before his eyes the object-continuum and not the momentary members of this continuum.[11] He has tackled the problem of valid cognition from the empirical or worldly viewpoint that accepts a thing as durable. Moreover, for Dharmakīrti valid cognition is a new cognition, the cognition of an object not yet cognised.[12] It might be urged that on this definition even the cognition of the universal (*sāmānyavijñāna)* arising in the wake of the cognition of the unique particular would become valid because the former cognises an object not yet cognised by a previous cognition.[13] But Dharmakīrti in this connection declares that what he means is that the cognition grasping the ungrasped unique particular[14] is valid. For, by means of valid knowledge people seek to acquire unique particulars only, because none but they lead to

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7. sarvasyānupalabdhe'rthe prāmāṇyaṁ ... ... / Ślokavārtika (Madras Uni. Ed.), p. 185
anadhigatārthādhigantṛ pramāṇam iti bhāṭṭamīmāṁskāḥ prāhuḥ/ Siddhāntacandrodaya, p. 20
8. etac ca viśeṣaṇatrayam upādadānena sūtrakāreṇa kāraṇadoṣabādhakajñānarahitaṁ agṛhītagrāhi jñānaṁ pramāṇam iti pramāṇalakṣaṇaṁ sūcitam / Śāstradīpikā, p. 45
9. svasaṁvittiḥ phalaṁ cātra tadrūpād arthaniścayaḥ/
viṣayākāra evāsya pramāṇaṁ tena mīyate// Pramāṇasamuccaya, I. 10
10. pramāṇam avisaṁvādi jñānam arthakriyāsthitiḥ/
avisaṁvādanaṁ ... ... // Pramāṇavārtika, I. 3
11. kintu kṣaṇāpekṣayā na prāmāṇyalakṣaṇam ucyate, api tu santānāpekṣayā/ Nyāyabindu-ṭippaṇī, p. 11
12. ajñātārthaprakāśo vā ... ...// Pramāṇavārtika, I. 7
13. ... ... svarūpādhigateḥ //
prāptaṁ sāmānyavijñānaṁ [pramāṇam iti śeṣaḥ] / Ibid, I. 7-8
Bracketed portion indicates vṛtti.
14. ... ... avijñāte svalakṣaṇe/ yaj jñānam ity abhiprāyāt ... ... // Ibid, I. 8

successful purposive activity.[15] Inasmuch as things, according to Buddhism, are momentary, two cognitions can never arise with regard to one and the same object. And so, to be consistent with the prime doctrine of momentarism Dharmakīrti deems it proper to put down 'grasping-the-hitherto-ungrasped-object' as a differentiating mark of valid cognition. In the Jaina tradition Siddhasena Divākara and Āc. Samantabhadra define valid cognition by pointing out that it is its nature to reveal itself as well as its object.[16] Akalaṅka, although he accepts this as one of the defining characteristics of valid cognition,[17] considers harmony or non-discrepancy *(avisaṁvāda)* to be the true mark of valid cognition.[18] For him non-discrepancy of cognition means its not being sublated by other valid cognitions as also its self-consistency.[19] By non-discrepancy he also means the correspondence of cognition with the nature of its object.[20] Sometimes he also means by non-discrepancy the coherence between the cognitive and conative activities. In addition to non-discrepancy, definiteness or determinateness is regarded by him as one of the essential characteristics of valid cognition.[21] He observes that even non-discrepancy of cognition is impossible without its possessing a determinate nature.[22] He has also introduced in his definition of valid cognition the adjectival phrase—'grasping-the-hitherto-ungrasped' in order to qualify valid cognition.[23] The influence of Dharmakīrti is evident here. It might be said that for the Buddhists who are momentarists it is alright to consider valid cognition to be a cognition pertaining to quite a new object. But for the Jainas reality is relatively permanent. Hence it is not proper for Akalaṅka to insert the adjectival phrase 'pertaining to a novel object' in his definition of valid cognition. Akalaṅka replies that reality, since it is relatively permanent, possesses innumerable modes. Hence even if two or more cognitions could operate in relation to one and the same thing, they would always determine the

15. svalakṣaṇavicārataḥ ... ... // Ibid, I. 8
arthakriyārthibhiḥ svalakṣaṇam eva pramāṇena anviṣyate tasyaiva arthakriyāsādhanatvāt/ Vṛtti thereon.
16. pramāṇaṁ svaparābhāsi jñānaṁ bādhavivarjitam/ Nyāyāvatāra, 1
svaparāvabhāsakaṁ yathā pramāṇaṁ bhuvi buddhilakṣaṇam/ Bṛhat Svayambhūstotra, 63
17. tadubhayātmārthajñānam pramāṇam/ Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 17
18. avisaṁvādakaṁ pramāṇam ... / Ibid, p. 8
19. pramāṇāntarābādhanaṁ pūrvāparāvirodhaś ca avisaṁvādaḥ/ Ibid, p. 14
20. timirādyupaplavajñānaṁ candrādāv avisaṁvādakaṁ pramāṇaṁ yathā tatsaṅkhyādau visaṁvādakatvād apramāṇaṁ ... .../ Ibid, p. 8
21. vyavasāyātmakaṁ jñānam ātmārthagrāhakaṁ matam/
grahaṇaṁ nirṇayas tena mukhyaṁ prāmāṇyam aśnute// Ibid, p. 20
22. avisaṁvādakatvaṁ ca nirṇayāyattam/ Ibid, p. 20
tato vyavasāya eva avisaṁvādaniyamo'dhigamaś ca niścetavyaḥ tatraiva tadbhāvāt, tadvaśād eva tatpratiṣṭhānāt/ Siddhiviniścayavṛtti, p. 114
23. pramāṇam avisaṁvādi jñānam anadhigatārthādhigamalakṣaṇatvāt/ Aṣṭaśatī, p. 175

mode or an aspect of it, not determined by the other. So, for us, says Akalaṅka, the phrase 'grasping-the-hitherto-ungrasped' means 'determining-the-hitherto-undetermined-mode.'[24] Akalaṅka seems to relax this condition in the case of memory.[25] Thus he is not serious about this condition. So, it ultimately boils down to this that the essential characteristics of valid cognition, according to Akalaṅka, are its non-discrepancy, its ability to enable us to attain the object capable of purposive activity, and its determinate nature. It is interesting to note that to be consistent with the doctrine of non-absolutism Akalaṅka considers all empirical cognitions to be valid as well as invalid. No empirical cognition is absolutely valid or absolutely invalid. Yet we call a cognition valid if it by far corresponds with the concerned external object and we call it invalid if it is mostly not in consonance with the form of the concerned external object.[26] The realisation that the powers of the sense-organs are limited seems to have led Akalaṅka to formulate such a view. But Akalaṅka would not deny the absolute validity of the highest transcendental perception called *Kevala-jñāna* which requires no media of sense-organs and mind to grasp its object. This suggests that the theory of non-absolutism is not to be applied without discrimination. For if it were so applied even the perfect knowledge of an omniscient being would have to be regarded as partly valid and partly invalid. But here the operation of non-absolutism ceases. Hence, it is said that even *Anekānta* itself is *anekānta*, that is, in certain spheres it operates and in certain others it does not.[27]

Nature of the source of valid knowledge: We have discussed the definitions of valid cognition. But what is the instrument or source of valid cognition? It is said by Vātsyāyana that the cause of valid cognition (*upalabdhi-hetu*) is its instrument.[28] But can any cause of such a cognition be its instrument ? Not any cause but the one which is the most efficient (*karaṇa*) is its instrument. But how can we know that a particular cause out of many is the most efficient? Some Naiyāyikas consider sense-organs to be the instrument of valid perceptual cognition. From this it becomes clear that for them the thing possessed of a function (*vyāpāravat*) is the

24. anadhigatārthādhigantṛ vijñānaṁ pramāṇam ity api kevalam anirṇītārthanirṇītir abhidhīyate ... ... / Siddhiviniścayavṛtti, p. 13
25. Ibid, p. 175
26. yenākāreṇa tattvaparicchedas tadapekṣayā prāmāṇyam iti/ tena pratyakṣatadābhāsayor api prāyaśaḥ saṅkīrṇaprāmāṇyetarasthitir unnetavyā, prasiddhānupahatendriyadṛṣṭer api candrārkādiṣu deśapratyāsattyādyabhūtākārāvabhāsanāt, tathopahatākṣāder api saṅkhyādivisaṁvāde'pi candrādisvabhāvatattvopalambhāt/ tatprakarṣāpekṣayā vyapadeśavyavasthā gandhadravyādivat/ Aṣṭaśatī, p. 276
27. anekānto'py anekāntaḥ ... ... / Svayambhūstotra, 103
28, upalabdhisādhanāni pramāṇāniti ... ... / Nyāyabhāṣya, I. 1.3

most efficient cause. Function here means the action which is immediately and invariably followed by the effect concerned. Some other Naiyāyikas consider the sense-object contact (*sannikarṣa*) to be the instrument of valid perceptual cognition. So, for them the function itself is the efficient cause. For Jayanta Bhaṭṭa neither the thing possessed of a function nor this function itself is the efficient cause. He emphatically holds that it is the aggregate (*sāmagrī*) of all conditions—physical as well as psychological—that is the most efficient cause of a valid cognition.[29] The aggregate is devoid of a function.[30] It is the most efficient in comparision to the particular factors (viz. subject, object, sense-organ etc.) included in it.[31] It is noteworthy that Kumārila, in his Ślokavārtika, has for the first time hinted at this view while enumerating all the possible views as regards the instrument of knowledge.[32]

As for the question of identity or difference between the resultant cognition and its instrument, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas consider the two to be absolutely different. This view of theirs seems to be a corollary of their fundamental position according to which an effect is quite different from its cause (*ārambhavāda*). One thing to be noted here is that they regard each stage in the process of cognition as an instrument as well as a resultant cognition--an instrument with respect to the succeeding stage that is generated by it and a resultant cognition with respect to the preceding stage whose result it is.[33]

Dharmakīrti maintains that nothing but cognition (*jñāna*) deserves to be called an instrument of valid cognition because it is the most efficient cause reguired to generate valid cognition. This is so for two reasons: (i) Sense-organs being non-conscious, it is impossible for them to generate cognition. (ii) It is mainly cognition that can enable us to attain the desirable and to avoid the undesirable.[34] From this it can be deduced that out of the four causal conditions (*pratyaya*) it is the *samanantara pratyaya* (the immediately preceding cognition-moment) that

29. tasmāt ... bodhābodhasvabhāvā sāmagrī pramāṇam iti yuktam/ Nyāyamañjarī, p. 14
30. Nyāyamañjarī (Bengali), Vol. I, p. 115
31. yat tu kim apekṣaṁ sāmagryāḥ karaṇatvam iti tadantargatakārakāpekṣam iti brūmaḥ,.../ Nyāyamañjarī, p. 13
32. yadvendriyaṁ pramāṇaṁ syāt tasya vārthena saṅgatiḥ/
manaso vendriyair yoga ātmanā sarva eva vā// Ślokavārtika, p. 134
33. yadā sannikarṣas tadā jñānaṁ pramitiḥ, yadā jñānaṁ tadā hānopādānopekṣābuddhayaḥ phalam/ Nyāyabhāṣya, I. 1.3
34. ... ... dhīpramāṇatā /
pravṛttes tatpradhānatvāt heyopādeyavastuni// Pramāṇavārtika, I. 5
kasmāt punar dhiyaḥ pramāṇateṣyate nendriyādeḥ? heyopādeyavastuviṣayāyāḥ pravṛttes tatpradhānatvāt dhiya eva prāmāṇyam/ na hīndriyam astīty eva pravṛttiḥ/ kiṁ tarhi? jñānasadbhāvāt/ sādhakatamaṁ ca pramāṇaṁ, tasyāvyavahitavyāpāratvāt/ Vṛtti thereon, jñānaṁ pramāṇaṁ nājñānam indriyārthasannikrṣādi/ Vṛtti on I. 3.

is considered by him to be the main or the most efficient cause of valid cognition. Here by the word *pramāṇa* he means the main or the most efficient cause required to generate the resultant cognition. But elsewhere he goes even a step further and considers the formal similarity obtaining between a piece of valid cognition and its object to be the instrument of this piece of valid knowledge. Thus he observes that because a particular piece of knowledge is determined to be (say) 'knowledge of the blue' or 'knowledge of the yellow' on the basis of the form it bears, it is this form that should be regarded as a *pramāṇa* (an instrument).[35] Here he seems to have given up the idea of calling the main or the most efficient cause of a particular piece of valid cognition its *pramāṇa* (its instrument). In its stead he now deems it quite proper to call the form that determines a particular piece of knowledge to be 'knowledge of the blue' or 'knowledge of the yellow' its *pramāṇa* (its instrument). And a particular piece of knowledge and its form being absolutely identical, he regards the resultant cognition and its instrument as identical. As a Vijñānavādin he observes that the capacity of cognition to cognise itself is the instrument and its actual cognition of itself (*svasaṁvedana*) is the resultant cognition[36]

Even Akalaṅka agrees with Dharmakīrti in so far as he holds that it is a cognition that should be regarded as *pramāṇa* (instrument). The reasons why he upholds this view are the same as those advanced by Dharmakīrti.[37] But this view of his means that the quality called knowledge is the main or the most efficient cause of a particular mode of this quality knowledge. Here by *pramāṇa* he means the main or the most efficient cause of the resultant cognition. And because particular piece of valid cognition is a mode of the quality knowledge (a quality which belongs to the substance soul), the two are regarded by him as identical as well as different.[38] It is interesting to note that Akalaṅka for the first time takes clear note of and endorses the relativistic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position according to which the intermediary links in the causal chain of a cognitive process are, each of them, a *pramāṇa* as well as an effect of *pramāṇa*.[39] Later on, a Jain logician like Hemacandra goes one step further and observes that because knowledge is determined to be 'knowledge of the blue' or 'knowledge of the yellow' on the basis of its mode it is this mode that should be regarded as the *pramāṇa* and the

35. arthasārūpyam asya pramāṇam/ tadvaśād arthapratītisiddher iti/ Nyāyabindu, I. 20-21
36. iti sā yogyatā mānam ... ... phalaṁ svavit/ Pramāṇavārtika, II. 366
37. sannikarṣāder ajñānasya prāmāṇyam anupapannam ... .../ Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 1 hitāhitāptinirmuktikṣamam....../ Ibid, p. 29
38. tathā hi karaṇasya kriyāyāś ca kathañcid ekatvaṁ pradīpatamovigamavat, nānātvaṁ ca paraśvādivat/ Aṣṭaśatī, p. 284.
39. pūrvapūrvapramāṇatvaṁ phalaṁ syād uttarottaram/ Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 3

knowledge as a whole of that particular time as the resultant cognition. Here the word '*pramāṇa*' means the determinant of a particular piece of valid cognition. The influence of Dharmakīrti is evident here. Āc. Hemacandra follows Dharmakīrti in positing the relation of the determinant and the determined *(vyavasthāpya-vyavasthāpakabhāva)* between the instrument and the resultant cognition.[40] But prior to Āc. Hemacandra, the Jaina logicians have criticised Dharmakīrti for having done so.

How do we know knowledge? : The Buddhists, be they realists or idealists, consider cognition to be self-revelatory.[41] The Jainas, the Prābhākaras,[42] and the Vedāntins agree with the Buddhists; but the Bhāṭṭas and the Naiyāyikas uphold some peculiar views. According to the Bhāṭṭas a cognition is not only not self-revelatory but is not even perceptible. It is inferred from the result of cognition, that is, from the cognisedness or manifestness (*jñātatā*) produced by cognition in the object cognised. For example, when we know a jar we have an apprehension that the jar is cognised by us; and from this cognisedness of the object we infer the existence of cognition; a cognition is inferred from the cognisedness of its object.[43] The Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that though every cognition is perceptible it is perceived by a cognition other than itself which is called 'after-cognition' (*anuvyavasāya*).[44] Dharmakīrti and Akalaṅka both criticise this peculiar Nyāya view.[45] They observe that if cognition is not self-revelatory but requires another cognition to reveal itself, it would involve us in an infinite regress. Akalaṅka has refuted the Bhāṭṭa view also.[46] Thus all philosophers except the Bhāṭṭa and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas "are unanimous in holding that cognition as such is self-perceptible (*svaprakāśa*), that is, that all cognition, whether acquired through perception *(pratykṣa)*, inference (*anumāna*), verbal testimony (*śabda*) or memory (*smṛti*), notices its own nature by way of direct observation *(sākṣātkāra)* while it is called 'inferential,' 'verbal,' 'mnemic' etc. owing to the nature of the object grasped *(grāhya)*. In other words, even though differing as regards their respective generating conditions (*sāmagrī)* and pertaining to objects that are differently characterised as 'cabable of being

40. pramāṇa-phalayor aikye sadasatpakṣabhāvī doṣaḥ syāt, nāsataḥ karaṇatvaṁ na sataḥ phalatvam/ satyam, asty ayaṁ doṣo janmani na vyavasthāyām/ Pramāṇamīmāṁsā, p. 29
41. sarvacittacaittānām ātmavedanaṁ svavedanam/ Nyāyabindu, I. 11.
42. sarvavijñānahetūtthā mitau mātari ca pramā/
sākṣātkartṛtvasāmānyāt pratyakṣatvena sammatā// Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 56.
43. Śāstradīpikā, (Kāśī, V. S. 1964), p. 202
44. tasmāt jñānāntarasaṁvedyaṁ saṁvedanaṁ vedyatvāt ghaṭādivat/ Vyomavatī, p. 529
manogrābyaṁ sukhaṁ duḥkham icchā dveṣo matiḥ kṛtiḥ/ Kārikāvalī, 57
45. Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 32
Pramāṇavārtika, II. 437-441
46. Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 32

perceived', 'capable of being inferred', 'capable of being recalled' etc., the various types of cognition like perception, inference, memory etc. are, all of them, perceptually cognisant of their own nature (i. e. of themselves)."[47]

How do we know the validity of knowledge?: For the Bhāṭṭas the validity of cognition is self-evident.[48] Its invalidity is known only when it is contradicted by some other strong cognition.[49] The Naiyāyikas maintain that neither the validity nor invalidity of cognition is self-evident. The two are inferred from its capacity or incapacity to produce successful activity.[50] The extant Sāṅkhya texts give no indication as to what stand it takes on the question under consideration; but the statements of its critics suggest that according to the Sāṅkhyas both the validity and invalidity of cognition are self-evident.[51] Dharmakīrti holds that cognition is alone self-cognised. Its validity is known through the subsequent successful activity.[52] Manoratha commenting on this observes that the validity of cognition is self-evident in the case of repeated acquaintance (*abhyāsa*) but that in the case of first acquaintance (*anabhyāsa*) it is known through the subsequent successful activity (*arthakriyājñānena*).[53] In the Pramāṇavārtika or in the Manoratha nothing is said regarding the question as to how one knows the invalidity of cognition. Śāntarakṣita maintains that both the validity and invalidity of cognition are self-evident in the case of repeated acquaintance while they are known through subsequent successful volitional experiences in the case of first acquaintance. This view is termed by him the *aniyamapakṣa.*[54] Th. Stcherbatsky[55] and Prof. S. C. Chatterjee[56] record the Buddhist view which is quite different from the one given by Śāntarakṣita. According to this view the invalidity of cognition is self-evident while its validity is known by the subsequent successful activity. Both these scholars seem

47. Advanced Studies in Indian Logic & Metaphysics, p. 33
48. svataḥ sarvapramāṇānāṁ prāmāṇyam iti gṛhyatām/ Ślokavārtika, p. 48.
49. doṣataś cāpramāṇatve svataḥprāmāṇyavādinām/ Ibid, p. 49, kā 56 et seq.
50. 'pramāṇato'rthapratipattau pravṛttisāmarthyād arthavat pramāṇam' iti tasmād aprāmāṇyam api parokṣam ity ato dvayam api parata ity eṣa eva pakṣaḥ śreyān/ Nyāyamañjarī, p. 160
51. pramāṇatvāpramāṇatve svataḥ sāṅkhyāḥ samāśritāḥ/ Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha, p. 279
52. ... ... svarūpasya svato gatiḥ/ prāmāṇyaṁ vyavahāreṇa ... ... // Pramāṇavārtika, I. 6-7
53. yadi svarūpamātraṁ svato gamyate na prāmāṇyaṁ kathaṁ tarhi tad avagamyam ity āha—'prāmāṇyaṁ vyavahāreṇa' arthakriyājñānena/ yasya sādhanajñānasya tādātmyād anubhūte'pi prāmāṇye sāśaṅkā vyavahartāro'nabhyāsavaśād anutpannānurūpaniścayās tatra arthakriyājñānena prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ, anyatra tu vibhramaśaṅkāsaṅkocād utpattāv eva svarūpasya prāmāṇyasya svato gatir ity uktam/ Pramāṇavārtikavṛtti, I.7
54. Tattvasaṅgraha, 3123; and pañjikā thereon.
55. Buddhist Logic, Vol. I, p. 66
56. The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge, p. 91.

to have before them the Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha where this view is ascribed to the Buddhists.[57] May be this view was held by a section of the Buddhist philosophers. Or, may be it is a misrepresentation of the Buddhist view on the part of the author of the Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha.

It seems that Akalaṅka has bodily taken, of course with a slight change, a quarter of a verse - *prāmāṇyaṁ vyavahāräddhi*[58] - from the Pramāṇavārtika. Akalaṅka, with Dharmakīrti, holds that the validity of cognition is known through subsequent successful activities. Like Dharmakīrti, he says nothing regarding the question as to how the invalidity of cognition is known. The later Jaina logicians maintain that both the validity and invalidity of cognition are self-evident in the case of repeated acquintance while they are known through subsequent successful activities in the case of first acquaintance.[59] Thus the Jaina view exactly tallies with the Buddhist view recorded by Śāntarakṣita.

Number of the sources of knowledge accepted by the different systems of Indian Philosophy: In the West logicians generally recognise only two sources of knowledge - perception and inference. But Indian philosophy presents a variety of views on the question. The Cārvākas admit only one source of valid knowledge viz. perception. The Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas recognise only two such sources--viz. perception and inference. To these the Sāṅkhyas add a third one--viz. authority or testimony. The Naiyāyikas admit a fourth way of knowing--viz. analogy (*upamāna*)-- in addition to these three. The Prābhākaras, again, add to these four sources a fifth one—viz. implication(*arthāpatti*). The Bhāṭṭas and monistic Vedāntins, however, recognise six sources of knowledge, adding non-cognition (*abhāva—anupalabdhi*) to the five already mentioned. The Paurāṇikas add two more—viz. *saṁbhava* (probability) and *aitihya* (tradition)—to those six. In the Maṇimekhalāī it is said that according to Vedavyāsa, Kṛtakoṭi and Jaimini there are ten sources of knowledge. Here we get two new designations, namely, *svabhāva* and *pariśeṣa.*[60] These two independent *pramāṇas* recognised by these authors seem to be what others have treated as two particular types of *anumāna*--viz. *svabhāvānumāna* and *śeṣavat anumāna.* Th. Stcherbatsky notes that the followers of Caraka increase the number of the sources of knowledge upto eleven.[61] The Jaina

57. pramāṇatvāpramāṇatve svataḥ sāṅkhyāḥ samāśritāḥ/
naiyāyikās te parataḥ saugatāś caramaṁ svataḥ// Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha, p. 279.

58. Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 14

59. tatprāmāṇyaṁ svataḥ parataś ceti/ Parīkṣāmukha, I. 13. tad ubhayam utpattau parata eva jñaptau tu svataḥ parataś ceti/ Pramāṇanayatattvāloka, I. 21

60. Bhāratīya Tattvavidyā, p. 26

61. Buddhist Logic, Vol. I, p. 72.

logicians accept only two sources of knowledge—viz. direct and indirect.[62]

Principles that determine the different numbers of the types of the sources of knowledge: Here the question naturally arises as to what are the different principles that determine the different numbers of the types of the sources of knowledge. Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti and their followers declare that as many are the types of the sources of knowledge as are the types of the objects of knowledge.[63] For these Buddhists there are only two types of objects viz. the unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). The Mīmāṁsakās seem to hold that not only the types of objects but also the types of the causal aggregates of knowledge determine the number of the types of the sources of knowledge.[64] To this position the Naiyāyikas add that the types of the results of knowledge also determine the number of the types of the sources of knowledge.[65] The Jainas are of the opinion that it is only the different natures of knowledge that determine the number of the types of the sources of knowledge. The knowledge possesses either of the two natures—vividness and blurredness. Hence even the sources of knowledge are two—direct and indirect.[66]

Rejection or inclusion of the sources not independently accepted: Those who accept a lesser number of the types of the sources of knowledge than the one accepted by others will have to answer two questions: (i) as to whether for them those other types of sources are no sources at all and (ii) if they are sources but not independent ones they are to be brought under which accepted type.

For the Cārvākas perception alone is an independent source of knowledge. All other sources are no sources at all. The Buddhist logicians consider testimony (*śabda*) to be a form of inference. As for analogy (*upamāna*) they identify it with memory and memory being not a source of valid knowledge according to them, they do not at all regard *upamāna* as a source of knowledge.[67] Again, implication[68] (*arthāpatti*)

62. pramāṇaṁ dvidhā/ pratyakṣaṁ parokṣam ca/ Pramāṇamīmāṁsā I. 9-10.
63. mānaṁ dvividhaṁ viṣayadvaividhyāt ... ... / Pramāṇavārtika, II. 1,
64. tasmād ananumānatvaṁ śābde pratykṣavad bhavet/
trairūpyarahitatvena tādṛgviṣayavarjanāt// Ślokavārtika, p. 370
65. athavā saty api viṣayadvaividhye sāmagrībhedāt phalabhedāc ca pramāṇabhedo bhavan katham apākriyate/ Nyāyamañjarī, p. 30
66 yad ekalakṣaṇalakṣitam tad vyaktibhede'pi ekam eva yathā vaiśadyaikalakṣaṇalakṣitaṁ cakṣurādipratyakṣam, avaiśadyalakṣaṇalakṣitaṁ ca śabdādi iti/ cakṣurādisāmagrībhedo'pi hi tajjñānānāṁ vaiśadyaikalakṣaṇalakṣitatvenaivābhedaḥ prasiddhaḥ pratyakṣarūpatā'-natikramāt, tadvat śabdādisāmagrībhede'pi avaiśadyaikalakṣaṇalakṣitatvena evābhedaḥ śabdādīnām parokṣarūpatvāviśeṣāt/ Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, p. 192
67. Tattvasaṅgraha, 1547-1549
68. evaṁ sati anumāna evāntarbhavān na pramāṇāntaratvaṁ syād ity abhiprāyaḥ/ Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā, p. 465

and non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*) are reduced to inference by them. The Vaiśeṣikas also recognise only two independent sources of knowledge-viz. perception and inference. They reduce analogy (*upamāna*), implication and testimony to inference. They consider even non-cognition to be a case of inference.[69] The Sāṅkhyas reduce analogy (*upamāna*) either to perception or to testimony.[70] Again, according to them implication is a form of inference.[71] And thay regard non-cognition as a form of perception.[72] The Naiyāyikas reduce implication to inference[73] and non-cognition to perception.[74] The Prābhākaras too regard non-cognition as a case of perception.[75] For the Jainas inference and testimony are two species of the indirect source. Again, according to them analogy (*upamāna*) is a form of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*)[76] which is a species of the indirect source of knowledge. Similarly, they consider cogitation (*tarka*) to be one of the species of the indirect source of knowledge.[77] As for non-cognition and implication they are both reduced to inference by them.

Pramāṇa-Saṁplava Vs. Pramāṇa-Viplava: There arises the question as to whether more than one organs of knowledge operate with regard to one and the same object or each organ has its own specific object. As the Buddhists uphold the doctrine of momentarism and reject the substance as unreal, there is no possibility, on their view, of one object being grasped even by two perceptions. This being the case no question arises of there taking place a co-operation of two quite different organs of knowledge--perception and inference—in the cognition of one and the same object. Again, they hold that perception and inference have their own special fields of action inasmuch as the former grasps the particulars only and the latter universals only.[78] And there is no third type of object that might be supposed to be common to both. So, perception can never grasp what is grasped by inference. The co-operation of different organs of our knowledge in the cognition of one and the same object is impossible.

69. Praśastapādabhāṣya, pp. 576-577
70. Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī, kā. 5.
71. Ibid, kā. 5
72. evam abhāvo'pi pratyakṣam eva/ Ibid, kā. 5
73. Nyāyamañjarī, p. 36
74. abhāvapratyakṣasya ānubhavikatvād anupalambho'pi na pramāṇāntaram/ Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī, kā. 144
75. Prakaraṇapañcikā, pp. 118-124.
    See also 'The Six Ways of Knowing', p. 164
76. Akalaṅkagranthatraya, pp. 7-8.
77. Ibid, p. 5 and p. 100
78. syān matir eṣā viśiṣṭaviṣayāṇi pramāṇāni/ viśeṣaviṣayam pratyakṣaṁ sāmānyaviṣayam anumānam iti/ Nyāyavārtika, p. 4

As against this none of those who repudiated momentarism and believed in the reality of the substance could rule out the possibility of the co-operation of the different organs of knowledge in the cognition of one and the same object (*pramāṇa-saṁplava*). Thus Gautama, the author of the Nyāyasūtra, seems to concede the possibility of *pramāṇa-saṁplava.* This is suggested by the term *pramāṇataḥ* used in the sūtra *pramāṇataś ca arthapratipatteḥ.*[79] Vātsyāyana clearly states that there are objects that could be grasped by all the organs of knowledge while there are other objects that could be grasped by some one organ only. As instances of the objects of the first type are cited *Ātman* and fire; they are cognised by the verbal authority, inference and perception successively. Then he gives instances of the objects in whose case only one organ can operate. The knowledge of Heaven could be acquired through verbal testimony only; the knowledge of clouds, after having heard the rumbling sound, could be had through inference only and the knowledge of one's own hand could be had through perception only.[80] Uddyotakara too accepts both *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* and *pramāṇa-saṁplava.* To give an illustration, he says that only visual sense organ grasps the quality colour, only auditory sense organ grasps the quality sound and so on yet all the sense organs grasp the Universal Being and the Universal Quality. Again he observes that though only visual sense organ cognises colour and only tactual organ cognises touch, yet both these organs cognise the solid body pot.[81]

Someone might urge that if all the organs were to grasp one and the same object then there would be no need of all these organs except one. Uddyotakara replies that though all organs co-operate in the cognition of one and the same object, they grasp this object differently, that is, in their own way; and what is to be borne in mind is that even if all the organs of knowledge operate in the cognition of the same object not one of them does so with reference to that entire object.[82]

The Jainas too accept both *pramāṇa-saṁplava* and *pramāṇa-viplava.* They accept momentarism from the point of view of modes. From this point of view a thing changes perpetually and hence no source of knowledge grasps what is grapsed by another source. Thus according to the Jainas *pramāṇa-viplava* is self-evident. But they are not absolutists. They

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79. Nyāyadarśana (Bengali), Vol. I, p. 87.
The comment of Uddyotakara on the word 'pramāṇataḥ' used by Vātsyāyana is noteworthy. It is: tatra pramāṇata iti tasirvacanavibhaktivyāptipradarśanārthaḥ/ ... ... vacanavyāptyā saṁplavo vyavasthā ca/ Nyāyavārtika, p. 4
80. Nyāyabhāṣya, I. 1. 3.
81. Nyāyavārtika, p. 5
82. syān matam yadi saṁkīryeran pramāṇāni nanv ekena pramāṇenādhigate'rthe dvitīyam pramāṇaṁ vyartham āpadyeta/ ... ... / na ca sarvasminn arthe saṁplavo'stīti ato na vaiyarthyam/ Ibid, p 5.

give equal importance to the point of view of substance. So, the Jainas accept even *pramāṇa-saṁplava.* From the point of view of substance things are permanent. Hence it is possible for several different sources of knowledge to co-operate in the cognition of one and the same object. But to the Jainas, *pramāṇa-saṁplava* is acceptable only in case a newly utilised source of knowledge adds something to the previously acquired knowledge of the object concerned. To illustrate, having known that there is fire there on the mountain through the statement of a passerby, if a person desires to know the same fire through inference he can do so, but the distinction of this inferential cognition of fire from the verbal cognition of it would be that in the latter case the person knows merely the general nature of fire while in the former case he knows it as connected with smoke. And if this person wants to know this fire through perception after having known it through inference, he may go to the place where the fire is actually present. The special feature of this perceptual cognition would be that the person grasps the specific characteristic of that fire viz. whether it is produced by hay or leaves etc. Thus even if these so many sources of knowledge co-operate in the cognition of one and the same thing fire each of them has its special sphere; this shows that *pramāṇa-saṁplava* and *pramāṇa-viplava* are not mutually contradictory as it would at first sight seem.[83]

Thus we finish our rapid survey of the different views adopted by the different systems of Indian Philosophy—particularly by the systems followed by Dharmakīrti and Akalaṅka on the problems of knowledge in general. In the following chapters we shall take up for discussion the different sources of knowledge one by one.

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83. Pt. D. Malavania's notes on the Nyāyāvatāravārtikavṛtti, p. 215

CHAPTER VI

ON PERCEPTION

Perception is the fundamental method of knowledge. The theory of perception is intimately related with metaphysics. As a matter of fact metaphysics starts with the theory of perception, and if it starts somewhere else it is demanded of it to offer a consistent, satisfactory and convincing account of perception. In Indian philosophy metaphysics has generally preceded epistemology. How intimately Metaphysics and Epistemology are related would become clear from the discussion that follows. The metaphysics of momentarism could not but reject the validity of every piece of knowledge that requires spatial and temporal extension and consequently in that metaphysics can fit only the theory that nothing but pure sensation gives us the true knowledge of reality. So, for the Buddhist logicians perception is equivalent to pure sensation. Those who upheld the metaphysics of permanence and substance in any form whatsoever could not agree with the Buddhist logicians. For them even (or only) the determinate cognition generated by the sense object contact can give us the direct knowledge of the object which continues to be there before the cogniser even at the time of his making an appropriate judgment. Thus these two main theories of perception are the result of two types of metaphysics or logic—momentarist and non-momentarist.

Dharmakīrti's Theory of Perception: We shall first give, after Dharmakīrti, a full account of the Buddhist theory of perception. This theory finds its first clear formulation in Diṅnāga, the funder of Buddhist Logic. Dharmakīrti mainly follows him.

Perception has been defined by Dharmakīrti as a cognition that is free from conceptual constructions (*kalpanā*) and errors.[1] In perception there is no conceptual construction. This is proved through experience itself. Let us stare at a patch of blue; withdraw all our thoughts and thus reduce our consciousness to a non-reflective state or what may be called 'a condition of rigidity.' This is the state of pure consciousness. A person awakened from such a state remembers that he had an experience of a patch of blue but he does not remember that he had an experience of a conception (image) of the 'blue' in that state. If in that state of pure sensation a conception were present the person would have experienced it and afterwards he would have remembered it just as he

1. tatra pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam/ Nyāyabindu, I, 4.

remembers the experience of the blue.[2] Conceptions never remain unnoticed or uncognised; they being of the nature of consciousness are self-cognised.[3]

Dharmakīrti defines conceptual construction as a cognition capable of being associated with verbal expressions.[4] The term 'capable' is advisedly used to include even the primitive constructions of the new born babes.[5] The main thing that makes possible the association of a verbal expression with a cognition is the latter's competence to relate the present experience with the past ones. The newborn babes are capable of relating the present experience with the past experiences. They stop crying as soon as they are brought near the mother's breast because they at once recognise that the breast present before them is just the same as that which had satisfied their need for nourishment formerly. Of course, all this is inarticulate and instinctive. But all the same the synthesis of the earlier experiences with the later one is there; no one can deny it. And the association of verbal expressions with such a synthetic cognition is simply symptomatic of the synthesis or construction involved in the cognition and does not constitute its essential nature; it is not always there in conceptions. The co-extensive feature of conceptual construction is a vague reflection. This vague reflection, in its turn, is due to the absence of an actual external object. A cognition that synthesizes the former experiences with the later one has not its object present to it, because the former experiences are not present there. And a cognition that does not require the presence of an external object has a vague reflection. Thus conceptual construction always involves a synthesis and invariably bears a blurred reflection.[6] Someone might

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2. pratyakṣaṁ kalpanāpoḍhaṁ pratyakṣenaiva siddhyati/ ... .
saṁhṛtya sarvataś cintāṁ stimitenāntarātmanā/
sthito'pi cakṣuṣā rūpam īkṣate sākṣajā matiḥ//
punar vikalpayan kiñcid āsīn me kalpanedṛśī/
vetti ceti na pūrvoktāvasthāyām indriyād gatau// Pramāṇavārtika, II. 123-125

3. pratyātmavedyaḥ sarveṣāṁ vikalpo ... ... // Ibid, II. 123.

4. abhilāpasaṁsargayogyapratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā/ Nyāyabindu, I. 5.

5. kācit tv abhilāpenāsaṁsṛṣṭāpi abhilāpasaṁsargayogyābhāsā bhavati/ yathā bālakasyāvyutpannasaṁketasya kalpanā/ ... ... yogyagrahaṇe tu sāpi saṁgṛhyate/ Nyāyabinduṭīkā, I. 5.
See also Pramāṇavārtika, II. 141-144

6. kutaḥ punar etadvikalpo'rthān notpadyata iti? arthasannidhinirapekṣatvāt/ bālo'pi hi yāvad dṛśyamānaṁ stanaṁ 'sa eva ayam' iti pūrvadṛṣṭatvena na pratyavamṛśati tāvan noparatarudito mukham arpayati stane/ pūrvadṛṣṭāparadṛṣṭaṁ cārtham ekīkurvad vijñānam asannihitaviṣayam, pūrvadṛṣṭasyāsannihitatvāt/ asannihitaviṣayaṁ cārthanirapekṣam/ anapekṣaṁ ca pratibhāsaniyamahetor abhāvād aniyatapratibhāsam/ tādṛśaṁ cābhilāpasaṁsargayogyam/ Nyāyabinduṭīkā, I. 5.
yasyārthasya sannidhānāsannidhānābhyāṁ jñānapratibhāsabhedas tat svalakṣaṇam/ Nyāyabindu, I. 13.
tasmāt sannidhānāsannidhānāc ca jñānapratibhāsasya grāhyākārasya bhedaḥ sphuṭatvāsphuṭatvābhyām/ Nyāyabinduṭīkā, II. 13.

urge that in the case of what is called continuous cognition we experience vivid reflection though this cognition is conceptual and determinate. It is conceptual and determinate because in it we continuously have the judgments 'this is x', 'this is x'. Dharmakīrti, however, points out that here is the case of the co-presence of perception and conception. The vivid reflection is borne by the former and not by the latter; or with deference to the persons who find it impossible that two cognitions should exist at one and the same time we may say that due to the frequent alternate occurrence of perception and conception man identifies them and as a result he attributes to conception the vivid reflection that is in fact borne by perception. This clearly shows that for Dharmakīrti vividness of reflection we experience in the cognition arising immediately after perception is not natural to that cognition but appears to be so on account of its close contiguity with the latter.[7]

Again, according to Dharmakīrti the object of perception is a unique particular *(svalakṣaṇa)*. The unique particular being what it is its essence is not shared by others, nor is it pervasive spatially or temporally. Hence recognition or synthetic cognition is not possible at all in connection with this unique particular. As a result, the formation of convention and use of words with respect to it is quite impossible and useless. Thus the object of perception being a unique particular it could not be capable of coalescence with verbal expressions. Only a mental construction is capable of being associated with words.[8]

That the object of perception is a unique particular can be proved as follows. If a man altogether stops all his sense-functions and thinks of a thing, he gets a blurred reflection of the thing in his cognition. This reflection would have been vivid if it pertained to an actual unique particular. We at times get vivid reflections and at other times the vague ones. This difference in reflections points to the difference in their objects. The perception that bears a vivid reflection has a unique particular for its object and the conception that bears a vague and blurred reflection has an exclusion *(vyāvṛtti)* or mental image for its object. The thesis can be proved in a different way. The object of conceptual construction is not a unique particular. If it were an object of conceptual construction a man who has arrested all the operations of his senses would have experienced a cognition the content of which is

7. manaso yugapadvṛtteḥ savikalpāvikalpayoḥ/
vimūḍho laghuvṛtter vā tayor aikyaṁ vyavasyati// Pramāṇavārtika, II. 133.

8. tasmād viśeṣaviṣayā sarvaivendriyajā matiḥ/
na viśeṣeṣu śabdānām pravṛttāv asti sambhavaḥ//
ananvayād viśeṣāṇāṁ saṅketasyāpravṛttitaḥ/
viṣayo yaś ca śabdānāṁ saṁyojyeta sa eva taiḥ// Pramāṇavārtika, II. 127-128

vivid, merely on hearing a name uttered by someone. Thus Dharmakīrti concludes that the object of perception is a unique particular and conversely that a unique particular is not the object of conceptual construction.[9]

Dharmakīrti maintains that determinate cognition does never require an external object for its emergence. It requires only the recollection of a convention. On the other hand, sense perception is generated by an external object only; it does not require for its emergence the memory of a convention. The Naiyāyikas who hold that even determinate cognitions can be perceptual might urge that the external object itself requires the assistance of the recollection of a convention in order to generate the concerned determinate cognition; this object alone is not efficient to generate it. But on this view the external object would become efficient to generate the recollection of a convention only because the object, when sensed, would generate the recollection and this recollection in its turn would generate the concerned determinate cognition. Thus recollection intervenes between sensation (perception) and determinate cognition. This determinate cognition being directly generated by recollection and not by the external object itself could not be regarded as a case of perception. It might be urged that it too is directly generated by the external thing. The external object itself generates determinate cognition after having generated the recollection. But the position is absurd. The external thing is uninatured. If it is efficient to generate the determinate cognition in question afterwards it should equally be efficient to do so even at the time when it is efficient to generate the recollection in question and this consequently would lead to the simultaneous emergence of the determinate cognition and this recollection. But that is not acceptable to the Naiyāyikas. It might be suggested that the things being momentary the object that generates recollection is different from the object that generates determinate cognition and hence the contingency pointed out by Dharmakīrti could be avoided. Thus on this view the determinate cognition in question though generated by the external object is not simultaneous with the recollection in question. But Dharmakīrti points out that this view considers the object of recollection and the object of determinate cognition to be mutually quite different and hence the memory of a convention caused by the former moment (*kṣaṇa*) becomes quite useless for the perception of the later moment (*kṣaṇa*). At last he concludes that perception does not require the memory of a convention;

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9. viśadapratibhāsasya tadārthasyāvibhāvanāt/
vijñānābhāsabhedaś ca padārthānāṁ viśeṣakaḥ//
cakṣuṣā'rthāvabhāse'pi yaṁ paro'syeti śaṁsati/
sa eva yojyate śabdair na khalv indriyagocaraḥ//
avyāpṛtendriyasyānyavāṅmātreṇāvibhāvanāt/ Ibid, II, 130-132

it requires for its emergence only the proper sense organ and the proper external object. Thus for him perception never involves thought or ideation or determination. Whatever cognition is determinate or involves thought is never generated directly by the external object and hence could not be considered to be a case of perception.[10]

Moreover, Dharmakīrti firmly believes that perception positively grasps a thing in its entirety and that the means other than perception are required only to remove the superimpositions. He proves this as follows. A thing has got only one nature and that has been grasped by perception. For, unless a thing (along with its total nature) is known no inference as to the presence in it of a particular attribute is possible, just as the presence of transitoriness in word cannot be inferred unless the word is already known. And here let us note that it is possible to know a thing in its entirety by perception alone, for there can be nothing in a thing which is not grasped by perception. That is to say, if there is something which remains unperceived when the thing is perceived, this something is not (a part of) the nature of this thing. Certainly, if B does not share the same fate as A, B cannot be said to be the nature of A. We regard two things as different from each other precisely when they do not share the same fate. Otherwise, there will remain no ground for our regarding two things as different from each other.

From this it naturally follows that there remains no scope for means other than perception unless a man even after perceiving the whole of a thing, becomes a victim of an illusion—an illusion preventing him from ascertaining the thing as it is—and ascribes a non-existing attribute to this thing. An illustration in point is that of the man who ascribes the nature of silver to shell. For, certainly a shell does not possess two natures, a specific one and a general one (i. e. one common to both shell and silver); for had it possessed two natures we would have taken note of them. We are not at all entitled to posit two different entities even when no two entities different from each other are taken note of

10. anapekṣitabāhyārthā yojanā samayasmṛteḥ/
tathā'napekṣya samayaṁ vastuśaktyaiva netradhīḥ//
saṅketasmaraṇāpekṣaṁ rūpaṁ yady akṣacetasi/
anapekṣya na cec chaktaṁ syāt smṛtāv eva liṅgavat//
tasyāṣ tatsaṅgamotpatter akṣadhīḥ syāt smṛter na vā/
tataḥ kālāntare'pi syāt kvacid vyākṣepasambhavāt//
krameṇobhayahetuś cet prāg eva syād abhedataḥ/
anyo'kṣabuddhihetuś cet smṛtis tatprāpy anarthikā//
yathā samitasiddhyartham iṣyate samayasmṛtiḥ/
bhedaś cāsamito grāhyaḥ smṛtis tatra kimarthikā// Ibid, II. 185-189.
See also Manorathavṛtti thereon.

by us, for that would be an absolutely arbitrary procedure. So, what happens is that when a man perceives a shell, he perceives its specific nature. However not being in a position to ascertain this fact—and this, in turn, because the conditions for such an ascertainment are absent there—the mental image capable of being generated by shell and silver is aroused in him. This causes him to mistake one for the other. As a result, he ascribes the nature of silver to shell. Similarly, when at a particular spatial point there is the generation of certain similar (though different) entities in close succession, one fails to take note of the difference obtaining between them and as a result comes to believe that an identical entity persists over there all the while. As many false ascriptions are possible in relation to a thing as are the types of things different from this thing, and different means (of the form of inference) other than perception are in place in order to remove these false ascriptions. Of course, these different means other than perceptions, whose sole utility lies in their excluding the thing in question from all other things, do not enable us to grasp the unperceived positive part of the thing's nature; for, no part whatsoever of this thing is left unperceived. As a matter of fact, the nature of a thing being partless, it is impossible to perceive it partwise.

Thus when a thing is perceived the totality of its attributes is always perceived, but, since owing to an illusion this is not so ascertained, we have to take recourse to inference. Thus Dharmakīrti logically proves that means other than perception do not enable us to grasp in a thing something that was left unperceived by the perception of that thing and that they are required only to remove super-impositions.[11]

11. ekasyārthasvabhāvasya pratyakṣasya sataḥ svayam/
ko'nyo na dṛṣṭo bhāgaḥ syād yaḥ pramāṇaiḥ parīkṣyate//
eko hy arthātmā/ sa pratyakṣaḥ/ asiddhe dharmiṇi sādhanā'sambhavāt/ yathā anityatve sādhye śabdaḥ/ tasya pratyakṣeṇaive sarvākārasiddhiḥ, tadanyasya asiddhasya abhāvāt/ bhāve vā tatsvabhāvatvam/ na hi yo yadekayogakṣemo na bhavati, sa tatsvabhāvo yuktaḥ/ tanmātranibandhanatvād bhedavyavahārasya/ anyathā abhāvaprasaṅgād ity uktam/ tasmāt pratyakṣe dharmiṇi tatsvabhāvasākalyaparicchedāt tatrānavakāśā pramāṇāntaravṛttiḥ syāt/
no ced bhrāntinimittena saṁyojyeta guṇāntaram/
śuktau vā rajatākāro rūpasādharmyadarśanāt//
yadi dṛṣṭasarvatattvasyāpi bhāvasya tathāniścayapratirodhinā bhrāntinimittena guṇāntaram na saṁyojyeta/ yathā śuktau rajatākāraḥ/ na hi śuktau dve rupe—samānaṁ viśiṣṭaṁ ca, tathāpratipattiprasaṅgāt/ apratipattau vā vivekena dvitvavikalpāyogāt, atiprasaṅgāc ca/ tasmāt paśyan śuktirūpaṁ viśiṣṭam eva paśyati/ niścayapratyayavaikalyāt tv aniścinvan tatsāmānyaṁ paśyāmīti manyate/ tato'sya rajatasamāropaḥ/ tathā sadṛśāparāparotpattyā alakṣitanānātvasya tadbhāvasamāropāt sthitibhrāntiḥ/ yāvanto'sya parabhāvās tāvanta eva yathāsvaṁ nimittabhāvinaḥ samāropā iti tadvyavacchedakāni bhavanti pramāṇāni sakalāni syuḥ/ teṣāṁ tu vyavacchedaphalānāṁ nāpratītavastvaṁśapratyāyane pravṛttiḥ tasya dṛṣṭatvāt/ anaṁśasya caikadeśena darśanāyogāt/
tasmād dṛṣṭasya bhāvasya dṛṣṭa evākhilo guṇaḥ/
bhrānter niścīyate neti sādhanaṁ sampravartate// Svārthānumānapariccheda, p. 17.

Someone might urge as to why there should not take place the determinate cognition of all its attributes if a thing in its entirety along with all its attributes has been perceived or experienced. In this connection Dharmakīrti observes that though the thing is perceived (experienced) in its entirety, yet merely on that account there does not arise the determinate knowledge of all its attributes because determinate knowledge requires certain auxiliary conditions in addition to the previous experience. The experience gives rise to the determinate knowledge of those aspects only that are repeatedly concentrated upon. To illustrate, though an ascetic, a lover and a dog have the same visual experience of the body of a woman, in the ascetic there arises the determinate knowledge of its disgusting aspect, in the lover there arises the determinate knowledge of its charming aspect and in the dog there arises the determinate knowledge of its eatable aspect as the three have repeatedly concentrated upon these respective aspects. Let us explain this fully. When we repeatedly concentrate upon a particular aspect of a thing, the memory traces or impressions of that aspect are deepened and retained for a long time; hence when that type of thing is experienced again, those memory traces are revived easily and as a result we have the determinate knowledge of that aspect of the thing. On the other hand, when we do not repeatedly concentrate upon a particular aspect of a thing, the memory traces of that aspect gradually fade away or remain very faint; hence when that type of thing is experienced again, those memory traces are not revived and as a result we do not have the determinate knowledge of that aspect of the thing.[12]

Again, it might be asked as to how possibly could that which is not being determined be regarded as being grasped by perception even? Dharmakīrti maintains that it is not the function of perception to determine anything. Whatever is grasped by perception is grasped without any determination. It is only in the case of determinate knowledges that we can say that they grasp their objects when they manage to determine them and do not grasp them when they fail to determine them. In what sense then does perception (or experience) grasp its object? It grasps its object through mere sensation or we may say that it grasps its object through sense-reflex. In other words, perception is said to grasp its object when it gives rise to the mere sensation of it and not to grasp it when it fails to give rise to this mere sensation. Hence Dharmakīrti replies that it is not proper to say that perception grasps its object

12. yady apy aṁśarahitaḥ sarvato bhinnasvabhāvo'nubhūtaḥ, tathāpi na sarvabhedeṣu tāvatā niścayo bhavati, kāraṇāntarāpekṣatvāt/ anubhavo hi yathāvikalpābhyāsaṁ niścayapratyayān janayati/ yathā rūpadarśanāviśeṣe'pi kuṇapa-kāmini-bhakṣyavikalpāḥ/ Ibid, p, 20.

when it manages to determine it and does not grasp it when it fails to determine it.[13]

According to Dharmakīrti all things are momentary. As a result, a thing is already destroyed when the perception of it takes place. How could then it be held that perception grasps a thing, for the thing is not there to be grasped by it? To avoid this difficulty, Dharmakīrti contends that an external thing causes its own perception, that is, is the object of perception inasmuch as it has the power to leave behind, through the sense-channel, its own impression in consciousness.[14]. Thus what we directly perceive is this impression; the object is at best inferred from this impression or copy. The perception of an external thing is therefore only the perception of an impression or copy in the mind, which copy or impression is supposed to represent faithfully the external thing. This raises the question as to what the immediate cause of perception exactly is. The copy is to be considered as the immediate cause of perceptual cognition and the perceptual cognition as such is the result. But the copy in the cognition and the cognition as such are really identical. So, how could they be related as cause and effect. In reply it is said that as a matter of fact the copy in the cognition is the determinant and the cognition as such is what is to be determined on the basis of this copy. But who determines it on the basis of the copy? It itself cannot determine itself because it is indeterminate. So, for this purpose it requires the determinate cognition arising in its wake. Unless and until the cognition is determined it is as good as non-existent because it cannot lead to successful purposive action and attainment of the desired object. It becomes efficient when it is, for example, ascertained as 'cognition-of-the-blue-object' by the determinate cognition. Hence only those indeterminate cognitions that generate determinate cognitions in their train are valid and efficient. If the indeterminate cognition does not generate determinate cognition in its wake, then the consciousness-of-the-object remains unascertained and consequently the indeterminate cognition remains inefficient with regard to its object. It might be urged that if it be so, then the indeterminate cognition is valid only when it is coupled with the determinate cognition and not in its pristine form of pure sensation. Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara emphatically refute this view. Perception does not involve construction or determination because immediately after it we remember (or judge) that

13. katham idānīm aniścīyamānaṁ pratyakṣeṇāpi gṛhītam nāma? na pratyakṣaṁ kasyacin niścāyakam/ tad yam api gṛhṇāti tan na niścayena/ kiṁ tarhi? tatpratibhāsena/ tanna niścayāniścayavaśāt pratyakṣasya grahaṇāgrahaṇe/ naivaṁ niścayānām, kiñcin niścinvato'py anyatrāniścayena pravṛttibhedād grahaṇāgrahaṇam/ Ibid, p. 20

14. bhinnakālaṁ kathaṁ grāhyam iti ced grāhyatāṁ viduḥ/
hetutvam eva yuktijñā jñānākārārpaṇakṣamam// Pramāṇavārtika, II, 247

we have *seen* the thing and not that we have *imagined* the thing. Seeing connotes the direct presentation involving no element of representation. On the other hand, imagination is the essence of conceptual construction. For example, while thinking of an absent thing, we say, 'I imagine the thing' and do not say 'I see the thing.' Thus the judgment immediately following the indeterminate cognition does not reveal its own nature but points to the nature of the previous indeterminate cognition. Thus the indeterminate cognition does not itself involve any construction or determination but all the same it is valid only if it generates determinate cognition in its wake.[15]

Then Dharmakīrti proves the validity of indeterminate cognition and the invalidity of the judgment immediately following it. Perception of a thing immediately generates the memory which gives verbal expression to the thing's exclusive practical efficiency and its distinction from everything else. But this memory is not valid cognition, for it takes note of what has already been taken note of. Inasmuch as this memory seeks to give verbal expression to the thing's already perceived exclusive form it is not a knowledge of something which was hither-to unknown; and inasmuch as through perception alone is cognised a practically efficient thing this memory is not a knowledge of something which possesses an exclusive practical efficiency. A means of valid knowledge is a cognition of something which was hither-to unknown and which possesses an exclusive practical efficiency. People seek to enquire as to what is a means of valid knowledge and what is not with a view to getting at things that are capable of performing some function or other. But 'generality' taken note of by the judgment that is occasioned and caused by the perception of a real thing performs no function whatsoever. For example, if one sees a blue thing and then judges 'here is a blue thing,' the blue thing that is capable of performing a function has already been taken note of by visual perception; on the other hand, the

15. vyavasthāpakaś ca vikalpapratyayaḥ pratyaksabalotpanno draṣṭavyaḥ/ na tu nirvikalpatvāt pratyakṣam eva nīlabodharūpatvena ātmānam avasthāpayituṁ śaknoti/niścayapratyayenāvyavasthāpitaṁ sad api nīlabodharūpaṁ vijñānam asatkalpam eva/ tasmān niścayena nīlabodharūpaṁ vyavasthāpitaṁ vijñānaṁ nīlabodhātmanā sad bhavati/ tasmād adhyavasāyaṁ kurvad eva pratyakṣam pramāṇaṁ bhavati/...janitena tv adhyavasāyena sārūpyavaśān nīlabodharūpe jñāne vyavasthāpyamāne sārūpyaṁ vyavasthāpanahetutvāt pramāṇaṁ siddhaṁ bhavati/ yady evam adhyavasāyasahitam eva pratyakṣaṁ pramāṇaṁ syāt na kevalam iti cet/ naitad evam/ yasmāt pratyakṣabalotpannena adhyavasāyena dṛśyatven artho'vasīyate notprekṣitatvena/ darśanaṁ ca arthasākṣātkaraṇākhyaṁ pratyakṣavyāpāraḥ/ utprekṣaṇaṁ tu vikalpavyāpāraḥ/ tathāhi parokṣam arthaṁ vikalpayanta utprekṣāmahe na tu paśyāma iti utprekṣātmakaṁ vikalpavyāpāram anubhavād adhyavasyanti/ tasmāt svavyāpāraṁ tiraskṛtya pratyakṣavyāpāram ādarśayati yatrārthe pratyakṣapūrvako'dhyavasāyas tatra pratyakṣaṁ kevalam eva pramāṇam iti/

— āyabinduṭīkā, I. 21

judgment of the blue that has arisen in the wake of the perception of the blue has for its object something that is incapable of performing the function of the blue thing. Hence when Dharmakīrti says that a means of valid knowledge is a cognition of something which was hitherto unknown he means to say that it is a knowledge of some real unique thing (*svalakṣana*) which was hitherto unknown.

When a real thing has been cognised through perception there arises a determinate cognition which, being a knowledge of practically the same thing as was grasped by this perception, is an imitation of this perception and hence not a *pramāṇa;* for a *pramāṇa* has to be a knowledge of some real thing which was hitherto unknown while the determinate cognition in question is a knowledge of no such thing. Certainly, a knowledge, in order to be *pramāṇa*, must have some real thing for its object. For, people who want to get some function performed seek to acquire a thing that is capable of performing this function. If a *pramāṇa* is that which helps people in acquiring things and if people seek to acquire real things (i. e. things capable of performing the function intended) a *pramāṇa* must be a knowledge of real things. However, even the determinate cognition that is caused and occasioned by perception enables people to determine (*adhyavasāya)* a real thing and thus to act (*pravṛtti*) in relation to this thing; but since perception in question also enables us to take note of this very thing and directs us towards the same, the determinate cognition in question is not a *pramāṇa*.

One might argue: If a knowledge ceases to be *pramāṇa* simply because its object was also the object of an earlier *pramāṇa,* a man's continuous perception of one and the same thing should be no *pramāṇa*, except at the moment this perception started; otherwise, the thesis that the knowledge of a hitherto unknown object is alone *pramāṇa* should be given up. To this Dharmakīrti replies that in case the percipient in question is competent to know the state of this thing from moment to moment his perception will be a new perception every moment; on the other hand, if a man is not so competent he will be cognising this thing's general behaviour during the period under notice and his cognition will not be the perception of a real thing, for the alleged object of this cognition will be supposed to perform one and the same function for several moments, a performance no real thing can undertake. The case is similar to the one of inferring fire from smoke. If a man is competent to know how smoke changes from moment to moment he will infer fire-of-the-moment from the smoke-of-the-moment; on the other hand, if he is not so competent he will infer fire-of-the-entire-period from the smoke-of-the-entire-period.[16]

16. Hetubindu, pp. 53–54

Thus Dharmakīrti refutes the notion that the determinate cognition arising in the wake of pure sensation (perception) is a *pramāṇa.*

Types of perception recognised by Dharmakīrti: Dharmakīrti recognises four types of perception—sense perception, mental perception, yogic perception, and self-perception. In the previous pages we have discussed perception in general and sense-perception in particular. Now we propose to explain the remaining types one by one.

Mental Perception: A mental perception is generated by the sense-perception which acts as the *causa materialis* i.e. the immediately preceding homogeneous cause.[17] But what is the object of mental perception? Does it grasp what is already grasped by the concerned sense-perception? It does not because that would deprive it of the status of a valid cognition. On the other hand, if it were to grasp what is altogether ungrasped by the concerned sense-perception then even the blind would perceive colour.[18] It grasps neither the object grasped by the concerned sense-perception nor the object absolutely unconnected with the object of this sense-perception. For it grasps only that object which is immediately produced by the object of the sense-perception. The sense-perception in co-operation with this newly produced object generates mental perception. So, there does not arise the contingency of the perception of colour on the part of the blind.[19]

This *mānasa-pratyakṣa* is not the same thing as the *mānasa-pratyakṣa* of the Naiyāyikas. It is an entirely different type of knowledge. The *mānasa-pratyakṣa* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy is nothing but the perception of the qualities of the self. Thus it could be included in self-perception *(svasaṁvedana-pratyakṣa)* a distinct type of perception recognised by the Buddhists.

It was Diṅnāga who first clearly formulated the concept of *mānasa-pratyakṣa.* The reason for his acceptance of this type of perception may be found in the metaphysical scheme of the Sarvāstivādins who included *manovijñāna* and *manovijñānadhātu* in the list of the seventy five categories into which the whole province of knowledge and reality was reduced by them. Again, it is stated in the Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭippaṇī that the conception of *manovijñāna* as a type of perception was a necessary deduction from the import of a scriptural text which declares, 'Colour is cognised, O

17. tasmād indriyavijñānānantarapratyayodbhavam/ Pramāṇavārtika, II. 243
18. pūrvānubhūtagrahaṇe mānasasyāpramāṇatā/
adṛṣṭagrahaṇe'ndhāder api syād arthadarśanam// Ibid, II. 239
19. svaviṣayānantaraviṣayasahakāriṇendriyajñānena samanantarapratyayena janitaṁ tan manovijñānam/ Nyāyabindu, I. 9
mano'nyam eva gṛhṇāti viṣayaṁ nāndhadṛk tataḥ// Pramāṇavārtika, II. 243

monks, by twofold cognition, the sense-perception and the mental perception induced by it.'

Diṅnāga's definition of *mānasa-pratyakṣa* was loose and taking the advantage of this looseness Kumārila severely criticised this additional type of perception accepted by Diṅnāga. Dharmakīrti amended the definition of Diṅnāga and formulated it in such a way as would remain free from all the defects pointed out by Kumārila. Though this definition is theoretically beyond any cavil yet there raged a controversy regarding its logical and psychological value, in short, regarding its *raison d'etre*. Jñānagarbha and his followers opine that mental perception which is sensory on one side and mental on the other is necessarily required in order to link two quite heterogeneous types of knowledge, namely, sense-perception and conception; without this intermediate link the rise of conception from perception would become impossible as the two are heterogeneous.[20] Dharmottara refutes this argument. He admits the possibility of an effect being generated from a heterogeneous cause. Perception is competent to generate conception. Even the validity of perception depends on this generative efficiency. And if sense-perception does not generate conception directly but requires for it the services of some intermediary like mental perception then it would become inefficient and consequently it would no more be a valid cognition, not a means of right knowledge—which is absurd.[21] This view of Dharmottara seems to be unsound because if sense-perception is efficient to generate the conceptual knowledge directly then the hypothesis of mental perception becomes useless. Dharmottara is conscious of this and hence he says that mental perception is a traditionally accepted doctrine; there are no facts and no possible experiments to prove its existence empirically.[22] Some interpreted this statement of Dharmottara to mean that mental perception is entirely transcendental (*atyantaparokṣa*).[23] The author of the Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭippaṇī admits that mental perception is not useful to us; but he adds that it is undoubtedly of use to the yogins. They acquire the capacity to discourse on spiritual or mystic matters by comprehending them (truths)in mental perception.[24] But this suggestion is not convincing because for the comprehension of such truths the supersensuous yogic perception

20. Buddhist Logic, Vol. II, pp. 315-316
21. Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭippaṇī, pp. 29-31
22. etac ca siddhāntaprasiddhaṁ mānasaṁ pratyakṣam/ na tv asya prasādhakam asti pramāṇam/ Nyāyabinduṭīkā, I. 9
23. Buddhist Logic, Vol. II, p. 333
24. na mānasapratyakṣeṇa asmadvidhānām arthakriyāvāptir bhavati, api tu yogino vītarāgādeḥ/ te ca tasmin kṣaṇe mānase copadarśitaṁ viṣayaṁ pratipadya dharmadeśanādikām arthakriyām āsādayantīty anavadyam/ Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭippaṇī, p. 29

should suffice which is postulated as an independent species of perception.

There is also a difference of opinion among the Buddhists regarding the question as to whether the concerned sense-organ operates even at the time when we are having a mental perception in the second moment. This implies that the point on which they are divided is as to whether sense-perception and mental perception can exist at the same moment. For, sense organ in operation must generate sense perception and if this operation is equally required for the generation of mental perception then the question arises whether sense perception and mental perception can possibly occur simultaneously. Jñānagarbha and others hold that the two can occur simultaneously because the rule is that though two perceptions of the same sense cannot occur at the same time, two perceptions of the different senses can. They quote the Abhidharmakośa in their support. There we are told that six different perceptions can occur simultaneously.[25] But Dharmottara refutes this view. He is of the opinion that if the sense organ were to operate even at the time when we are having a mental perception i.e. if the sense perception and mental perception could occur simultaneously, then there would be no sense-perception at all, that is, no perception generated by sense-organ would then be possible. The Ṭippaṇī explains this as follows: 'If we assume that in the second moment the outer sense-organ is engaged just as it is engaged in the first moment, then its function will also be the same, that is, it will make the object present in our ken. Why indeed should then sense-perception not arise in the second moment also, why should not both the moments receive the same name of sense perception ?' [26] Durveka's explanation of Dharmottara's statement is as follows: 'The first moment of the cognition-series is regarded as dependent upon the sense-organ because it is invariably concomitant with the presence and absence of the sense-organ. If even mental percep-

25. tair evaṁ vyākhyātaṁ vyāpāravati cakṣuṣīndriyajñānam utpadyate mānasaṁ ca/ na śakyate vaktuṁ dvayor yugapad utpattir nāstīti/ yataḥ samānendriyayor nāsti, na bhinnendriyayoḥ, ṣaṇṇāṁ yugapad utpattir iti vacanāt/ tataś ca dvayor bhinnendriyayor yugapad utpattiḥ/ Ibid, p. 29

26. etac ca manovijñānam uparatavyāpāre cakṣuṣi pratyakṣam iṣyate/ vyāpāravati tu cakṣuṣi yad rūpajñānaṁ tat sarvaṁ cakṣurāśritam eva/ itarathā cakṣurāśritatvānupapattiḥ kasyacid api vijñānasya/ Nyāyabinduṭīkā, I. 9
atha vyāpāravati cakṣuṣi kim iti mānasotpattir lupyata ity āha vyāpāravatītyādi/ sarvendriyāśritaṁ jñānaṁ cakṣurvijñānam eva na mānasasyotpattir astīty abhiprāyaḥ/ nanu vyāpāravati cakṣuṣi prathame kṣaṇa indriyavijñānaṁ bhavati dvitīye kṣaṇe mānasaṁ bhavati yadyapi samānajātīyayor yugapad utpattir nāstīty āha itarathetyādi/ evaṁ manyate/ vyāpāravati cakṣuṣi kim itīndriyavijñānaṁ notpadyate dvitīye kṣaṇe yogyakaraṇe sati samānarūpaṁ; tena tayoḥ katham indriyavijñānavyapadeśo na syād iti/ Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭippaṇī pp. 28–29

tion were to have invariable concomitance with the presence and absence of the sense-organ, then the invariable concomitance with the presence and absence of the sense-organ could not be given as a reason to establish a cognition as sense perception, that is, sense perception could not then be so called on the ground that it depends on the sense organ. So, even the first moment could not be established as sense perception on the ground that it has invariable concomitance with the presence and absence of the sesnse-organ.'[27]

Self-perception (*Svasaṁvedana*): All cognitions (*citta*) and mental states (*caitta*) are self-cognised.[28] This self-cognition on the part of each cognition and mental state is unique and free from conception. Hence it is a case of perception.[29]

Self-cognition of all cognitions and mental states is proved by Dharmakīrti as follows. First he points out that pleasure, pain, etc. are mental states. Then he proves that they are of the nature of cognition (*jñāna*) and lastly he proves that they could not be cognised by other cognitions. From this it naturally follows that all cognitions and mental states are self-cognised.

Let us see how he proves the first thesis. The Naiyāyikas contend that pleasure, pain etc. are not of the nature of cognition. For argument's sake they may grant that knowledge can be self-cognised; but they would certainly ask as to how the pleasure, pain, etc. that are not efficient to cognise even an external object cognise their own selves. Really speaking, says the Naiyāyika, it is only cognition that grasps pleasure, pain, etc. because cognition and pleasure, etc. have a common substratum, the soul.[30] Dharmakīrti refutes this view. He observes that things are identical in nature if they are generated by the same causal aggregate and they are different in nature if their causal aggregates are different. The cognition and the pleasure etc. have the same causal aggregate, namely, the object, the sense organ and the immediately antecedent homogeneous cause (that is, cause in the form of the immediately preceding state of consciousness). In the presence of this causal aggregate both of them arise and in the absence of this causal aggregate

27. kevalam ayam abhiprāyaḥ—yad api tad ādyaṁ cakṣurvijñānaṁ tad api cakṣuranvayavyatirekānuvidhānād eva tadāśritaṁ vyavasthāpanīyam/ saty api tadanvayavyatirekānuvidhāne yadi kasyacin mānasatvaṁ tadā cakṣuranvayavyatirekau cakṣurāśritatvavyavasthāyā anaṅgam ity ādye'pi tadvyavasthā na syād iti sādhīyān prasaṅgaḥ/ Dharmottarapradīpa, p. 62

28. sarvacittacaittānām ātmasaṁvedanam/ Nyāyabindu, I. 10

29. Pramāṇavārtika, II. 249

30. avedakāḥ parasyāpi te svarūpaṁ kathaṁ viduḥ/
ekārthāśrayiṇā vedyā vijñāneneti kecana// Ibid, II. 250

neither of the two does. Thus as the pleasure etc. and cognition both have the same causal aggregate they are identical in nature. Dharmakīrti thus concludes that pleasure etc. are of the nature of cognition. [31]

Then he goes on to prove that they could not be grasped by others. Sense perception could not grasp pleasure, etc. It grasps woman etc. (i.e. objects) that have caused this perception. For, the rule is that the sense perception grasps the object which has produced this perception. Moreover, objects like woman etc. produce pleasure, pain etc. simultaneously with the sense perception of these objects. How can then sense perception grasp pleasure, pain etc. which are invariably produced simultaneously with this sense perception ? [32] It might be urged that first sense perception grasps an external object and then mental perception grasps the concerned pleasure, pain etc. This view, observes Dharmakīrti, is not sound because on this view we would grasp external object and pleasure etc. successively which is not the case. [33] If it were urged that sense perception of the external object and mental perception of the internal qualities occur simultaneously then there would arise the contingency of a simultaneous experience of pleasure and pain with respect to one and the same object inasmuch as there might be objects that produce both pleasure and pain. The opponent might contend that this difficulty does not arise because the rise of pleasure and pain is caused not by the external object alone but by the immediately antecedent cognition (rather mental disposition) also. This is the reason why the external object produces pleasure only or pain only, though it might be capable of producing both simultaneously. Dharmakīrti at this stage raises the question as to how cognition can act as a cause proper of that which itself is not of the nature of cognition. It may at the most act as an auxiliary cause of pleasure and pain. [34]

Thus it is concluded that pleasure, pain, etc. could not be grasped by something other than themselves. As for the external object it merely generates these pleasure, etc. and is grasped by them—but certainly it does not grasp them. But then it might be objected that cognition could not become an object of itself even, because the subject and the object are two quite different categories. In reply, Dharmakīrti

31. tadatadrūpiṇo bhāvās tadatadrūpahetujāḥ/
tat sukhādi kiṁ ajñānaṁ vijñānābhinnahetujam// Ibid, II. 251

32. yasyārthasya nipātena te jātā dhīsukhādayaḥ/
muktvā taṁ pratipadyeta sukhādīn eva sā katham// Ibid, II. 255
See also Manorathavṛtti thereon.

33. avicchinnātha bhāseta tatsaṁvittiḥ kramagrahe/
tallāghavāc cet tattulyam ity asaṁvedanaṁ na kim// Ibid, II. 256
See also Manorathavṛtti thereon.

34. Ibid, II. 262–264

observes that cognition directly experiences the form of the external object reflected in itself and not the external object itself ; so, only metaphorically is it said that cognition grasps the external object which in fact simply causes this reflection. Really speaking, cognition does not grasp the external object; it grasps merely its own form.[35]

Thus, Dharmakīrti established the self-cognition of cognition after having refuted the Nyāya position. But he is not content with this much. There are the Sāṅkhya realists who regard the cognitions and mental states not only as incapable of cognising their own selves but also as material. Dharmakīrti refutes the Sāṅkhya view as follows, thereby establishing his thesis that all cognitions and mental states are self-cognised.

The Sāṅkhya philosophers consider the pleasure, etc. to be material and external. But in that case, these pleasure etc. would be grasped even alone, that is, without the grasping of the blue etc.—which is absurd. It might be urged that the pleasure etc. and the blue etc. both being identical we never grasp the pleasure etc. alone. Both the pleasure etc. and the blue etc. are grasped simultaneously. This raises the further question as to how those that are identical cause different forms of cognition.[36] Again, if the external object blue were of the nature of pleasure, pain and infatuation then how can one and the same object generate pleasure in one person, pain in another and infatuation in a third? Or, how can one and the same object generate in the same person pleasure at one time, pain at another time and infatuation at a third time? It might be argued that this can be explained by the fact that intellect (*buddhi*) of the persons is also of the nature of pleasure etc. and the element that predominates in his intellect is exeprienced by the person in the external object. Let us grant that the intellect is of the nature of pleasure etc. and that the element that predominates in it is experienced by the person. But why should the Sāṅkhyas consider the external object blue etc. to be of the nature of pleasure etc.? They answer that this is so because the relation of the cogniser and the cognised obtains between two things that are of the same nature. Dharmakīrti observes that on this view the *puruṣa* (soul) being not of the nature of pleasure etc. could not experience these pleasure etc. and as a result it would be deprived of its nature of being an enjoyer (*bhoktā*). To avoid this contingency the Sāṅkhyas should believe that the relation of subject and object may obtain even

35. tasmāt sukhādayo'rthānāṁ svasaṅkrāntāvabhāsinām/
vedakāḥ svātmanaś caiṣām arthebhyo janma kevalam//
arthātmā svātmabhūto hi teṣāṁ tair anubhūyate/
tenārthānubhavakhyātir ālambas tu tadābhatā// Ibid, II. 266–267

36. Ibid, II. 268–269

between things that are of quite different nature. So, the external object could not now be proved to be of the nature of pleasure etc. simply on the ground that their subject or grasper, the intellect, is of the nature of pleasure etc. From this Dharmakīrti concludes that the pleasure etc. are exclusively internal.[37] Moreover, he says that as they are experienced, they should be sentient (and not physical). We can never experience the form that is not an integral part of a sentient experience.[38] Some might urge that the sentient experience is not of the nature of pleasure, etc. The pleasure, etc. are external and constitute the nature of the intellect which is material. Yet the sentient experience grasps them. Dharmakīrti asks them as to what this intellect is except the sentient experience that takes the form either of a percept or of a concept. As a matter of fact, nothing like the 'intellect' as is described by the Sāṅkhyas is observed in between the external object and the sentient experience of it. It might be urged that the intellect is not noticable as distinct from the sentient experience because it is closely intermingled with the sentient experience. Dharmakīrti observes that this means that even if we have the reflection of but a unitary sentient experience we have to admit the existence of the intellect as distinct from this sentient experience. But this would make it impossible for us to establish either the difference between things or the identity of things, for even while there is a reflection of one thing we are asked by the Sāṅkhyas to hold that there exist two things over there.[39] The Sāṅkhyas consider the blue etc. and the pleasure etc. to be mutually identical and then intellect and the sentient experience to be mutually different but Dharmakīrti asks them as to how they would prove the identity of the former and the difference of the latter if the reflection is not regarded as the criterion for the establishment of identity and difference.[40]

37. tasyāviśeṣe bāhyasya bhāvanātāratamyataḥ/
tāratamyaṁ ca buddhau syān na prītiparitāpayoḥ//
sukhādyātmatayā buddher api yady avirodhitā/
sa idānīṁ kathaṁ bāhyaḥ sukhādyātmeti gamyate//
agrāhyagrāhakatvāc ced bhinnajātīyayoḥ pumān/
agrāhakaḥ syāt sarvasya tato hīyate bhoktṛtā//
kāryakāraṇatā'nena pratyuktā'kāryakāraṇe/
grāhyagrāhakatābhāvād bhāve'nyatrāpi sā bhavet// Ibid, II. 270–273

38. *tasmāt ta āntarā eva saṁvedyatvāc ca cetanāḥ/*
saṁvedanaṁ na yad rūpaṁ na hi tat tasya vedanam// Ibid, II. 274

39. atatsvabhāvo'nubhavo bauddhāṁs tān sann avaiti cet/
muktvā'dhyakṣasmṛtākārāṁ saṁvittiṁ buddhir atra kā//
tāṁs tān arthān upādāya sukhaduḥkhādivedanam/
ekam āvirbhavad dṛṣṭaṁ na dṛṣṭaṁ tv anyad antarā//
saṁsargād avibhāgaś ced ayogolakavahnivat/
bhedābhedavyavasthaivam ucchinnā sarvavastuṣu// Ibid, II. 275-277

40. Ibid, II. 279

So ultimately Dharmakīrti arrives at the conclusion that the intellect is not different from the sentient experience, which means that the pleasure, etc. are internal and sentient. This, in turn, means that the affective and cognitive aspects constitute the nature of the *puruṣa*, soul. And the soul being regarded by the Sāṅkhya realists as self-luminous, even these aspects of the soul should also be regarded as self-luminous. Thus after having refuted the Nyāya and the Sāṅkhya realists Dharmakīrti establishes his thesis that all cognitions and mental states are self-luminous.

Yogic Perception: Dharmakīrti defines yogic perception as the cognition produced from the subculminational state of deep meditation on transcendental reality.[41] It is necessary to explain what Dharmakīrti means by 'subculminational state of meditation.' Dharmottara, while commenting on the above, observes that there are three degrees of trance-absorption —(i) that when the image begins to be clear, (ii) that when the yogi contemplates reality as though it were covered by a transparent plate of clean mica; this stage is called the subculminational state of meditation; (iii) that when the object is perceived as though it were an *āmalaka* fruit on the palm of one's hand—this is yogic perception and is immediately generated by the subculminational state of meditation.[42]

In the Pramāṇavārtika Dharmakīrti explains the definition of yogic perception. First he states that yogic perception is generated by deep contemplation and that it is vivid and free from conceptual construction; and afterwards he explains each of these qualifying terms in anticipation of the possible objections that might be urged against them. It might be asked as to how the cognition generated by contemplation can be vivid. Dharmakīrti proves his point by drawing our attention to the fact that the persons possessed of fear, sorrow and passion vividly see the non-existent things as a result of the repeated thought of those things. Again, some one might ask, 'Conceded that the cognition generated by contemplation is vivid but how can one accept it to be free from conception?' Dharmakīrti answers that the cognition in question has indeed vividness and just for this reason it ceases to be a conceptual construction. The conceptual constructions are never vivid. Dharmakīrti again observes that all cognition born of a deep contemplation on either reality or unreality is vivid and non-conceptual; but the cognition born of a contemplation on reality is valid while the cognition born of a contemplation on unreality is invalid because the former alone is in harmony with conative activity or is efficient to lead to the attainment of the object pointed out

41. bhūtārthabhāvanāprakarṣaparyantajaṁ yogijñānam ceti/ Nyāyabindu, I 11
42. Nyāyabinduṭīkā, I. 11

by it. This, in short, is how the cognition born of a deep contemplation on reality is vivid, non-conceptual and efficient to generate the purposive action, and hence it is a case of perception.[43]

Akalaṅka's criticism of Dharmakīrti's position: Akalaṅka vehemently criticises Dharmakīrti's conception of perception in general and then attacks, one by one, the types of perception recognised by the latter. We shall first see how Akalaṅka refutes Dharmakīrti's conception of perception in general and then we shall consider Akalaṅka's criticism of the types of perception recognised by Dharmakīrti.

Dharmakīrti contends that perception does not involve determinations or conceptions (*kalpanā*) as they are not noticed by us in the perceptual cognition. If they were present there in the perceptual cognition they would have been noticed by us because they never come into existence or pass away unnoticed. But Akalaṅka points out that though conceptions are present in perception they are not noticed by us at the time of perception just as the difference among point instants coming into existence in close succession at one spatial point is not noticed by us in perceptual cognition. Dharmakīrti might urge that there is no reason why we should not notice conceptions if they are present in perceptual cognition, while there is a reason why we do not notice the difference obtaining among point instants—the reason being that they are similar. Akalaṅka observes that on the momentarist hypothesis there is no possibility of any two things being similar. The intelligent person should ponder over the question whether absolutely indeterminate thought-less cognition is possible or not. Moreover, how could the absolutely thought-less and indeterminate cognition generate cognition determinate and involving thought?[44]

Again, Akalaṅka observes that since perception as conceived by Dharmakīrti is in certain cases capable of forming mental traces and also of reviving the previously formed traces it could never be absolutely indeterminate. It is only a determinate cognition that can leave impressions on the mind. Again, it is only a determinate cognition that is efficient to revive the mental traces. For forming the mental traces and for reviving them determinate cognition is necessary. However, perception as conceived by Dharmakīrti is able to form the mental traces of the blue and the like and to revive them—even if it is not able to form the

43. Pramāṇavārtika, II. 281-286

44. pratisaṁviditotpattivyayāḥ satyo'pi kalpanāḥ/
pratyakṣeṣu na lakṣyeraṁs tatsvalakṣaṇabhedavat//
sadṛśāparāparotpattivipralambhāt tadviśeṣādarśino'navadhāraṇam asamīkṣitābhidhānam; sarvathā tatsādṛśyāniṣṭeḥ/ pratisaṁhāraikāntaḥ sambhavati na veti cintyam etat/ kathaṁ ca pratyakṣabuddhayaḥ sarvathā'vikalpāḥ punar vikalpyeran/ Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 9

mental traces of momentariness and the like and to revive them. This suggests that what is called indeterminate perception by Dharmakīrti is not absolutely indeterminate. For, on his showing, it is determinate with respect to the blue etc. and indeterminate with respect to momentariness etc. Now Dharmakīrti might contend that though momentariness etc. and the blue etc. are both grasped by indeterminate perception yet only in the case of the first set there is no formation of mental traces and their revival while in the case of the second set it is there because we have no repeated experiences of the first set while we do have repeated experiences of the second set. Akalaṅka points out that this is not so, as we have repeated experiences of both the sets. Then it might be urged that perception is efficient to form impressions of the blue etc. and to revive them while it is inefficient to form impressions of momentariness etc. and to revive them. But here again Akalaṅka points out that the position is not reasonable because the blue etc. and momentariness etc. both being the objects of perception it should be either equally efficient or equally ineffiicient with respect to the two. Nor could Dharmakīrti hold that similar moments being in close succession we are not able to determine their unique momentary nature, for in momentarism there is no possibility at all of two things being similar. And he could not explain similarity as the absence of the determination of the unique nature of things, for that would involve over-absurdity; e. g. there is the absence of the determination of the unique nature of the seed-moment and the sprout-moment immedaitely following it but they are not similar. Nor could he explain similarity as the 'absence of the conditions necessary for determination, viz. repeated experiences etc., for those conditions are present in the case of momentariness too. Thus Akalaṅka concludes that what is called perception by Dharmakīrti is not absolutely indeterminate but relatively indeterminate. [45]

In a different manner, again Akalaṅka proves that perception as conceived by Dharmakīrti is determinate. The Vaiśeṣikas who believe that generality *(sāmānya)* which is quite different from the individual *(vyakti)* is first perceived should not consider this perception of generality to be indeterminate *(nirviklpa)*, because on the strength of this perception we cognise identity in different individuals or apply one word to many

45. vyavasāyātmano dṛṣṭeḥ saṁskāraḥ smṛtir eva vā/
dṛṣṭe dṛṣṭasajātīye nānyathā kṣaṇikādivat//
darśanābhyāsapāṭavaprakaraṇādeḥ dṛṣṭasajātīyasaṁskārasmṛtiprabodhe svabhāvavyavasāyam antareṇa kṣaṇabhaṅgādāv api liṅgānusaraṇam anupapannaṁ tadaviśeṣān nīlādivat/ ......sadṛśāparotpattivipralambhān nāvadhārayatīty asamañjasam; sarvathā sādṛśyāsaṁbhavāt/ vailakṣaṇyānavadhāraṇe atiprasaṅgaḥ/ tadvikalpakāraṇavyatireka ity api tādṛg eva/ Siddhiviniścaya, p. 26 and p. 31

individuals. Similarly, it is not proper for Dharmakīrti who holds that we first perceive the unique particulars to consider this perception to be indeterminate, because on the strength of this perception there arises the conceptual cognition of the exclusion of the opposite. How can Dharmakīrti who accepts the exclusion of the opposite *(atadvyāvṛtti)* on the basis of the perception of the particulars say that we do not have the determinate perception of the particulars? If we were to have the determinate knowledge of the exclusion of the opposite even without the determinate perception of the particular itself, even the Vaiśeṣikas may equally say that the cognition of identity in many things or the application of one word to many things can take place even without the determinate perception of generality. Dharmakīrti might ask the Vaiśeṣikas as to how generality which is not determinately known be the cause of the cognition of identitiy in many things or the application of one word to many things. The Vaiśeṣikas would reply that the power of generality is unimaginable. Even Dharmakīrti will have to give the same answer to the question as to how we can have determinate cognition of the exclusion of a particular from its opposite if we do not have the determinate cognition of the particular itself. So, says Akalaṅka, Dharmakīrti's view that perception (whose object is a unique particular) is absolutely indeterminate is not plausible and tenable.[46]

Akalaṅka has criticised the definition of *kalpanā*. Let us study his criticism. The Buddhists including even Dharmakīrti generally define *kalpanā* as a cognition expressed in words. But if a cognition expressed in words is *kalpanā* and if there can be no *kalpanā* without the relation of words, then *kalpanā* in the form of the memory of words would require other words and the memory of these other words would require still other words and so on *ad infinitum*. Thus *kalpanā* itself remains unproved and unestablished. As a result, it would not be possible for us to determine the nature of perception. In such a situation how can we make use of perception so as to acquire a true knowledge of reality? If, in order to avoid this difficulty, *kalpanā* in the form of the memory of words were regarded as arising without requiring the use of other words then the definition of *kalpanā* as a cognition expressed in words would become narrow because in that case it would not apply to the *kalpanā* in question. And if the memory of words were not

46. yathaiva hi vyaktivyatirekasāmānyadarśinas tadanupalakṣaṇam ayuktaṁ taddarśanabalād bhinneṣu dravyādiṣu abhinnapratyayotpatteḥ, tathaiva svalakṣaṇadarśinas tadanupalakṣaṇaṁ taddarśanabalāt tadanyavyavacchedavikalpotpatteḥ tadanubhavehitavyapoham [illegible] kathaṁ anupalakṣaṇo nāma? svalakṣaṇadarśinaḥ svalakṣaṇopalakṣaṇavikalpam antareṇāpi tadanyāpohakalpanāyāṁ jātidarśino'pi tadupalakṣaṇavikalpam antareṇāpi kasmiṁścit bhinneṣu samavāyinaḥ pratyayaḥ kathaṁ virudhyeta? kāraṇaśakter acintyatvāt itaratrāpi etad uttaraṁ viśeṣābhāvāt Ibid, p. 133

regarded as *kalpanā* on the ground that it arises without being related to other words denoting the words remembered then on the same ground other determinate cognitions too should not be regarded as *kalpanā* so long as they are not put in words. Thus the sensory cognition determining a thing without the use of words would be proved to be free from *kalpanā* and hence to be a case of perception. [47] After this Akalaṅka proceeds on to criticise the definition of *kalpanā* given by Dharmakīrti himself at another place. Dharmakīrti has defined it as a cognition bearing the reflection capable of being expressed through words. Akalaṅka points out that to define *kalpanā* as a cognition bearing the reflection capable of being expressed through words would mean this much that *kalpanā* does not reflect the impartite unique particulars but reflects one gross form. But if the defining phrase 'capable of being expressed through words' were to mean this then the perception which is defined by Dharmakīrti as free from *kalpanā* could be no perception at all, because as a matter of fact it does reflect a gross form and does so vividly while on the other hand the unique particular posited by Dharmakīrti never becomes an object of perception. [48]

Dharmakīrti is of the opinion that an indeterminate cognition is valid while the determinate cognition following in its wake is invalid because the former is naturally vivid while the vividness of the latter is borrowed or derived from the former on account of its being contiguous with it. Akalaṅka, on the contrary, proves that the vividness of a determinate cognition is natural to it. It is a fact that only determinate cognitions leave impressions on the mind. And these impressions when revived by the contact of the sense with the object generate the memory of the previously experienced similar objects; it is this memory that constitutes the determinate cognition which follows in the wake of an indeterminate cognition. This memory of the form of determinate cognition being generated by and under the control of sense-object contact is to be viewed as vivid by its very nature. Again, that determinate cognition is valid which rightly recalls the impressions concerned. On the otherhand, there arises no question of impressions being recalled—rightly or wrongly—in

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47. abhilāpatadaṁśānām abhilāpavivekataḥ/
apramāṇaprameyatvam avaśyam ānuṣajyate// Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 30
kiñcit kenacid viśiṣṭaṁ gṛhyamāṇaṁ viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-tatsambandhādigrahaṇam antareṇa na bhavitum arhati/ tataḥ pratyakṣasadṛśārthābhidhānasmṛtir anabhilāpinī abhilāpaviṣayā siddhā/ tadanyābhilāpāpekṣaṇe anavasthāprasṅgāt/ Siddhiviniścaya, pp. 36-37

48. abhilāpasaṁsargayogyapratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpaneti viśeṣaṇād adoṣaś cet svārthasannikarṣaniibhāsaviśeṣavaikalyavyatirekeṇa na tadviśeṣaṇārtham utprekṣāmahe/ tataḥ kim? ....svalakṣaṇāni svayam abhimatakṣaṇakṣayaparamāṇulakṣaṇāni paśyato'pi kevalam eko hi jñānasannivesī sthavīyān ākāraḥ parisphuṭam avabhāsate/ Siddhiviniścaya, pp. 37-38.

the case of an indeterminate cognition. Thus it is concluded that only determinate cognitions are valid.[49]

Akalaṅka has also criticised Dharmakīrti's view that the object of perception is only a unique particular. He observes that indeterminate cognition which is the only type of perception according to Dharmakīrti has not a unique particular for its object because a man whose senses are operating never cognises such an object. One does not experience such a unique particular either externally or internally. Externally we perceive (for example) a pot undergoing modifications and having parts; internally we experience our own consciousness having many forms. Even the person who has withdrawn his thoughts or concepts from all objects, perceives only a gross form having many parts and not an absolutely unique impartite particular. This is proved by the fact that a person awakened from such a state does not remember to have experienced such an absolutely unique particular.[50]

Akalaṅka further points out that even the perception recognised by Dharmakīrti could not know its object, a particular, unless it excludes it from others ; nor could it exclude this particular from others unless it has known at least something general about it. Otherwise, it would not be possible at all to establish the nature of the thing.[51] Akalaṅka then remarks that even Dharmakīrti could not deny that though the objects of perception are somewhat unique from the point of view of their time and place, yet they are reflected in their general nature only, that is, they are reflected as the blue etc. and not as something momentary and atomic.[52]

After this, let us study Akalaṅka's criticism of Dharmakīrti's argument that the determinate cognition taking place immediately after the indeterminate cognition of an object is not generated by the object and hence it could not be regarded as a case of perception. Akalaṅka proves that this determinate cognition is generated by an external object and that it is really a case of perception. It requires the presence of an external object. On account of the contact of the sense with the object the memory images involved in the cognition under consideration are

49. Ibid, pp. 34-35

50. sarvataḥ saṁhṛtya cintāṁ stimitāntarātmanā sthito'pi cakṣuṣā rūpaṁ saṁsthānātmakaṁ sthūlātmakam ekaṁ sukṣmānekasvabhāvaṁ paśyati na punaḥ asādhāraṇaikāntaṁ svalakṣaṇam/ pratisaṁhāravyutthitacittasya tathaivāsmaraṇāt/ tasmād aviśadam eva avikalpakaṁ pratyakṣābham/ Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 8.

51. na hy anyataḥ svārtham avyavacchindat pratyakṣam paricchinatti, nāpi kathañcid aparicchindad eva vyavacchinatti sarvathā arthasvabhāvāsiddhiprasaṅgāt/ Siddhiviniścaya, p. 147

52. abhimatasvalakṣaṇānāṁ kathñcid asādhāraṇatve'pi sadṛśātmanaiva pratibhāsanāt/ Ibid, p. 123. See also the ṭīkā thereon.

tied and not free. Our attention, therefore, remains centred on the presented object itself: it does not move in the realm of ideas in themselves. Akalaṅka proves it to be a case of perception rather than mental construction on Dharmakīrti's own rule that two conceptual cognitions could not coexist. The determinate cognition under consideration does not disappear even when the thought of another thing takes place. While having the determinate cognition of a cow we can have a thought or concept or mental image of a horse. This proves that this determinate cognition is not mental or conceptual but really perceptual in character. If it were conceptual then according to the rule that two conceptual cognitions could not coexist it would disappear as soon as there takes place the thought of a horse. Thus the possibility of its existence along with the thought of another thing proves that it itself is not a conceptual construction but something perceptual.[53]

Again, Akalaṅka criticises Dharmakīrti's position that perception positively cognises a thing in its entirety while the means other than perception are required only to remove the false superimpositions. The criticism is as follows. Perception does not grasp a thing in its entirety inasmuch as some part or aspect of it remains unperceived. This can be corroborated by what are called perceptual illusions *(pratyakṣa-bhrānti)* by Dharmakīrti. In perceptual illusions the cogniser perceives a thing partly as it is and partly as it is not. If it were the nature of perception to grasp a thing in its entirety, then in perceptual illusion also the cogniser would have perceived the thing in its entirety with the result that perceptual illusions should not arise at all. Thus perceptual illusions would become an utter impossibility if it were held that perception grasps a thing in its entirety. [54]

Dharmakīrti argues that an inference is *pramāṇa* because it removes superimpositions consequent upon the cognition of similarity. Akalaṅka in return observes that it is precisely because an indeterminate cognition stands in need of the removal of superimpositions that we refuse to

53. na caitad vyavasāyātmapratyakṣaṁ mānasaṁ matam/
pratisaṁkhyā'nirodhyatvād arthasannidhyapekṣaṇāt//
na hīdaṁ svārthavyavasāyātmakaṁ mānasaṁ pratyakṣam, gavi sannihite mānasīṁ gobuddhiṁ vinivartya tadā aśvakalpanāyām api gor eva viniścayāt/ sa punaḥ niścayaḥ vikalpāntaravad yadi mānasaḥ syāt tadā arthasannidhiṁ nāpekṣeta/ tasmād idaṁ spaṣṭaṁ vyavasāyātmakaṁ jñānaṁ svārthasannidhānānvayavyatirekānuvidhāyi pratisaṅkhyā'nirodhyāvisaṁvādakaṁ pramāṇaṁ yuktam/ Ibid, p. 112

54. sarvātmanāṁ niraṁśatvāt sarvathā grahaṇaṁ bhavet/
nauyānādiṣu vibhrānto na na paśyati bāhyataḥ//
na ca nāsti sa ākāraḥ jñānākāre'nuṣaṅgataḥ/
tasmād dṛṣṭasya bhāvasya na dṛṣṭaḥ sakalo guṇaḥ// Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 49

treat it as *pramāṇa*.[55] On the other hand, the determinate cognition arising in its wake removes the superimpositions that are due to similarity. Thus there is no difference whatsoever between an inference and the determinate cognition arising in the wake of an indeterminate cognition. The only difference is that the determinate cognition under consideration is generated *directly* by what is called perception by Dharmakīrti. But this is an additional factor favourable to our treating it as *pramāṇa* or valid knowledge.[56]

Though perception grasps the unique nature of its object it does not determine even the existence of this object or of itself—such a view involves, Akalaṅka observes, glaring contradiction. Again, the view that perception grasps the unique nature of its object entails the contingency of the non-operation of (i. e. futility of) the other means of cognition. For a person who has known the unique nature of an object, there remains no scope for a desire to know something more about that object and hence he would not try to get more information or knowledge about that object. So, for him there is no use of recalling the similar objects; as a result, in his case there arises no possibility of superimposition of a foreign characteristic on the presented object, a superimposition that might require another means of cognition for its removal. If it is urged that there remains a possibility of the superimposition of a foreign characteristic on an object even when it has been grasped by perception, then there would remain a possibility of the superimposition of a foreign characteristic on this object even when it has been grasped by inference. And this involves an infinite regress. If Dharmakīrti were to say that an object is merely experienced and not determined in any way by perception, Akalaṅka points out that even this experience being as good as slumber, would not provoke a man to remove the superimpositions concerned. Again, to say that the cogniser perceives a particular and remembers what is similar to it is not proper, because no memory of the similar can arise from the perception of a unique particular which is absolutely different from all others. Moreover, Akalaṅka argues that since the determinate cognition under consideration grasps a similarity and since a similarity is inefficient according to Dharmakīrti, this determinate cognition would prove to be something useless. Dharmakīrti might reply that it is useful because it is generated by the indeterminate cognition of an object, the real particular, and also because it, like inference, urges a man to undertake

55. sarvasyaiva nirvikalpakajñānasya samāropavyavacchedākāṅkṣiṇaḥ prāmāṇyaṁ na syāt.../ Ibid, p. 3

56. samānabhūtasamāropavyavacchede saṁvṛtyanumānayor na kaścid viśeṣaḥ/ sākṣād anubhavād utpattiḥ mahān aparādhaḥ/ Siddhiviniścaya, p. 13

purposive action. But then, Akalaṅka observes that in that case it is proper to consider determinate cognition to be a case of valid knowledge and not indeterminate cognition, for, in the absence of a determinate cognition there could be no successful purposive action on the part of a man nor any harmony between his cognitive activity and his conative activity. Therefore, Akalaṅka concludes that those who hold that the memory of a similarity arises from the indeterminate cognition grasping a unique particular must have been dull-witted persons. [57]

Dharmakīrti maintains that only an indeterminate cognition can be valid; and it is valid only when it gives rise to a determinate cognition. kalaṅka considers this view to be strange on the following ground. Because the determinate cognition directly leads to a successful action, it should be viewed as a piece of valid knowledge. And Dharmakīrti himself has defined valid knowledge as that which leads to a successful purposive action. So, only the determinate cognition that arises immediately in the wake of the indeterminate cognition of an object should be viewed as a piece of valid knowledge and not the latter that precedes it. Like sense-object contact (*sannikarṣa*) the mere indeterminate cognition of an object could not lead to a successful purposive action. [58]

Now let us study Akalaṅka's criticism of Dharmakīrti's argument that since the determinate cognition under consideration grasps what is already grasped and since its object is a universal (which is something unreal according to Dharmakīrti) it could not be regarded as a piece of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Akalaṅka proves that a universal is something real. How he does so we have already studied. So, Dharmakīrti could not consider a determinate cognition to be invalid simply on the ground that it cognises a universal. Nor could it be regarded as invalid simply on the ground that it grasps what is already grasped. Akalaṅka observes that 'grasping-the-hitherto-ungrasped', the adjectival phrase used by

57. svaviṣayaviśeṣanirbhāsaṁ pratyakṣam ātmānaṁ kathañcin na lakṣayatīti viruddham, yathāsamayaṁ pratipatteḥ/ pratipattau vā pramāṇāntarāvṛttiprasaṅgāt/ viśeṣaṁ lakṣayato nirākāṅkṣatvāt kathañcid aprayatamānasya kutaḥ smṛtir yataḥ samāropavyavaccheda-vikalpaḥ ...../ tallakṣitasamārope atiprasaṅgāt....../ yadi punaḥ anubhūtaṁ sarvathā na lakṣayet kutaḥ samāropavyavacchedaprayatnaḥ suṣuptavat/ viśeṣaṁ paśyato lakṣayato vā samānākārasmṛtir ayuktaiva tayor asambandhāt/ atiprasaṅgo hy evaṁ syāt/ anarthikā ceyam arthakriyāsamarthasvalakṣaṇadṛṣṭir grāhakaṁ yataḥ vikalpabuddher etadviṣayatvāt/ tattvadarśinas tadviparītasmṛtyutpādanaprayatnānupapatteḥ taddarśana-balotpatteḥ tattve pravartanāc ca nānarthikā anumānavad iti cet, tasyās tarhi prāmāṇyaṁ yuktaṁ tadabhāve saṁvādāyogāt/...tadayaṁ viśeṣadarśanāt sāmānyasmṛti-vyavahāraṁ pravartayan avikalpa eva/ Ibid, p. 152

58. tasyāś cej jananāt pramāṇam ata evāstu svato nirṇayaḥ/ Ibid, p. 6
pratipattur uttaraṁ pramāṇaṁ tatsādhanabhāvāt na tu pūrvakam, anumāne'py evaṁ prasaṅgāt/ Ibid, p. 13
taddhetutvaṁ (=avisaṁvādahetutvaṁ) punaḥ sannikarṣādivan na darśanasya/ Ibid, p. 13

Dharmakīrti in his definition of valid knowledge, should mean nothing but 'determining-the-hitherto-undetermined'. Otherwise, even an inference could not be held to be a piece of valid knowledge, because it grasps what is already grasped by an indeterminate cognition. For example, inference grasps momentariness etc. that are already grasped by indeterminate cognition. Inference is a piece of valid knowledge because it determines or ascertains what is left undetermined or unascertained by the concerned indeterminate cognition. In the same way, the determinate cognition under consideration is a piece of valid knowledge because it determines what is not determined by the preceding indeterminate cognition. On the other hand, indeterminate cognition that merely grasps or experiences an object should not be held to be a piece of valid knowledge because it does not determine any feature of the object. [59]

We have studied the arguments of Akalaṅka against Dharmakīrti's conception of perception in general. Now let us study Akalaṅka's criticism of the different types of perception recognised by Dharmakīrti.

Akalaṅka's refutation of mental perception as conceived by Dharmakīrti: Akalaṅka gives the following arguments in refutation of mental perception recognised by Dharmakīrti and other Buddhists: (i) One finds no difference between sense-perception and mental perception as conceived by Dharmakīrti. (ii) Śāntabhadra is of the opinion that sense-perception *(nirvikalpa jñāna)* being quite different from conception *(savikalpa jñāna)* could not generate the latter directly without mental perception to link them. But it might be asked as to how mental perception that is equally quite different from conception could generate the latter directly. (iii) If as many mental perceptions are accepted as are the sense-perceptions, there would not arise the co-ordinating cognition *(pratisandhi)*, viz. 'I who have smelt the sweet have eaten it'. (iv) If one mental perception were regarded as grasping all types of objects—viz. colour, flavour, odour, etc. —there would remain no need of our positing five types of sense-perception. (v) If it were held that mental perceptions arise successively one after another, then Dharmakīrti's thesis that the sense-perceptions of different types arise simultaneously would be contradicted; for, on this view a mental perception would intervene between two sense-perceptions. (vi) Even the experience and inference contradict the view of Dharmakīrti that *mere* mental perception directly arises from the preceding sense-perception, for, we actually experience the conceptual cognitions like 'I experience through eye, nose, etc. colour, odour, etc.

59, anadhigatārthādhigantṛ vijñānaṁ pramāṇam ity api kevalam anirṇītārthanirṇītir abhidhīyate, anyathā atiprasaṅgāt/ adhigatamātrasya visaṁvādakasya sādhanāntarāpekṣyagocarasya sādhakatamatvānupapatteḥ/ tadanadhigatasvalakṣaṇādhigatāv api dṛṣṭe pramāṇāntarāpravṛttiprasaṅgāt/ Ibid, p. 13

simultaneously' arising directly from sense-perception. There is an invarible relation between sense-perception and judgment. The judgment 'this is blue' does not establish the existence of mental perception because the judgment is generated directly by sense-perception only; for its generation there is no need of the intermediary mental perception. (vii) If mental perception were regarded as akin to self-cognition (*svasaṁvedana*) there would arise an over-absurdity (namely, that mental perception will then be a redundant concept). (viii) If it is urged that the definition of mental perception is given in accordance with the canonical texts, then it is to be pointed out that in scientific treatise such unnecessary things (i.e. definitions based on dogmas) should find no place.[60]

Refutation of self-cognition (svasaṁvedana pratyakṣa); According to Dharmakīrti every consciousness and every mental phenomenon are self-cognised. Akalaṅka would not contradict this. For him also a cognition is necessarily self-cognitive but he would not endorse Dharmakīrti's view that all self-cognitions are *pramāṇa* (valid). Akalaṅka is emphatic on the point that only determinate self-cognitions deserve to be called *pramāṇa*. This is so because according to him a *pramāṇa* has to be a determinate piece of cognition. On Dharmakīrti's view, says Akalaṅka, the cognition of a man even in states of sleep, swoon, etc. would become *pramāṇa* but this is surely absurd. To avoid this absurdity Dharmakīrti could not maintain that in those states there is no cognition at all; for, this would mean a complete non-existence of the *Bhāvanā* of the four noble truths in those states—a position not acceptable to Dharmakīrti.[61] Again, Akalaṅka observes that if self-cognition of every consciousness and every mental state were regarded as *pramāṇa* capable of attaining desirable and avoiding the undesirable, then there would be no possibility of any difference between a waking state and a sleeping state; as a result, it could not be said that successful human actions preceded by right knowledge occur in a waking state and not in a sleeping state.[62] Moreover, Akalaṅka rightly observes that the self-cognition of a determinate knowledge at least could never be indeterminate. Dharmakītri holds that the self-cognitions of all knowledge—including even determinate knowledge—is indeterminate. This would mean that even a determinate knowledge is not self-determined but requires another knowledge to determine its self; this would involve an infinite regress

60. Nyāyaviniścaya, kā. 160-165 with Vivaraṇa.
61. adhyakṣam ātmavit sarvajñānānām abhidhīyate//
svāpamūrcchādyavastho'pi pratyakṣī nāma kiṁ bhavet/
vicchede hi catuḥsatyabhāvanādir virudhyate// Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 51
62. sarvacittacaittānām ātmasaṁvedanaṁ pratyakṣaṁ hitāhitaprāptiparihārasamartham icchatāṁ svāpaprabodhayoḥ ko viśeṣaḥ saṁbhāvyate yataḥ svāpādau samyagjñānapūrvikā sarvapuruṣārthasiddhir na bhavet/ Siddhiviniścaya, p. 96

detrimental to all purposive action.[63] Through all this Akalaṅka proves that though all cognitions are self-cognised, a self-cognition is not necessarily indeterminate; that the self-cognition of a determinate knowledge is always determinate; and that only a determinate self-cognition deserves to be called *pramāṇa.*

Akalaṅka's criticism of Dharmakīrti's conception of Yogic Perception : Akalaṅka would not object to this type of perception provided it is determinate. To regard it as indeterminate contradicts the following statement of Dharmakīrti himself: 'The people seek that person who knows the means *(upāya)* of attaining *Nirvāṇa* so that they desiring *Nirvāṇa* follow the advice of this person without any doubt in their mind.' If the yogic perception of the four noble truths *(catur-āryasatya)* were indeterminate the *yogi* could not relate them to the *vineyas*, the seekers of the truth.[64]

Akalaṅka's own position: Now, we should know what the position of Akalaṅka himself is on this point. He recognises indeterminate cognition *(darśana)* as a psychological fact. It simply grasps a thing's bare existence without any particular. We interpret this to mean that at this stage the cogniser experiences the bare existence of the relevant substance, qualities and actions (modes) of the thing presented. In other words, at this stage the substance, its qualities and its modes are experienced as an undifferentiated whole. It arises immediately after the contact of the sense with its object.[65] Contact here does not mean physical contact but such proximity as is competent for the rise of cognition. In addition, he, like Dharmakīrti, posits a type of indeterminate cognition which arises independently of sense-object contact and on account of *yoga* or the special competence of a soul. Such a transcendental indeterminate cognition is known as yogic perception in Buddhism and as *avadhi-darśana* and *kevala-darśana* in Jainism. But as these cognitions are indeterminate and grasp the bare existence of their respective objects they are not included by the Jainas in the list of *pramāṇas* which, according to them, are by definition, determinate. Hence it is that the cognitions in question are not a case of perception (*pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*).

Akalaṅka defines perception as the determinate cognition which is lucid and vivid.[66] In turn, he defines vividness in such a manner as

63. sarvavijñānānāṁ svasaṁvedanaṁ pratyakṣam avikalpakaṁ yadi, niścayasyāpi kasyacit svata evā'niścayāt/ niścayāntaraparikalpanāyām anavasthānāt kutaḥ tatsaṁvyavahārasiddhiḥ/ Akalaṅkagranthatraya, pp, 6-7
See also Siddhiviniścaya, p. 96
64. Nyāyaviniścaya, kā. 168 with Vivaraṇa.
65. akṣārthayoge sattālokaḥ........./ Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 2
66. pratyakṣaṁ viśadaṁ jñānaṁ....../ Ibid, p. 2

would apply the definition to both the sensory and extra-sensory perceptions. Vividness, for him, consists in generating a type of objective awareness in which are reflected the particular characteristics of an object more in number than those reflected in inferential cognition and the like.[67] This vividness is natural to it and neither borrowed nor adventitious as Dharmakīrti holds. Moreover, Akalaṅka repudiates the idea that perception grasps its object through the mental copy of that object. On his showing it grasps the object directly.

Akalaṅka, following his predecessors, divides perception into two categories—empirical *(sāṁvyāvahārika)* and transcendental *(mukhya)*.[68] The former requires the help of sense-organs and mind for its emergence, the latter does not. For, this latter is directly generated in a soul without the intervention of sense-organs and mind. The transcendental perception is again of three types—*Avadhi-jñāna, Manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna* and *Kevala-jñāna*.

Empirical perception (sense perception): Sense-organs are a condition of sense perception. Akalaṅka observes that the cognition which is generated by the senses and which is capable of avoiding the undesirable and attaining the desirable (i. e. which enables one to avoid the undesirable and attain the desirable) is sense perception.[69] At another place he defines sense perception as a knowledge due to sense-organs and mind. The soul, the object etc. are here not mentioned as conditions of sense perception because they are not peculiar to sense perception. For this very reason it is possible to avoid, in the definition of sense-perception, the mention of mind as a condition of sense perception. Akalaṅka has at times done even that.

According to Akalaṅka and other Jaina logicians sense perception can be analysed into four stages—*avagraha, īhā, avāya* and *dhāraṇā*. These four stages are usually described as types of sense perception. But it would be more appropriate to treat them as four stages of sense perception because this is what they turn out to be when psychologically analysed. The correctness of this interpretation can be seen from the fact that Akalaṅka himself states that an earlier form develops into the next subsequent forms and that all of them are of the same essential nature.[70]

Let us explain these four stages after Akalaṅka. Akalaṅka defines *avagraha* as that determinate cognition of the distinctive nature of an object which follows in the wake of the indeterminate cognition of the

67. anumānādyatirekeṇa viśeṣapratibhāsanam/
tad vaiśadyaṁ mataṁ........./ Ibid, p. 2
68. Ibid, p. 1
69. hitāhitāptinirmuktikṣamam indriyanirmitam/
yaddeśato'rthajñānaṁ tad indriyādhyakṣam ucyate// Ibid, 29
70. Ibid, p. 2

pure existence of this object, an indeterminate cognition which in turn is consequent upon the contact of the sense-organ with the object. On the contact of the sense-organ with the object there arises the indeterminate cognition of pure existence (*san-mātra-darśana*). This indeterminate cognition then develops into the determinate cognition of the object. This is called *avagraha*. *Īhā* is defined by Akalaṅka as the striving for (the knowledge of) a specific characteristic of the object cognised by *avagraha*. This *īhā* is different from doubt for the reason that it positively possesses the element of ascertainment. The definition of *avāya* given by him is as follows. *Avāya* means the ascertainment of the specific features of an object. In other words, *avāya* is the determinate cognition of a specific characteristic of an object. It arises from the exclusion of the wrong and the ascertainment of the right. Akalaṅka defines *dhāraṇā* as the condition of recollection, a condition called *saṁskāra* (trace).[71] But this *saṁskāra* or trace is not physiological in nature. It is a species of cognition.[72] It is, we may say, of the nature of mental disposition. Upādhyāya Yaśovijayaji seems to reserve the term *saṁskāra* for physiological traces only; hence, he states that *saṁskāra* or *vāsanā* should not be considered to be of the nature of cognition.[73]

We have given the description of the four stages of sense perception. We recapitulate the discussion in brief. *Avagraha* is not a pure sensation. It refers to an external object. It has a meaning in so far as it refers to something other than itself. It does not grasp the bare existence but the secondary universal features, that is, the universal features other than bare existence, and to that extent it is determinate. It involves thought. This leads us to the next stage called *īhā*. It is what is to be called associative integration. In this stage of integrative experience we do not get a full knowledge of the object in the form of the cognition of the determinate nature of the object in its fullness. In this we do not form a judgment, yet we are bent on ascertaining a fact. In the next stage of *avāya* we get perceptual judgment. In this stage the sense impressions are interpreted and a meaning is assigned to the experience. The implicit presence of the thought element in *avagraha* etc. gets expression and a concrete experience is formed. This experience being concrete and determinate is retained in the form of a cognitional trace. This cognitional trace makes possible the recollection of the concerned past experience.

Transcendental perception : The transcendental perceptions—which are due to the special capacity of a soul and which require no media in the form of sense-organs and mind—are of three types, viz. *avadhi-jñāna*,

71. Ibid, pp. 2-3
72. Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 3
73. Jainatarkabhāṣā, p. 6

manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna and *kevala-jñāna*. According to the Jainas, a soul is inherently capable of cognising all the things along with all their characteristics however remote in time and place any of these things might be. It is only because of the *karmic* veil that this capacity is obscured. But it is quite possible that though the veil of *karma* is not completely removed, the relevant knowledge-obscuring *karma* is removed. Such removal may be by degrees. And corresponding to the degree of the removal of *karma* the degree of supernormal perception also varies. Omniscience arises when there is a complete destruction of the obscuring veil. But when the destruction-and-subsidence of this veil is of a lower degree two other varieties of transcendental perception make their appearance. Let us take these three types of transcendental perception one by one and explain them in brief, mainly after Akalaṅka.

Avadhi-jñāna : In *avadhi* one perceives such things as have a form, that is, material objects. This faculty differs in scope and durability in different individuals on account of the different capacities developed by them through merit (spiritual discipline). Owing to the varying degrees of destruction-and-subsidence of the karmic veil, there is a corresponding variation in the degrees of remoteness—spatial and temporal—of the objects to be grasped by a type of *avadhi-jñāna*. The highest type of *avadhi-jñāna* can know a material thing that may lie anywhere in the universe *(loka)* and that might have taken place at any time in the past or might take place at any time in the future. It grasps a material thing lying anywhere in the universe but not beyond the universe because material things are not there beyond the universe, that is, in the space outside the universe *(alokākāśa)*. It cannot perceive all the modes of all the things—material and otherwise nor all the modes of all material things but only some modes of all the material things. The lowest type of *avadhi-jñāna* extends to a very small fraction of space and knows the material things that fall within that much space. As regards time it can penetrate only a short layer of it, a second—rather less than a second. It can perceive only a few modes of the material thing that happens to be its object. On the whole *avadhi-jñāna* is divided into six types; for the details thereof one may refer to Rāja-vārtika1.22.4.[74]

Manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna : Now we come to the next form of transcendental perception called *manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna* by the Jainas. Mind, according to them, is a material substance. Its modes are its different changing states running parallel to the acts of thought. Every state of our mind is a particular mode of the mind substance. As our states of thought change, the mind also changes correspondingly. Thus every mode of

74. Rājavārtika, I. 21, 22, 27

thought is appropriately reflected in the mind substance. The direct apprehension of the modes of mind is called *manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna* in the Jaina philosophy. All this means that the cognition of the states of thought is nothing but a direct perception of the modes of the stuff of which the mind is fashioned.

Although there is, among the Jainas, a general agreement as to the nature of *manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna*, they differ as to what constitutes its proper object. Jinabhadra rejects the possibility of a direct cognition of the external objects thought of by other persons. He is of the view that they are cognised through inference. Only the modes of the mind substance are here directly cognised.[75] Pūjyapāda widens the scope of this knowledge by granting the possibility of direct perception of the external objects too that are thought of by other persons.[76] Akalaṅka observes that the states of the mind are only the *media through* which external objects are perceived.[77] Umāsvāti too grants the possibility of a direct perception of the external things thought of by others.[78]

Only human beings can acquire the capacity for this type of perception and this they do through a rigorous spiritual discipline.[79] The Jainas recognise two varieties of *manaḥ-paryāya—ṛjumati* and *vipulamati.* The former is less pure and sometimes falters. The latter is purer and lasts upto the rise of omniscience.[80]

Kevala-jñāna : Let us now turn to what is called omniscience. Omniscience, for Akalaṅka, means simultaneous knowledge of all the substances and all their modes, that is, their modes whether belonging to the past, present or future.

The possibility of omniscience is implied in the Jaina conception of soul. A soul in its pure form possesses knowledge infinite. It is omniscient. But this faculty of it is obscured by the veil of knowledge-obscuring *karma.* This veil can be removed totally by the practice of meditation and self-control, just as the obscuration of the sun or the moon caused by cloud can be removed by a blast of wind. And it is when this veil is removed totally that omniscience dawns.

The Mīmāṁsaka philosophers reject the possibility of omniscience. This attitude of theirs is the result of their position that religious duty *(dharma)* is not a thing to be grasped by sense-perception and there is

75. Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, 814
76. parakīyamanogato'rtho mana ity ucyate/ sāhacaryāt tasya paryayaṇaṁ parigamanaṁ manaḥparyayaḥ/ matijñānaprasaṅga iti cet; na, apekṣāmātratvāt/ Sarvārthasiddhi, I.9
77. Tattvārthavārtika, I. 23, 2-5.
78. avadhijñānaviṣayasyānantabhāgaṁ manaḥparyāyajñānī jānīte, rūpidravyāṇi manorahasyavicāragatāni ca.../ Tattvārthabhāṣya, I. 29
79. Tattvārthavārtika, I. 25
80. Tattvārthasūtra, I. 24-25

no super-normal perception to grasp it; the knowledge of religious duty can be had through the *Vedas* alone; and the *Vedas* are authorless *(apauruṣeya)*. Kumārila declares that the denial of omniscience means the denial of a perceptual knowledge of religious duty; the knowledge of religious duty is possible only through the authorless *Vedas*. He has no objection if some one becomes omniscient by knowing *dharma* through the *Vedas* and the remaining things by means of other *pramāṇas*.[81] But one should note that this amounts to the rejection of omniscience as a cognitive faculty *sui generis*. Omniscience in the sense of a type of perception that enables a soul to directly cognise everything is not acceptable to Kumārila.

As against this, Akalaṅka proves the possibility of omniscience in the sense of an independent facutly that enables a soul to cognise everything. If super-normal perception is inadmissible, how can we have—as we certainly do—the not-discrepant astrological divinations?[82] Hence it should be conceded that there is a facutly of direct knowledge which is super-normal and extrasensory and this facutly is nothing but omniscience. The very progressive gradation of knowledge necessarily implies the highest magnitude of knowledge attainable by man.[83] If a person has no inherent capacity to know everything, he will not be able to know everything even by means of the *Vedas*. Again, the impossibility of omniscience cannot be established without one having the knowledge of all the persons of all times and climes. That is to say, one who rejects omniscience in the case of all the persons of all times and climes, must himself be an omniscient person.[84] After thus offering the positive arguments, Akalaṅka takes recourse to the negative argument that it is certain that there is no contradictory *pramāṇa* to reject the established omniscience;[85] he substantiates this argument by examining the various so-called contradictory *pramāṇas* advanced in this connection.

The Buddhists in general and Dharmakīrti in particular grant that man is capable of perceiving *dharma*—spiritual matters. They support this contention by the example of Buddha who perceived *dharma* as

81. dharmajñatvaniṣedhaś ca kevalo'tropayujyate/
sarvam anyad vijānaṁs tu puruṣaḥ kena vāryate// A kārikā of Kumārila quoted in Tattvasaṅgraha, kā 3128

82. dhīr atyantaparokṣe'rthe na cet puṁsāṁ kutaḥ punaḥ/
jyotirjñānāvisaṁvādaḥ śrutāc cet sādhanāntaram// Siddhiviniścaya, p. 413
See also Nyāyaviniścaya, kā. 414

83. jñānasyātiśayāt siddhyed vibhutvaṁ parimāṇavat/
vaiśadyaṁ kvacid doṣamalahānes timirākṣavat/ Siddhiviniścaya, p. 539
Compare Yogasūtra, I. 25 with Vyāsabhāṣya.

84. Siddhiviniścaya, VIII. 9-15

85 asti sarvajñaḥ suniścitāsambhavadbādhakapramāṇābhāvāt sukhādivat/ Ibid, p. 537

such in the form of four noble truths. According to them Buddha realised the great truth of life, viz. that there is sorrow, the cause of sorrow, the removal of sorrow and the way of removing sorrow. And the fact of the revelation of the truth of life implies that he should be taken as an authority on the remaining matters also.

Dharmakīrti does not deny the possibility of omniscience but lays emphasis on the need for acquiring the knowledge of the essentials. He little cares whether a person knows or does not the things which are not connected with the religious pursuit. He has not discussed the question whether the one possessed of the vision of *dharma* is necessarily an omniscient being. Kumārila rejects the possibility of a perception of *dharma*, Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, establishes it. [86]

Prajñākaragupta, the commentator of Dharmakīrti, justifies the arguments of Dharmakīrti offerd by way of establishing the possibility of a perception of *dharma*; in addition, he proves the *sarvajñatva* or omniscience. In his opinion any spiritual aspirant can attain omnisceince provided he has freed himself from passions. [87] Śāntarakṣita also proves that an omniscient person can know each and every thing if he wants to know it because he is devoid of what causes the obscuration of knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇa*).[88] Even Nāgasena expresses a view similar to this. [89] Thus the difference between Dharmakītri and Akalaṅka on the question of omniscience is merely one of emphasis. Again, if we were to hold that the view of Nāgasena and Śāntarakṣita—that an omniscient person can know anything provided he wants to know it or directs his attention towards it—was also the view of Dharmakīrti, then we will certainly find some difference between Dharmakīrti and Akalaṅka regarding the conception of omniscience. For Dharmakīrti, an omniscient person, though capable of knowing everything, will know only that thing towards which he has directed his attention ; whereas for Akalaṅka, an omniscient person always actually knows everything; his attention remains directed towards all things always.

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86. tasmād anuṣṭheyagataṁ jñānam asya vicāryatām/
kīṭasaṅkhyāpaıijñānaṁ tasya naḥ kvopayujyate//
dūraṁ paśyatu vā mā vā tattvam iṣṭaṁ tu paśyatu/
pramāṇaṁ dūradarśī ced ete gṛddhrān upāsmahe// Pramāṇavārtika, I. 33, 35

87. tato'sya vītarāgatve sarvārthajñānasambhavaḥ/
samāhitasya sakalaṁ cakāstīti viniścitam// Pramāṇavārtikabhāṣya, p. 329

88. yad yad icchati boddhuṁ vā tat tad vetti niyogataḥ/
śaktir evaṁvidhā hy asya prahīṇāvaraṇo hy asau// Tattvasaṅgraha, kā. 3628

89. bhante, buddho sabbaññū'ti// āma mahārāja, bhagavā sabbaññū, na ca bhagavato satataṁ samitaṁ ñāṇadassanaṁ paccupaṭṭhitam, āvajjanapaṭibaddhaṁ bhagavato sabbaññutaññāṇaṁ, āvajjitvā yadicchitaṁ jānāti'ti// Milindapañho, p. 105

History of the definition of perception in general: We have studied Akalaṅka's position on the question of the nature and types of perception. Now let us trace the history of the difinition of perception in general.

In the early definition of perception offered by the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas and the Mīmāṁsakas we find terms expressive of its special cause and its correspondence with the external object. But there is not introduced in the definition any term that may describe its specific positive nature, viz. its vividness and immediacy. It is the Buddhists who first started the tradition of defining it in a positive manner pointing out its essential nature. They defined it as vivid and immediate. This way of defining perception is found most advantageous by the medieval Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system and Jaina system. As by this time the former had clearly made room for God in the shape of the creator of the universe and the author of the *Vedas*, divine perception came to be regarded as an eternal verity and hence there arose for it the problem of formulating a definition common to the generated and eternal types of perception. In the case of the Jaina system too there similarly arose the problem of formulating a definition that may apply to both the empirical and transcendental types of perception. This seems to be the reason why the medieval Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Jaina logicians followed the Buddhist logicians in defining perception as vivid and direct. Siddhasena Divākara seems to be the first to have defined perception as not-non-direct cognition. But Akalaṅka positively declares that a cognition which is vivid constitutes perception and he thus removes the fallacy of mutual dependence involved in the definition offered by Siddhasena. All the Jaina logicians—Digambara as well as Śvetāmbara—that flourished after him follow him in this matter. Bhāsarvajña, like Siddhasena, employed the term *aparokṣa* in his definition of perception.[90] The author of the Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī, Śālikanātha[91] and Gaṅgeśa[92] define perception as a direct or immediate cognition of an object.

Although all these logicians defined perception as a vivid or direct, they rejected the Buddhist equation of a vivid or direct cognition with indeterminate sensory cognition or pure sensation (*nirvikalpa pratyakṣa*). According to the Buddhist logicians, only pure sensations which are indeterminate cognitions devoid of all thought element whatsoever are of the nature of perception. The Jaina logicians, on the other hand, declare that only determinate, thought-involving cognitions can be of the nature of perception (*pratyakṣa pramāṇa*). Logicians following other systems

90 Nyāyasāra, p. 2

91 Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 51

92 pratyakṣasya sākṣātkāritvalakṣaṇam/ Tattvacintāmaṇī, p. 543

in the main maintain an intermediate position. For them both indeterminate and determinate cognitions could be of the nature of perception (*pratyakṣa pramāṇa*). So, their task is to counter the Buddhist view by showing that determinate cognitions also could be of the nature of perception. But the task of the Jaina logicians is two-fold. They have to prove on the one hand that indeterminate cognitions can never be counted as perception (*pratyakṣa pramāṇa*) and on the other that only determinate cognitions can be so counted. Thus like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, they establish the validity of the determinate cognitions generated by sense-object contact but in addition they prove the invalidity of all indeterminate cognitions. In their first task they are naturally assisted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Mīmāṁsakas as this is their common concern. In the second task they are helped by the terms and conditions laid down by the Buddhist logicians themselves in their definition of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), viz. efficiency and non-discrepancy. The Jaina logicians too, following in the footsteps of these Buddhist logicians, difine valid cognition as efficient and non-discrepant. But they rightly observe that indeterminate cognition being never efficient and non-discrepant can never be regarded as valid.

History of the concept of indeterminate perception (Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa): I think it would not be here out of place to consider the history of the doctrine according to which even indeterminate cognition is of the nature of percepiion (*pratyakṣa pramāṇa*).

It is difficult to find the doctrine of indeterminate perception in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra. In the Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha it is said that in the eighth chapter of the Vaiśeṣikasūtra is propounded the doctrine of the two types of perception—determinate (*savikalpaka*) and indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*).[93] But this seems to be a misconception possibly arisen from the statement of the Sūtrakāra that the cognition of universals does not depend on the cogniton of any other category.[94] Of course, in the course of a perceptual cognition, the cognition of universals always takes place first. But that does not mean that this cognition of universals is indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*). If we were to take it to be so, there would be no possibility at all of there being determinate perception of universals. And as a result the Vaiśeṣikas would have no right to talk of universals of which they themselves never have a determinate perceptual knowledge. We are, therefore, compelled to maintain that this cognition of universals is as much determinate and thought-involving as the cognition of any other

93. aṣṭame nirvikalpakasavikalpakapratyakṣapramāṇacintanam/ Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha, pp. 211-212

94. sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu sāmānyaviśeṣābhāvāt tata eva jñānam/ sāmānyaviśeṣāpekṣaṁ dravyaguṇakarmasu/ Vaiśeṣikasūtra, VIII. 5-6

category. So, if we are at all to find out in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra something like indeterminate perception (or pure sensation) we would have to hunt for the *sūtras* that may suggest a stage where there is a cognition of all the categories (viz. substance, quality, action, universals, and the relation inherence) in an undifferentiated form. Is it possible for us to point out any *sūtra* containing this idea? To us it seems that there is not a single *sūtra* that may even suggest this idea. And Praśastapāda seems to be fully conscious of the difficulty. That is why he speaks of an additional stage previous to the cognition of universals, a stage which he calls *Avibhakta Ālocana.*[95] The term *Avibhakta* is pregnant with meaning. It points to the fact that at this stage all the categories are presented to consciousness but the cogniser is absolutely unable to differentiate them from one another and to recognise them as they are. This *Avibhakta Ālocana* is nothing but a passive reception of sensedata or pure sensation. This is very much like the indeterminate perception of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. Whether Praśastapāda independently felt the need for introducing the stage in question or he was influenced by the contemporary Buddhist logicians who were evolving the doctrine of indeterminate perception we cannot say definitely. The *Avibhakta Ālocana* gives rise to the *Svarūpālocana* type of cognition. Here the mind becomes active and analyses the content of the *Avibhakta Ālocana.* At this stage the universals are being first found out, differentiated from the remaining content of that undifferentiated whole, and determined or recognised as they are by mental analysis. From this stage onward we should regard the whole cognitive process as determinate and thought-involving. It would not be much logical to treat the second stage as that of indeterminate perception though—following the medieval commentators of Praśastapāda—scholars have generally done so (while taking no notice at all of the stage we have here recognised as the one preceding this second stage). Then we come to the third stage which will be that of determinate perception on our interpretation as also on the traditional one. At this stage the mind finds out from the original undifferentiated whole those entities in which the universals inhere and thus it here has first the cognition of the substance, qualities and actions as quilified by their respective universals and then the cognition of substance as qualified by those qualities and/or actions.

So, we can safely conclude that in the Vaiśeṣika system the doctrine of indeterminate perception was probably first introduced by Praśastapāda. His *Avibhakta Ālocana* is not essentially different from

95. tatra sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu svarūpālocanamātraṁ pratyakṣaṁ pramāṇaṁ...pramitir dravyādiviṣayaṁ jñānam/ sāmānyaviśeṣajñānotpattau avibhaktam ālocanamātram pratyakṣaṁ pramāṇam asmin nānyat pramāṇāntaram asti/... Praśastapādabhāṣya, p. 553

Diṅnāga's and Dharmakīrti's conception of perception (*pratyakṣa pramā*). But one thing should be taken note of. Though Praśastapāda recognizes the indeterminate perceptual cognition (*Avibhakta Ālocana*) as a psychological fact he does not regard it as perception proper (*pratyakṣa pramā*); it is merely the immediate cause (*pramāṇa=karaṇa*) of the perception proper (*pratykṣa pramā*). Moreover, we should not lose sight of the fine distinction that obtains between *Avibhakta Ālocana* of Praśastapāda and the *pratyakṣa* of Diṅnāga. This distinction is mainly (rather entirely) due to the two different conceptions of reality lying at the back of the two and not to an essential difference in their nature. The Vaiśeṣikas, being ultra-realists, consider substance, quality, action, universal, and even the relation inherence to be objectively real and hence, according to them, they all—of course in the form of an undifferentiated whole—are presented to consciousness even at the stage of *Avibhakta Ālocana. Avibhakta Ālocana* is a foetus consciousness (or cognition) which has as its content all the categories (from substance down to inherence) taken in an undifferentiated form. Later on this consciousness develops and we have the cognition of categories as distinct from one another. Thus these categories are not mental fictions, that is, something introduced later on by mind out of itself. So, even the determinate perception of these categories is valid. On the other hand, these categories are dismissed as unreal by Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti and consequently they are not regarded by them as something presented to consciousness—not even in an undifferentiated form—at the time of perception (pure sensation). They are absolutely adventitious mental figments. And hence thoughts or determinate cognitions whose object they are, are treated by Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti as false conceptions.

In the Nyāya Philosophy the doctrine of indeterminate perception is first introduced by Vācaspati Miśra. And he seeks to justify his procedure on the basis of the occurrence of the term '*avyapadeśya*' in the aphorism concerned. On his showing this aphorism does not contain a general definition of perception but enumerates the types of perception. Thus for him, the term '*avyapadeśya*' refers to indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa)* and the term '*vyavasāyātmaka*' to determinate perception (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa)*.[96] He is forced to take recourse to this ingenious farfetched interpretation of the term '*avyapadeśya*' simply because he is introducing a foreign doctrine into the Nyāya fold. It is note-worthy that Vācaspati attributes the introduction of the doctrine in the Nyāya system to his teacher Trilocana. [97] A statement of Udayanācārya will

96. iha dvayī pratyakṣajātir avikalpikā savikalpikā ca iti/...tatra avikalpikāyāḥ padam avyapadeśyam iti, savikalpikāyāś ca vyavasāyātmakam iti/Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā, p. 125
97. trilocanagurūnnitamārgānugamanonmukhaiḥ/
yathāmānaṁ yathāvastu vyākhyātam idam idṛśam// Ibid, p. 133

justify the surmise that Trilocana had effected something of a revolution in the teaching of the Nyāya school by introducing into it the tenets of Praśastapāda.[98] Nor are we wrong if we suggest that it is again Vācaspati who first introduces this conception in the Sāṅkhya philosophy as well.

It might be asked as to why we insist that the Sūtrakāra does not intend to mark off special kind of perception, namely, indeterminate perception, by the term *'avyapadeśya'*. In answer we point out that among the old views, recorded in the Nyāyamañjarī, as to the purpose of the occurrence of the term *'avyapadeśya'* in the *sūtra* none is akin to that of Vācaspati. Even Uddyotakara treats the *sūtra* as containing a general definition of perception.[99] We give below those old views recorded in the Nyāyamañjarī.

The *Vṛddha Naiyāyikas* are of the opinion that the term *'avyapadeśya'* (non-designable) is introduced in the *sūtra* to exclude the cognition which, though generated by sense-object contact and determinate, is designated by the name of its object. Designable cognition means the cognition that is an object of words. There are cognitions that are generated by sense-object contact but they are designated by the names of their objects e. g. 'this is flavour-cognition,' 'this is colour-cognition.' They become designable cognitions, that is, the cognitions that are an object of words. Such cognitions should not be counted as perception. Let us make the point more clear. Only those cognitions that are disposed to grasp the external object colour etc. could be considered as perception or an instrument of perception. But when these very cognitions are later on designated by the name of their respective objects, they giving up the nature of perception—a nature acquired through the act of grasping the external objects—assume the nature of an object on account of having become an object of words; in such a condition they could never be regarded as either a resultant cognition or its instrument.[100] MM. Phanibhusana

98. ......atra trilocanaguroḥ sakāśād upadeśarasāyanam āsāditam amūṣāṁ punar navībhāvāya dīyata iti yujyate/ Nyāyavārtikatātparyapariśuddhi, p. 9

99. ......samastaṁ lakṣaṇam ity ucyate/ Nyāyavārtika, p. 40

100. tatra vṛddhanaiyāyikās tāvad ācakṣate...yad indriyārthasannikarṣād utpannam sadviṣayanāmadheyena vyapadiśyate rūpajñānam rasajñānam iti tad vyapadeśyaṁ mā bhūd ity avyapadeśagrahaṇam/ Nyāyamañjarī, p. 73
ayaṁ tu teṣām āśayaḥ, rūpādiviṣayagrahaṇābhimukhaṁ hi tad akṣajaṁ jñānaṁ pramāṇaṁ phalaṁ vā ucyate, yadā tu tad eva śabdena ucyate rūpajñānam rasajñānam iti tadā rūpādijñānaviṣayagrahaṇavyāpāralabhyāṁ pramāṇatām apahāya śabdakarmatā"pattikṛtāṁ prameyatām eva avalambata iti na tasyāṁ daśāyāṁ tat pramāṇam.../ Ibid, p. 82

observes that Vātsyāyana seems to be the representative of this view.[101] It is interesting to note that this interpretation does not imply the exclusion of the cognitions that grasp the external things by applying their names to them because the objects of these cognitions are those external things themselves. In short, according to this view the cogni·tion that grasps the object present before the senses and refers to it by its own name is no doubt perception but as soon as this very cognition itself is referred to by the name of its object it no longer remains perception but instead becomes an object of verbal cognition. It is to exclude such cognitions that the term '*avyapadeśya*' is included in the definition of perception.

Ācāryāḥ contend that the Sūtrakāra introduced the term '*avyapadeśya*' in the definition of perception to exclude the cognition that is generated not by sense-object contact alone but by the contact as well as words spoken by the instructor (*vyapadeśyam=vyapadeśājjātam*).[102] It is note-worthy that while commenting on the word '*avyapadeśya*' occurring in the Praśastapādabhāṣya Udayana and Śrīdhara adopt this view and give an identical explanation. Suppose there is a person who has not seen a cow as yet. For the first time his visual sense-organ comes in contact with the thing called 'cow'; though he has the determinate cognition of the thing at this stage, he is unable to apply the word 'cow' to that thing and judge that thing as 'cow'. In the meanwhile, some learned person arrives there and utters a sentence with respect to that animal, the sentence 'this is a cow'. As soon as the person innocent of the convention hears the sentence, there arises in him the cognition of the thing as 'cow'. Though this cognition is generated by the sense-object contact, it is not perception because it is directly generated by the authoritative statement (*śabda-pramāṇa*). And on this account, it is to be counted as verbal. To exclude this type of cognitions, say Udayana and Śrīdhara, from the field of perception Praśastapāda describes perception as *avyapadeśya*.[103] This view exactly tallies with the view ascribed to Ācāryāḥ by Jayanta. It is almost certain that Jayanta

101. Nyāyadarśana (Bengali), Vol. I, p. 106
See also Nyāyabhāṣya, I. 4

102. ācāryāḥ śabdārtheṣu sthaviravyavahārato vyutpadyamāno janaḥ saṁśayāvagamasamaye saṁjñopadeśakād 'ayaṁ panasa ucyate' iti vṛddhodīritād vākyāt puro'vasthitaśākhādimantam arthaṁ panasaśabdavācyatayā jānāti/ tadasya jñānam indriyajam api na kevalendriyakaraṇakaṁ bhavitum ucitam, asati saṁjñopadeśini śabde tadanutpādāt/ tena śabdendriyābhyāṁ sambhūya janitatvād ubhayajam idaṁ jñānam vyapadeśāj jātam iti vyapadeśyam ucyate/ tad avyapadeśyapadena vyudasyate/ Nyāyamañjarī, pp. 73-74

103. Nyāyakandalī, p. 199

uses the term *ācāryāḥ* for Vyomaśivācārya because the view ascribed to *ācāryāḥa* is the same as is found in the Vyomavatī.[104]

Some are of the opinion that the Sūtrakāra has introduced this term in the definition of perception in order to avoid the fallacy of *asambhava*. In the absence of the thing itself, there is no possibility of its definition. There are some philosophers like Bhartṛhari who contend that there is no cognition whatsoever that is generated by sense-object contact alone. This is because the object of all cognitions is not merely the external thing but the external thing qualified by its name. There is not a single cognition whose object is purely an external thing. Thus even in the case of what is called perception the name of the object attains the status of an object because it is cognised as a qualification of the object. When the visual sense-organ comes in contact with the thing pot, the cogniser first remembers the name pot. That is, he first has the cognition of the name which acts as a qualification. Afterwards, from this cognition of the qualification which is of the nature of recollection, there arises the cognition of the thing qualified by the name e.g. the thing pot qualified by the name 'pot'. This cognition could not be regarded as perception because the qualification viz. the name of the object could not be grasped by the eyes; nor could the object whose qualification the name is, be grasped by ears; and moreover, there is no possibility of one cognition being generated by *two* senses *simultaneously* Again, in the case of the cognition under consideration, the name 'pot' which is the object of recollection functions as an instrumental cause (*karaṇa*), that is, the cognition under consideration is directly generated by the word and hence it is to be treated as a verbal cognition. Thus all cognitions that are ever treated as perception are no perception at all but verbal cognitions only. To refute this view the Sūtrakāra has introduced the term *avyapadeśya* in the definition of perception.[105]

From all this we may conclude that the conception of indeterminate perception was a later addition to the Nyāya philosophy and that it was probably first introduced there by Trilocana. The Nyāya conception of indeterminate perception could not be different from the

104. na, indriyasahakāriṇā śabdena yaj janyate tasya vyavacchedārthatvāt, tathāhy akṛtasamayo rūpaṁ paśyann api cakṣuṣā rūpam iti na jānīte/ rūpam iti śabdoccāraṇānantaraṁ pratipadyata ity ubhayajaṁ jñānam/ nanu ca śabdendriyayor ekasmin kāle vyāpārāsambhavād ayuktam etat/ tathāhi—manasā adhiṣṭhitaṃ na śrotraṁ śabdaṁ gṛhṇāti punaḥ kriyākrameṇa cakṣuṣā sambandhe sati rūpagrahaṇam/ na ca śabdajñānasya etāvatkālam avasthānaṁ sambhavatīti katham ubhayajaṁ jñānam? atra ekā śrotrasambaddhe manasi kriyotpannā vibhāgam ārabhate...tataḥ svajñānasahāyaśabdasahakāriṇā cakṣuṣā rūpajñānam utpadyate ity ubhayajaṁ jñānam/ yadi vā...bhavatī eva ubhayajam jñānam/ Vyomavatī, p. 555

105. Nyāyamañjarī, p. 75

Vaiśeṣika conception of it because both of them consider all the categortes—viz. substance etc.—to be objectively real and hence for both the indeterminate perception should cognize all the (perceptible) categories but as an undifferentiated whole.[106] With regared to the Mīmāṁsā philosophy, it is to be noted that in the *sūtra* containing the definition of perception there is definitely no indication of a recognition of indeterminate perception. We may surmise that it was Kumārila who for the first time introduced the conception of indeterminate perception in the Mīmāṁsā philosophy. Thus even before Trilocana we find Kumārila not only recognising the indeterminate cognition as a psychological stage but also attributing to it the status of perception proper (*pratyakṣa pramāṇa*) provided the contact concerned is non-defective (*samprayoga*). Kumārila recognises the categories substance, quality, action and universal as objectively real and perceptible too. So, his conception of indeterminate perception is not essentially different from that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. For, according to him too the indeterminate perception cognises all the perceptible categories in an undifferentiated form. That is, the categories are different from one another but they are not cognised as such.[107] Kumārila defines indeterminate perception as the simple apprehension of an object (*vastu*), pure and simple, similar to the apprehension of a baby or a dumb person.[108] The analogy given by him is defective and misleads one to think that the determinate thought-involving cognition of a person innocent of convention is a case of indeterminate perception. This cognition is *nameless* no doubt but it is not *thoughtless* because the essence of thought is the assimilation of a present experience to the past similar ones and such an assimilation is present even in the case of the cognitions of a baby or a dumb person. Kumārila further states that neither the specific characteristics nor the general characteristics are apprehended by the indeterminate cognition. Here again we should take this statement to mean that though the specific and general characteristics are apprehended at this stage they are not recognised and judged as such. This is corroborated by a statement of Pārthasārathi Miśra. He says that the indeterminate perception cognises the *sammugdha vastu* i.e. the substance, quality, action and universal in an undifferentiated conglomeration, in other words, the specific and general characteristics as an undifferentiated whole (*avivikta*).

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106. kvacij jātiḥ kvacid dravyaṁ kvacit karma kvacid guṇaḥ/
yad eva savikalpena tad evānena gṛhyate// Ibid, p. 92

107. na hi ākhyātum aśakyatvād bhedo nāstīti gamyate// Ślokavārtika, p. 149

108. asti hy ālocanājñānaṁ prathamaṁ nirvikalpakam/
bālamūkādivijñānasadṛśaṁ śuddhavastujam//
na viśeṣo na sāmānyaṁ tadānīm anubhūyate/
tayor ādhārabhūtā tu vyaktir evāvasīyate// Ibid, pp. 147-148

The terms '*avivikta*' and '*sammugdha*' remind us of the term '*avibhakta*' of Praśastapāda.[109] The Prābhākars' conception of indeterminate perception is essentially the same as that of the Bhāṭṭas. Thus Śālikanātha says that it apprehends the substance, quality and universals but in an undifferentiated form, that is, as bare existence.[110] Action (*kriyā or karma*) is regarded by him as imperceptible and hence on his view it is not grasped even by determinate perception. Even some Advaitins (who follow Śaṅkara) recognise the *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*, the primary awareness or simple experience of an object taking place prior to the developed perception of it. According to them the *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* grasps Existence (*sattā*) alone.[111] And in the stage of *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* this Existence becomes differentiated through the activities of mind. Thus on their view the *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* really gives us a knowledge of pure existence and not of particulars (*guṇa, karma, etc.*) which are but the subsequent creations of our own mind. This means that for these philosophers all determinate thought-involving cognitions are false and invalid and consequently the *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* is the only source of true knowledge. [This is exactly the Buddhist position.] Jayanta refutes this view extensively. There is also another Advaitic view upheld in the Vedāntaparibhāṣā. According to its author, all identity judgments generated by a sense-object contact are of the nature of *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. Thus on this view the *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* is not a pre-jedgment stage but it is merely a certain types of judgment the import of which is the identity (*tādātmya*) of two terms, e.g. 'this is Mr. X', 'that thou art', etc.[112]

Though Praśastapāda accepts the *Avibhakta Ālocana* as a psychological fact he does not consider it to be perception proper (*pratyakṣa pramāṇa*) at all. For him it is merely the immediate cause (*karaṇa*) of perception proper. This view comes very near to that of the Jainas. For Kumārila the indeterminate cognition is not merely a psychological stage preceding perception proper but he includes it in the province of perception

109. aviviktasāmānyaviśeṣavibhāgaṁ sammugdhavastumātragocaram ālocanajñānam/ Śāstradīpikā, p. 40

110. prathamaṁ hi svarūpamātrajñānaṁ dravya-jāti-guṇeṣūpajāyate/ Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 54
See also Tantrarahasya, p. 10
sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu pratipadyamānaṁ pratyakṣaṁ prathamam utpadyate, kintu vastvantarānusandhānaśūnyatayā sāmānyaviśeṣarūpatā na pratīyate/ Prakaraṇapañickā, p. 54
See also Tantrarahasya, p. 10

111. ......nirviśeṣasanmātrabrahmagrāhitvāt pratyakṣasya/ Śrībhāṣya (Mahāpūrvapakṣa) p. 22
See also Śāstradīpikā and Nyāyaratnākara on Ślokavārtika, Pratyakṣasūtra, kā. 104 et seq.

112. tatra savikalpakaṁ vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhijñānaṁ yathā ghaṭam ahaṁ jānāmītyādi jñānam/ nirvikalpakaṁ tu saṁsargānavagāhijñānam/ yathā so'yaṁ devadattaḥ, tat tvam asītyādivākyajanyajñānam/ Vedāntaparibhāṣā, p.41

proper. On his view a perception can be indeterminate though not all indeterminate cognitions are perception (*pratyakṣa pramāṇa*). It is only those indeterminate cognitions which are generated by a *non-defective* sense-object contact (*sam-prayoga*) that are regarded by him as perception (*pratyakṣa pramāṇa*).[113] Vācaspati parts company with him in so far as the former regards all indeterminate cognitions as valid and hence perception proper (*pratyakṣa pramāṇa*). Thus he tells us that cognitions of this type are always valid. Therein things present themselves as they are. The experience is always true. If a person is unable to interpret or analyse or judge the experience of a thing properly it is his fault and not that of the thing or of the experience.[114] From this we can conclude that for him all illusions involve a mental activity or interpretation. This view of Vācaspati closely tallies with that of Diṅnāga who does not include the term '*abhrānta*' in the definition of perception. Can we surmise from this that Vācaspati follows Diṅnāga on the question? Let us explain the view under consideration in brief. Senses never deceive us. They grasp the thing as it is. Of course, when they grasp it, they grasp it along with its peculiar position and environment. A person looks at a round table from a distance. The actual image on the retina is oblique. But this is due to the peculiar position of the table and the person. We should not say that the visual sense-organ has presented the thing wrongly. As a matter of fact the thing has not been presented as devoid of the relation it holds with other things. And if we take into considerations these relations we cannot but say that the senses are trust-worthy. They present the whole as it is. But we see that we are deceived many a time. This is due to the wrong interpretation of the whole by the mind or its interpretative faculty. At times it does not take into consideration the relevant relations obtaining between a thing and the things of its environment and as a result it mistakes the thing as standing in its environment for the same as standing in isolation. If the mind fails to notice the special relation of the cogniser to the round table—the object, it judges the table to be oblique. This judgment is wrong. But afterwards when it finds its mistake, the image on the retina remains the same; it does not change; what changes is the judgment pronounced by

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113. samyagarthe ca saṁśabdo duṣprayoganivāraṇaḥ/
prayoga indriyāṇāṁ ca vyāpāro'rtheṣu kathyate//
duṣṭatvāc chuktikāyogo vāryate rajatekṣaṇāt/ Ślokavārtika, p. 129

114. atra ca na nirvikalpakaṁ bhrāntaṁ kintu savikalpakam ity āha tāṁs tu marīcin iti/ indriyeṇa ālocya marīcīn uccāvacam uccalato nirvikalpakena gṛhītvā paścāt tatra upaghātadoṣād viparyeti savikalpako'sya pratyayo bhrānto jāyate, tasmād vijñānasya vyabhicāro nārthasya iti/ yathā''huḥ niruktakārāḥ—naiṣa sthāṇor aparādho yad enam andho na paśyati puruṣāparādho sa bhavati/ Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā, p. 132

the mind. This proves that experience or indeterminate perception is always true; there is no possibility of error so far as it goes. Only judgments are liable to error. And hence only in connection with judgments there might arise the question of correction. Jayanta being the upholder of the view that the most efficient cause (*karaṇa*) of perception is the aggregate of the conditions physical and cognitional (*bodhābodha-svabhāvā sāmagrī*), there arises for him the problem of justifying his view that a perception can be indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*), because it is impossible to find any cognition (*bodha or jñāna*) among the causal conditions of an indeterminate perception. To find the way out, it is suggested by some that the eternal *jñāna* of God is one of the factors constituting the causal aggregate that generates indeterminate perception. [115] Be that as it may, with regard to the question of the possibility of error in an indeterminate perception Jayanta clearly maintains that the liability to error is common to both the indeterminate and determinate perceptions. The illusions of sense, like the cognition of two moons, are instanced by him as the cases of indeterminate perception that is erroneous. Thus he argues that there is a possibility of the indeterminate cognitions being erroneous and hence in order to exclude even the illusory indeterminate cognitions from the field of perception proper (*pratyakṣa pramāṇa*) the Sūtrakāra has introduced the term '*avyabhicārī*' ('non-contradictory') in the definition of perception (*pratyakṣa pramāṇa*). Thus Jayanta agrees on this point with Dharmakīrti who includes the term '*abhrānta*' in his definition of perception. For Dharmakīrti those illusory cognitions that bear a vivid reflection and are incapable of being corrected by thought and logical persuasion are perceptual. [116] Gaṅgeśa, the father of the Navya-Nyāya, defined perception as the cognition which has no other cognition as its instrumental or immediate cause (*karaṇa*). [117] He offered the definition of perception in this manner in order to make it applicable to both the types of *pratyakṣa*—eternal and non-eternal. Again, this definition is in harmony with his two views, viz. that sense-organs (and not any sort of cognition) are the instrumental cause (*karaṇa*) of both the indeterminate and determinate perceptions and that some perceptions (that is, the determinate perceptions) have cognition (*jñāna*) as one of their causal conditions—though not as an instrumental cause (that is, as a *kāraṇa*—though not as a *karaṇa*). [118] Lastly for him and his followers all valid and invalid cognitions are determinate thought-involving cognitions. Hence in connection with the indeterminate perceptions there does not arise the question of validity or invalidity. In other words, they are neither valid nor invalid. [119]

115. Nyāyamañjarī (Bengali), Ṭippaṇī, p. 120
116. Pramāṇavārtika, II. 297-298
117. jñānākaraṇakam jñānam iti tu vayam/ Tattvacintāmaṇī, Sannikarṣavādarahasyam.
118. Nyāyamañjarī (Bengali), Ṭippaṇī, p. 118
119. ......na pramā nāpi bhramaḥ syān nirvikalpakam// Kārikāvalī, 135

It has become amply clear from the preceding discussion that on the question of the possibility of error in an indeterminate perception there are mainly three or four views. Thus some recognise the indeterminate cognition as a psychological fact preceding the perception proper (*pratyakṣa pramā*) but they do not bring it in the province of perception proper. Others are of the opinion that the determinacy or indeterminacy of a cognition is no bar to its being perception (*pratyakṣa pramā*) if it is generated by sense-object contact and presents the things as they are. In other words, all determinate cognitions are perception, provided they are generated by sense-object contact and present the things as they are; and all indeterminate cognitions too are perception if they are generated by sense-object contact and present the things as they are. But there are some who object to the second part of the above statement. The proviso of non-contradiction (presenting the things as they are) is, on their view, meaningless in the case of indeterminate cognitions because there is no possibility of contradiction or illusion in their case; all the indeterminate cognitions generated by sense-object contact are necessarily non-contradictory and hence valid (*pramā*). They all are perception (*pratyakṣa pramāṇa*). Again, there is a fourth group of philosophers who regard indeterminate cognitions as neither valid nor invalid. On their view, there arises no question of validity or invalidity in the case of such cognitions. The Jainas positively state that such cognitions are not-valid (*apramāṇa*). They have no pragmatic value because they do not definitely inform us of the true nature of their object. Thus for the Jainas *pramāṇa* (a valid cognition) is, by definition, always determinate.

Concluding Remarks : Akalaṅka seems to have taken great pains to establish the validity (*prāmāṇya*) of the determinate cognitions generated by sense-object contact (this in the direct contrast to the Buddhist position). The following are the main reasons adduced by him in this connection. The object of an indeterminate cognition and the corresponding valid determinate cognition is the same. The determinate cognition in question is not contradicted by a subsequent conative activity. It determines what is hither-to undetermined. It may co-exist with the thought or conception (that is, the determinate cognition) of another thing. It has vividness (*vaiśadya*) natural to it because it is generated by sense-object contact. Of course, it involves memory images but they are revived and controlled by the concerned sense-object contact. There is here no unrestrained flight of imagination. The attention remains centred on the presented object itself. It does not move in the realm of pure idea (that is, idea unconnected with the object presented). The recollection of convention or a name of the object could not deprive this determinate

cognition of its perceptual character. Though we remember the conventional name of the object before the determinate perception takes place, yet the remembered name does not take away from forthcoming determinate cognition its perceptual character. The recollection of convention could not affect the perceptual character of the cognition in question. Certainly, this recollection cannot render obscure the nature of the thing presented to the senses.

To sum up, the metaphysics of momentarism is bound to reject all temporal and spatial extention. For it, the reality is an indivisible unique point instant without any extension, spatial or temporal. It is just like a mathematical point. This quite naturally necessitates the banishment of the categories substance, quality, action, universal and relation from the realm of reality. So, this metaphysics of momentarism consistently condisers all thought to be fictitious—on the ground that thought creates its own objects, viz. substance, quality, etc. On the other hand, the metaphysics of non-momentarism and extension is bound to regard the substance, quality, action, universal and even relation as real entities. Consequently, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṁsā and even the Jaina schools of thought endorse the position that the thought-involving determinate cognition generated by sense-object contact is valid (*pramāṇa*) because the substance, etc. that are recognised and judged in the course of this cognition are not an adventitious mental creation but .were already present there in an undifferentiated form -as a content of the previous experience or indeterminate cognition. The object of an indeterminate cognition and the corresponding determinate cognition is one and the same. The point we want to draw attention to is that if we were to judge the theory of perception irrespective of its metaphysics we would naturally reject the Buddhist view of perception and accept the opposite view. But to view a theory irrespective of its metaphysical back-ground would be doing no justice to its upholder—Buddhist or Non-buddhist. And as soon as we adopt the method of judging a theory in its metaphysical setting we at once get at the rightness of both the theories. All the arguments that Akalaṅka has advanced against Dharmakīrti's theory of perception are no doubt intelligent, logical, illuminating and most of them are novel (e. g. not to be found in his predecessors—the Naiyāyika, the Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṁsaka or the Jaina). But Dharmakīrti's theory of perception stands unrefuted so long as the fundamental metaphysical doctrine of momentarism remains unshaken. From the pragmatic point of view the Jainas are no doubt quite right in their stand that only determinate cognitions—non-contradictory and generated by sense-object contact—are perception (*pratyaṣka pramāṇa*); there is no other type of perception. They admit that there is a previous stage of indeterminate cognition but this should not be treated as perception (*pratyakṣa pramāṇa*) because it has no pragmatic value.

CHAPTER VII

ON INFERENCE

All logicians except a section of Cārvākas unanimoulsy uphold that *anumāna* (inference) is an independent instrument or source of valid knowledge. But what is *anumāna* ? We give below a general idea of what *anumāna* is according to logicians. *Anumāna* literally means knowledge that follows (*anu*) some other knowledge. It is a cognition of an object through the perception of another object that acts as an invariable mark of the former. Precisely this is meant by Gotama when he writes that perception invariably precedes inference. Let us be more clear. In case we happen to know about two objects or objective characters (say M and P) that P is found wherever M is we can say about a thing S which is *seen* to possess M (but not P) that it possesses P also ; this will be a case of inferring the existence of P from the existence of M in the thing S. In the technical language (terminology) of logic M will be called 'probans' or middle term (*hetu* or *liṅga*), P 'probandum' or major term (*sādhya*) and the thing S 'locus of probans (and of the probandum)' or minor term (*pakṣa*); the relation of invariable concomitance obtaining between M and P is called *vyāpti* in Sanskṛt. The definitions of inference given by the logicians of different schools agree as to this very general nature of inference.[1]

Psychological conditions of inference : Under what psychological conditions are we urged to apply the method of inference ? The answer to this question is found in the traditional discussion on the nature of the thesis(=*pakṣa*=*pratijñā*=*sādhya*). The requisite characteristics of a genuine thesis supply us with the psychological conditions of inference. The logicians maintain that a genuine thesis has three characteristics : (i) it should be hitherto unproved (*siddhyabhāva* or *sādhyasaṁdeha*) (ii) it should be desired to be proved (*siṣādhayiṣā*), (iii) it should not be, from the very start, in contradiction with perception, etc. (*anirākṛta*)[2].

Let us take these three one by one. The doubt or absence of certainty is a necessary condition of inference. Whatever is definitely known by perception is not sought to be known through inference. In other words, where perception is available inference is not necessary. To

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1. mitena liṅgena liṅgino'rthasya paścān mānam anumānam/ Nyāyabhāṣya, I. 1.3
   tatra svārthaṁ trirūpāl liṅgād yad anumeye jñānaṁ tad anumānam/ Nyāyabindu, II. 3
   sādhanāt sādhyavijñānam anumānam.../ Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 52
2. svarūpeṇaiva svayam iṣṭo'nirākṛtaḥ pakṣa iti/ Nyāyabindu, III. 38
   sādhyaṁ śakyam abhipretam aprasiddham....../ Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 53

know objects present to our senses inference is not required; nay, in such cases it does not function at all. Even in Nyāya-Bhāṣya it is stated that inference functions with regard to things doubtful.[3] S. Stebbing rightly observes that doubt is a necessary psychological condition of inference.[4] All logicians except the Neo-Naiyāyika accept this. The Neo-Naiyāyika is of the opinion that inference can function even in matters definitely known or proved provided the disputant desires to prove them through inference.[5] Is this not an indication of their undue emphasis on the formal aspect of the problem of inference? Of course,this view of theirs is not quite unnatural. We may infer,if we choose, the presence of an elephant before us from the trumpeting sound emanating from its trunk even when we directly perceive it with the eyes.

When we are in a doubt as to the presence of an object or objective character, we cannot but try to know it definitely. The state of doubt is always unbearable. Hence doubt necessarily entails the will to know the doubtful thing. Doubt sets us thinking and gives rise to efforts directed towards the solution of the problem encountered. Thus these two psychological conditions, namely, doubt or absence of certainty and the positive desire to know go hand in hand. This condition—desire to prove—too is accepted by all logicians except the Neo-Naiyāyika who maintains that inference becomes possible even when the disputant *does not desire* to deduce or prove the unproved facts.[6] This seems to be a curious position. How can any one prove the fact that is not desired by him to be proved or deduced?

For the sake of precision Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti observe that not all doubtful facts but only those ones that are *accepted by the disputant* as facts to be proved or deduced can give rise to inference. In the traditional style we may put the thing as follows. Sometimes it so happens that even the statements of reason and example obviously stand in need of proof but they are not theses (*pakṣa=sādhya*). As for example, some one might put forth the statement 'the words are visible' in order to prove the statement 'the words are non-eternal'. Here, though the statement of reason itself needs a proof yet, merely on that account, it could not be regarded as a thesis because in addition to the characteristic of needing a proof it should also possess the characteristic of its being *accepted* by the disputant as a thesis or a fact to be proved.[7]

3. na nirṇīte'rthe nyāyaḥ pravartate kintu saṁśayite/ Nyāyabhāṣya, I. 1. 1
4. Modern Introduction to Logic, p. 215
5. yatra siṣādhayiṣā asti tatra siddhau satyām asatyām api pakṣatā/ Siddhāntamuktāvalī, kā. 70
6. yatra siddhir nāsti tatra siṣādhayiṣāyāṁ satyām asatyām api pakṣatā/ Ibid, kā. 70
7. svarūpeṇeti sādhyatveneṣṭaḥ/ svarūpeṇaiveti sādhyatvenaiveṣṭo na sādhanatvenāpi/ yathā śabdasyānityatve sādhye cākṣuṣatvaṁ hetuḥ, śabde'siddhatvāt sādhyam/ na punas tad iha sādhyatvenaiveṣṭam, sādhanatvenābhidhānāt/ Nyāyabindu, III. 39-41

Again, Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti say that the unproved facts accepted by the disputant *himself*—and not by the Scriptures of his faith and school —as theses or facts to be deduced make it possible for him to employ inference for the deduction of these facts from others. They observe that a statement intended to be proved by the disputant *himself* and not by the scriptures of his faith and school is a thesis. [8] On this basis it can be said that they here attack dogmatism. They stress the point that the philosopher is free to prove by reason anything he likes. He is not bound to prove only those facts that are accepted by his school. They mean that none should seek to silence an arguer from the start merely on the ground that his thesis is contradictory to his own scriptures. But then they should not have mentioned the thesis-contradicted-by-scripture in their list of contradicted —hence impermissible— theses. In Diṅnāga's list it is mentioned [9] but Dharmakīrti might have become conscious of the inconsistency and he omits it in his list.[10] These refinements of the Buddhist logicians are rejected by the Naiyāyikas, the Jainas and the Mīmāṁsakas.

The third main condition of inference is already hinted in the previous paragraph. Inference functions only when facts desired to be deduced from other facts by the disputant do not involve, from the very start, a contradiction. In other words, if the fact to be proved is not in contradiction with perception, with inference, with the identity of a conception made use of or with the very words of the statement formulated then it works as a thesis and makes inference possible.

What precisely is it that we infere ? (The problem of the probandum): We have already noted that a proposition that is *unproved* and is *desired* to be proved makes inference possible. But what exactly is to be inferred or proved ? To make the point clear, let us suppose that the proposition–' the hill has fire on it ' is to be proved ; but the hill is already known through perception and hence the question naturally arises as to what exactly is here sought to be inferred. It is not quite impossible to find persons who would declare the hill (S=subject=minor term) as such to be the probandum. But common people naturally think that the hill (S) being already perceived, what remains to be inferred or proved is just the fire (P=predicate or property =major term). This is the second alternative. We get three other alternatives as we put major emphasis on either the subject (S=hill) or predicate (P=fire) or the copula (' is ') that joins them both ; and again we get a fourth one

8. svayam iti vādinā/ etena yadyapi kvacic chāstre sthitaḥ sādhanam āha, tacchāstrakāreṇa tasmin dharmiṇy anekadharmābhyupagame'pi yas tadā tena vādinā dharmaḥ svayaṁ sādhayitum iṣṭaḥ sa eva sādhyo netara ity uktaṁ bhavati/ Ibid, III. 42, 44
9. Nyāyapraveśa, p. 2
10. Nyāyabindu, III. 48

if we were to put equal emphasis on the both S and P. Those who put major emphasis on S (hill) feel that the probandum is Sp (= hill qualified by fire=fiery hill); those who put major emphasis on P (fire) feel that the probandum is sP (= fire qualified by hill=hilly fire); those who put the major emphasis on the copula ('is') feel that the probandum is the relation between S (hill) and P (fire). And those who put equal emphasis on S and P both feel that the probandum is S and P both i.e. S plus P. Thus there are six possible answers to the question as to what exactly we infer or what precisely the probandum is. They are S, P, S+P, relation between S and P, sP, Sp.

Let us discuss these alternatives one by one and see which of them is right. (i) The S by itself cannot be regarded as a probandum because it is already known. Moreover, on this view, the universal relation becomes impossible because M is not invariably related to S while it is a rule that M should stand in an invariable relation to the probandum. Thus in our instance the universal relation grasped on the occasion of observing the smoky and firey hearth is that between smoke and fire and not that between smoke and hill. So, this alternative is not acceptable. (ii) Some hold that from M we infer P. That is, according to this view we infer fire *in general* from the smoke. But fire in general is already known at the time of apprehending universal relation between smoke and fire; so, it by itself does not stand in need of a fresh *pramāṇa*. This means that if we were to infer fire in general, we are inferring nothing new. That which is already apprehended cannot as such constitute the probandum—the thing that is to be proved. The probandum of inference cannot be thought of as mere P, that is, P out of relation to S. The terms M and P are terms not in themselves but only in so far as they refer to S. M and P are always the qualifiers of S. If M and P as such, that is, M and P out of any relation to S were to work as M and P then they would fall apart and M would not function as a middle term. So, this second alternative too, we should reject. (iii) The aggregate of S and P (S plus P) cannot be considered as a probandum, because this position fares no better than either of the preceding two; nay, it involves the defects of them both. So, this alternative is doubly unsatisfactory. S and P by themselves are already known, as is shown previously. Moreover, M is not invariably related to S+P, while as a rule it should be so related to the probandum. Hence M cannot function as a middle term. For example, we cannot adduce the reason 'there is smokiness' to prove that hill and fieriness exist, because smokiness is not invariably related to both the hill and fieriness but to fieriness alone. Thus this alternative is to be rejected. (iv) The relation of S and P is not the probandum because such a relation is not asserted by name, e.g. in the form 'there exists the relation between the hill and fire'; nor is it asserted by means of

the genetive case, e.g. in the form 'there exists fire of the hill.' The normal mode of assertion is 'the hill has fire on it' or 'there is fire on the hill.' We do certainly express our conclusion in the form 'the hill has (possesses) fire' and 'possession' is according to the grammarians just the significance of the genetive preposition 'of'. This could not be denied but it is not the primary object of assertion. Moreover, on this view a universal relation between the middle term and the probandum becomes impossible as there obtains no universal relation between M and S-P relation. For instance, we do not have *vyāpti* in the form 'wherever there is smoke there is hill-fire relation.' Thus even this alternative is not acceptable. (v) Let us consider the fifth one. According to this alternative the probandum is sP (hilly fire). But this alternative involves unnecessary complications. Let us elucidate with the help of an example. Commonly we argue: 'Sound is transitory because it is a product.' But on this view we should say: Transitoriness resides in sound because it is a product.' But this is absurd; transitoriness is not a product. So, we will have to change the statement of reason into the form 'because the character of being a product belongs to sound.' And even then the line of thought remains somewhat clumsy. So, we have to conclude that to regard sP as the probandum is fraught with difficulties. (vi) The only alternative that remains to be considered is that of Sp. All logicians accept this veiw as correct. S and P by themselves are already known and the universal relation of M with P too is already apprehended elsewhere; so, what we infer is the subject qualified by the property and this we do on the basis of the universal relation established in other cases. Thus the probandum is nothing but S–as–qualified–by–P (Sp.)

Vātsyāyana is of the opinion that a probandum is either a thing qualified by a property (Sp) or a property qualified by a thing (sP).[11] But he does not discuss the problem as such. On the other hand Diṅnāga, Uddyotakara, Kumārila and Dharmakīrti do so at considerable length. Diṅnāga criticises the views according to which either P or the relation between P and S is probandum and he finally accepts the position which regards S-as-qualified-by-P (Sp) as probandum. The arguments advanced by him against the two views are the same as we have put forth above.[12] Uddyotakara too explicitly states that the mere subject could

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11. sādhyaṁ ca dvividhaṁ dharmiviśiṣṭo vā dharmaḥ śabdasyānityatvam, dharmaviśiṣṭo vā dharmī anityaḥ śabda iti/ Nyāyabhāṣya, I. 1.36

12. Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā, p. 180

not be regarded as probandum because it is already known; so what we precisely infer is the subject-as-qualified-by-the-property-desired-to-be-proved-in-it.[13] At another place while criticising Diṅnāga's view on the problem of probandum he has in his mind the question as to what could be treated as a probandum when the ordinarily accepted minor term (S = subject) is not being perceived as in the case of a hill out of vision due to distance or due to the interception of a large volume of smoke. He opines that even in this case the probandum could be nothing but Sp. But someone might object that according to the rule that out of Sp which is the accepted probandum S as such should already be apprehended, while here the hill being unperceived or invisible cannot function as S (minor term). So, instead of the hill, what is it that functions as S (subject = minor term) here? Uddyotakara holds that in the case under consideration the substance called smoke is already perceived and it is this substance that functions as S (minor term). It might be asked if the substance smoke is to function as S (minor term) then what would function as M (middle term). Uddyotakara replies that the observed characters, on the basis of which that substance is determined as smoke, function as M. Thus Uddyotakara ultimately *seems to conclude* that even in the case like this the probandum is Sp (substance-smoke-as-qualified-by-the-characteristic-fieriness=fiery smoke).[14] Kumārila discusses all the alternatives at length and finally accepts the Sp alternative.[15] In the Pramāṇavārtika of Dharmakīrti there occurs a *kārikā* which suggests that Dharmakīrti rejected the S alternative and P alternative on the ground that they respectively contradict the definitions of reason and instance (given by the Naiyāyikas). This verse, moreover, explicitly states that the alternative of S plus P involves both these defects. The point to be noted here is that Dharmakīrti considers Sp and sP alternatives as equivalent to S plus P alternative and so he rejects them too. As a result he seems to conclude that as it is very difficult to determine what the probandum is from the point of view of pure logic it would be advisable to accept

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13. Nyāyavārtika, pp. 108-109

14. anumeyo'gnimān ayaṁ dhūma iti/ dhūmaviśeṣaṇāsādhāraṇenānumīyata iti/ ubhayaṁ hi tadā pratyakṣaṁ dhūmaś ca tadgatāś ca sātatyasaṁhatyūrdhvagatisvabhāvādayo dharmā iti/ te caite dhūmadharmā dhūmavṛttayo'prasiddhaṁ dhūmam anumāpayanti/ sarvasyānumeyasya vastuno dharmī pratipādakaś ca dharmaḥ prasiddho bhavati/ yathā śabdasya ātmasattā prasiddhā kṛtakatvaṁ ca dharmas tv anityatvalakṣaṇo'prasiddha iti/ tadviśeṣaṇo'-anumīyata iti/ Nyāyavārtika, p. 51

 See also A. B. Dhruva's Introduction to Nyāyapraveśa, pp. XXII-XXIII.

15. Ślokavārtika, Anumānapariccheda, kā. 24-51

empirically plausible view commonly accepted by logicians.[16] In the Nyāyabindu, on the other hand, he adopts what is nothing but the Sp view. There he states that the probandum is the subject-qualified-by-the-property-desired-to-be-proved-in-it.[17] The word 'here' (*atra*) in his aphorism containing the definition of probandum (*sādhya*) suggests that there is a possibility of the occasions when Sp could not be regarded as the probandum. What are these occasions and what could be regarded as probandum when they are in view? The suggestive word 'here' perhaps provided Dharmottara an opportunity to speak of three occasions respectively appropriate for the three different (forms of) probanda. S is probandum when the definition of its mark (middle term=M) is considered, the mark being an attribute of S (subject=minor term). Sp is probandum when the deduced conclusion is considered. But P as such should be regarded as probandum when the invariable concomitance is in view.[18] Consider the following statements: (1) A valid *hetu* always resides in the *sādhya*. (2) (In conclusion), we infer *sādhya* from the *hetu*. (3) A vaild *hetu* should always be invariably connected with the *sādhya*. The meaning of the terms *sādhya* differs in each statement. In (1) it means S, in (2) it means Sp and in (3) it means P, because the *hetu* could be treated as residing in S only, in conclusion we infer S-as-P only and M is universally related to P as such (and not to P particularised in S i.e. sP). But to the question as to what exactly we infer, we should categorically reply that it is Sp that we infer. Durveka comments that primarily Sp is probandum but S and P being the constituents of Sp, S and P as such may also be secondarily regarded as probandum. And he quotes a verse in support of this veiw.[19] Akalaṅka has not discussed

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16. kiñca sādhyo dharmo dharmī dvayaṁ vā syāt/ yadi dharmas tadā sādhyasādharmyāt taddharmabhavī dṛṣṭānta udāharaṇam iti dṛṣṭāntalakṣaṇaṁ virudhyate/ na hi sādhyadharmasyānityatvāder dharma utpattimatvādiḥ/ kintu śabdasya/ tataḥ sādhyadharmaṇa sādharmyāt dṛṣṭāntasya taddharmabhāvitvaṁ sādhyadharmotpattimattvādibhāvavattvaṁ nāsti/
atha dharmī sādhyaḥ tadodāharaṇasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanaṁ hetur iti hetulakṣaṇaṁ na yujyeta/ na hi śabdo dharmyasiddho yena tatsādhanāt sādhyasādhano hetuḥ syāt/ athobhayaṁ sādhyaṁ tadā ubhayapakṣabhāvidoṣaprasaṅgaḥ/ samudāyasyāsiddhatvāt sa eva sādhya ity āha—
samudāyasya sādhyatve'py anyonyasya viśeṣaṇam/
sādhyaṁ dvayaṁ tadā'siddhaṁ hetudṛṣṭāntalakṣaṇam//...
asambhavāt sādhyaśabdo dharmivṛttir yadīṣyate/
śāstreṇālaṁ yathāyogaṁ loka eva pravartatām// Manorathavṛtti, p. 471-473
17. anumeyo'tra jijñāsitaviśeṣo dharmī/ Nyāyabindu, II. 6
18. anumeyo'tretyādi/ atra hetulakṣaṇe niścetavye dharmī anumeyaḥ/ anyatra tu sādhyapratipattikāle samudāyo'numeyaḥ/ vyāptiniścayakāle tu dharmo'numeya iti darśayitum 'atra'-grahaṇam/ Nyāyabinduṭīkā, II. 6
19. dharmi-dharmayoś cānumeyatvam/ tasmiṁs tasmin kāle'numeyaikadeśatvād upacārato draṣṭavyam/ taduktam—
samudāyasya sādhyatvāt dharmamātre ca dharmiṇi/
amukhye'py ekadeśatvāt sādhyatvam upacaryate// Dharmottarapradipa, p. 97

the problem of probandum. But the later Jaina logicians—Māṇikyanandin[20] and Devasūri and Hemacandra[21] accept Dharmottara's view which is consistent with their Non-absolutistic doctrine. It is, however, to be noted that they generally refer to the last two forms (viz. Sp and P) only.

Logical grounds: *Pakṣadharmatā* and *Vyāpti* are the two logical grounds of inference. That is to say, in case we happen to possess the knowledge that two objects or objective characters (say, x and y) are such that y exists wherever x does (*vyāptijñāna*) and also the knowledge that a particular thing possesses x (*pakṣadharmatājñāna*), there ensues the inferential knowledge to the effect that this thing possesses y. We infer fire on the hill from the smoke rising from it. Thus for this inferential knowledge viz. 'there is fire on the hill' to be valid we should first be certain that the smoke in question rises from *the hill*; and this knowledge we get through perception. From this it will be clear that *pakṣadharmatājñāna* is usually a judgment of perception. Hence the problem of the acquisition of the knowledge that a particular mark (middle term) resides in the subject or locus (minor term) in which we want to prove the presence of the major term does not present any serious difficulty. But merely this knowledge does not validate inference. In addition to the knowledge of *pakṣadharmatā* we should possess the knowledge of *vyāpti*, that is, the knowledge that the middle term is invariably connected with the major. We can infer fire from smoke only when we know that smoke is invariably connected with fire. An inference requires the knowledge that there obtains a universal relation between the concerned middle term and major term. Now, in connection with *vyāpti* we will have to consider three questions: (i) what do we exactly mean by universal relation (*vyāpti*)?; (ii) how many types of universal relations are there? and (iii) how do we come to acquire the knowledge that a particular relation is universal?

To take the first question, *vyāpti* is the technical name for the relation obtaining between the middle term and the major term while this relation is of such a nature that the middle is never present where major is absent. Thus *vyāpti* is not a simple assertoric judgment but it is a necessary judgment. 'Smoke is accompanied by fire' is an assertoric judgment while 'smoke must be accompanied by fire' is a necessary judgment. *Vyāpti* is a necessary judgment having the form 'this happening that must happen.' If the relation between the middle and the major

20. vyāptigrahaṇasamayāpekṣayā sādhyaṁ dharma evānyathā tadanupapatter iti/ ānumānikapratipattyavasarāpekṣayā tu pakṣāparaparyāyas tadviśiṣṭaḥ prasiddho dharmīti/ Parīkṣāmukha, III. 18, 20

21. sādhyaṁ sādhyadharmaviśiṣṭo dharmī, kvacit tu dharmaḥ/ Pramāṇamīmāṁsā, I. 2.15

terms were not necessary, how can the conclusion be certain? That the relation between the two terms is necessary implies that it is universal. Thus *vyāpti* is a necessary and universal statement of the relation holding between the middle and the major, e.g. 'all men are mortal.' It is not a summary statement of some totality of observed events. 'All men are mortal' is not the 'short-hand' of 'John is observed to be mortal, Lucy is observed to be mortal, Dick is observed to be mortal, etc.' It does not refer merely to the observed cases but to the unobserved ones as well. *Vyāpti* contains a *leap* from the observed to all, observed and unobserved. It contains a prediction of the unknown events on the basis of the known ones. What is the justification for taking such a leap? Or how do we acquire the knowledge of all events on the basis of the observation of some of them only? This is the fundamental problem which has proved 'dispair of philosophy.' Before we take up this problem for discussion it would be proper to consider the second question, viz. whether the number of universal-necessary relations is fixed.

Dharmakīrti holds that there are only two necessary connections—causality and essential identity.[22] What is the logic behind the acceptance of these two necessary connections only? This logic is as follows. That one thing is necessarily connected with another means that the existence of the former is necessarily dependent upon the existence of the latter. Now one thing's existence could necessarily depend on the existence of another only under two conditions. One thing's existence necessarily depends on another's if the latter causes the former or if the latter is a part of the essence of the former. There is no other condition that makes the existence of one thing necessarily depend on the existence of another thing. Hence Dharmakīrti asserts that the relation of causality and that of essential identity are the only two necessary relations.[23]

In the Sūtras of Kaṇāda we find a tendency to reduce the necessary connections to a fixed number.[24] But it is given up later on.[25] The established tradition of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools is to regard the necessary connections as innumerable and inexhaustible.[26] Hence they repudiate the Buddhist view that there are only two necessary connections that of causality and that of essential identity.

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22. vastutas tādātmyāt tadutpatteś ca/ Npāyabindu, II. 22
23. atatsvabhāvasyātadutpatteś ca tatrāpratibaddhasvabhāvatvāt/ Nyāyabindu, II. 23 See also Dharmottara's comment on the same.
24. asyedaṁ kāryaṁ kāraṇaṁ sambandhi ekārthasamavāyi virodhi ceti laiṅgikam/ Vaiśeṣikasūtra, IX. 18
25. śāstre kāryādigrahaṇaṁ nidarśanārthaṁ kṛtaṁ na avadhāraṇārtham/ Praśastapāda-bhāṣya p. 562
26. tasmād yo vā sa vā'stu sambandhaḥ kevalaṁ yasyāsau svābhāviko niyataḥ sa eva gamako gamyaś cetaraḥ sambandhīti yujyate/ Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā, p. 165

In order to show that there are necessary connections other than those of causality and essential identity they cited many instances of inference that are ordinarily deemed valid but the relation between the major term and the middle term of which is not ordinarily recognised as either that of causality or that of essential identity. Thus, for example, the rise of the sun in the morning is inferred from its rise on the previous day; high tide in the sea is inferred from the rise of the moon; the forthcoming appearance of the *kṛttikā* constellation is inferred from the appearance of the *bharaṇi* constellation; impending rainfall is inferred from the movements of ants and also from some peculiar overt features manifested by fishes, etc. All these are instances of invariable sequence which is not founded on causality. Again, we infer the particular taste of a fruit from its particular colour. Yet the relation obtaining between the two is not based on causality because they arise simultaneously whereas causality is a relation of necessary sequence. Nor could it be held that in this case there obtains the relation of essential identity because—so would say the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas—the taste in question and the colour in question are two quite *different* qualities residing in one substance.[27]

The Jaina logicians in general and Akalaṅka in particular cite similar cases in order to refute the Buddhist logician's position. Akalaṅka's criticism is based on a general understanding that the simultaneous occurrence of two things does not necessarily suggest that they are essentially identical and that the successive occurrence of two things does not necessarily suggest that they are causally related. As for the *vyāpti* based on essential identity, Akalaṅka does not deny that it is a case of necessary simultaneous existence of *hetu* and *sādhya*. But he goes on to point out that there are cases of necessary simultaneous existence of *hetu* and *sādhya* where the relation between *hetu* and *sādhya* is not that of essential identity; nevertheless these latter are the cases of valid *vyāpti* according to Akalaṅka. Thus Akalaṅka finds out instances where two phenomena are invariably simultaneous but have no relation of essential identity. Though at this juncture he refers to the inference of a particular flavour from a particular colour yet he is conscious of the fact that it could not be of much help to him because on the non-absolutistic theory of Jaina metaphysics he could not deny that there does obtain the relation of identity between the flavour in question and the colour in question. As they are inseparable and are the qualities of one substance they will have to be treated as somewhat identical. So, he gives other

27. tadyathā adhvaryur Oṁ śrāvayan vyavahitasya hetur liṅgam, candrodayaḥ samudravṛddheḥ kumudavikāśasya ca, śaradi jalaprasādo'gastyodayasyeti/ evamādi tat sarvam asyedam iti sambandhamātravacanāt siddham/ Praśastapādabhāṣya, p. 563
See also Vyomavatī on the same; Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā, pp. 161-163; Nyāyamañjarī, pp. 113-118

instances of inference ordinarily accepted as valid—in which the objects denoted by the major and the minor, though simultaneous, are not essentially identical. We infer the downward movement of one scale of a balance from the upward movement of the other scale. In this case though the two movements are invariably simultaneous the relation between them cannot be construed as that of essential identity. This seems to be the case because the two movements have different substrata.[28]

Coming to the cases of *vyāpti* based on the relation of necessary succession between *hetu* and *sādhya*, Akalaṅka points out that even if some of these are the cases of causal relationship between *hetu* and *sādhya* the others are not. Thus he finds out instances where though two things are invariably successive yet they are not causally related. Such for example is the inference of the previous appearance of the *bharaṇī* constellation and the forthcoming appearance of the *rohiṇī* constellation from the rise of the *kṛttikā* constellation. The *kṛttikā* appears invariably after the appearance of the *bharaṇī* and the *rohiṇī* appears invariably after the appearance of the *kṛttikā*. Yet they are not causally related with one another. Merely on the ground that the *kṛttikā* appears after the appearance of the *bharaṇī* we could not assert that the *kṛttikā* is caused by the *bharaṇī*. Certainly, the stars forming the constellation *bharaṇī* do not generate the stars forming the constellation *kṛttikā*. Thus Akalaṅka proves the possibility of there being necessary sequence even without causality.[29] Like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians the Jaina logicians refute the Buddhist position but unlike the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians they recognised only four necessary connections. They are: (1) Relation of simultaneity based on essential identity, (2) Relation of simultaneity which is necessary without any apparent reason, (3) Relation of succession (sequence) based on causality, (4) Relation of sequence which is necessary without any apparent reason.[30]

In reply to this usual criticism the Buddhist logicians point out that the alleged additional necsssary relations are traceable to causality,

28. tulonnāmarasādīnām tulyakālatayā na hi/
nāmarūpādihetutvaṁ na ca tadvyabhicāritā//
tādātmyam tu kathañcit syāt tato hi na tulāntayoḥ/
sāsnādīnāṁ...candrārvākparabhāgayoḥ// Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 75
See also Siddhiviniścaya, 6. 15

29. bhaviṣyat pratipadyeta śakaṭaṁ kṛttikodayāt/
śva āditya udeteti grahaṇaṁ vā bhaviṣyati//
tadetad bhaviṣyadviṣayam avisaṁvādakaṁ jñānaṁ pratibandhasaṅkhyāṁ pratiruṇaddhi/
Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 5
See also Siddhiviniścaya, 6. 16

30. sahakramabhāvaniyamo'vinābhāvaḥ/ sahacāriṇoḥ vyāpyavyāpakayoḥ sahabhāvaḥ/ pūrvottaracāriṇoḥ kāryakāraṇayoś ca kramabhāvaḥ/ Parīkṣāmukha, III. 16-18

if causality is rightly understood. We infer a particular taste from a particular colour. Here the two are simultaneous, yet there obtains between them no relation of essential identity. The necessary dependence of one on the other and vice versa is due to the fact that both of them are the co-effects of certain causal conditions that are available when the fruit in question attains the requisite stage of ripeness. The necessary sequence of the appearance of the *bharaṇī*, the *kṛttikā* and the *rohiṇī* is caused by certain cosmic changes. The relation between certain overt features manifested by fishes and the forthcoming rain is necessary because they are the co-effects of atmospheric changes. In this manner all these necessary relations can be reduced to that of causality.[31] This shows the insight of the Buddhist logicians into the nature of causality. It is their fundamental tenet that between two independent phenomena there can be no relation other than that of causality. [Dharmakīrti has repeatedly stated this in his Pramāṇavārtika as we have seen earlier.] This helps them to be thorough in their study of causality. Moreover, the emphasis put on causality in the Pāli canon might have stimulated the Buddhist philosophers to probe deep into the phenomenon of causality.

As we shall see, this Buddhist position somewhat helps the Buddhists to answer the third and difficult question, viz. how do we acquire the knowledge that a particular relation is necessary and universal.[32] Those who posit innumerable necessary connections cannot say that a particular relation is necessary because it is based on either causality or essential identity. Even the Jaina logicians are here not in a better position than their Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika counterparts. The former have accepted two types of necessary connections in addition to those based on causality and essential identity; but the acceptance is without any (apparent) reason. A relation cannot be established as necessary merely by swearing that it is necessary. So, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Jaina logicians have to find out other means of justifying the necessity of a particular connection.

Some hold that the knowledge of necessary connection (*vyāpti*) is acquired by a single act of sense-perception. For example, the necessary connection between smoke and fire is grasped at the time of the very

31. ekasāmagryadhīnasya rūpāde rasato gatiḥ/
hetudharmānumānena................//
.........etena pipīlikotsaraṇa-matsyavikārāder varṣādyanumānam uktam/ tatrāpi bhūta-pariṇāma eva varṣaheluḥ pipīlikādisaṁkṣobhahetur iti/ Svārthānumānapariccheda, p. 5
See also Dharmottarapradīpa, pp. 115-116

32. kāryakāraṇabhāvad vā svabhāvād vā niyāmakāt/
avinābhāvaniyamo........// Svārthānumānapariccheda, p. 13

first observation of the two together.[33] On the very face of it this view is untenable. The object of sense-perception is something existing at the present time and place while the necessary connection between smoke and fire expresses their relation in all times and places. So, we cannot grasp the necessary relation between two things at the time of the first observation of the two together.[34] Some have modified this view. According to them, though it is not possible for a sense-organ to grasp the necessary connection at the first observation, it can do so at the time of the final observation. Why? It is so because at the latter time the capacity of the sense-organ is much more enhanced as a result of repeated observations. Thus at the time of the final observation the relevant sense-organ, assisted by the revival of the memory impressions of previous observations, grasps the necessary connection between two things.[35] This view also is unsound and for the following reasons. Auxiliary conditions can only enhance the natural capacity of a cause proper to produce the effect concerned but they cannot generate in this cause proper quite a new capacity or nature that may enable it, to produce an effect not proper to its type. The nature of perception is to grasp objects here and now. And auxiliary conditions like revival of the memory impressions formed as a result of repeated observations can enhance the capacity of perception to grasp such objects but certainly they cannot change the nature of perception and enable it to grasp objects

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33. tatpūrvakam ity anena liṅgaliṅginoḥ sambandhadarśanaṁ liṅgadarśanaṁ cābhisambandhyate/ Nyāyabhāṣya, I. 1.5
liṅgaliṅgisambandhadarśanam ādyaṁ pratyakṣaṁ, liṅgadarśanaṁ dvitīyam/ Nyāyavārtika, p. 44
See also Nyāyadarśana (Bangali), Vol. I, p. 135
Read the following passage: atrocyate/ vahnidhūmādīnāṁ tāvat saṁyogādisambandhaḥ pratyakṣādibhir avasīyate/ tatrāpi saṁyogo viśeṣaṇatvena guṇādīnāṁ dravyaparatantrasvabhāvatvāt/ viśeṣyatayā ca svatantrabhūtaṁ dravyaṁ prakāśate/ deśakālāv api viśeṣaṇatvenaiva avabhāsataḥ/ sannihitadeśavartamānakālatā hi idantā/ sā ca viśeṣaṇam eva/ evaṁ ca deśakālābhyāṁ saṁyogādisambandhena ca viśiṣṭau dravyabhūtau vahnidhūmāv avagamyete na punar deśakālābhyām sambandhasya viśiṣṭasyāvagatiḥ/ tathāhi saṁyuktāv imāv iti pratiyanti na punar ayam anayoḥ saṁyoga iti deśakālāvacchinnaḥ prathamam agnidhūmayoḥ saṁyogalakṣaṇo sambandho dvayor avagamyate/ Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 70
34. na hi pratyakṣaṁ 'yāvān kaścid dhūmaḥ kālāntare deśāntare ca pāvakasyaiva kāryaṁ nārthāntarasya' iti iyato vyāpārān kartuṁ samarthaṁ sannihitaviṣayabalotpatter avicārakatvāt/ Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 5
See also Bhāmatī (Nirnayasāgara), p. 766
35. ...bhūyodarśanabalād agnidhūmayor deśādivyabhicāre'py avyabhicāragrahaṇam/ Vyomavatī, p. 570
prācīnānekadarśanajanitasaṁskārasahāye carame darśane cetasi cakāsti dhūmasya vahniniyatasvabhāvatvam/ Kāśikā on Ślokavārtika, Anu., kā. 12

remote in time and place.[36] According to some, it is mental perception that grasps necessary connections;[37] but this view also fares no better than the one just considered, because in the case of external things mind cannot function independently of the sense-organs while necessary connections (in the case of external things—which are the things usually considered in this connection) are something external.[38] Mind even when assisted by repeated observation cannot perceive a necessary connection. Repeated observation may at the most produce in a mind the habit of expecting an event at the time of perceiving its usual attendant. It cannot validate the idea of necessary connections. 'Logically, multiplication of instances is superfluous, for, an inductive inference which cannot be derived from one instance cannot be derived from a thousand instances.' Experiences, positive and negative, cannot establish the necessary connection.[39] Nor could it be held that it is inference that grasps necessary connections. For, it might be asked as to which inference grasps a necessary connection—the inference requiring the knowledge of necessary connection or another one. The first alternative involves the fallacy of mutual dependence; the second involves an infinite regress.[40] The Jaina philosophers opine that reasoning (*tarka*) based on the observation and non-observation of the co-occurrence of two objects together gives us the

36. na khalu pradīpasahakṛtaṁ cakṣū rasādau pravartamānaṁ pratīyate/ svaviṣaye pravartamānasya atiśayādhānaṁ ca adhyakṣasya vyāptiviṣayatve siddhe siddhyet/ tac ca asiddham, sambaddhavartamānārthaviṣayatvāt tasya/ na ca tatsahakṛtasyāpīndriyajādhyakṣasya kaścana utkarṣo jāyate, yena svaviṣayātikrameṇāpy arthān gṛhṇīyāt/ Nyāyakumudacandra, p. 430

37. tatra kecid ācakṣate mānasaṁ pratyakṣaṁ pratibandhagrāhīti/ pratyakṣānupalambhābhyām analasahacaritam anagneś ca vyāvartamānaṁ dhūmam upalabhya vibhāvasau niyato dhūma iti manasā pratipadyate/ manaś ca sarvaviṣayaṁ kena vā nābhyupeyate/ asannihitam apy artham avadhārayituṁ kṣamam/ Nyāyamañjarī, pp. 110-111

tasya grahaṇaṁ pratyakṣānupalambhasahāyāt mānasāt pratyakṣāt/ dhūmam agnisahacaritam indriyeṇopalabhya anagneś ca jalāder vyāvartamānam anupalambhena jñātvā manasā niścinoti dhūmo agniṁ na vyabhicaratīti/ Nyāyakalika, p. 3

38. pratyakṣaṁ mānasaṁ yeṣāṁ sambandhaṁ liṅgaliṅginoḥ/
vyāptyā jānāti te'py arthe'tīndriye kimu kurvate//
yatrākṣāṇi pravartante mānasaṁ tatra vartate/
no'nyatrākṣādivaidhuryaprasaṅgāt sarvadehinām// Tattvārthaślokavārtika, p. 179

na cātītānāgatānāṁ vyaktīnāṁ manasā saṅkalanam iti nyāyyam, manaso bahir arthe svātantrye andhabadhirādyabhāvaprasaṅgāt/ Kandalī, p. 210

nāpi mānasam, manaso bāhyendriyanirapekṣasya bahirarthe pravṛttyabhāvāt/...vyāptiś ca bahirarthadharmatvād bahirarthaḥ/ Nyāyakumudacandra, pp. 431-432

39. avinābhāvaniyamo'darśanān na na darśanāt/ Pramāṇavārtika, III. 30

40. nānumānād asiddhatvāt........./
nāpy anumānāntaram, sarvatrāviśeṣāt/ Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 5

knowledge of a *necessasy* connection between the two.[41] But this opinion could not be justifed. How can *tarka* based on a limited number of observations and non-observations of two objects together give us certain knowledge to the effect that one of them *must always* accompany the other? The Jainas seem to have been conscious of this difficulty as they often say that at the time of realising the necessary connection between two objects a man attains the status of a mystic.[42] Some Naiyāyikas are of the view that a relation must be treated as necessary if our doubt as to its necessity were to bring our everyday behaviour or practice to a standstill. As for instance, if one doubts that smoke is necessarily produced by fire he would not try to get fire for the purpose of igniting his cigar.[43] But this view is not sound because our practice is not based on the absolute certainty of knowledge. Do people have the absolute certainty that the train by which they travel shall not meet with an accident? They do not have. Yet they travel by the train. This shows that certainty is not essential for our everyday practice.[44] The Naiyāyikas seem to be conscious of the fact that the method of agreement, the method of difference, the joint method of agreement and difference, the non-observation of any contradictory instance (*vyabhicārāgraha*) and even the method of practical contradiction (*tarka*) could not give us the knowledge of necessity or absolute certainty. So, they posited a type of extra-ordinary (*alaukika*) perception which involves no sense-operation and yet grasps the necessary and universal connections. To this perception they give the name *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. This perception enables a cogniser to become directly aware of all the past, future and present instances of a class of objects through observing the 'universal' commonly residing in the objects. When we perceive fire and smoke we also perceive the universals 'fireness' and 'smokeness' and through this latter perception we perceive all the actual and possible instances of fire and smoke.[45] But this view of the Naiyāyikas is nothing more than a hypothesis formulated in order to solve the problem of induction. It is not a fact of experience.[46] Not

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41. upalambhānupalambhasambhavaṁ trikālikalitasādhyasādhanasambandhādyālambanam idam asmin saty eva bhavatīty ākāraṁ saṁvedanam ūhā'paranāmā tarka iti/ Parīkṣāmukha, III. 7
sambhavapratyayas tarkaḥ pratyakṣānupalambhataḥ/ Akalaṅkagranthatraya. p. 100
42. tasyāpi vyāptigrahaṇakāle yogīva pramātā sampadyata iti/ Pramāṇamīmāṁsā, p. 36
43. vyāghātāvadhir āśaṅkā......../ Nyāyakusumāñjali, p. 23
See also the Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, p. 277
44. yat tāvad uktaṁ niścayena prekṣāvatāṁ pravṛttir iti tad asat/ saṁśayenāpi pravṛttidarśanāt/ Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā, p. 3
45. Siddhāntamuktāvalī, kā. 64
46. tathā ca sāmānyalakṣaṇāṁ vinā dhūmatvena sakaladhūmānāṁ vahnitvena sakalavahnīnāṁ ca bhānaṁ kathaṁ bhavet tadarthaṁ sāmānyalakṣaṇā svīkriyate/ Ibid, kā. 65

only the Naiyāyikas but the Jainas also posit some extra-ordinary experience supposed to grasp necessary connections. Even the Buddhist philosopher Prajñākaragupta offers a similar explanation. According to him yogic perception is the means of cognising necessary connections.[47] We shall call these theories by one name 'intuition theories.' As it was impossible for these ancient philosophers to give up the ideal of certainty and necessity, they took refuge under the shelter of intuition. But to take shelter under intuition is to escape from the difficulty rather than solve it. Again, the intuition of any and every individual person does not possess so much authenticity and universality as to be made the basis of a sound and commonly accepted philosophy. That the connection is necessary cannot be established either by non-observation or by observation—this is endorsed by Dharmakīrti. The observation of positive instances (*sapakṣas*) is not enough to prove that the relation is universal and necessary. The mere non-observation of one object without another in a limited number of negative instances too cannot assure us that there will be no instance in future of the presence of the former in the absence of the latter. But, he says, when it is known that A is either the cause or the nature of B, then, since it is inconceivable that a thing can ever come into existence without its cause or can ever exist without its nature, we know the necessary connection of B with A.[48] Here Dharmakīrti assumes two things: (i) Every thing has a cause. (ii) The same cause always uniformly produces the same effect. We may grant that there is a general or broad regularity in the universe, that is, no thing is causeless (or natureless). But even then how are we to know that the cause which we have discovered in a particular instance will necessarily be the cause of similar things also in future? To be more clear, we may admit that every event has a cause. Every event may have a cause, but the same cause need not always produce the same effect, nor the cause of the same effect be always the same. The human will, for example, is a cause; but it does not always act in the same way under the same circumstances; to-day in a given situation I may act meanly; but it is possible that in a situation of the same kind I may act better to-morrow. To take another instance, it is not logically necessary that heat should cause bodies to expand rather than contract. We may accept that every event has a cause, but whether causes act uniformly, whether the same cause in the same situation always has the same

47. kāryakāraṇabhāvasya viśeṣeṇa viniścaye/
atītānāgatajñānam asya bhāvi parisphuṭam// Pramāṇavārtikabhāṣya, p. 329
yas tu manyate prajñākaraguptaḥ yogijñānaṁ vyāptijñānam iti/ Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā, p. 189

48. kāryakāraṇabhāvād vā svabhāvād vā niyāmakāt/
avinābhāvaniyamo'darśanān na na darśanāt// Svārthānumānapariccheda, p. 15

effect can never be determined with *certainty*. Similarly, we can never assert with *certainty* that the specific gravity of mercury will always be 13.6, a number which is found to constitute the nature of mercury in observed cases.

To this Dharmakīrti's reply is as follows. Whatever is a cause of a particular type of thing remains for ever the cause of that type of thing. To think otherwise, namely, that one type of cause does not always produce only one type of effect is to go against logic. Y cannot be treated as an effect of X even in a single case if *all* Y is not an effect of some X. It is so because we call X the cause of Y, only if X invariably produces Y. Moreover, to say that at times Y is produced by X and at times it is produced by something other than X, that is non-X, would mean that Y possesses two contradictory natures. Again, this would suggest that the nature of a thing does not depend on its cause; and to grant this suggestion would mean that the thing comes into existence without any cause. This, in turn, would make it eternal and consequently devoid of efficiency which is the criterion of reality. So, one type of effect can never be regarded as being produced at times by this type of cause and at times by that type of cause. When we feel that there are instances of one type of effect at times being produced by this type of cause and at times by that type of cause (e.g. scorpions being generated at times by cowdung and at times by scorpion-parents) our feeling is not justified. We commit a fallacy of non-observation. The two effects produced by two different types of cause are not really of one type. We are deceived by their outward similarity. A close scrutiny and examination may reveal the traits which turn them into different types.[49]

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49. kasyacit kadācit kutaścid bhāve'pi sarvas tādṛśas tathāvidhajanmeti kutaḥ, tathā ca nānvayavyatirekau iti cet/ na/ atadbhāvinas tasya sakṛd api tato'bhāvāt/ parasparāpekṣayā janyajanakasvabhāvalakṣaṇe kāryakāraṇe/ tatra yadi dhūmo'gnyādisāmagryā anyato'pi bhavet tadā tasyā tajjanyasvabhāvo na bhavatīti sakṛd api tato na bhavet/ arthāntaravat/ nāpi sāmagrī taṁ janayet, atajjananasvabhāvatvāt/ sāmagryantaravat/ na ca dhūmasya tadatajjanyaḥ savabhāvo yuktaḥ/ ekasvabhāvatvāt/ dhūmādhūmajananasvabhāvāt bhavato dhūmādhūmasvabhāvaḥ syāt/ kāryasvabhāvānāṁ kāraṇasvabhāvakṛtatvāt/ akāraṇāpekṣaṇe ca ahetukatvaprasaṅgāt/ tasmād yo dhūmajananaḥ sa agnyādisāmagrīviśeṣo bhavatīti kāryakāraṇayor evaṁ svabhāvasya niyamāt tadvijātīyād utpattir na bhavati/tat yādṛśaṁ kāryaṁ kāraṇād dṛṣṭam ekadā tat tan na vyabhicarati/ tena siddhe kāryakāraṇabhāve kāryasya kāraṇena vyāptiḥ siddhā bhavati/ nanu vijātīyād api kiñcid bhavad dṛṣṭaṁ tadyathā gomayādeḥ śālūkādiḥ/ na vijātīyād utpattiḥ/ tathāvidham eva hi tādṛśām ādinimittam—iti na kāraṇabhedaḥ/ prabandhena utpattau śarād bhavati/ asti ca gomayetarajanmanoḥ svabhāvabhedaḥ rūpasyābhede'pi/ na hi ākāratulyataiva bhāvānāṁ tattve nimittam/ abhinnākārāṇām api keśāñcid anyato viśeṣāj jātibhedo dṛśyate/ Hetubindu, pp. 63-64

See also Svārthānumānaparicheda, p. 15

But this does not solve the problem. We ask Dharmakīrti as to how he determines that there obtains a causal relation (i. e. the relation of *necessary* sequence) or an identity relation (i. e. the relation of *necessary* simultaneity) between two things. Experience cannot give us the knowledge of *necessary* sequence or *necessary* simultaneity. It gives us the knowledge of mere sequence or mere simultaneity. Thus the notorious problem of induction remains unsolved. It is not easy for Dharmakīrti to show how one acquires the knowledge of causality or identity, i. e. of necessary sequence or necessary simultaneity. But he does not take recourse to the idea of a direct trancendental perception of these two necessities—as was done by other philosophers including even Prajñākaragupta. Looking to the general trend of his philosophy we may surmise that the following might be the solution at the back of his mind. Buddhist logicians hold that we directly perceive nothing but point instants; thus on their view perception is nothing but a running multiplicity of sensations without any connections or order in them. It is only the Intellect (*vikalpa-buddhi*) that constructs a system or order out of them through the instrumentality of the two necessities in question. Thus these two necessities are not derived from experience but in fact precede experience and make the world orderly and intelligible. In this sense they are *apriori.* This means that according to the Buddhist logicians there is no uniformity, universality and order in the universe. It is the Intellect (*vikalpa-buddhi*) that imparts order and uniformity to the world. They are superimposed by it on the external reality. The universe is really not a cosmos but a chaos, so to say. The pure sensations as such represent what reality is and they being chaotic what they represent should also be regarded as chaotic. Some one might urge here that the Buddhist logician too should be regarded as considering the world to be uniform and regular because they too uphold that one point instant is always caused by the point instant immediately preceding it. The Buddhist logician would however argue that this is a generalisation which intends to predicate of the unique particulars something that is common to them, while as a matter of fact the particulars being unique have nothing common to them. Thus it involves a self-contradiction to make any generalisation in the case of the unique particulars, and any attempt to do so should be viewed as futile. The causality (relation of necessary sequence) that is said to obtain between two point instants is as unique as the point instants themselves. In this sense, it seems, causality is not denied by the Buddhist logician. It is rather the empirical causality that he refuses to treat as real. We ordinarily conceive causality as a relation over and above the relata and subsisting in them but in reality—so says the Buddhist logician—causa-

lity is identical with the concerned couple of point instants and it does not subsist in the two because the two are never simultaneous.[50] The Buddhist logician's denial of causality (empirical) may have a further implication. Causality (empirical) without uniformity and necessity is inconceivable. Causality means the principle that the same cause always produces the same effect on different occasions. But in the world of unique particulars how can this principle have its sway? As soon as we think away the uniformity and necessity suggested by the words 'same' and 'always' occurring in the statement of causal principle causality loses all its meaning. To say that though a thing does have a cause it does not have the same cause always is to give up causation in favour of chance. And as it is impossible to think of any uniformity or necessity in the case of unique particulars it is better to deny causality outright and declare it to be unreal. Causality does not have its sway in the realm of reals—particulars. Could this not be the implication of the Buddhist logician's denial of causality in the case of real things themselves? Thus it is the empirical causality and not the transcendental causality, that is denied by the Buddhist logician.[51] Uniformity and order as such are the creation of Intellect (*vikalpa-buddhi*). Intellect creates and superimposes them on the particular discrete reals where they are virtually absent. So, it is only the concepts that are necessarily related with one another and not the external things themselves. And ultimately, what we infer is also a concept. We mistake this concept for something real. Yet this mistake leads to successful purposive action because the concept in question is generated only by some select individuals and no others, that is, by the individuals that are capable of performing the action in question.

Thus according to Dharmakīrti, the necessities are *apriori*. They are present to the Intellect or mind prior to all experience. He holds that our mind is so made that from the very beginning it faces nature in the expectation that the latter will be uniform. The experience here plays only a psychological part, that is, it simply makes us conscious of a notion which the mind already possessed. In other words, experience is but an occasion for calling forth this notion into consciousness.[52] This *apriori* view of Dharmakīrti is a natural deduction from the metaphysical doctrine of momentarism and its epistemological counterpart, viz. sensationism.

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50. kāryakāraṇabhāvo'pi tayor asahabhāvataḥ/
prasiddhyati kathaṁ dviṣṭho'dviṣṭhe sambandhatā katham//
Sambandhaparīkṣā, kā. 7 as quoted in Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, p. 509
51. Buddhist Logic, Vol. I, p. 247, 4n
52. Ibid, p. 262

Conditions of a valid reason (hetu): In the preceding section we saw that in order to formulate a correct inference two pieces of knowledge are necessary—(1) knowledge that the *hetu* is actually present where we want to infer the *sādhya*, (2) knowledge that the *hetu* has a necessary connection with the *sādhya*. So, it naturally follows that the conditions of a valid *hetu* should also be two—(i) its presence in *pakṣa* (ii) its necessary connection with *sādhya*.

But the official doctrine of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school is that there are five conditions of a valid *hetu:* (1) its residence in *pakṣa* (minor term S); (2) its residence in *sapakṣa* (homologue or the thing that is definitely known to possess *sādhya*); (3) its non-residence in *vipakṣa* (heterologue or the thing that is definitely known to lack *sādhya*); (4) its not being counter-balanced or neutralised by another *hetu;* (5) its not being contradicted by a valid knowledge not inferential in charater. In other words, the *hetu* should be present in the subject where we want to infer the *sādhya;* it should be present in places where the *sādhya* is found; it should not be present in a place where the *sādhya* is found to be absent; it must be such that it is impossible to point out in the *pakṣa* a *hetu* whose invariable concomitant is the absence of *sādhya;* its *pakṣa* should not be known —through a means of valid cognition other than inference—to lack *sādhya.* [53]

We have already pointed out that a *hetu* must be related to its *sādhya* by a universal necessary relation. Some might think that this condition is covered by the second and the third conditions of the five given by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians. But this is not the case. Of course, we do not want to suggest that these logicians were unaware of the necessary connection in question.[54] Though they were aware of it, they failed to formulate their doctrine of *Heturūpa* in a manner capable of covering this essential condition. Observed examples as such—whether positive or negative—do not show that the *hetu* has a necessary connection with the *sādhya*. So, even if the first three conditions are fulfilled, the *hetu* will always remain exposed to the danger of contradicicition by another valid cognition and neutralisation by another equally strong *hetu*. This seems to have constrained the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians to recognise two additional conditions of a valid *hetu*,viz. it should not be counterbalanced by another strong *hetu* and that it should not be contradicted by a valid non-inferential cognition. But even these conditions along with the first three do not establish the validity of a *hetu* beyond doubt. A *hetu* could not become valid merely on the ground that no counter-hetu has been proposed against it *so far* and that no non-infere-

53. Nyāyamañjarī, p. 101
54. A.B. Dhruva's Introduction to Nyāyapraveśa, pp. XXVI—XXXI

ntial *pramāṇa* has contradicted it *so far*. These conditions merely reduce to the minimum the possibility of its being invalid.

The Buddhist logicians have tried to incorporate this essential condition of a *hetu*—the necessary connection of *hetu* with *sādhya*—in their doctrine of *Hetutrairūpya* (i.e. 'three conditions of a *hetu*) by introducing restrictive particle *eva* in the second and the third conditions formulated by them. The three conditions of a valid *hetu*, according to them, are—(1) The *hetu* or middle term must be present (and never absent) in the subject of inference i.e. minor term. (2) The middle term must be found *only* in things known to have the *sādhya* or major term. (3) The middle term must be *only* absent (and never present) in things in which the major is known to be absent.[55] The introduction of the particle *eva* in (2) and (3) at proper places implies that a *hetu* has a necessary connection with the *sādhya*. Thus as a *hetu's* necessary connection with the *sādhya* is covered by the conditions (2) and (3)—they being a modification of the corresponding conditions of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scheme—there remains no possibility of its being either counterbalanced by another *hetu* or contradicted by a non-inferential *pramāṇa*. So, for the Buddhists the conditions (4) and (5) formulated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians become redundant. It is noteworthy that the Buddhist's insertion of the particle *eva* in his conditions (2) and (3) makes them say exactly the same thing. The usual criticism of the Buddhist doctrine is also based on this very fact. However, the Buddhist logicians themselves recognise that the conditions in question say the same things, though of course, in different ways.

But we will have to admit that even this Buddhist formulation of the triple nature of a valid *hetu* retained the implication that a valid *hetu* must have its *sapakṣas* and *vipakṣas*. This is quite wrong. And it is on this basis that Akalaṅka criticises the Buddhist doctrine of *Hetutrairūpya*. There are cases of a valid *hetu* having no *sapakṣas* or *vipakṣas* at all. These considerations are particularly applicable in the cases where the *pakṣa* is eveything (*sarvam*).[56] For, a *sapakṣa* must be something other than the *pakṣa* (though known to possess *sādhya*) but nothing can be other than everything; similarly, a *vipakṣa* must be something other than the *pakṣa* (though known to lack *sādhya*) but nothing can be other than everything. So, ultimately the essential conditions of a valid *hetu* would be: (1) its presence in the *pakṣa* and (2) its necessary connection with the *sādhya* (and a connection with no reference to *sapakṣas* or *vipakṣas*). The Jainas go a step further, for according to them the first of these two is not an essential condition

55. trairūpyaṁ punar liṅgasyānumeye sattvam eva, sapakṣa eve sattvam, asapakṣe cāsattvam eva niścitam' Nyāyabindu, I. 5
56. Nyāyakumudacandra, Vol. II, p. 440

of a valid *hetu*. A valid *hetu* may not even have a *pakṣa*. It is on this ground that Akalaṅka criticises the first condition of the Buddhist thesis of *Hetutrairūpya* and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thesis of *Hetupañca-rūpya*. Akalaṅka asks the Buddhist logician to point out a *pakṣa* in the inference of the forthcoming rise of *Rohiṇī* from the rise of *Kṛttikā*. The Buddhists answer that in this particular instance the *pakṣa* is *Ākāśa* or *Kāla*. The inference takes the form: In this *Ākāśa* the *Rohiṇī* constellation will appear in the next moment because at present there rises in this *Ākāśa* the *Kṛttikā* constellation at present. Akalaṅka objects to the habit of making cosmic substances the *pakṣa* in an inference because that would lead to overabsurdity, that is, in that case no *hetu* valid or invalid would be without a *pakṣa*. Take the following example of obviously invalid inference: 'There is fire on the sea because there is smoke in the kitchen'. On the Buddhist view even here the *hetu*–' there is somke in the kitchen'—should not be considered to be devoid of a *pakṣa*. It has the universe as its *pakṣa*. We may state the inference in the form: 'The universe has fire on the sea because it has smoke in the kitchen.'[57] So, Akalaṅka concludes that it is better to admit that there are some valid *hetus* that have no *pakṣa* than to posit cosmic substances as *pakṣa* in the case of such *hetus*. Thus, according to the Jaina logician there is only one essential condition of a valid *hetu*. And that is its otherwise-unaccountability. By otherwise-unaccountability they mean its necessary universal connection with the *sādhya*.[58] This Jaina criticism seems to be misconceived because as a matter of fact in all cases of inferene it so happens that the *hetu* occupies one portion of the *pakṣa* and the *sādhya* another. For example, when we say that the mountain possesses fire because it possesses smoke we take it for granted that the portion of the mountain occupied by somke is different from that occupied by fire. Similarly, when we say that there is *Kṛttikā-udaya* because there is (rather has been) *Rohiṇī-udaya* what we actually mean is that one portion of the observable part of sky possesses *Kṛttikā* because another portion of this very part possesses (rather has possessed) *Rohiṇī*. (In this connection we are assuming that *Rohiṇī-udaya* is a valid *hetu* for inferring *Kṛttikā-udaya* whatever be the ground of this assumption). Thus the instance of absurd *anumāna* considered by Akalaṅka is defective because in this instance the proper *pakṣa* where *hetu* and *sādhya* both reside could not be pointed

57. udeṣyati śakaṭam udagād bharaṇiḥ kṛttikodayād iti/ kālādidharmikalpanāyām atiprasaṅgaḥ/ Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 104
See also Nyāyakumudacandra, p. 440

58. vyāptir vyāpakasya tatra bhāva eva vyāpyasya vā tatraiva bhāvaḥ; tatra anyathā'nupapattir eva nānyad rūpam/ Siddhiviniścaya, p. 373
See also Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 5 and p. 66

out. Thus in all cases of valid inference it should be possible to point out a proper *pakṣa.*

Fallacies of reason (hetvābhāsa): The next topic essentially connected with the preceding one is that of fallacies of reason. Since according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Buddhist and the Jaina logicians the number of the essential conditions of a valid *hetu* (reason) is five, three and one respectively the number of the possible fallacies of reason too is, according to them, five, three and one respectively. And all these logicians point out that the fallacies of reason recognised in their school result from the violation of the conditions of a valid *hetu* (reason).

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians recognise five fallacies of reason viz. *asiddha*, *anaikāntika*, *viruddha*, *satpratipakṣa* and *bādhita. Asiddha* results from the violation of the first condition; *anaikāntika* results from the violation of either the second *or* the third condition; *viruddha* results from the violation of the second *and* the third conditions; *satpratipakṣa* results from the violation of the fourth condition and *bādhita* results from the violation of the fifth condition. Only the *anaikāntika* and *viruddha* fallacies of reason require explanation. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians recognise three types of *anaikāntika—sādhāraṇa*, *asādhāraṇa* and *anupasaṁhārin.* The *sādhāraṇa* type of *anaikāntika* fallacy arises when the reason resides in the positive as well as negative instances (i.e. in both *sapakṣas* as well as *vipakṣas*). Thus it violates the third condition of a valid reason. Take for example the reason 'knowable' adduced in order to prove that the hill is fiery. The reason 'knowable' resides in the fiery as well as non-fiery objects, i. e. in *sapakṣas* as well as *vipakṣas*. The *asādhāraṇa* type of *anaikāntika* arises when the reason resides in the *pakṣa* (subject of inference) alone though there are instances positive and negative i.e. *sapakṣas* and *vipakṣas.* It violates the second condition. This is illustrated when one argues that sound is eternal because there is '*śabdatva*' or 'soundness' in it. Here the reason 'soundness' resides in the subject of inference only. It resides neither in the eternal objects (*sapakṣas*) nor in the non-eternal objects (*vipakṣas*), though there are eternal as well as non-eternal objects other than *śabda.* The *anupasaṁhārī* type of *anaikāntika* arises when the *hetu* resides in the *pakṣa* (subject of inference=minor term) alone because there is no possibility of positive and negative instances i. e. *sapakṣas* and *vipakṣas.* Here the subject of inference is 'everything' and there cannot be anything other than 'everything'. This type of *anaikāntika* can also be said to violate the second condition. This is illustrated in the inference that 'all things are momentary because they are causally efficient.' The fallacy of reason called *viruddha* results when the reason does not reside in any *sapakṣa* but on the contrary it resides in *vipakṣas* only. Thus this fallacy of reason violates the second and the

third conditions both. If one argues 'sound is eternal, because it is caused' we have a fallacy of reason called *viruddha*. The reason 'being caused' does not reside in any eternal object (*sapakṣa*) but on the contrary it resides in the non-eternal objects (here *vipakṣas*) only.

As we have seen, the Buddhist logicians consider the fourth and the fifth conditions formulated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians to be redundant. So, it is natural for the former to reject the *satpratipakṣa* and *bādhita* fallacies of reason and accept only the remaining three, viz. *asiddha*, *anaikāntika* and *viruddha*.[59] Let us give the definitions of these fallacies of reason, after Dharmakīrti. 'If one aspect of the reason, namely, its first aspect, its presence upon the subject of the conclusion, is either non-existent, or uncertain, the reason is called unreal (*asiddha*).'[60] This definition of the *asiddha* pseudo-reason presents no difficulty and is essentially the same as that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. Dharmakīrti defines the *anaikāntika* reason as follows: 'When another aspect of the reason—its absence in counter instances—taken singly is unreal the fallacy is called *anaikāntika* (uncertainty).'[61] He further says, 'When this aspect of the reason is dubious the fallacy is likewise one of *anaikāntika* (uncertainty)[62]........(Again) when one of the two forms *sapakṣa-sattva* and *vipakṣa-vyāvṛtti* is unreal and the other dubious, the reason becomes uncertain.[63] When there is doubt regarding these same two forms of the reason, the fallacy is also called *anaikāntika* (uncertain).'[64] His definition of *viruddha* runs thus: 'When the reverse of two aspects of the adduced reason is true, the fallacy is called *viruddha* (contrary or inverted) reason.'[65] What are these two aspects? Its presence in similar and absence in dissimilar cases. As for example, the attributes of being a product, or of being voluntarily produced become contrary reasons, if the eternality of the sounds of speech is to be deduced from them.

But we should note that because the Buddhist logicians have introduced the restrictive particle '*only*' in his third and second conditions the two, as we have seen, become quite equivalent and so the non-realization or dubiousness of either of them necessarily entails the non-realization or dubiousness of the other. Thus they are not justified in saying that the fallacy of *anaikāntika* reason reaults when one of the two forms

59. evam eṣāṁ trayāṇāṁ rūpāṇām ekaikasya dvayor dvayor vā rūpayor asiddhau sandehe vā yathāyogam asiddhaviruddhānaikāntikās trayo hetvābhāsāḥ/ Nyāyabindu, III. 109
60. ekasya rūpasya dharmisambandhasyāsiddhau sandehe vā'siddho hetvābhāsaḥ/ Ibid, III. 57
61. tathaikasya rūpasyāsapakṣe'sattvasyāsiddhāv anaikāntiko hetvābhāsaḥ/ Ibid, III. 66
62. tathā—asyaiva rūpasya sandehe'py anaikāntika eva/ Ibid, III. 71
63. dvayo rūpayor ekasyāsiddhāv aparasya ca sandehe'naikāntikaḥ/ Ibid, III. 93
64. anayor eva dvayo rūpayoḥ sandehe anaikāntikaḥ/ Ibid, III. 96
65. dvayo rūpayor viparyayasiddhau viruddhaḥ/ Ibid, III. 81

(conditions) is unrealized and the other is either real or dubious; and that the fallacy of *viruddha* reason results when both these forms are unrealized. The Buddhist logicians should have said that both the *anaikāntika* and *viruddha* reasons have both the forms unrealized, that is, they both *certainly* violate the two conditions of a valid reason yet they are two different types of fallacies of reason because they violate the two conditions differently. In *anaikāntika* the reason resides not only in the positive instances but also in the negative ones (while as a matter of fact a reason to be valid must (i) reside in the positive instances *only* and (ii) must *never* reside in the negative instances). In *viruddha* the reason resides in the negative instances only and never in the positive ones (while in fact a valid reason must *never* reside in the negative instances but must reside in the positive ones *only*).

While discussing the fallacies of reason Akalaṅka has tried to be consistent with his doctrine of 'one-condition-of-a-valid-reason.' Though he accepts all the fallacies of reason recognised traditionally he observes that there is in fact only one fallacy of reason and that is called *asiddha* or *akiñcitkara* by him; all the other fallacies are mere species of this one fallacy.[66] *Asiddha* or *akiñcitkara*, therefore, means that fallacy of reason which results when the sole condition of a valid *hetu* is violated. And since the sole condition of a valid *hetu*—the other-wise (i. e. in the absence of *sādhya*) unaccountability of the *hetu*—is violated in different ways, there arise four fallacies of reason that constitute the species of a single fallacy. They are *asiddha, sandigdha, viruddha* and *akiñcitkara. Asiddha* and *akiñcitkara* are here understood by Akalaṅka in a restricted sense. The *asiddha* fallacy occur when *hetu* does not reside in *pakṣa.*[67] But Akalaṅka and other Jaina logicians have not recognised the residence in *pakṣa* to be an essential condition of a valid *hetu*. So, how could they say that when *hetu* does not reside in *pakṣa* there arises the fallacy of reason called *asiddha?* By *akiñcitkara* Akalaṅka here means a fallacy of reason that results when the reason is adduced to prove a thesis that is either already proved or is contradicted by other valid cognitions.[68] But then these two types of *akiñcitkara* cannot really by treated as fallacies of reason. They are in fact fallacies of thesis. At another place Akalaṅka observes that all those reasons that are devoid of a necessary connection with the *sādhya* concerned are to be called *akiñcitkara* inspite of their

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66. viruddhāsiddāsandigdhā akiñcitkaravistarāḥ/ Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 66
asiddhaḥ ..../
anyathā'sambhavābhāvabhedāt sa bahudhā smṛtaḥ//
viruddhāsiddhasandigdhair akiñcitkaravistaraiḥ/ Ibid, pp. 78-79
67. asiddhaḥ sarvathā'tyayāt/ Ibīd, p. 111
68. siddhe'kiñcitkaro'khilaḥ/ Ibid, p. 111

fulfilling those three conditions of a valid *hetu* (formulated by the Buddhist)[69]

As regards the remaining two fallacies, viz. *viruddha* and *sandigdha (anaikāntika)* Akalaṅka's stand is as follows: When the reason is not found to have a necessary connection with the *sādhya*—which necessary connection is the only condition of a valid *hetu*—there would result a fallacy of reason. In fact, this is the only fallacy of reason. But as the reason violates that one condition in two different ways, this one fallacy of reason may be recognised as having two species—*viruddha* and *anaikāntika* (*sandigdha*). The fallacy called *viruddha* results when the reason breaks the condition by being never related with the *sādhya* and on the contrary by being always necessarily related with the absence of *sādhya* (i. e. the contradictory of *sādhya=vipakṣa*).[70] The fallacy called *anaikāntika* results when the reason violates the condition by being related not only with the *sādhya* but also with the absence of *sādhya* (i. e. the contradictory of *sādhya=vipakṣa*).[71] This formulation avoids reference to *sapakṣas* and *vipakṣas* in their usual sense and hence is in tune with Akalaṅka's doctrine of *heturūpa*.

Types of Reason (Hetu): Dharmakīrti in his Nyāyabindu has enumerated three types of logical reasons which make inference legitimate. These three are styled *kārya* (effect), *svabhāva* (essential identity of nature) and *anupalabdhi* (non-cognition).[72] The logical reason 'because it is possessed of the nature of an oak' adduced to establish the conclusion that 'it is possessed of the nature of a tree' is an instance of *svabhāva-hetu*.[73] Akalaṅka recognises this type of logical reason and gives a similar instance to illustrate it. The logical reason 'because the smoke rises from the hill' advanced to establish the conclusion that 'there is fire on the hill' is an instance of *kārya-hetu*.[74] Smoke is the effect of fire. Even this type of *hetu* is accepted by Akalaṅka and other Jaina logicians. The logical reason 'because (though all the conditions necessary for the perception of a jar are present there) the jar is not perceived there' adduced to establish the conclusion that 'there is no jar there' is an instance of *anupalabdhi-hetu*.[75] Akalaṅka and other Jaina logicians too

69. anyathā'nupapannatvarahitā ye trilakṣaṇāḥ//
akiñcitkārakān sarvāṁs tān vayaṁ saṅgirāmahe/ Ibid, p. 79
70. sa viruddho'nyathābhāvāt........./ Ibid, p. 111
71. vyabhicārī vipakṣe'pi........./ Ibid, p. 111
72. anupalabdhiḥ svabhāvaḥ kāryaṁ ceti/ Nyāyabindu, II. 11
73. svabhāvo svasattāmātrabhāvini sādhyadharme hetuḥ/ yathā vṛkṣo'yaṁ śiṁśapātvād iti/ Ibid, II. 15-16
74. kāryaṁ yathā vahnir atra dhūmād iti/ Ibid, II. 17
75. tatrānupalabdhir yathā na pradeśaviśeṣe kvacid ghaṭaḥ upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdher iti/ Ibid, II. 12

recognise this type of logical reason. Of course, with regard to this type of logical reason Dharmakirti and Akalaṅka differ in matters of detail. We postpone the consideration of this difference.

Akalaṅka and other Jaina logicians accept four types of logical reason in addition to the above three. They are styled *kāraṇa* (cause), *pūrvacara* (prior), *uttaracara* (posterior) and *sahacara* (co-occurrent).[76] Regarding the last three, Dharmakirti would emphatically say, as is clear from his discussion relating to the types of necessary relations, that they can easily be reduced to the logical reason of the *kārya* type. But he would refuse to recognise the *kāraṇa* type of logical reason and his argument is that a cause proper does not *necessarily* produce the effect concerned.[77] As for example, it may not rain though there are clouds. So, it is not possible for us to legitimately infer an effect from its cause proper. Akalaṅka with other Jaina logicians and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians on his side urges that though a cause proper does not necessarily produce the effect concerned yet the appropriate totality of causal conditions always necessarily produces this effect. Hence we can legitimately infer an effect from the concerned totality of causal conditions. When the effect does not take place even in the presence of the cause proper it means that the totality of causal conditions is not present there. Thus though from the presence of the cause proper alone we cannot legitimately infer the effect, yet from the presence of the totality of causal conditions we can legitimately infer the effect. So, when it is said that the cause can serve as a logical reason to infer the effect, the word 'cause' means not the cause proper but the totality of causal conditions.[78] Dharmakirti does not deny this. But he proposes that the logical reasons treated by others as *kāraṇa-hetu* should be brought under *svabhāvahetu*, and this on the plea that just as (for example) a thing which is an oak needs nothing additional in order to be a tree even so the totality of causal conditions needs nothing additional in order to generate the effect concerned.[79] But this plea of his shows the confusion of his mind because the nature of a thing and the cause of a thing are mutually quite different and one cannot be reduced to the other. The stand taken

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76. Akalaṅkagranthatraya, pp. 5, 75 and 76

77. ....nāvaśyaṁ kāraṇāni tadvanti [=kāryavanti] bhavanti.. ....../ Svārthānumāna-pariccheda, p. 3

78. Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 3
rasād ekasāmagryanumānena rūpānumānam icchadbhir iṣṭam eva kiñcit kāraṇaṁ hetur yatra sāmarthyāpratibandhakāraṇāntarāvaikalye/ Parīkṣāmukha, III. 60
Nyāyamañjarī, pp. 117-118

79. hetunā yaḥ samagreṇa kāryotpādo'numīyate/
arthāntarānapekṣatvāt sa svabhāvo'nuvarṇitaḥ// Pramāṇavārtika, III. 6

by the Jaina and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians on this point seems to be right.

Now let us see on what points Akalaṅka follows the lead of Dharmakīrti and on what points he differs from him with regard to the *anupalabdhi* type of logical reason. As we have already stated, like Dharmakīrti, Akalaṅka recognises this type of logical reason. Though Dharmakīrti recognises this third type of reason, he does not think it necessary to assume for it a third type of necessary relation. Karṇagomin while commenting on the Pramāṇavārtika actually states that non-cognition does not presuppose an independent necessary relation for its validity. The necessary relation which obtains between positive terms determines the concomitance of the corresponding negative terms, and, so, there is no occasion for the postulation of a separate type of relation between non-cognition and non-existence.[80] Even Akalaṅka would not deny all this. But then the question arises as to how *anupalabdhi* could be considered to be an independent type of logical reason. Here Akalaṅka seems to part company with Dharmakīrti. Dharmakīrti holds that from the point of view of the *negative conclusion* established by it, it should be classed as a distinct type of reason,[81] while Akalaṅka is of the opinion that from the point of view of its own negative nature *(anupalabdhi-svabhāva)* it should be classed as a distinct type of reason. Thus on Dharmakīrti's view even a cognition should be regarded as the 'non-cognition' type of logical reason provided it establishes a negative conclusion while on Akalaṅka's view only that reason which is of the nature of non-cognition should be classed as a distinct type of logical reason called 'non-cognition' (*anupalabdhi*)—no matter whether it establishes a positive or a negative conclusion.[82] Again, on another important point Dharmakīrti and Akalaṅka differ. Dharmakīrti holds that we can establish through non-cognition the absence of that thing only which is amenable to perception[83], while Akalaṅka holds that we can establish through non-cognition

80. yata eva pratibandhāt kāryavyāpye kāraṇavyāpake gamayatas tata eva pratibandhāt kāraṇavyāpakānupalabdhī kāryavyāpyābhāvam gamayataḥ/ Karṇagomiṭikā, p. 11

81. sarvatra cāsyām abhāvavyavahārasādhanyām anupalabdhau yeṣāṁ svabhāvaviruddhādīnām upalabdhyā kāraṇādīnām anupalabdhyā ca pratiśedha uktas teṣām upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptānām evopalabdhir anupalabdhiś ca veditavyā/ Nyāyabindu, II. 45
See also Advanced Studies in Indian Logic & Metaphysics, p. 91

82. Dr. M. K. Jaina's Introduction to Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 61
See also Advanced Studies in Indian Logic & Metaphysics, p. 91

83. upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptir upalambhapratyayāntarasākalyaṁ svabhāvaviśeṣaś ca/ yaḥ svabhāvaḥ satsv anyeṣūpalambhapratyayeṣu san pratyakṣa eva bhavati sa svabhāvaviśeṣaḥ/ Nyāyabindu, II. 13-14
See also Ibid, II. 27-28

the absence not only of the things amenable to perceptual cognition but also of those amenable not to perceptual cognition but to cognition derived from inference, etc. Akalaṅka explains his point through the following illustration. The soul (life) of the other persons is never amenable to perceptual cognition; it is only inferable through some overt symptoms. So, the absence of the soul (life) in some person at the time of his death is inferred from the absence of (inferential) cognition of the soul (life) in that body; the absence of inferential cognition of the soul (life) in that body is due to the absence of its symptoms and this absence of symptoms is established through their non-perception.[84] Thus for Dharmakīrti non-cognition necessarily means non-perception of the perceptible while for Akalaṅka it means not only non-perception of the perceptible but also an absence of inferential cognition in the case of things inferable, an absence of verbal cognition in the case of things knowable through verbal testimony, etc. etc.

The Object and Status of Inference: According to Dharmakīrti the object of inference is the exclusion of the opposite (*atad-vyāvṛtti*). Inference does not cognise the positive nature of a thing. It is so because perception, as we have seen, cognises a thing in its entirety. When a thing is perceived all its attributes are perceived. But it may so happen that owing to some illusion we cannot ascertain correctly what is sensed or perceived and superimpose some foreign character on it. It is only to remove these false ascriptions that we take recourse to inference. If it be suggested that inference too, like perception, cognises the positive nature of a thing, there would arise the contingency of no attribute of a thing being left to be cognised by another inference when one inference has already cognised some one particular attribute of this thing. Certainly, when the positive nature of a thing has already been ascertained there remains in this thing nothing that is to be ascertained later on. On the other hand, when it is held that inference cognises a thing's exculsion from certain other things (i.e. from things dissimilar to it) it is well possible that one inference cognises a thing's exclusion from one type of dissimilar things and another its exclusion from another type of dissimilar things (that is to say, on this view one inference does not render another inference futile). It might be urged that ascertainment of a particular attribute belonging to a thing does not necessarily presuppose our ascribing an opposite (contrary) attribute to this things; as for example, when we suddenly infer fire from smoke there is no occasion for our ascribing 'absence of fire' to the place in question. Hence it

84. yathaiva darśanābhāvakāraṇāsaṁbhave dṛśyābhāvo'nupalabdheḥ siddhyati tathaiva anumānābhāvakāraṇāsaṁbhave anumeyasya paracittādeḥ bhavaty abhāvasiddhiḥ; anyathā niścetanaparaśarīrapratipatter anupapatteḥ/ Siddhiviniścaya, p. 434

should not be held that inference invariably cognises an exclusion. To this Dharmakīrti replies that even here when one perceives a place having smoke he is not certain about the nature of this place, and this, in turn, is so because he is under a misapprehension. And again even he who, on account of his non-ascertainment of fire at the place, is under a doubt as to whether this palce is fiery or not could not be said to be free from misapprehension. As a matter of fact, only one who falsely ascribes 'absence of fire' to a place or, at least is in doubt about the existence of fire at that place takes recourse to inference (in order to prove the existence of fire there). In fine, one who is not under a misapprehension or in a doubt will not care to formulate the relations of concomitance-in-presence and concomitance-in-absence that are necessary for all inference.[85]

Thus Dharmakīrti maintains that the proper object to be cognised by inference is a thing's exclusion from the different types of dissimilar things; for, ortherwise there would remain nothing to be cognised in a thing after one inference has grasped it in the form of a real unitary partless thing.

When it is said that the object of inference is a universal what is meant by 'universal' is this exclusion of the opposite. This exclusion is not a positive real thing. It is a mental concept. Yet it does not arise in a baseless fashion. It is not merely a creation of Nescience (*vāsanā*). It is generated by real things. Moreover, it is the nature of some select real things to generate a particular concept. So, a mental concept is invariably related to those things. It is on this account that though an inference cognises a mental concept, yet it enables us to attain a real thing capable of the intended purposive activity. In so far as it does not cognise a real thing, it is an illusion. But in so far as it enables us to attain the efficient real thing it is a *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge).

In a different manner Dharmakīrti again proves that an inferential judgment is ultimately grounded in a real thing. The real fire that is

85. vastugrahe'numānāc ca dharmasyaikasya niścaye/
sarvadharmagraho'pohe nāyaṃ doṣaḥ prasajyate//
.... yadā punar anumānena samāropavyavacchedaḥ kriyate, tadā naikasamāropavyavacchedād anyavyavacchedaḥ kṛto bhavati iti tadartham anyat pravarteta/
nanu nāvaśyaṁ viparyāsapūrvaka evāpratītaniścayo bhavati/ yathā akasmād dhūmād agnipratipattiḥ/ na hi tatrānagnisamāropaḥ saṁbhāvyate/ tanna sarvatra vyavacchedaḥ kṛyate/ uktam atra—dharmipratipattāv abhedāt sarvapratipattiḥ/ bhede vā asambaddhasya tatrāpratipattir iti/ tasmāt tatrāpi taddarśinaḥ tatsvabhāvāniścayaḥ/ kutaḥ? viparyāsāt/ sa ca taṁ pradeśaṁ tadviviktena rūpeṇa niścinvann agnisattābhāvanāvimukhayā buddhyā katham aviparyasto nāma/ tadākārasamāropasaṁśayarahitaś ca tatpratipattau na liṅgam anusaret/ na tasyānvayavyatirekayor ādriyeta/ Svārthānumānapariccheda, pp. 17-18

the cause of the real smoke is the remote cause of the inferential judgment that there is fire on the hill. The real fire generates the real smoke, the real smoke generates its own sensation, this sensation generates the perceptual judgment that there is smoke on the hill, this perceptual judgment with the help of the memory of the necessary concomitance between smoke-in-general and fire-in-general generates the inferential judgment that there is fire on the hill. The actual object of inferential judgment is the fire-in-general which is necessarily related with the real unique fires. In other words, the mental concept of fire has the real fires at its basis. And so the inference whose object is the concept of fire necessarily points to the real fire. And on this account an inferential judgment enables us to attain the intended object capable of purposive activity in spite of the fact that its object is a concept and not a real thing. It is only on this ground that inference is considered to be a *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge) by Dharmakīrti. But inasmuch as it bears the form of fire-in-general and not that of a real unique fire it is regarded as an illusion by him. Thus inference is *pramāṇa* and *bhrama* both at the same time.[86]

Elsewhere Dharmakīrti repeats this same thing in different words. He says that the object of knowledge is in fact only one and that is the unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*). Because this object is cognised in two different ways, we have recognised two *pramāṇas* (or types of valid knowledge), perception and inference. Perception cognises a thing as it is, that is, as unique. Inference grasps the same thing as it is not, that is, as general. On this account the former is not an illusion while the latter is. It might be asked as to how inference which is an illusion could be regarded as a *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge). *Bhrānti*, says Dharmakīrti in answer, is not necessarily *apramāṇa*. Only that cognition whose form does not coincide with the form of a real thing is *bhrānti*. But the minimum requirement of a *pramāṇa* is that it should enable us to attain an efficient real thing. It is not necessary that all *pramāṇas* should bear the form corresponding to that of a real thing. Hence even *bhrānti* could be considered to be a *pramāṇa* provided it enables us to attain an efficient thing. And there are cases of *bhrānti* enabling us to attain an efficient thing. As for example, our cognition of the lustre of a gem as a gem is a case of *bhrānti* because the gem-form of the cognition does not coincide with the lustre-form of the lustre actually present there

86. yo hi bhāvo yathābhūto sa tādṛgliṅgacetasaḥ/
hetus tajjā tathābhūte tasmād vastuni liṅgadhīḥ//
liṅgaliṅgidhīyor evaṁ pāramparyeṇa vastuni/
pratibandhāt tadābhāsaśūnyayor apy avañcanam// Pramāṇavārtika, II, 81-82
anumānaṁ ca liṅgasambaddhaṁ niyatam arthaṁ darśayati/ Nyāyabinduṭīkā, I, 1

and yet it enables us to attain the gem. But how could this happen? It happens so because the object reflected in this *bhrānti*(viz. the gem) is invariably related with a real object (viz. the lustre). Inference is regarded as *bhrānta* by Dharmakīrti because in it the form of knowledge, as we have already stated, does not coincide with the form of a real thing. Yet because the form of an inferential cognition is invariably related with the form of a real thing it enables us to attain a real efficient thing and hence it is regarded as *pramāṇa* by Dharmakīrti. Though all inferences are *bhrānta* only those would be regarded as *pramāṇa* that enable us to attain an efficient thing; the rest of them would be dismissed as pseudo-inferences[87]

All this creates an impression that Dharmakīrti implicitly accepts the perceptual judgment as a *pramāṇa*, of course, not an independent *pramāṇa* but a case of inference. The reason for this is that Dharmakīrti himself says that this perceptual judgment, like the inferential one, removes the superimposition of a wrong character on a thing. Again, like inference it enables us to attain an efficient real thing inspite of the fact that its form does not coincide with that of the real thing. But from Arcaṭa's commentary on Dharmakīrti's Hetubindu we gather that the Buddhist logician, in fact, does not consider the perceptual judgment to be a case of inference, and that for him the perceptual judgment is not *pramāṇa* while inference is. Till now we have observed only the points of similarity between the perceptual judgment and inference. Now let us note the points of difference between the two. This would explain why the perceptual judgment is not a *pramāṇa* though inference is. (i) The thought immediately following in the wake of perception (i.e. perceptual judgment) cognises what is already cognised by perception (*gṛhītagrāhī*) while inference cognises an object hither-to-uncognised (*agṛhītagrāhī*). One might object: 'In inference too thought takes note of a thing as being of the same kind as several earlier cognised things. For example, in inferring fire on the mountain I cognise the same thing which I have earlier cognised at several other places like kitchen, etc.' To this

87. .... meyaṁ tv ekam svalakṣaṇam//.........
tasya svapararūpābhyāṁ gater meyadvayaṁ matam //
ayathābhiniveśena dvitīyā bhrāntir iṣyate/
gatiś cet pararūpeṇa na ca bhrānteḥ pramāṇatā//
abhiprāyāvisaṁvādād api bhrānteḥ pramāṇatā/
gatir apy anyathā dṛṣṭā pakṣaś cāyaṁ kṛtottaraḥ//
maṇipradīpaprabhayor maṇibuddhyā'bhidhāvatoḥ/
mithyājñānāviśeṣe'pi viśeṣo'rthakriyāṁ prati//
yathā tathā'yathārthatve'py anumānatadābhayoḥ/
arthakṛyānurodhena pramāṇatvaṁ vyavasthitam// Pramāṇavārtika, II. 53-58
tatpratibaddhajanmanām vikalpānām atatpratibhāsitve'pi vastuny avisaṁvādo maṇi-prabhāyām iva maṇibhrānteḥ/ Svārthānumānaparicceda, p. 27

the Buddhist logician replies that the inference in question makes us cognise not fire as existing in kitchen, etc. (which we have no doubt cognised earlier) but fire as existing now here at this mountain(which we are cognising for the first time). Such however is not the case with thought arising in the wake of perception; for, this thought cognises *exactly the same thing as was cognised by the preceding perception*[88]

Let us explain this in clear terms. The perceptual judgment determines that very unique thing which is already sensed (perceived) by sense-organs; of course, it is a different matter that while determining it, the perceptual judgment distorts it, that is, finds it as something general though it is in fact something unique. And since it does not determine the unique thing hitherto-not-sensed it could not be regarded as *pramāṇa*. Otherwise is the case with the inferential judgment. It determines a unique thing that is not already sensed. As for example, it determines the unique fire that is the cause of the unique smoke sensed and judged by a person. But this fire is not already sensed. Thus it could be said that the inferential judgment determines a unique thing hitherto-not-sensed. And on this account the inferential judgment could be regard as a *pramāṇa*. (ii) The perceptual judgment does enable us to attain a real thing. But this function of it is merely a repetition of the function already performed by the preceding perception. On the other hand, in the case of inference this function is not already performed by some other earlier cognition. So, the perceptual judgment could not primarily be said to perform this function, while inference could primarily be said to perform this function. On this account the former is an *apramāṇa* while the latter is a *pramāṇa*. [89] (iii) Moreover, the object of the percep-

88. yat tu sāmānyam anumānavikalpagrāhyaṁ tat kārāṇavyāpakasmbaddhaliṅganiśca-yadvārā''yātaṁ sambaddhasambandhād anadhigatārthakriyāsādhanaviṣayām arthakriyām upakalpayatīti tadviṣayo vikalpaḥ pramāṇam/ idaṁ[=pratyakṣapṛṣṭhabhāvi vikalpajñānam] tu naivam, adhigatatvād arthakriyāsādhanasyālocanajñāneneti/ Hetubinduṭīkā, p. 29 tatraitat syāt—nanv anumānavikalpaḥ smṛtirūpo'pi pramāṇam iṣyate/ tathā hi—yad evānagnivyāvṛttaṁ vastumātraṁ mahānasādāv anubhūtam āsit tad eva pradeśaviśeṣe dhūmadarśanāt smaryate/ tadvad vidhivikalpo'pi pramānaṁ bhaviṣytīti ata āha—"anadhigata"sya "vastu"no "rūpa"sya "anadhigateriti"/ evaṁ manyate—yat mahānasādāv anagnivyāvṛttaṁ vastumātraṁ prāg anubhūtaṁ na tat taddeśādisambandhitayaivānumānavikalpena smaryate kintu yatra pradeśe prāg ananubhūtaṁ tatsambandhitayā/ Ibid, p. 34

89. yadi nāma tadadhyavasāyena vastuny eva puruṣasya pravṛttis tathāpy anadhigatasāmānya-grāhiṇo'sya darśanāt pṛthak prāmāṇyaṁ kim iti neṣyate? iti ced āha—"pravṛttau" svalakṣaṇa eva satyāṁ "pratyakṣeṇa" ālocanājñānākhyena "abhinnayogakṣematvāt"/ Ibid. p. 36

tual judgment is *sāmānya* , while the object of inference is *asāmānya.*[90]

Thus on these three grounds perceptual judgment is denied pramāṇa-hood while inference is not denied it.

According to Jainism the object of inference is both the universal and the particular. Someone might here ask as to how it could be said that the object of inference is the particular also; it can grasp the universal only. Jaina logicians reply that through inference we cognise the fire not merely as fire but as fire connected with smoke or as that present on the hill. But then it might be objected that the object of inference being both the universal and the particular and out of the two the universal being unreal the object of inference would be partly unreal and consequently the inference would be an illusion (at least a part-illusion). The Jaina logicians relpy that on their view the universal is real. It is not a conceptual or mental fiction. How the Jaina logician proves the universal to be real we have already seen in the chapter on universal. Hence the inference could not be regarded as *bhrānti* in any way whatsoever.

Members of a Syllogism: Though Akalaṅka has not touched upon this topic we briefly discuss it in order to see what the different views on this matter are in different philosophies, especially Buddhist and Jaina. It is recorded by Vātsyāyana that old Naiyāyikas were of the opinion that a syllogism consists of ten members: *Jijñāsā, Saṁśaya, Śakyaprāpti, Prayojana, Saṁśayavyudāsa, Pratijñā, Hetu, Udāharaṇa, Upanaya, Nigamana.* But Vātsyāyana and all the later Naiyāyikas criticise this view on the ground that the first five members represent not so much the logical steps needed for drawing a conclusion as the psychological or epistemological conditions involved in an inference. They consider the last five to be the true members of a syllogism.[91] Each one of them contributes some meaning to the total sense. In other words, each one has its special function.[92] Moreover, Mr. Randle opines that in the case of the Nyāya school the convention of five members may have been fixed owing to a desire to equate the four 'premises' with the four *pramāṇas.*[93] To follow Vātsyāyana, *Pratijñā=Śabdapramāṇa, Hutu=Anumāna, Dṛṣṭānta=*

90. "anumānavad" iti vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntaḥ/ yathā pratyakṣena arthakriyāsādhane pradeśākhye dharmiṇy adhigate'py anadhigatasyāgner arthakriyāsādhanasya asāmānyākāreṇa parokṣasya svalakṣaṇākāreṇa pratipattum aśakyatvāt pratipattir naivaṁ vidhivikalpena sāmānyākareṇa anadhigatam arthakriyāsādhanam adhigamyate, tasyālocanājñānenaivādhigamāt/ tasmin smṛtir evāsau iti na pramāṇam iti/ Ibid, pp. 27-28

91. Nyāyabhāṣya, I. 1.32

92. pratijñādayo'vayavāḥ pratyekaṁ svārthamātreṇa paryavasāyinaḥ/ Nyāyakandalī, p. 252

93. Indian Logic in the Early Schools, p. 167

Pratyakṣa, and *Upanaya=Upamāna*. It is noteworthy that inference is here identified with *hetu* only. The Mīmāṁsakas hold that *Upanaya* and *Nigamana* are merely a restatement of *hetu* and *pratijñā* respectively. So, they declare that either the first three or the last three out of the five members enumerated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika constitute a syllogism.[95] Dharmakīrti goes one step further and states that only two members—either the second and the third or the third and the fourth—constitute a syllogism and that *Pratijñā* and *Nigamana* should not be regarded as members of a syllogism. *Pratijñā* is known from the context or the drift of the discussion and what can be known otherwise should not be stated. And the conclusion (*Nigamana*) follows irresistibly from the two members in question and, as such, it need not be stated in so many words. At one place Dharmakīrti even says that only one member—*hetu* is logically necessary to constitute a syllogism.[96] The Jaina logicians have, since the time of Niryuktis, adopted on the question a position that is in confirmity with their Non-absolutistic standpoint. Bhadrabāhu refers to a ten-membered syllogism. But he is of the view that the number of the membeɪs of a syllogism depends on the calibre of the person to whom it is addressed. Accordingly it may be ten-membered syllogism or a five-membered one or a three-membered one or a two-membered one.[97] None of these alternatives is to be rejected. 'We reject none.' The later Jaina logicians also maintain that the minimum number of the members of a syllogism is two. These are *Pratijñā* and *Hetu*. But the number may be increased upto ten in accordance with the grasping power of the hearer. However, it is to be noted that Vādideva even grants that in dealing with a particular type of hearer one single member, viz. *hetu* can constitute a syllogism.[98] Now considering the problem strictly from the point of view of logic we have to say that the Jainas follow in the footsteps of the Buddhist inasmuch as they, like the latter, consider two or one to be the minimum number of the members of a syllogism; when the Jainas allow this number to increase it is only from the point of view of psychology. But it is noteworthy that the Jaina logicians have surpassed the Buddhist in not including the statement of example among the constituent members of a syllogism. [99] It will be proper to conclude this topic with

94. āgamaḥ pratijñā/ hetur anumānam/ udāharaṇaṁ pratyakṣam/ upamānam upanayaḥ/ sarveṣām ekārthasamavāye sāmarthyapradarśanaṁ nigamanam iti/ so'yam paramo nyāya iti/ Nyāyabhāṣya, I. 1.1

95. Nyāyaratnamālā on Ślokavārtika, Anu., kā. 54
See also Prakaraṇapañcikā, pp. 83-85

96. Hetubindu, pp. 55-56

97. Vide Supra, p. 31

98. Syādvādaratnākara, p. 548

99. Nyāyāvatāra, 20

the words of that great scholar Dr. S. Mookerjee: "From the doctrine of ten-membered syllogism reduced to five in the Nyāyasūtra and still further reduced to two (or one) in Buddhist logic, we can trace the history of the evolution of syllogism. Naturally the psychological and logical factors were mixed together in the doctrine of ten-membered syllogism. In the Naiyāyika's syllogism there has been a bold attempt to shake off the psychological incumbus, but still the psychological influence did not cease to be at work. In the Buddhist syllogism as propounded by Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti the psychological factors were carefully eliminated and the syllogism received a perfectly logical shape. But the survival of the example was a relic of the ancient sway of psychology and this was destined to be unceremoniously brushed aside by the onslaughts of Jaina logicians.........."[100]

Concluding Remarks: The broad results that emerge from the whole discussion are: (i) The Naiyāyikas are the pioneers in the field of logic. (ii) Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti have tried to improve upon the Naiyāyikas. And their contribution to the problem of inference is remarkable. (iii) The fate of the Jaina logicians in general and Akalaṅka in particular is mostly to take the side of this or that party. But sometimes they differ from both and on certain topics they bring the Buddhist position to its logical conclusion. The illustration in point is their view on the problem of the conditions of a valid *hetu*.

100. Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, p. 364

CHAPTER VIII

ON TESTIMONY

The necessity of testimony is felt by all the Indian philosophers, because all of them alike believe in the existence of objects that are amenable neither to perceptual cognition nor to inferential cognition. All would join hands with Vātsyāyana [1] who observes that objects like *svarga* etc. could be known through testimony only. This, however, does not mean that testimony cannot give us a knowledge of perceptible things. It can. But, then, why should we use testimony even in the case of objects that are perceptible? The answer to this question is not a difficult one. Man cannot progress if he were to depend on his own personal experience for a knowledge of whatever perceptible objects there are and were not to accept the findings of his predecessors. In that case he would have to start anew in every generation. Again, were he to know things depending exclusively upon his own experience his stock of knowledge would be very meagre, his mental outlook would be narrow and he could neither impart to others the results of his own experiences nor become acquainted with the achievements of others. Hence the necessity of testimony even for a knowledge of objects that are perceptible. Testimony is defined as a 'word' of an authority. [2] All Indian philosophers except the Cārvākas have recognised it as a source of valid knowledge. But there has raged a controversy as to whether it is an independent source of knowledge or merely a case of inference. The Vaiśeṣikas [3] and the Buddhists regard it as a case of inference while the rest consider it to be an independent source of knowledge.

How do we acquire knowledge by testimony ?: For a clear understanding of this controversy it is necessary to know first how we acquire knowledge by testimony. First, we have an auditory or visual perception of the spoken or written sentences. Then we try to understand the meaning of these sentences. For understanding the meaing of a particular sentence, the knowledge of three things is necessary, viz. that the words constituting it expect one another (*ākāṅkṣā*), that they have mutual fitness (*yogyatā*) and that they are continuous with one another in time and place (*sannidhi*). And the

1. vyavasthā punaḥ 'agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ' iti laukikasya svarge na liṅgadarśanam, na pratyakṣam/ Nyāyabhāṣya, I. 1.3
2. āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ/ Nyāyasūtra, I, 1.7
3. śabdādinām apy anumāne'ntarbhāvaḥ samānavidhitvāt/ yathā prasiddhasamayasyāsandigdhaliṅgadarśanaprasiddhyanusmaraṇābhyām atīndriye'rthe bhavaty anumānam evam śabdādibhyo'pīti/ Praśastapādabhāṣya, p. 576

knowledge of the expectancy, fitness and propinquity of the words in a particular sentence requires the application of certain general rules. But a mere understanding of the meaning of a sentence does not directly lead to a knowledge of things. For a knowledge of things what is necessary is the assurance that the speaker is an authority (even if he may not actually be so). As soon as one understands the meaning of a sentence and feels sure that the speaker is an authority, there arises in him a knowledge of things. Afterwards, if he wants to ascerain the validity of this knowledge, he will have to examine whether his understanding of the meaning of the sentence concerned is correct and whether his assurance as to the speaker's authoritativeness is well based. Out of the two, it is the second reguirement that deserves a close scrutiny and critical examination. So, the question as to how we can determine the authoritativeness of a speaker is of prime importance in this connection.

What makes a person an āpta or authority ?: There are four conditions that make a person an *āpta.* (1) He should know correctly the fact stated by him. (2) He should have no desire to deceive others. (3) He should have a desire to speak out the truth. (4) He should have his concerned sense organs in perfect order. Out of these four the first two are really important. The capacity to know things as they are and the absence of a desire to deceive others are invariably related with the freedom from narrow love and hatred.[4] Dharmakīrti is right when he observes that universal love is the prime condition that makes a man reliable, truthful or āpta.[5] A man impelled by universal love would never think of deceiving others and would always exert himself to know as precisely as possible the ways of freeing man from worldly misery. Even the Jainas hold the same view.[6] It is an interesting point worthy of note that the conditions regarded necessary for a person to be an authority, are more or less similar in all the systems of Indian philosophy.

4. āptaḥ khalu sākṣātkṛtadharmā yathādṛṣṭasyārthasya cikhyāpayiṣayā prayukta upadeṣṭā/ sākṣātkaraṇam arthasya āptiḥ, tayā pravartate ity āptaḥ/ Nyāyabhāṣya, I. 1.7
āptiḥ sākṣād arthaprāptiḥ yathārthopalambhaḥ, tayā vartata ity āptaḥ sākṣātkṛtadharmā, yathārthaprāptyā śrutagrāhī/ āgamo hy āptavacanam āptaṁ doṣakṣayād viduḥ/ kṣīṇadoṣo'nṛtaṁ vākyaṁ na brūyād dhetv asambhavāt/ svakarmaṇy abhiyukto yo rāgadveṣavivarjitaḥ/ Māṭharavṛtti, p. 13
vivakṣitārthatattvajñānam avipralipsā karaṇapāṭavaṁ vivakṣā ca itīyam āptiḥ/ Nyāyasudhā, p. 29
5. sādhanaṁ karuṇā........./ Pramāṇavārtika, I. 36
sā (karuṇā) bhagavataḥ prāmāṇyasya sādhanam/ Manoratha thereon.
6. tīrthakṛtsamayānāṁ ca parasparavirodhataḥ/
sarveṣām āptatā nāsti kaścid eva bhaved guruḥ//
doṣāvaraṇayor hānir niśśeṣā'sty atiśāyanāt/
kvacid yathā svahetubhyo bahirantarmalakṣayaḥ// Āptamīmāṁsā, I. 3-4
See also Aṣṭaśatī thereon.

How can we know that a particular person is an āpta?: But opinions are devided on the question as to how we can know that a particular person is an authority. Akalaṅka recognises the possibility of the knowledge of the internal quality 'absence of narrow love and hatred' which, as we have already seen, makes a person an authority. He opines that a man's good and bad overt behaviour is governed by and caused by the internal good and bad qualities respectively. And hence from the good overt behaviour we can infer the internal good quality 'absence of narrow love and hatred'. But Dharmakīrti is of the opinion that the character of a man is not easy to know. The overt behaviour mainly depends on human will, and if a man wills to behave in such a fashion as would not disclose his internal qualities he can do so. He may be a hypocrite. He may put an air of a righteous man but in reality he may not be so. Even a villain may act like a virtuous one. So, overt behaviour cannot always enable us to legitimately infer the internal qualities and thence the reliability or otherwise of a person.[7] So, Dharmakīrti supplies us with another criterion for the ascertainment of authoritativeness or reliability. It is coherence in the body of what one has said and written[8], and its not being contradicted by perception and inference.[9] Even Akalaṅka accepts this[10] but he criticises Dharmakīrti's view that the internal qualities could never be inferred legitimately from overt behaviour. A well-examined overt behaviour would always enable us to infer its cause, the internal quality. It is a rule that a well-scrutinised effect would never frustrate our efforts to infer its proper cause.[11]

Of course, the votaries of every system regard the scriptures of their own faith as valid on the ground that they are not composed by persons smitten with narrow love and selfishness. The Mīmāṁsakas consider the Vedas to be authorless and thus they rule out the possibility of their being composed by a person suffering from defects.[12]

7. caitasebhyo hi guṇadoṣebhyaḥ puruṣāḥ samyagmithyāpravṛttayaḥ/ te cātīndriyāḥ svaprabhavakāyavāgvyavahārānumeyāḥ syuḥ/ vyavahārāś ca prāyaśo buddhipūrvam anyathā'pi kartuṁ śakyante, puruṣecchāvṛttitvāt, teṣāṁ ca citrābhisandhitvāt/ tad ayaṁ liṅgasaṅkarāt katham aniścinvan pratipadyeta/ Svārthānumānapariccheda, p. 73
atra yathā rakto bravīti tathā virakto'pīti vacanamātrād apratipattiḥ/ nāpi viśeṣāt/ abhiprāyasya durbodhatvāt/ vyavahārasaṅkareṇa sarveṣāṁ vyabhicārāt/ Ibid, p. 6
8. śāstraṁ yat siddhayā yuktyā svavācā ca na bādhyate/
dṛṣṭe'dṛṣṭe'pi tad grāhyam iti cintā pravartate// Pramāṇavārtika, IV. 108
9. pratyakṣeṇānumānena dvividhenāpy abādhanam/ Ibid. III. 215
10. Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 14.
See also Nyāyakumudacandra, p. 634
11. yatnataḥ parīkṣitaṁ kāryaṁ kāraṇaṁ nātivartata iti cet stutam prastutam/ Aṣṭaśatī, p. 72
See also Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 10
12. vede tu praṇetuḥ puruṣasya abhāvād doṣāśaṅkaiva na pravartate vaktradhīnatvād doṣāṇām........./ Nyāyamañjarī, p. 154

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that these Vedas are composed by God who knows the things as they are and is beyond love and hatred. The Jainas and the Buddhists consider their respective scriptures to be the words of the masters who have freed themselves from the clutches of internal enemies and as a result have developed transcendental vision.

Is testimony a case of inference?: Now let us come to the point whether the knowledge derived through testimony is inferential. The Nyāya logicians hold that words are directly connected with things. Of course, this their connection with things is conventional or arbitrary. But that does not mean that the words do not generate a knowledge of things in those who have learnt the relevant convention. They certainly do so.[13] But they do not generate valid knowledge. In other words, they are not responsible for the generation of validity or invalidity in the knowledge concerned. Validity and invalidity depend on *guṇa* and *doṣa* respectively. Here in our context authoritativeness and unauthoritativeness of the speaker respectively constitute the *guṇa* and *doṣa* to be taken into consideration.[14] Thus the attitude of the Nyāya logicians is that as soon as we understand the meaning of a sentence, we acquire the knowledge of things and if it happens to be a sentence spoken by an authority, the knowledge is valid. And as according to them the process of understanding the meaning of a sentence is not inferential,[15] even the knowledge of things acquired through words should not be regarded as inferential. They consider the process of understanding the meaning of a sentence to be quite different from that of perception, inference and the rest. The knowledge of things acquired through words is an independent type of valid knowledge.

The Vaiśeṣika philosophers consider the knowledge of things acquired through words to be a case of inference. The following considerations should make their position clear: (i) According to the Vaiśeṣika philosophers the process by which we understand the meaning of a sentence is inferential. Suppose somebody says to me that 'the river is fordable.' What kind of knowledge do I have when I understand this sentence? Is it inferential? If so, what is the probans? And what is the probandum? From the way the Tarkasaṅgrahadīpikā formulates the

13. sāmayikatvāc chabdārthasampratyayasya/ Nyāyasūtra, II. 1. 55
śabdasya jñāpakatvāt/ jñāpakasya dhūmāder etadrūpaṁ yat sambandhagrahaṇāpekṣaṁ svajñāpyajñāpakatvam/ Nyāyamañjari, p. 221

14. yuktaṁ caitad eva yad dīpavat prakāśatvamātram eva śabdasya svarūpaṁ na yathārthatvam ayathārthatvaṁ vā viparīte'py arthe dīpasya prakāśatvānativṛtteḥ/........ prakāśātmanas tu śabdasya vaktṛguṇadoṣādhīne yathārthetaratve/ Ibid, p. 146

15. yogyatārthagatākāṅkṣā śabdaniṣṭhitānubhāvikā/
pratyekaṁ vā militvā vā naite liṅgam asiddhitaḥ// Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, kā. 4

syllogism on behalf of the Vaiśeṣika it would appear that the probandum here is the total meaning of the entire sentence, i. e. of the whole group of words contained in the sentence 'the river is fordable.' The group of words is the subject (*pakṣa*). The concluion (*nigamana*) is: "This group of words possesses the connected meaning i. e. refers to the connection of the meanings of the words of this group." The probans or mark is the fact that this is a group of words which have, in respect of one another, expectancy, suitability, etc. The universal proposition expressing the invariable concomitance of the mark with the probandum is: whatever is a group of words which have, in respect of one another, expectancy, suitability, etc. refers to (or means) the connection of the meanings of these words. An illustration showing that this universal proposition is true is any sentence employed by the person who attempts to understand the sentence, 'the river is fordable.'[16] Thus it is by the process of inference that after having heard the sentence 'the river is fordable' I know the total meaning of this sentence.

The generally accepted view that we arrive at the meaning of a sentence by applying the rules of syntax and grammar seems to have been expressed here in a different manner. For what has been argued is that since the essence of inference consists in arriving at knowledge through the application of a general rule to a particular instance, the process of understanding the meaning of a sentence, which involves the application of certain general rules to a particular instance should be deemed inferential.

(ii) Like the Naiyāyikas the Vaiśeṣikas too hold that words are directly connected with things and that the connection is conventional. But unlike the Naiyāyikas they are able to understand the implications of the conventional character of this connection. As convention is dependent upon or governed by the human will or desire, words *qua* words cannot generate the knowledge of things. Words *qua* words can generate only the knowledge of the intention of the speaker to convey a particular information to a hearer who has learnt the relevant convention. It might be asked if smoke can generate the knowledge of fire in the person who has learnt that smoke is a sign of fire, why a word should not generate the knowledge of the corresponding thing in the person who has learnt that this word is a symbol of that thing. The answer is that a sign has always a physical and natural connection with the thing it signifies while a symbol has merely a mental and arbitrary connection

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16. nanu etāni padāni svasmāritārthasaṁsargavanti ākāṅkṣādimatpadakadambakatvāt madvākyavad ity anumānād eva saṁsargajñānasambhavāc chabdo na pramāṇāntarm/ Tarkasaṅgraha, p. 54

with the thing it symbolises. So, a sign gives us the knowledge of the thing concerned while a symbol gives us the knowledge of a mental image or concept of the thing concerned that is in the mind of the speaker. That is why through words *qua* words we cannot have the knowledge of things, but only the knowledge of the corresponding concepts that are there in the mind of the speaker, in other words, the knowledge of the speaker's intention to convey a particular information. Certainly, a word and the corresponding concept being invariably related, we infer this concept from this word.[17]

(iii) At times the Vaiśeṣikas observe that through words we get the knowledge of things but they add that this knowledge is inferential. They consider the knowledge to be inferential because words give us the corresponding knowledge by the force of universal connection just as smoke gives us the knowledge of fire by the force of universal connection between smoke and fire. Sentences, when understood, serve as invariable marks of external things and facts. Though, as shown above, these marks have no natural relation with things they enable us to infer things when characterized by certain qualifications, viz. that they are conventionally connected with things and that they are spoken by an authority. The adding of qualifications to the 'mark' does not prevent the case from being a case of inference. Even such an inferential mark as smoke used for inferring that there is fire on the hill is a valid mark only when characterized by certain qualifications, e.g. if the smoke is rising upward with no breach of connection with the ground.[18]

Thus from all this it follows that according to the Vaiśeṣika philosophers the knowledge acquired through words is inferential. Words *qua* words enable us to infer the intention of the speaker while words *qua* the utterances of an authority enable us to infer things. In other words, according to the Vaiśeṣikas the mere understanding of a sentence cannot lead to the knowledge of things. For that, the knowledge of the authoritativeness of the speaker as also the knowledge of the universal rule that the sentences spoken by an authority, when understood, do invariably point to facts, are necessary. A mere statement of an authority, unless we possess the knowledge that it is an invariable mark of the corresponding state of affairs, does not generate the knowledge of that state of affairs just as smoke *qua* smoke, unless we know it to be an invariable mark of fire, does not generate the knowledge of fire. The Vaiśeṣika view that

17. vākyarūpas tu śabdo'rthapratipattau samayam api nāpekṣata iti sambandhabalena arthapratipādakatvam asiddham/ na ca śabdasyānumānatvam eva niṣidhyate/ vivakṣākāśādhigame liṅgatvāt/ yathā hy ākāśādhigame sarvaḥ śabdo'numānaṁ vivakṣākāryas tu vivakṣādhigame'pīti/ Vyomavatī, p. 578

18. Nyāyakandalī, pp. 214-217

there are only two sources of valid knowledge—perception and inference and that testimony is a case of inference is an original one but their explanation of how testimony can be reduced to inference seems to be borrowed from Buddhist logicians. The fact that the Vaiśeṣika explanation closely tallies with the Buddhist one and that only in those Vaiśeṣika works that are later than Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti we come across attempts to explain how testimony be reduced to inference corroborate our presumption.

Let us now see in what ways the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti reduces testimony to inference. For Dharmakīrti, words have no connection whatsoever with the the external things.[19] Were they connected with the things, there would have been the relation either of causality or of essential identity between them. But there obtains neither of the two relations between them. Words are not even conventionally connected with the things. They are conventionally connected with concepts. That is why it is said that words call forth concepts in the mind and concepts call forth the words. And it is only on this account that words *qua* words give rise to cognitions that bear no form of the external things at all.[20] For example, the words 'there are hundreds of elephants dancing on a finger-tip' have no corresponding actual fact outside. Of course, Dharmakīrti would not deny the fact that on hearing these words we are able to form or construct an image or concept in our mind, of hundreds of elephants dancing on a finger-tip. But this concept or image is not an external fact.

This naturally means that from words we can infer the concepts that are there in the mind of the speaker. In other words, though the words and verbal statements are not connected with things and facts, they are invariably connected—for the persons who have learnt relevant convention—with the corresponding concepts, rather with the intention of the speaker. The verbal statements are the effects of the intention of the speaker. So, they enable us to infer the intention of the speaker.[21] But do they enable us to infer a general intention of the speaker or a parti-

19. na vai śabdānāṁ kācid viṣayasvabhāvāyattā vṛttiḥ/ Svārthānumānapariccheda, p. 21
tatra vācyeṣu puruṣāyattavṛttīnāṁ śabdānām avastusandarśināṁ yathābhyāsaṁ vikalpaprabodhahetūnāṁ pravṛtticintā, tadvaśād vastuvyavasthāpanaṁ ca kevalaṁ jāḍyakhyāpanam/ Ibid, p. 23

20. tasmān na svalakṣaṇe samayaḥ/ Ibid, p. 29
vikalpavāsanodbhūtāḥ samāropitagocarāḥ//
jāyante buddhayas tatra kevalaṁ nārthagocarāḥ/ Ibid, p. 102
nāntarīyakatā'bhāvāc chabdānāṁ vastubhiḥ saha/
nārthasiddhis tatas te hi vaktrabhiprāyasūcakāḥ// Ibid, p. 71

21. tasmān na svābhāvikaḥ śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaḥ/ tadabhiprāyaprayogād utpanno'bhivyakto vā śabdo tadavyabhicārīti tattvam asya sambandhaḥ/ Ibid, p. 80
te hi vaktur vivakṣāvṛttaya iti tannāntarīyakās tām eva gamayeyuḥ/ Ibid, p. 71

cular intention? This point is not considered by Dharmakīrti but later on Sāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla have discussed it. It is said by them that the verbal statements enable us to infer both a general intention and the particular intention. The verbal statements *qua* verbal statements enable us to infer a general intention but the verbal statements *qua* utterances of a normal man enable us to infer the particular intention also. The verbal statements *qua* verbal statements, that is, verbal statements not ascertained to be coming from normal persons enable us to infer merely the speaker's desire to speak. They cannot enable us to infer the speaker's desire to give expression to a particular information. This is so because there are verbal statements that have no particular intention, i. e. desire to express a particular information, as their cause. As for example, a drunken man or a mad person speaks sentences without any particular intention. He has merely the desire to speak but not a particular desire i. e. desire to convey a particular information. Thus the verbal statements *qua* verbal statements enable us to infer only the speaker's desire to convey something but the verbal statements *qua* utterances of a normal man enable us to infer the speaker's desire to convey a particular thing.[22] And, as is said by Dharmakīrti, the desire of a speaker to convey a particular information is not always generated by the corresponding fact. So, the knowledge of a speaker's intention could not enable us to infer the corresponding fact.[23]

We should note that the inference that enables us to infer the speaker's intention only cannot be regarded as a source of valid knowledge or *pramāṇa* because it does not give us a knowledge of things and facts while a source of valid knowledge *(pramāṇa)* ought to give us a knowledge of things and facts. We may call the inference in question a source of valid knowledge *(pramāṇa)* only by way of courtesy, considering the intention itself to be a fact. Thus the fact that the verbal statements, when understood, enable us to infer the intention of the speaker could not persuade Dharmakīrti to regard this verbal knowledge as a case of inference which by definition is a source of such valid knowledge as relates to external things and facts.

Dharmakīrti knows all this. He seems to be conscious of the force of the objection. He, therefore, takes one step further and observes that the words or verbal statements do not indicate the speaker's intention only but they also enable us to infer the corresponding things and facts provided they are known to be spoken or written by an authority,

22. Tattvasaṅgraha, kā. 1515-1520

23. na ca puruṣecchāḥ sarvā yathārthabhāvinyaḥ/ na ca tadapratibaddhasvabhāvo bhāvo'nyaṁ gamayati/ Svārthānumānapariccheda, p. 71

it being a general rule that the words of an authority always correspond to facts.[24]

He further observes that it is ingrained in man to take for granted the authoritativeness of a person or a scripture whose words are in tune with his own desires or interests. Man accepts precepts and scriptures as authoritative on matters pertaining to heavenly pleasures and hellish tortures and the ways and means to attain and avoid them respectively because he craves for the one and shivers merely at the thought of the other and there is no other valid knowledge to contradict them. But if a man is determined to lead his life in accordance with the words of scriptures or preceptors (rather in accordance with the knowledge derived through those words) he should first examine and ascertain the so far taken-for-granted authoritativeness. For certainly it is on the speaker's authoritativeness that the validity of the knowledge derived through words depends.[25]

Thus, for Dharmakīrti, this is the process by which we arrive at the knowledge of facts or things through words and sentences. Verbal statements are invariably connected with the intention of the speaker to convey a particular information. So, they enable us to infer merely the intentions of the speaker. But as soon as they are known to come from the mouth or pen of an authority they no more merely indicate the speaker's intention but also enable us to infer the corresponding facts, because the intention of an authority to convey a particular information always has an actual fact corresponding to itself. Now the validity of this knowledge can be ascertained only after having examined and ascertained the authoritativeness of the speaker or writer. How the authoritativeness of a speaker or a scripture is to be ascertained is an important problem which we have already discussed.

Akalaṅka refutes the Buddhist view that words do not directly lead to the knowledge of things. He observes that words are connected with things. Of course, though words and things are not related by natural and physical relation just as *Śakaṭa* and *Kṛttikā* are not, yet they do have

24. āptavādāvisaṁvādasāmānyādanumānatā/ buddher agatyābhihitā parokṣe'py asya gocare// tasyāsyaivaṁbhūtasyāptavādasyāvisaṁvādasāmānyād adṛṣṭavyabhicārasya pratyakṣānūmānāgamye'py arthe pratipattes tadāśritatvād tadanyapratipattivad avisaṁvādo'numīyate/ tataḥ śabdaprabhavāpi satī na śābdavad abhiprāyaṁ nivedayaty eva ity arthāvisaṁvādād anumānam api/ Ibid, p. 72
athavā anyathā āptavacanasya avisaṁvādād anumānatvam ucyate/ Ibid, p. 72

25. nāyaṁ puruṣo'nāśritya āgamaprāmāṇyam āsituṁ samartho'tyakṣaphalānāṁ keṣāñcit pravṛttinivṛttyor mahānuśaṁsā'pāyaśravaṇāt tadbhāve virodhādarśanācca/ tatsati pravartitavye varam evaṁ pravṛtta iti parīkṣayā prāmāṇyam āha/.........tad yadi parīkṣāyāṁ na visaṁvādabhāk pravartamānaḥ śobhate/ Ibid, p. 72

some invisible invariable relation between them just as *Śakaṭa* and *Kṛttikā* have—as a result of which it becomes possible to infer the posterior rise of *Śakaṭa* from the prior rise of *Kṛttikā*.[26] Prabhācandra in his commentary on Laghīyastraya of Akalaṅka observes that though words have neither the relation of causality nor that of essential indentity with things, they do have with them the relation called *yogyatā-sambandha*. Dharmakīrti might ask as to how, in the absence of those two relations, even this relation will be possible. Prabhācandra observes that this relation is found to obtain between a visual sense organ and its object even in the absence of those two relations. Even the Buddhist logicians have recognised it. Were they to reject this, their position would come in conflict with experience and with their own doctrine of *aprāpyakāritā* (i. e. the doctrine that a sense-organ is not in bodily contact with its object).[27] It might be urged that if there obtains between a word and its object the relation called *yogyatā-sambandha*, this object can as well serve as the denoter and this word as the denoted. This objection, says Prabhācandra, is illfounded, because the capacities of things are definite.[28] Some one might say: If words are inherently capable of generating the knowledge of things they would generate it even in a man innocent of language. In reply it is said that this does not happen because words generate the knowledge of things in those alone who have learnt the relevant language or convention. Convention means the man-made rule that this word will denote this thing. Just as smoke could not enable a man who does not know that smoke is an invariable mark of fire, to infer fire, even so a word could not enable a man who has not learnt the relevant convention, to know the corresponding thing.[29] Some one

26. yathā kṛttikādeḥ śakaṭādijñānaṁ svabhāvapratibandham antareṇa tathaivādṛṣṭapratibandhārthābhidhānaṁ jñānam avisaṁvādakam/ Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 9

27. nanu śabdārthayoḥ tādātmyatadutpattilakṣaṇasambandhasyāpāstatvāt kathaṁ sambaddhatvam ity apy anupapannam; tadabhāve'py anayoḥ yogyatālakṣaṇasambandhasambhavāt/ tadabhāve so'pi katham ity apy avācyam; cakṣūrupayos tadabhāve'pi taddarśanāt/ na khalu cakṣuṣo ghaṭādirūpeṇa saha tādātmyaṁ tadutpattiḥ saṁyogo vā saugatair abhyupagamyate pratītivirodhānuṣaṅgāt, aprāpyakāritvakṣatiprasaṅgāc ca/ Nyāyakumudacandra, p. 538

28. nanu yogyatātaḥ śabdasyārthavācakatve arthasyāpi śabdavācakatvaṁ kinna syāt ? ity apy asāmpratam; pratiniyataśaktitvād bhāvānām/ Ibid, p. 538

29. nanu yogyatāvaśāt śabdo yady arthaṁ pratipādayati tadā bhūbhavanavardhitotthitasyāpi pratipādayed viśeṣābhāvād ity apy apeśalaṁ; saṅketasacivayogyatāvaśāt tasya tatpratipādakatvābhyupagamāt, bhūbhavanavardhitotthitaṁ prati cāsya tathāvidhatvābhāvān na tatpratipādakatvaprasaṅgaḥ/ saṅketo hi 'idam asya vācyam idaṁ vācakam' ity evaṁvidho vācyavācakayor viniyogaḥ sa yasyāsti tasyaiva śabdaḥ svārthaṁ pratipādayati nānyasya, anyathā dhumādisādhanam apy asya agnyādisādhyaṁ gamayed aviśeṣād, avinābhāvo hi sādhanasya sādhyagamakatve aṅgam, sa ca sarvadā sarvaṁ praty asyāsti/ yenaiva sādhyasādhanayor avinābhāvo gṛhītaḥ tam praty eva sādhanaṁ sādhyasya gamakam ity abhyupagame yenaiva śabdārthayoḥ saṅketo gṛhītaḥ taṁ party eva śabdo'rthasya vācaka ity abhyupagamyatām aviśeṣāt/ Ibid, p. 539

might here insert a suggestion that convention being dependent upon and governed by human will and human will being free, even the thing may become the denoter and the word the denoted. Prabhācandra observes that just as the invariable relation between smoke and fire is natural even so the relation between a word and a thing is natural. Convention merely makes us conscious of the relation the way the repeated observation makes us conscious of the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire.[30] After having granted that there obtains a natural relation between a word and the thing denoted by it, some one might here ask as to whether words generate the knowledge of certain particular things or of all things. If the first alternative is accepted, no thing other than those particular things would be cognised through words even if hundreds of conventions are formed. If the second alternative is accepted then through a single word all things would be cognised at a time and consequently all activity on our part with respect to a definite object would become impossible, because in this case all words would be capable of generating the knowledge of all things. Prabhācandra replies that this difficulty would not arise because though every word is capable of being related to any object yet it would actually denote only that object with which it is conventionally connected.[31] Thus the words being connected with things enable us to know things. It might be objected that if the words have with things the relation called *yogyatā-sambandha* just as the visual organ has this relation with its object then the words should generate the knowledge of external things without requiring convention just as the visual organ does so in the case of its object. In answer it is said that the word is a *jñāpaka-kāraṇa* (revealing cause) and hence it requires the assistance of convention while the visual organ is a *kāraka-kāraṇa* (generating cause) and hence it does not require convention to generate the knowledge of its object. The visual organ being a *kāraka-kāraṇa* of the knowledge of its object generates this knowledge even when the cogniser has not learnt that there obtains an invariable relation between the organ and the knowledge generated by it. But the words, smoke, etc. being *jñāpaka-kāraṇa* cause the knowledge of objects only in case one has learnt that there obtains an invariable relation between the mark and

30. ....ity apy asundaram; tatsaṅketasya sahajayogyatānibandhanatvād dhūmāgnivat/ yathaiva hi dhūmāgnyor naisargika eva avinābhāvaḥ sambandhaḥ, tadvyutpattaye tu bhūyodarśananimittam āśrīyate tathā śabdārthayoḥ svābhāvika eva pratipādyapratipādakaśaktyātmā sambandhaḥ, tadvyutpattaye tu saṅketaḥ samāśrīyate/ Ibid, pp. 538-539

31. nanu śabdasya svābhāvikī śaktiḥ kim ekārthapratyāyane, anekārthapratyāyane vā? yady ekārthapratyāyane tadā saṅketaśatair api tato'rthāntare pratītir na syād dhūmād anagnipratītivat/ atha anekārthapratyāyane, tadā yugapat tato'nekārthrapratītiprasaṅgāt pratiniyate'rthe pravṛttir na syāt;...anekārthapratyāyanayogyasyāpi śabdasya pratiniyatasaṅketavaśāt pratiniyatārthapratipādakatvam aviruddham/ Ibid, 539-540

the marked.[32] The entire trend of the argument makes it clear that even the Jaina philosophers, like the Nyāya philosophers, are of the opinion that as soon as we hear a word, the knowledge of the corresponding thing is generated in us—and if the speaker is an authority this is a case of valid knowledge or knowledge of things as they are.

Akalaṅka says that words enable us to know not only the intention of the speaker but the external things also. The mere fact that the knowledge acquired through words at times does not correspond to facts is not sufficient to establish that all knowledge acquired through words is of such nature that words could not enable us to know things at all. Akalaṅka observes that if this be the reason for the Buddhist logician's acceptance of the position that words do not enable us to know things and that they enable us to know only the intention of the speaker, they are labouring under a blunder because sometimes, as for example in the case of *gotraskhalana* (the mistake of pronouncing a different name from the intended one) etc., the words are not used by the speaker according to his intention to convey some particular information and hence the knowledge derived through words would not then have for its object the speaker's intention to convey some particular information. But Dharmakīrti deems it possible to know the speaker's intention through his words inspite of the fact that all words are not used in accordance with the intention of the speaker. Similarly, he should recognise the possibility of knowing things through words even though all words do not describe the things as they are.[33] Again, Dharmakīrti who thinks that words enable us to know the speaker's intention only, turns out to be a confused man when he observes that Sugata (the Buddha) is an authority as his words are true to facts while others are not so as their words are otherwise, as also when he determines as to what statements are necessary for proving a fact syllogistically and what statements are not necessary for that (for on his view all words and all statements should equally have nothing to do with facts). Thus

32. atha matam—cakṣurādivat śabdasya arthe yogyatālakṣaṇasambandhasambhave tadvad eva ataḥ saṅketānapekṣā arthapratītiḥ syāt; tad apy asaṅgatam; tasya jñāpakatayā tatsāpekṣasyaiva arthapratītyṅgatopapatteḥ/ yaj jñāpakaṁ tat jñāpye pratipannapratibandham eva pratītim utpādayati yathā dhūmādi, jñāpakaś ca śabda itī/ cakṣurādīnāṁ tu kārakatvāt yuktaṁ svārthasambandhagrahaṇānapekṣāṇāṁ tadutpādakatvam/ svayaṁ hi pratīyamānam apratītārthapratītihetur jñāpakam ucyate/ tadrūpatā ca śabdāder evāsti na cakṣurādeḥ, ataḥ sa eva pratipannapratibandhaṁ svārthaṁ gamayati/ śaktis tu svābhāvikī yathā rūpaprakāśane cakṣurādeḥ tathā arthaprakāśane śabdasya/ Ibid, pp. 540-541

33. kvacid vyabhicārāt sākalyenānāśvāse vaktrabhiprāye'pi vācaḥ katham anāśvāso na syāt tatrāpi vyabhicārasambhavāt? tathānicchātaḥ śrutikalpanāduṣṭādeḥ uccāraṇāt/ Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 9

the Jainas, like the Naiyāyikas, emphatically maintain that words directly lead to the konwledge of things.

But the question remains whether this knowledge of things derived through words is inferential. Akalaṅka has not touched this point. But we find the problem discussed in Prabhācandra's commentary on Akalaṅka's Laghīyastraya. There it becomes clear that Jaina logicians do not regard the knowledge in question as a case of inference. The reasons given out in this connection are as follows: (i) The object of inference and that of testimony are not identical. The object of testimony is an unqualified thing while that of inference is a thing qualified by an attribute desired to be proved in it.[35] (ii) Even their causes are not identical. Presence of the middle term in the minor, etc. (*pakṣadharmatvādi*) that are the necessary conditions of an inference are not available in the case of testimony.[36] (iii) The relation that obtains between the probans and the probandum is different from the one that obtains between a word and the object denoted by it because the former relation necessitates the physical presence of the probandum where and when its probans is physically present while the latter relation does not do so. The place where a word resides is not the place where the object denoted by it resides and the time when a word exists is not the time when the object denoted by it exists. Yet a word invariably points to the object denoted. And when the word of an authority is said to have an invariable relation to the corresponding thing or fact it is only in the sense that the thing is invariably present at the place and time at which the word means it to be.[37] (iv) Word is a symbol, while smoke, etc. are signs. Word works as a symbol of a particular thing provided men by common consent will it to be so while 'smoke,' etc. do not work as signs of water, etc. even if men by common consent how so often will them to be so. This is the difference between a symbol and a sign.[38] (v) Testimony is not a case of inference because words generate valid knowledge on the strength of the authoritative character of the

34. sugatetarayoḥ āptetaravyavasthāṁ kutaścit sādhanāsādhanāṅgavyavasthāṁ vā svayam upajīvan "vaktur abhipretaṁ tu vācaḥ sūcayanti aviśeṣena nārthatattvam api" iti katham aviklavaḥ/ Ibid, p. 10

35. arthamātraṁ hi śabdasya viṣayaḥ, anumānasya tu sādhyadharmaviśiṣṭo dharmī iti/ Nyāyakumudacandra, p. 532

36. pakṣadharmatvādirūpatrayarūpā hi anumāne sāmagrī, sā ca śabde na sambhavati/ Ibid, p, 532

37. Ibid, pp. 534-535

38. ito'py ananumānam asau puruṣair yatheṣṭaṁ niyujyamānasya arthapratītihetutvāt, yat punar anumānaṁ na tat tathā yathā kṛtakatvādi, tathā ca śabdaḥ, tasmān nānumānam iti/ na ca sādhanā'vyatireko'yaṁ dṛṣṭāntaḥ ity abhidhātavyaṁ; tathā tair niyujyamānasyāsya sādhyapratītyajanakatvāt/ na hi kṛtakatvaṁ nityatvasādhyecchayā dhūmatvādikaṁ vā jalādisādhyecchayā niyujyamānaṁ tatpratītihetuḥ/ Ibid, p. 535

speaker concerned while in an inference the mark generates valid knowledge on the strength of the concerned invariable concomitance.[39]

The grounds on which the Jaina logicians refute the view that considers testimony to be a case of inference are not strong enough. Nay, they themselves acknowledge that 'the residence of a logical reason (*hetu*) in the subject of inference (*pakṣa*),' etc. do not constitute the nature of a valid mark. For, according to them the essential nature of a valid mark is its invariable concomitance with the thing it signifies. And invariable concomitance is the basis of testimony too. A word always means the corresponding object, and a word of an authority always corresponds to an actual fact.

Though this invariable relation is based on convention, it could not prevent testimony from being a case of inference. What is necessary for an inference is just the invariable relation between the mark and the object it signifies and not some particular type of invariable relation. Otherwise, there would be as many independent sources of valid knowledge as are the types of invariable relations.

Only a word *qua* the utterance of an authority generates the knowledge of a fact. This means that a word serves as a mark of the corresponding fact only when characterized by certain qualifications. But that is no ground for maintaining that testimony is not a case of inference. As was shown earlier, the adding of qualifications to a mark could not prevent its employment from being a case of inference.

All the differences pointed out by Jaina logicians between inference and testimony are trivial and they do not constitute sufficient ground for maintaining that testimony is a source of valid knowledge independent of inference. What Akalaṅka has observed in the context of Analogy (*upamāna*) equally applies to testimony. He says: If only on the strength of such trivial differences among the various cases of knowledge we were to regard them as results of several independent sources of valid knowledge then there would be innumerable such sources.[40] This is a healthy attitude and he should have maintained it even in the case of testimony. Thus we can legitimately conclude that the Buddhist view as to the nature of an authority is sound. It might also be noted that it is under the in fluence of this Buddhist veiw that Prabhākara reduces testimony to inference. Of course, we have to bear

39. śabdo nānumānam āptoktatvenaiva avyabhicārijñānajanakatvāt, yat punar anumānaṁ na tat tathā tajjanakaṁ yathā kṛtakatvādi, tathā tajjanakaś ca śabda iti/ kṛtakatvādi-sādhanasya hi sādhye'vyabhicārijñānajanane avinābhāva eva nimittaṁ na āptoktatvam anāptoktatvaṁ vā śabdasay tu āptoktatvam eva/ Ibid, p. 536

40. yadi kiñcid viśeṣeṇa pramāṇāntaram iṣyate/
pramito'rthaḥ pramāṇānāṁ bahubhedaḥ prasajyate// Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p, 93

in mind that only the ordinary cases of verbal testimony are regarded by him as cases of inference. Thus according to him there is also a case of verbal testimony, viz. the testimony coming from the authorless Vedas—which cannot be reduced to inference. We quote a passage from Śālikanātha's Prakaraṇapañcikā because its line of argument is somewhat novel: So far as the humanly uttered words are concerned their status is not, according to us, different from that of inference. In so far as the composition of an ordinary sentence depends on some person it can always be doubted that such a sentence is not true to facts; and this means that such a sentence does not automatically enable us to know facts. It is our common experience that people often compose sentences which describe things as they are not; hence it is that the humanly uttered sentences do not enable us to know as to how things in themselves stand in relation to each other. The reasons why people compose untrue sentences may be illusion, selfish motive, carelessness, or incapacity. Thus even while things are capable of standing in such mutual relationship as is depicted by a human sentence we cannot be certain that they in fact stand so related; this is because human sentences are often found to depict things as related in a fashion that is not the case. Thus in so far as the validity of a human sentence can always be doubted the mere hearing of such a sentence can never yield true knowledge (or the knowlegde of facts or external things); what is necessary in this connection is an ascertainment on the hearer's part that the speaker concerned has had a perceptual (i. e. first-hand) knowledge concerning the things described by him. It is for inferring the perceptual knowledge earlier had (if at all) by the speaker that the sentence uttered by him acts as a *hetu*. In the case of a person who is known to speak only after having had a perceptual knowledge the spoken sentence is invariably accompanied (i. e. preceded) by a prior perceptual knowledge; that is why this sentence besomes a *hetu* for inferring this perceptual knowledge. And since a perceptual knowledge of things is a knowledge of things as they are a knowledge of this knowledge also becomes a knowledge of things as they are. Thus in this case a knowledge of things as they are is to be had through inference while the concerned spoken sentence acts as a mere translator of this knowledge; for originally this sentence is but a *hetu* for inferring the perceptual knowledge earlier had by the speaker. Thus human sentence is a *hetu* for inferring an original knowledge and is also a translator of this knowledge; but in no case is this sentence itself a source of original knowledge. The reason why a human sentence acts as a proban for inferring a perceptual knowledge is that this sentence is the effect of this knowledge; certainly, it is agreed on all hands that an effect is a valid *hatu* for inferring the cause. Thus a human sentence, in so far as it is a mere translator of some other knowledge,

cannot be classed under verbal testimony (lit. scripture). (The idea is that verbal testimony is to be an original source of knowledge and not a mere translator of some other knowledge.) A human sentence, since its validity can always be doubted, can never yield an ascertained piece of knowledge. It is in this sense that we say that a human sentence yields no knowledge. Otherwise, even without having a prior knowledge of the things depicted by a sentence spoken to him an intelligent hearer can always say to himself : 'Here is an authoritative person who is uttering words that denote things which possess the competence to combine with one another. Hence this person must have had first known these things as thus combined. For, this person never speaks without first knowing things and knowing them as they are; this person is free from defects.'[41]

The entire spirit—trend underlying this passage is substantially sound. Thus we see that the stand of the Buddhists in regard to the problem under consideration is reasonable—so much so that it could even win over the followers of certain opposite camps, viz. the Vaiśeṣikas and the Prābhākarites.

41. Prakaraṇapañcikā pp. 14-16

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